Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1980

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EAST EUROPEAN DISSENT

Walter D. Connor

Soviet Jews

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Problems of Communism

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1980 VOL XXIX

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IN THE JANUARY-FEBRUARY ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?

Walter D. Connor

With the possible exception of post-1976 Poland, there is little evidence as yet of workers and intellectuals' bridging the gap between their respective interests to form coalitions in opposition to the East European Communist regimes. Expanded working classes, faced with declining mobility opportunities, may develop increased "class consciousness," but they are more likely to be concerned with "bread and butter" issues than with the more abstract goals of the dissenting intelligentsia.

Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways

Zvi Gitelman

In the last decade, a variety of official Soviet policies—including a sharp increase in anti-Zionism—have interacted with latent popular feelings to generate a new surge of antisemitism in the USSR. The decision to allow some Jews to emigrate, far from easing matters, has increased tensions, as Moscow has evidently come to view Soviet Jews as a virtual fifth column to be denied advanced education and responsible jobs. Such developments have convinced even many highly acculturated persons of Jewish descent that their future does not lie in the Soviet Union.

Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement

William M. LeoGrande

Since its inception, the nonaligned movement has experienced not only a major expansion of its ranks but also a radicalization of its outlook. In its first decade, its politics were shaped by the cold war conflict between East and West; in its second decade, they have been defined largely by the members' grievances against the West alone. As the movement enters its third decade, however, its politics, especially in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, will probably be determined by an interaction with both of the world's power blocs that is more complex than that which characterized either of the two previous decades.

• • •

Essay-reviews

Soviet Energy: Supply vs. Demand

Edward A. Hewett

Soviet and East European energy needs have major ramifications both for world energy supplies and for political relations within the Soviet orbit. In the 1980's, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance should become a net importer of petroleum. The key question is whether the Soviet Union will continue to subsidize the oil imports of its Comecon allies or force them to make hard-currency purchases on their own.

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China's Energy Prospects
Kim Woodard

Prospects that China will become a major energy exporter over the next several decades are dim. While the People's Republic has considerable energy resources, its own enormous developmental needs can be expected to absorb the bulk of its increased output of commercial energy commodities; indeed, one might even predict, on the basis of comparative analysis with other major economies, that China will itself become a net importer of energy toward the end of this century.

Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe
Peter Grothe

Communist leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe have long considered broadcasting to their countries by Western radio stations one of the most potent threats to their rule. Western broadcasts force Communist authorities to address topics they might otherwise seek to avoid and to adjust domestic broadcasts to compete with the foreign stations. To the extent that Western broadcasts break regime monopolies on information, this perceived challenge is likely to grow in the 1980's as advancing technology makes not only Western radio but also Western television accessible to the masses in Communist states.

Sourcebooks on European Communist States
Vladimir Socor

Sourcebooks on Soviet and East European affairs tend to fall into three broad categories: surveys of current events, bibliographies of published work, and resource guides for those interested in primary research possibilities. Among a recent sampling of such sourcebooks, the resource guides appear most likely to promote progress in Soviet-East European area studies, whereas the surveys and bibliographies are more useful for reference and orientation.

The Cuban Enigma
Antoni M. Kapcia

The Cuban Revolution has now lasted for more than 20 years and appears to have become an established fact of international life. Over these years, Cuba has evolved an "alternative" revolutionary model to that of the USSR. This may be described as nationalist "mobilization politics," with adapted elements of socialist models and an agrarian, export-led distribution economy. Moreover, Cuba seems to be slowly, if tentatively, reducing some aspects of the dependence on the Soviet Union that marked the Revolution's early years.

Conflict Within the Iraqi Left
John K. Cooley

Since the overthrow of the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in 1958, various groups in Iraq, all claiming to speak with a leftist voice, have competed to lead Iraq toward what they perceive as its rightful place in the world. Of these, the most important have been the Baath and the Iraqi Communist Party. While a rapprochement between these two rivals took place in the wake of the establishment of the present Baathist regime in 1968 and of a subsequent warming of Soviet-Iraqi relations, the recent discord between Baghdad and Moscow has produced a renewal of the conflict.

Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?

By Walter D. Connor

Judged by the ultimate test of success applicable to states—survival—the East European Communist regimes have succeeded. All past the age of 30, they have now achieved a measure of security after an early period marked both by severely compromised legitimacy and identity as Soviet-sponsored and -controlled regimes (as all save Albania and Yugoslavia have been) and by the threat of "rollback" by a West then preponderant in the international power balance. Still dominated in many matters by the USSR, each regime nonetheless strikes, in characteristic ways, a balance between persistent elements of national identity and the effects of 30 years of Soviet-initiated change.

None, however, has escaped internal protest and criticism, dissent and opposition. The sources of this opposition have been diverse. Segments of the intelligentsia seem to be in a state of permanent dissent, finding as much to despise in the current regimes as their forebears did in the interwar regimes of elitist Poland and Hungary, "bourgeois" Czechoslovakia, and the unstable Balkan states. Workers, too, have registered discontent, but the potential impact of their larger numbers has been reduced by the episodic quality of their activity. For the most part, the new working classes have remained quiet—their outbursts leaving only memories of riots, marches, and crudely lettered banners, but no literature, no organizational heritage, however loose.

Regimes have prospered from this situation, wherein generally only the intelligentsia seemed to require constant collective political surveillance. But things would grow less favorable were the future to produce a more politicized working class, and if linkages of an enduring sort were to be established between workers and the more articulate intellectuals. This article shall examine—in the light of past events and current politics in Eastern Europe—the possibilities of the development of such linkages.

Workers and the Workers' State

Though East European Communist parties assumed power in the 1940's in the name of the "workers," the dependence of these parties—as organizational entities—on this social base was minimal. Highly disciplined, centralized organizations, the Communist parties found their raison d'être in the acquisition and retention of absolute power, not in the direct representation of worker aspirations. What Richard Lowenthal has said of the Soviet party is equally true of its later imitators:

> *. . . the Russian Bolsheviks' pretense of being a working-class party had never been true either, even when industrial workers constituted the majority of their membership–because their form of organization made them independent of the actual support of the bulk of the working class and enabled them to change their "social basis" as occasion required . . . .*[1]

Liberated as they were from any mass social base,

Mr. Connor is director of Soviet and East European studies at the US Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. He is the author of Deviance in Soviet Society, *1972, and* Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR, *1979, as well as coauthor of* Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems, *1977.*

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[1] Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 109.

Workers on the production line at a modern pharmaceutical plant on the outskirts of Warsaw.

—P.A. Interpress Photos.

the East European regimes, backed by Soviet power, were able to a large degree to insulate themselves from popular demands, to suppress their very expression. The reality was party domination of all classes, including the workers, and preemption by the party of all organizational "space" between workers and the polity through dominance of the trade-union organizations, "production conferences," and other organs at the factory and higher levels. Add to this formidable array of party control instrumentalities the police apparatus, especially at its high-Stalinist peak, and the quietude of the workers is not difficult to explain.

Yet, all these were not the only factors contributing to the relative absence of worker militancy and dissent during the "gray years" of Stalinism. As I have argued elsewhere,[2] the impact of rapid economic modernization and industrialization on the working class also contributed greatly to its political "neutralization." True, the "takeoff" into "planned" industrialization in the late 1940's, with its high reinvestment rates, depressed the living standards and real incomes of most social groups—including many elements of the working class—to a point lower than that of the last years before World War II and lower than the level achieved in the first few years of reconstruction after World War II, but the result was not that destabilizing with respect to the working class. This was because the "working class" itself was undergoing rapid change. It grew in size as a consequence of the recruitment of peasants (which in turn eased the traditional problems of rural overpopulation and underemployment.) "Hereditary" proletarians became a minority in workers' ranks. Moreover, the demand for present and future managers and professionals of presumably "healthy" social origin generated a flow out of the ranks of the working class, especially by working-class children, into the new socialist intelligentsia, the new political and economic bureaucracies. Despite the regimes' continued rhetoric extolling proletarian virtue, the participants in this movement out of the working class experienced it as upward mobility.

The working class, thus, was open at both ends. At the top, the ambitious, intelligent, and even opportunistic—from whom working-class leaders have always tended to come—were co-opted into the new privileged groups. At the bottom, peasants and their offspring, unused to city life and industrial discipline but eager to escape the harsh rural life, entered in increased numbers. It made little difference that the new socialist intelligentsia of, say, 1952 did not live as well as its interwar predecessor, or that skilled workers in the Warsaw or Budapest of the same year worked longer for less than their counterparts in 1938. The frame of reference of the members of the new intelligentsia was that of the working class from which they had risen; that of the new workers, the peasant world they had left. For both, their new status yielded satisfactions, psychological and material, which gave them a "stake" in the system, a reason to feel that what had befallen them could not have come under the old regime.

This state of affairs profoundly affected the psychology of the working class and the probabilities of its developing "class consciousness" in the classic sense. For the peasant, mobility into the working class—into the urban environment, to a job with bounded hours, steady work, and regular pay—represented an *individual* solution. For working-class offspring not content to settle for their father's status, the expansion of educational opportunities and the demand for professional cadres held out the prospect, once again, of *individual* advancement. These high mobility prospects militated against a readiness to seek *collective* solutions to problems—a readiness more likely to arise when individuals are convinced that their membership in a particular class is a "life sentence."

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[2] What follows summarizes points made in the author's "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1977. See also Walter D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

However, the prospects of mobility have been diminished in recent years. The intelligentsia is not expanding at the rate it did during the "heroic" years, and the rate of growth of the working class has slowed with a decline in fertility and the drying-up of the peasant labor pool. Although the offspring of today's intelligentsia possess inherited advantages in their quest to reproduce their parents' status, working-class youths face diminished prospects for advancement, for their numbers and educational aspirations have grown faster than university vacancies. Working-class youths of today also must view their social status differently than their fathers did theirs, i.e., from the more critical perspective of the working class itself rather than as ex-peasants. The chances are increasing that these youths will be forced to remain, against their will, in their class of origin.

Thus, there have appeared to be better prospects for the emergence of a proletarian "class consciousness." Some saw such a development foreshadowed in the Polish events of 1970 and 1976, the Romanian strikes of 1977, and other protests. But the question of whether the "new" activism means anything more fundamental than the spontaneous and ad hoc disorders of 1953–56 is a complex one, and even Marxist dissidents have expressed doubts. For example, the Hungarian András Hegedüs has voiced concern that in the Polish protests of 1970 and 1976, "it was not the demands of the workers as producers . . . but as consumers which came to the front,"[3] and he has argued that the experience of the past has turned work-

A photo of noncollectivized Romanian peasants in the village of Dobresti outside Bucharest in 1953. Industrialization has since brought many such individuals into urban, industrial jobs.

—Wide World.

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[3] András Hegedüs, "The Main Characteristic of the Social Structure of East European Societies, and the Alternatives of Democratic Development of their Power Structure," paper presented to the 1978 Annual Meeting of the National Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Cambridge University, Cambridge, mimeo., p. 8.

ers toward the maximization of wages and the minimization of work to the exclusion of other concerns.[4] Ernest Mandel has called Marxist dissidents to the task of helping the working mass become "politically active and conscious," but has noted that the "higher level of job security and much lower work rhythm" which workers enjoy in socialist economies vs. their counterparts in capitalist economies will make this difficult.[5] It is, indeed, difficult to deny that workers' demands have been "economistic."[6]

Whether these demands and those who express them should therefore be written off as of little potential significance for political change is another question. True, in the past, there has been little inclination on the part of workers to merge their particular demands with broader demands voiced by intellectual dissidents for liberalization of economic and political life in Eastern Europe. But is this still the case? To answer that question, one must first examine the record in an attempt to understand better how and why the activities of these two groups have diverged.

Different Worlds, Different Concerns

The dynamics of Communist politics over the last three decades have unquestionably shown that a wide gap still separates intelligentsia from workers. At most critical junctures, cooperation between them has been the exception rather than the rule.

Poland provides much to ponder in this regard. In 1956, each group contributed to the upheaval of the Polish October, but in different and uncoordinated ways. A rebel intelligentsia and studentry made its impact felt in the pages of *Po prostu* and other journals, as well as through a "revisionist" element in the upper councils of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) itself, paving the way for the return of Wladyslaw Gomulka. Although little contact existed between this intelligentsia and Poland's workers, expressions of dissent by the latter—the riots in Poznan and elsewhere and the rapid growth of workers' councils in the factories—were perhaps even more critical than actions of the intelligentsia in convincing the regime hierarchs that substantial accommodations would be required to restore social peace. In these actions, workers were returning to the tactics used less successfully almost a decade earlier to defend themselves against fundamental changes heralded by the absorption of the Polish Socialist Party into the PUWP.[7] In the context of early 1957, contemplating the tragedy that had befallen their counterparts in Budapest, both the intelligentsia and the workers of Poland could convince themselves that they had "won." Nevertheless, each Polish group had acted separately to achieve its results.

CRZZ —
Z ROBOTNIKA
MI NIE Z PARTIA
INNYCH
ZLEWU
NIE STRZELAĆ
MO
DO ROBOTNIKÓW

The Szczecin building in which Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek met with striking workers in January 1971. The signs read: "The Central Trade Union Council [CRZZ]*—with the Workers and Not with the Party"; "Punish Those Guilty of the Bloodshed"; and "Citizens' Militia: Do Not Shoot at Workers."*

—A private photo by a Polish citizen now in the West.

In the Polish crises of 1968 and 1970, there were not even simultaneous actions by both groups. In the first crisis, the intellectuals and students found themselves quite alone. The workers showed no disposition either to identify with the quest of the intelligentsia for greater freedoms of its own or to be greatly concerned about the "anti-Zionist" binge of 1967–68, in which Gomulka struggled to retain his grip on power against the challenge of Mieczyslaw Moczar and at the same time "cool" the intellectuals. In December 1970, the situation was reversed. Precipitous price rises brought the workers into the streets and firebombs into party headquarters, but a dispirited intelligentsia expressed little active sympathy with "bread and butter" concerns of the workers. Thus, the spheres of workers and intellectuals, in dissent as in everyday life, continued to be separate in Poland.

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[4] *Socialism and Bureaucracy*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1976, pp. 116–17.

[5] Ernest Mandel, "The Social Forces Behind Détente," in Ken Coates, Ed., *Détente and Socialist Democracy*, New York, NY, Monad Press, 1976, pp. 45–46.

[6] For some comments on the nature of workers' demands, see David Lane, *The Socialist Industrial State*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1976, pp. 97–101.

[7] See Jaime Reynolds, "Communists, Socialists and Workers: Poland, 1944–1948," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1978, pp. 516–39.

What did the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia tell us about worker-intellectual relations there? A decade later, there still remain questions about the degree of collaboration across class boundaries in the Czechoslovak reform movement of that time. To be sure, in March 1968, the philosopher Ivan Svitak told a group of mine workers in Ostrava that "the best guarantee that our process of regeneration will be socialist and democratic in nature lies in the alliance of workers and intellectuals, that is to say in you, the working class."[8] But such an alliance did not arise swiftly. Some support for a central reform demand of the intelligentsia—a free press—came in the form of "workers' committees for the defense of press freedom," which emerged first in the Ostrava region and then elsewhere. Still, neither the mandate nor the procedures and activities of such committees were ever clear. As one analyst put it, they could be regarded only as "a worthy initiative which, although promising spontaneous working class action and an alliance between workers and the intelligentsia, did not in fact go very far."[9]

Moreover, the attempts of the reformers to "sell" the nation on the dual package of political and economic reform encountered a mix of worker apathy and resistance. This response reflected the success of a government policy that, since 1948, had attempted to drive a wedge between the workers (who were exalted in almost cult proportions in official rhetoric) and the intelligentsia (oft-derided). This divisive view had "infected the party as a whole and all levels of society."[10] Under Antonin Novotny, the regime continued to play on worker "prejudices and disdain for intellectuals."[11] As the events of 1968 unfolded, Novotny partisans denounced the reformers as "radicals" who sought "to rob the working classes of what they had achieved in 20 years' hard work." Indeed, the reformers' call for discipline and productivity—in addition to appeals for greater civil freedom—did seem to threaten the extreme egalitarianism of reward and the degree of security workers had achieved in jobs they performed with minimal effort. Furthermore, the same persons who had crippled implementation of the New Economic System shamelessly blamed its architects for the sorry state of the Czechoslovak economy in 1968.[12]

Whatever the distortions in such demagoguery, both the political emphasis of the reform and the social background of its vocal proponents made it seem alien to some, perhaps a majority, of the workers. Gordon Skilling describes the situation:

> *The workers were often unhappy with the prominent part taken by journalists, scholars, and writers after January and feared a "hegemony" of the intellectuals. . . . The economic reform itself was viewed with considerable reserve, and even opposition, raising as it did the specter of unemployment and by its emphasis on productivity and qualification, threatening the "equalization" of income under previous wage policy. The so-called workers' policy in the past had given them, they felt, "social security," assuring them both employment and a minimum and stable standard of living, and affording certain sectors of the working class a privileged position. Such attitudes were fostered by trade union and party functionaries, often of working-class origin, who saw their own positions endangered by reforms and speaking in the name of "their" class, inculcated the workers with their fears for the fate of socialism.*[13]

As a consequence, no firm "coalition" of workers and intellectuals emerged in Czechoslovakia until August 1968, when the Soviet-led invasion persuaded the two groups to look beyond "class" or occupational interests. The effect was similar to the temporary unification of views wrought by invasion or the threat of it in 1956 Hungary and Poland. However, it was not long before workers and intellectuals returned to uncoordi

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[8] Ivan Svitak, *The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968–1969*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 52.

[9] Vladimir V. Kusin, *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 36. For more on the committees on press freedom, see ibid., pp. 34–37; and Svitak, op. cit., pp. 74–75, 96–97.

[10] H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 132.

[11] Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962–1968*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 29.

[12] See Alex Pravda, "Some Aspects of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform and the Working Class in 1968," *Soviet Studies*, July 1973, pp. 104ff.

[13] Skilling, op. cit., p. 580.

The Soviet invasion of Prague in August 1968 unified the mass of the Czechoslovak capital's population in opposition.

—Helman Pabel.

nated pursuit of their respective and disparate goals.

Let us look more closely at these differing sets of aspirations. Many members of the intelligentsia, despite the group's generally successful accommodation to the socialist system and benefit from it, incline toward liberal reform for reasons both of self-interest and of principle. Decentralizing, market-oriented reforms of the economy promise rewards for scarce skills and knowledge. The intellectual is likely to see his specialized competence as "scarce" and to anticipate greater rewards in any move away from the "compression" of pay differentials common in command systems. "Marketization" also promises broadening of the range of goods, services, and housing available to the many intellectuals and professionals who are already well paid. Greater freedom to travel abroad offers the prospect of new earning opportunities, as well as professional growth.

More fundamentally, liberal intellectuals are attracted by the prospect of a more generalized "freedom," which would permit them to go where facts, theory, and the thought process lead. While virtually no large organization anywhere completely guarantees the specialist such autonomy, the politicization of broad spectra of life and the pervasiveness of the party apparatus in research institutes and universities (as well as in the factories and farms) in Eastern Europe tend to reduce such autonomy to a minimum. Intellectuals look to reform to bring a freer, looser, "decompressed" political environment, which they see as benefiting not only themselves but other classes as well.

But other classes—the working class the largest among them—have their own priorities. As Alexander Matejko puts it, for the intelligentsia "political freedom was and is a primary need, whereas for the blue-collar workers it is only a secondary need."[14] Indeed, given the social and economic history of the East European working classes, preoccupation with more mundane concerns—an adequate material existence and security of employment to undergird it—is no surprise.

And, whatever the ultimate consequences for productivity and efficiency, socialist economies have provided "full" and secure employment—often through an overstocking of labor, which creates a full-paid "underemployment" wherein individual workers do not work hard and many husband their energies for other, more remunerative "private" work.[15] However modest the general living standards may be, wage and welfare policies have provided a "floor" below which one cannot fall, whether one is diligent or not. These policies have also in some measure kept down top earnings, in response to and reinforcing egalitarian sentiments among workers.

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[14] Alexander Matejko, *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1974, p. 114.

Prescriptions for economic reform, particularly the emphasis on increased efficiency and a tighter tying of reward to performance and to scarcity of skills, seem to menace many worker interests. Unskilled workers fear the stated preference for skilled workers; lazy workers, the endorsement of the industrious and energetic; those in unprofitable factories, the possibility of closings and layoffs; and all workers, a new and more demanding tempo of work.

The need for financial and psychological "belt-tightening" among some portion of the working class in the short run lessens the receptivity of workers to the long-run reform promise of a more productive economy and an overall improvement in living standards. Promises for a greater role of workers in management—a change itself generally envisaged for later stages of the reforms—run up against worker coolness to contemporary forms of "participation" and perhaps some preference for revitalization of the trade unions as defenders of workers' interests *against* management.[16] As Matejko observed in the Polish context, "intellectuals, who may advocate reform, cannot count on the immediate support of the blue-collar workers."[17]

Through the early 1970's in Eastern Europe, then, the concerns of the dissident intelligentsia sparked uncertain response at best among the workers. The working class, when it showed signs of dissent and revolt, generally acted independently of the intelligentsia, manifesting different timetables and priorities. Such outbursts were episodic and lacking in organization. There was little evidence of any alliance between intellectuals and workers.

Prospects for a Coalition

Events in Poland, beginning in June 1976, have raised at least the possibility of a significant change in the general pattern just described. However, the Polish case must be judged against the backdrop of developments in other East European states to determine whether it is unique or symptomatic of a major new trend in the area.

As the summer of 1976 came to Poland, things seemed to be proceeding according to form. For example, there had been little worker participation in the protests that had been voiced by Polish intellectuals in late 1975 and early 1976 over proposed changes in the Polish constitution that would further strengthen regime controls and "cement" relations between Poland and the USSR.[18]

But an unprecedented sequence of events began with the riots by workers in Ursus, Radom, and other locales after the June 25 official announcement of sharp price increases. As in 1970, the workers acted on their own, responding to "bread and butter" issues of particular concern to them (in the process bringing both a rollback of the price rises and police repression). This time, however, the intellectuals came to the support of the workers in a most untypical fashion. On June 29, an open letter to the Polish parliament (the *Sejm*) from 14 intellectuals denounced government reprisals against the workers who had rioted, and observed that "on the agendum is the establishment of a real representation of the workers."[19] This was followed on July 11 by Jacek Kuron's open letter to Italian Communist Party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, calling for Eurocommunist support for the Polish workers' cause,[20] and then throughout the summer by further protests on the workers' behalf. Finally, in September, there emerged a Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). This group, which included a broad spectrum of mainly Marxist intellectuals, from Jerzy Andrzejewski to Jacek Kuron, promised economic, legal, and medical assistance to strikers' families; called for an amnesty; and demanded investigations of "police brutality" during and after the riots.

The creation of this "bridge" across the gap between worker and intellectual reflected, perhaps, a reassessment of the paths to, and potential for, political change in Poland. Indeed, the young Polish historian Adam Michnik, a "veteran" of the struggles against intellectual repression in 1968 and subsequently a member of KOR's directing committee, had earlier urged intellectuals to appreciate

> *the power of the workers who, by their firm and resolute attitude, have already wrested some spectacular*

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[15] See the study of the Ikarus factory work force summarized in Radio Free Europe, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *HSR*), No. 2, May 17, 1978, pp. 7–10.

[16] On this in the 1968 Czechoslovak context, see Pravda, op. cit., pp. 121ff.

[17] Op. cit., p. 219.

[18] For documents protesting the proposed constitutional changes, see Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, Compiler, *Dissent in Poland 1976–1977*, London, 1977, pp. 11–24.

[19] Ibid., p. 71.

[20] Ibid., pp. 72–75.



Workers from the tractor plant in Ursus block the Berlin-Warsaw train during disorders in the summer of 1976 protesting drastic food price increases announced by the Polish government.

—Stern Archiv from Black Star.

> *concessions from the government. . . . without any doubt it is of them that the government is really afraid; it is the pressure of this social class which is the sine qua non of the evolution of national life towards democratization.*[21]

The pro-worker activism of KOR, fostered by implicit support from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, by occasional spontaneous open letters of protest from workers,[22] and by the gingerly quality of the harassment by a regime concerned above all with "muddling through" a time of trial, proceeded along the lines KOR had laid out for itself. To be sure, KOR remained an organization of intellectuals who had decided to defend workers' interests—not a joint organization of workers and intellectuals as such. The degree of unity between the two groups with respect to demands and views must be regarded as questionable—despite Michnik's statement that "within one year, we have succeeded in creating an extraordinary unity among intellectuals, students, and workers."[23] Still, the dissenting intellectuals had learned the importance of joint action from the events of 1968 and 1970.

The government, aware of the significance of such action, attempted at various junctures to discredit the intellectuals of KOR before the workers. For example, a speaker at a Socialist Youth Union conference in February 1977 stated that "in 1968 these people [the intellectuals] expressed their contempt of the working class. They don now the garb of defenders of workers."[24]

The year 1977 saw some significant, if partial, successes for KOR and its causes. By late July, less than 13 months after the Radom-Ursus riots, all the jailed strikers had been released. KOR also was eventually able to achieve some measure of cooperation with a new organization, the Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO)[25]—a group with a non-Marxist and more traditionalist orientation. At the end of September, KOR reconstituted itself as the "Committee for Social Self-Defense-KOR" (KSS-KOR).[26] Its earlier, more limited objectives partially achieved, the group took on some new, more general goals, committing itself to "supporting and defending all social initiatives aimed at implementing human and civil rights." While these more "global" objectives (like the renaming of the committee) might to some degree have blurred the earlier commitment to specifically workers' causes, KSS-KOR announced a new *samizdat* journal, *Robotnik* (The Worker), designed to support a unified defense of workers' interests, promote independent representatives of the workers in place of the "moribund" official trade unions, and work for greater worker control over matters such as factory conditions and housing.

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[21] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey* (London), Summer-Autumn 1976, p. 274.

[22] See *Dissent in Poland*, pp. 112ff., for the texts of workers' letters from Radom and Ursus.

[23] Quoted in *La Repubblica* (Rome), Nov. 16, 1976, and cited in Radio Free Europe, *Polish Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *PSR*), No. 40, Nov. 29, 1976, p. 11.

[24] See *PSR*, No. 5, Feb. 18, 1977, p. 10.

[25] *Dissent in Poland*, pp. 180–86; and *PSR*, No. 16, June 15, 1977, pp. 1–2.

The Polish situation just described was unique in Eastern Europe at the time—not at all with respect to the existence of dissent, but to the degree that it provided signs of a bridging in some measure of the old gap between workers and intellectuals. With regard to the latter phenomenon, the situation elsewhere in the area was quite different. This is clear from a brief review of the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary.

After roughly eight years of "normalization" under Gustav Husak, dissent resurfaced in Czechoslovakia in January 1977 in the form of the "Charter 77" manifesto. The "chartists" formed no committee as such and coalesced around no set of crises such as the June 1976 events had provided for their Polish counterparts. The political and economic scene in Czechoslovakia was very different from that in Poland. In Prague, there was an unpopular government, but one that felt itself rather more firmly "in the saddle" than did that of Poland's Edward Gierek. This sense of security was due to Soviet support, political resignation on the part of the populace, and a different set of economic facts. "Consumerism" had flourished in Czechoslovakia, sweetening the bitter pill of "normalization." Thus, there was unfertile ground for the seeds of protest, and by all indications, mass response to the chartists has hardly been overwhelming. To be sure, the number of signatories grew rapidly from the initial 250 or so (by mid-1978, to more than 1,000 signatories), and at each phase those identifying themselves as workers grew as well. But the total of the latter never reached the point where it was more than a modest minority of all signers. Moreover, some portion of the "worker" signatories were former students or former members of the intelligentsia—precipitated by political reprisal into the working class—rather than "authentic" proletarians.[27]

Prominent figures in the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR): left, Jacek Kuron; right, Adam Michnik.

—NOWA.

Basically, the chartists have lacked an issue broad enough, and conditions appropriate, to galvanize other groups. Their problem is not so much one of integrating intelligentsia and worker interests as of finding *any* significant mass base willing to offer support. Conscious of this isolation of dissidents, and probably prepared to face the subsequent protest from the West, including the "Eurocommunist" parties, the Husak regime in late 1979 went ahead with the trial of six activists connected with Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) and, on October 22–23, sentenced five to a total of nineteen and a half years' imprisonment (the sixth to a suspended term).[28] Those convicted ranged from the writer Vaclav Havel (four and a half years) to Dana Nemcova, a mother of seven (two years, with a five-year suspended sentence)—an outcome probably inconceivable in Poland, where volatile public moods are an element with which Gierek's regime must reckon. Dissent in Czechoslovakia thus remains a virtual monopoly of the highly committed, and the meetings that since 1978 have occasionally taken

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[26] On this and what follows, see *PSR*, No. 25, Oct. 13, 1977, pp. 5–9.

[27] See H. Hajek and L. Niznansky, "Czechoslovak Dissent: Sources and Aims," Radio Free Europe, *RAD Background Report* (Munich—hereafter *RAD*), No. 143, June 29, 1978, p. 7.

[28] See Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Situation Report* (Munich), No. 33, Oct. 24, 1979, pp. 1–6.

Jiri Hajek, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a signer of the Charter 1977 appeal, shown under house arrest in Prague in 1977.

—Vincent Mentzel.

place between Czechoslovak dissidents and some of their Polish KOR counterparts[29] may indicate that the former have more in common with the latter than with any significant segment of their own countrymen.

In Romania, 1977 saw manifestations of dissent by both intellectuals and workers, in characteristically differing and isolated forms. Early in the year, the writer Paul Goma's letter of support to Pavel Kohout and the Czechoslovak chartists emerged, followed by the "Letter of the 8"—a protest from Goma, his wife, and six others calling on Romania to honor the human rights prescribed in "basket three" of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[30] The regime combined harsh denunciation of the dissidents with permission for a significant number to emigrate, even as the number of signatories to the "Letter of the 8" grew. Significantly, the document said little specific about *workers'* interests and rights, and it is unclear if many of the signatories (whose number reached approximately 200 by mid-November 1977[31]) were workers—and if so, whether their protest was motivated by "class" or by ethnic interests (the original signatories included a number of ethnic Hungarians and Germans, whose complaints against the regime could have to do mainly with Ceausescu's policies of cultural homogenization).[32]

Goma was arrested in April 1977, released the following month, and then "exiled" to Paris later in the year. This combination of intimidation and enforced emigration has been used by the Bucharest regime to contain what, so far, seems to be a relatively small problem, involving mainly intellectuals. The chances that such policies would generate mass reaction must have appeared slim in a Romania where (in contrast to Poland) virtually no historical precedent existed for the recognition of the intelligentsia as the "conscience" of a nation in adversity.

Far different in implications were the disorders in Romania's Jiu Valley in July and August 1977, which saw thousands of miners strike on issues involving a new pension law, poor food, forced overtime, and poor equipment.[33] These were "workers' issues," and the regime's response was rapid. State and party chief Nicolae Ceausescu visited the area on August 3, promising reforms and announcing a 5 percent pay raise, and, for the moment, he at least partially defused the situation.

The workers had acted on their own, and in the wake of their action, Bucharest intellectuals generally remained silent. Reports are still vague, but it seems clear that, in the aftermath, many miners were fired, "delegates" of the spontaneous strikers were arrested, and activists were deported back to their native villages.[34] Yet neither workers nor intelligentsia organized effectively to press for amnesty of the sort achieved in Poland in 1977.[35] While Goma did observe later that "workers are the main victims" of internal repression in Romania,[36] Romanian intellectuals have yet to develop a "critical mass" of open dissidents who might, in the Polish fashion, seek contact

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[29] See ibid., No. 28, Aug. 23, 1978, pp. 1-2.

[30] See Radio Free Europe, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter *RSR*), No. 6, Feb. 18, 1977, pp. 12-15.

[31] Ibid., No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, pp. 7-10.

[32] On the Jiu Valley events, see ibid., Nos. 26, 31, and 32, Aug. 12, Oct. 12, and Oct. 26, 1977.

[33] There are reports that some Jiu Valley miners expressed knowledge and support of Goma's letter. See *Libération* (Paris), Nov. 25, 1977, as cited in *RSR*, No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, p. 8.

[34] See *RSR*, Nos. 32 and 34, Oct. 26 and Nov. 22, 1977.

[35] I find overstated the conclusion of Radio Free Europe analyst Patrick Moore, that the strikers had been able to "organize and advance demands in the manner of workers in developed countries—and not like villagers recently transferred to industrial sites." See "Dissent in Romania: An Overview," *RAD*, No. 112, June 5, 1978, p. 2.

[36] *RSR*, No. 35, Dec. 6, 1977, p. 8, citing United Press International and Agence France Presse dispatches of Nov. 24, 1977.

with a working class at least segments of which have shown a readiness to fight.

The resolution of the 1977 crisis in the Jiu Valley followed a fairly traditional pattern for "personalistic" rule in a Communist state (which is more pronounced in Romania than in any other East European country): the appearance of the leader "on the scene" to cool tempers and to signal that cries had been heard at the top, and then moves to "crack down on the leaders [of disturbances] and introduce quick palliatives for the area's population as a whole."[37] So far, such a strategy seems to have minimized sustained dissent and to have prevented a bridging of the gap between the intelligentsia and the workers in Romania.

Hungary's situation is different yet. Janos Kádár's delicate political management and the fruits of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) have generated a legitimacy for his regime which could scarcely have been predicted from the perspective of 1956. Hungary today combines a rather liberal internal regime and a population generally satisfied and thus "resigned" to realities as they are. What this has meant is that, for some time, links of the dissident intellectuals to the working class have been "next to nonexistent" (though their moral links to dissidents elsewhere were manifested in the protest of more than 250 Hungarian intellectuals against the trials of Czech dissidents).[38]



Romanian dissident writer Paul Goma at a November 24, 1977, press conference in Paris after being exiled "for a year" by the Romanian government.

—Sipa Press from Black Star.

Having no "issue" to take to the working class, Hungarian dissidents have, for the most part, dealt with questions (the quality of life in socialist society, the measure of egalitarianism appropriate to socialism, "consumerism" and its implications) which reflect both a rather low degree of crude political repression in Hungary and the "New Left" orientation of some of the dissenters. The writings of the Budapest dissidents have been complex, dense, and aimed at other intellectuals. Manifestos and broadsides have not been their métier.[39] Rather, their aim seems to be the diffusion of ideological alternatives, the starting among potential allies in the intelligentsia of a process of thought which goes beyond acceptance of the current, rather comfortable situation. Two volumes of *samizdat* essays which appeared in 1977, *Marx in the Fourth Decade* and *Profiles*, indicated some movement away from Marxism among some of the dissidents. (A subsequent Polish compilation of selections from these two volumes prepared at the request of Adam Michnik represented another instance of cross-national cooperation among Eastern Europe's dissenting intelligentsia.)[40]

Thus, dissent emanating from the intellectuals has not spread far outward into Hungarian society. The relative self-confidence of the Kádár regime has allowed it to deal with the dissidents in a relatively "civilized" manner. Expulsions from the party have been followed by enforced emigration, either permanent or of indefinite duration. Iván Szelényi and György Konrád were dealt with in such a fashion in 1974. Similarly, in early 1978, György and Mária Márkus, Ferenc Fehér, and Ágnes Heller were sent off to the West with little rhetorical flourish or denunciation—indeed, with official statements verging on regret.[41]

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[37] Patrick Moore, "Romania: A Crisis of Leadership," *RAD*, No. 212, Sept. 27, 1978, p. 2.

[38] See Peter Moravets, "Criticism and Dissent in Hungary," *RAD*, No. 185, Aug. 23, 1978. On the protest to the October Czech trials, see *HSR*, No. 21, Nov. 19, 1979, pp. 13–15.

[39] An exception was a letter of support from 34 intellectuals to the "Charter 77" group in Czechoslovakia, an event largely ignored by Hungarian authorities. See *HSR*, No. 3, Jan. 25, 1977, pp. 2–4.

[40] On this, see Moravets, loc. cit.

[41] See *HSR*, No. 4, Feb. 14, 1978, pp. 2–4.

For all the differences in national situations in Eastern Europe, there does appear to be emerging one common theme in the dissident intellectuals' views of workers: explicit support for freely elected trade unions and for the workers' right to strike. In a very real sense, the intellectuals have accorded legitimacy to the workers' "economistic" demands. Thus, the "Letter of the 59" to the Polish *Sejm* on December 5, 1975, spoke of the "freedom of work":

> *There is no such freedom while the State is the sole employer, and while Trade Unions are forced to conform to the administration of the Party, which actually wields the power in the State. In conditions such as these—as the events of 1956 and 1970 testify—any attempts to protect the workers' interests are threatened by bloodshed and can lead to serious outbreaks of violence. For this reason employees must be assured their freedom to choose their own trade representation, which is independent of both State and Party. The right to strike must also be guaranteed.*[42]

In like vein, András Hegedüs regards the increasing tendency of trade unions to defend particular workers' interests at the factory level in the NEM period as a desirable development.[43] And Jiri Pelikan, speaking no doubt for many like-minded Marxist and non-Marxist veterans of the Prague Spring and "Charter 77," makes an element of his "common platform" for the Marxist opposition in Eastern Europe the guarantee of "the autonomy of trade unions in defense of workers' interests which can, even in a socialist society, conflict with the interests of State power."[44]

Summer vacationers throng camp sites at Hungary's Lake Balaton in August 1978.

—Interfoto MTI via Eastfoto.

Although the "programmatic" aspects of the liberation of trade unions from state-party control are vague (perhaps the intellectuals look to the workers to make their own arrangements?), the important matter is the evident unity among dissident intellectuals, *including* Marxists, regarding the right of independent unions to defend workers' interests in a "workers' state." This seems to represent a serious response to the workers' concerns and view of the world.

Beyond this, however, there is little else, except a conviction concerning the necessity of cooperation between intellectuals and workers. The intellectuals recognize that they "need" the workers as a broad social base supporting change, and they see the workers as needing the intellectuals to provide continuity, the persistence in opposition which will break the pattern of "outburst-repression-concession-stabilization" which has characterized conflict between workers and regimes in the past. Thus, Pelikan observes that the socialist opposition "should see to it that outbursts of workers' struggle do not lose impetus after a few economic concessions and that a united front of workers, progressive intellectuals and youth unremittingly challenge the bureaucracy."[45] Similarly, KSS-KOR observes in its 1978 "Appeal to Society" that the concessions that "social pressure" forced out of Polish authorities in 1970 and 1976 were "short-lived." Indeed, "in no time at all, the authorities took back from the disintegrated community what it had obtained. Only steady, broad, and organized pressure can counteract this."[46] "Organized" pressure implies, above all, functional linkages between intelligentsia and workers.

But whether these perceptions are being realized in action is another story. The current situation differs from country to country. Hungary's smooth political surface "conceals" what, for the time, is likely to be a smooth reality as well. Kádár's talents for political management remain evident. In Romania, the Jiu Valley is seemingly quiet, and Bucharest offers little of

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[42] *Dissent in Poland*, p. 13.

[43] Hegedüs, *Socialism and Bureaucracy*, pp. 89–92. Hegedüs sees a persistent lack of worker interest in participation in economic management in Hungary, which he attributes to "the alienation which developed under capitalism" and the continuing division of labor necessitated by realities of technological development. Ibid., p. 45.

[44] Jiri Pelikan, "The Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe and the Western European Left," in Coates, op. cit., p. 109.

[45] Ibid., p. 112.

[46] Translated as *RAD*, No. 236, Oct. 13, 1978, p. 8.



ROBOTNIK nr 33

1-VI-1979

WITAMY JANA PAWŁA II

/red/

Od 17 do 27 maja trwała głodówka Kazimierza Świtonia w Bazylice Matki Bożej Piekarskiej. W liście do ludu Śląska i Zagłębia Świtoń pisał, że podjął głodówkę na znak protestu przeciwko niedopuszczeniu Jana Pawła II do wiernych Śląska i Zagłębia.

21 maja do Kazimierza Świtonia przyłączył się Zdzisław Bradel, członek redakcji niezależnego czasopisma katolickiego "Spotkania".

28 kwietnia powołano w Krakowie Chrześcijańską Wspólnotę Ludzi Pracy. Celem Wspólnoty jest:
-pogłębianie życia religijnego ludzi pracujących;
-rozpowszechnianie i pogłębianie wśród pracujących chrześcijańskich ideałów życia;
-obrona praw ludzi wierzących do pełnego i równego z innymi życia społecznego, publicznego i obywatelskiego, zgodnego z ich przekonaniami i poglądami religijnymi;
-walka o uznanie i szacunek dla tysiącletniej tradycji chrześcijańskiej w Polsce;
-walka o sprawiedliwy podział dóbr materialnych, zgodnie ze wskazaniami katolickiej nauki społecznej.

Komunikat o utworzeniu Wspólnoty podpisali:
Franciszek Grabczyk Nowa Huta Os. 1000-lecia 30m 4
Adam Macedoński Kraków ul.18 stycznia 92m.30
Jan Leszek Franczyk.

W dniach 26 i 30 kwietnia rozkolportowano w Szczecinie ok. 2500 ulotek 1-majowych podpisanych przez uczestników ROPCiO oraz Grupy Sympatyków KSS "KOR".

Przeprowadzona w zakładach przemysłowych Żyrardowa analiza przyczyn absencji chorobowej ujawniła, że prawie 70% pracowników to ludzie chorzy, którzy powinni przejść na rentę lub zmienić stanowisko pracy. Zdrowie utracili przede wszystkim na skutek złych warunków pracy.

Part of page one of the June 1, 1979, issue of Robotnik *(The Worker), published by the Committee for Social Self-Defense/Workers' Defense Committee (KSS-KOR). The articles, reading clockwise from the top left, consist of a sober welcome to Pope John Paul II; word of a hunger strike by Kazimierz Switon, protesting the fact that the Pope would not be able to visit Silesia; a statement of purpose by a Christian Community of Working People calling for freedom of religious observance and "just distribution of material goods"; mention of the handing-out of 2,500 leaflets by the ROPCiO and KSS-KOR groups in Szczecin in April; and an analysis of industrial health problems in the factories of Zyrardow.*

—NOWA.

an intelligentsia "core" likely to provide support and ideological articulation of worker demands. So far, the Bucharest regime has taken tough measures toward the "Free Labor Union" (SLOMR) formed in February 1979.[47] The "Charter 77" group in Czechoslovakia has manifested courage but on balance has failed to bridge critical class and ethnic cleavages. Slovaks, workers, and peasants have stood aside, and the Husak regime in late 1979 imposed harsh sentences on major spokesmen of the movement.

In Poland, to a greater degree than elsewhere, action has followed rhetoric. When KSS-KOR announced in November 1977 that a "cell" of its journal *Robotnik* had been formed among workers in Radom, to struggle for workers' interests, one analyst in the West viewed the event as the "first concrete evidence of institutionalized links between the workers and the intelligentsia."[48] Yet, even here one cannot be sure how

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[47] See *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News* (Washington, DC), May 1979, pp. 1–5; and *RSR*, No. 4, Mar. 19, 1979, pp. 18–22, and No. 8, May 4, 1979, pp. 3–5.

[48] See *PSR*, No. 28, Dec. 2, 1978, pp. 14–15.

"institutionalized," how durable, such links will prove or whether intellectuals can keep workers', and therefore mass, concerns in the forefront of their activity.

Clearly, Poland remains for the present the most critical testing ground for the viability of a worker-intelligentsia alliance. On the workers' side, there are signs of more purposeful organizational work, as witnessed in the foundation of workers' committees to push for the creation of free trade unions, first in Katowice in February 1978, and then in the Baltic coastal cities in late April of the same year.[49] This trend continues in the founding of another free trade union committee, in Szczecin, in October 1979.[50] There have been some rural echoes of this organizational activism in the emergence of peasant dissent in the Lublin area,[51] and later in Grojec.[52] "Bread and butter" issues, centering at first on new peasant pension laws, expanded into demands by peasants for what amounts to a veto power over legislation affecting them; in the words of the Grojec activists: "nothing about us—without us."[53] It is of interest that there was even a heavy "worker" flavor in the peasant dissent, for a large proportion of the activists were "peasant-workers," with one foot in the private sector and the other in socialist industry.[54] As for the intellectuals, both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO have commented favorably on the new worker activism and have reported with concern reprisals against working-class activists and their families.[55] Moreover, 1978 also saw the foundation of the Society for Educational Courses (TKN) and its "Flying University" among Polish students, which among its many themes included sensitization of the students to the interests of the working class of Poland.

The Polish context, of course, cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the role of religion and mass religious consciousness. To be sure, religious issues—freedom of belief and ritual—have served to mobilize workers and peasants in other East European states, and in the USSR as well. In general, such issues seem of greater concern to nonintelligentsia groups than do the general issues of liberty which mobilize the intellectuals. In some states—for example, Romania—the "action" has been with religious minorities, typically Protestant groups, and religious divisions in the society have blunted the potential impact of such dissidence. Poland, however, combines a virtually universal nominal Catholicism with high levels of religious observance and an articulate and organized Catholic intelligentsia that is in touch with the secular intelligentsia. To top things off, a Pole, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow, has now ascended to the papacy as John Paul II. Catholicism thus provides an alternate—and more authentic—focus of national identity for Poles than the state or its ideology, as the mass response to the June 1979 papal visit to Poland once again reaffirmed. In such a situation, the support that the Church offers to intelligentsia seeking freedom of expression and to workers seeking economic justice, as well as the moderating influence it exerts with respect to the way in which demands for the latter are expressed, places it in a position of strength vis-à-vis a regime which, paradoxically, is dependent on the church's acquiescence in many important areas. Consequently, the Church will remain a critical actor in Poland.

No other East European state currently faces the "mobilization," albeit quite partial, of such a diversity of social strata and groups, as does Poland under Gierek's government.[56] At the same time, this very diversity creates problems of cooperation. Factory conditions and price subsidies on foodstuffs are matters of more direct concern to workers than to the intelligentsia, whose work environments differ from those of laborers and who expend a smaller proportion of their budgets for food than do laborers. The preoccupations of peasants, as *producers* of food the others consume and as both beneficiaries and victims of their own private-sector status, are not the same as those of either the workers or the intelligentsia, but the peasants tend to have more in common with the former than with the latter. While the intellectuals feel a political pinch, the workers and peasants feel an economic one.

The differences in perspectives between workers and intellectuals are evident in a 1978 KSS-KOR document analyzing the state of Poland's economy.[57] The independent-minded economists who drafted the document see the "big picture"—the irreconcilabilities inherent in the consumption aspirations of Polish workers, the shortages, a huge foreign debt, and the costs of price subsidies. Shortages cannot end, pay packets grow, and subsidies continue, all at the same time. To the worker, however, the "big picture" is vague, and the problems of the moment are paramount. The foreign debt means little to him, even if it ultimately affects his prospects in profound ways, and he fears the message of "belt-tightening" implicit in the KSS-KOR document. This conflict in perspectives does not bode well for the construction of firm and lasting linkages between intelligentsia and workers in the years to come.

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[49] Ibid., No. 6, Mar. 3, 1978, pp. 8–9; No. 12, May 30, 1978, p. 8.

[50] Ibid., No. 23, Oct. 30, 1979, pp. 3–5.

[51] Ibid., No. 19, Aug. 6, 1978, pp. 7–10.

[52] Ibid., No. 22, Sept. 25, 1978, p. 12.

[53] Ibid.

[54] I am grateful to Professor George Kolankiewicz of the University of Essex for drawing my attention to this phenomenon. As he has observed, such peasant-workers are especially sensitive to the possibilities of double-taxing for pensions—an example of the unexpected structural problems created for the regime by social change.

[55] See "Review of Uncensored Polish Publications December 1977–April 1978," *RAD*, No. 152. July 6, 1978, pp. 13, 17.

[56] For a recent review of the spectrum of Polish dissent, see Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, September-December 1978, pp. 37–51.

[57] KSS-KOR, "Notes on Poland's Economic System: An Inside View," translated in *RAD*, No. 177, Aug. 9, 1978, p. 17.

The Outlook

Indeed, it may be that the conflict between the relatively egalitarian attitudes of workers, fostered if not completely satisfied by 30 years of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and the more meritocratic convictions of the intelligentsia is insuperable. Likewise, conflict between the concrete, here-and-now issues that concern the workers and the more abstract strivings for "freedom" that motivate intellectuals may not be resolvable. This is a pessimistic assessment, but one shared by a number of observers of worker-intelligentsia relations in the East European societies.

For example, Zygmunt Bauman—analyzing the interplay of class structure and bureaucratic power in the Communist states—concludes that the workers, holding suspect the reformers' calls for greater play of market forces,

> *see in officialdom the only body called to defend them against mounting deprivations in the market sphere. A sort of alliance between the party and the workers against the managers and professions (. . . the most privileged classes in market terms) asserts itself more often than not as a persistent mark of the . . . power structure.*[58]

Similarly, two Hungarian dissidents, writing under the pseudonym "Marc Rakovski," note how the "elite of the ruling class . . . presents itself as the protector of the working class against those strata [the economic and technical experts and the lower- and middle-level managers] which are trying to enrich themselves at the latter's expense."[59] The Hungarians György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, now émigrés, push their analysis a step further to argue that the intelligentsia—far from serving as a mediator between workers and the political elite—is on the road to becoming the dominant group within the ruling class, the intellectuals' possession of "teleological knowledge" giving them a claim to preeminence in a system of "rational (i.e., non-Marxist) redistribution." Intellectuals who defend the workers, then, take on the character of "defectors" from their own class.[60]



György Konrád, Hungarian author who, with Iván Szelényi, has argued that the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe is intent on gaining primacy within the ruling elite rather than on representing worker interests.

—UPI.

These general formulations may seem overly abstract, too simple, when held up against the quite complex realities of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976. Yet the "pessimism" of the Bauman-Rakovski view has much to support it, on the evidence. Workers' coolness toward the Czechoslovak reform package in earlier 1968 was transformed into support of a generalized sort after the Warsaw Pact invasion, but worker resistance, as long as it continued, focused more and more on the sort of economic issues embodied in the trade union charter and statutes adopted in March 1969 rather than on broader issues of participation in management and the expansion of civil freedoms. And, while the fire-bombing of PUWP offices at first glance hardly seems the sort of act that workers who "look to officialdom for redress" from economic grievance would perpetrate, it is a form of communication with the locus of power, with the party. In the absence of institutionalized nonviolent mechanisms, it is a way of telling the party that the "social compact" between the regime and the masses is being violated. Workers have not looked to intellectuals for redress, whether or not they view them as a group with opposed interests.

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[58] Zygmunt Bauman, "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality in Socialist Society," in Frank Parkin, Ed., *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*, London, Tavistock, 1974, pp. 129–48.

[59] Marc Rakovski (pseud.), *Towards an East European Marxism*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978, p. 33.

[60] György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

Economic issues are the ones that will continue to catalyze workers' direct action. Thus, one can expect more localized protests at the factory or industrial-branch level when earnings appear endangered by upward revision of output norms, or by the tying of wages more tightly to productivity, and broader protest when price rises threaten purchasing power.[61] Either may be precipitated within one of two more general situations: (a) relatively constant working-class material expectations whose fulfillment is threatened by stagnating economic conditions, or (b) rising expectations fed by a record of recent substantial progress but impossible to fulfill without the sort of modifications in the "social compact" workers are unwilling to countenance—namely, a sacrifice of security and/or of slow and undemanding work rhythms for heightened reward for the skilled and diligent.

In all of these circumstances, there is little of the evident political content of issues dear to the hearts of the intelligentsia. The political issue that KOR seized upon at its foundation was the repression of workers after protest had occurred—a protest that had succeeded in securing a rapid rollback of the 1976 price rises before pro-worker intelligentsia activity had even surfaced. Unquestionably, worker-intellectual cooperation can develop around the relatively "narrow" political issue of specific anti-worker repressions—to which KOR's call for amnesty and restoration of jobs, as well as its welfare work among families of the imprisoned and fired, was an appropriate and well-received response. However, mobilization of the large mass of workers for the long haul has proved difficult. With the goals of amnesty largely achieved by the summer of 1977, Polish workers seem to have settled into a relative passivity. This is not to deny the significance of *Robotnik* or of the "free trade union" committees. Rather, it is to emphasize that by now, more than three years after 1976, a more mobilized working class would have spawned more such committees, more *samizdat* clearly its own, and, perhaps, more of its own organizational initiatives for at least tactical cooperation with sympathetic members of the intelligentsia. This has not happened.[62]

To their credit, the Polish and Czechoslovak dissident intelligentsia have focused on immediate worker concerns by generally continuing to advocate free trade unions for the workers and downplaying any appeal for the more conceptually elaborate, and practically difficult, mechanisms of worker participation in management, to which workers, finding it hard to envision their representatives on both sides of a bargaining table, have generally remained cool. Still, the divide between the groups remains wide. The KSS-KOR economic analysis mentioned earlier, as a document of the intelligentsia, takes into account the long-term implications of Polish economic problems in a way that Polish workers, self-organized to defend their own interests, could not—and under the current circumstances, perhaps should not—be expected to. The ability of intellectuals to articulate complex proposals, to be "objective" and to strike a balance between the claims of various groups, to persist in commitment over the long run to work for political change—all distinguish the intelligentsia as a privileged, even if dissident, element, and all distinguish it from the working class as well. The contrasts are highlighted by Rakovski:

> *Even among themselves, the members of the working class are not linked by a network of communication comparable to that which serves as the basis for the circulation of samizdat. This kind of communication is not a natural part of the lifestyle of the worker. To establish an opening through which the underground can communicate with the workers, the workers themselves must reach the stage of organized class struggle and institute, at least at factory level, associations which can then be stabilized. Then these organizations would be able to interact with the under-*

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[61] This distinction between two types of protest and their sources is suggested by Alex Pravda in his "Industrial Workers: Patterns of Opposition, Dissent, and Accommodation," in Rudolf L. Tőkés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979.

[62] See Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968–1978: The End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of Civil Society," in Tőkés, op. cit.; and Abraham Brumberg, "The Open Political Struggle in Poland," *New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 8, 1979, pp. 29–34.

ground. But in Soviet-type societies, the working class is as incapable of organizing itself as [*is*] *any other social group. While the rare moments of cataclysmic crisis in the system give rise to strike committees and workers' councils, these organizational results of popular uprisings never succeed in consolidating after normal reproduction has been reestablished. In such circumstances, to a working class which is deprived of its organizations, the ideas of the underground are not social facts, or else they are the particular business of an alien group.*[63]

For the present, then, both the factual record and some of the analytic perspectives on socialist societies explored here warrant a good deal of pessimism about the maintenance of worker-intelligentsia coalitions as sources of major change in Eastern Europe. It is, of course, not beyond the realm of possibility that an intelligentsia-worker alliance might take shape despite the existing conflicts of interests between the two groups, and that this sort of an alliance would constitute a unified force for change. Such a development would require not only mutual recognition of opposing interests but also an agreement to "rise above" their conflict until mutual cooperation brought about institutionalized political mechanisms (now absent) through which it could be channeled. This kind of an agreement would amount to a recognition that a civil society—freer politically and less centralized economically, and therefore probably more inegalitarian yet more productive as well—would achieve no final resolution of conflict, because such is impossible. In addition, both groups would have to acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that freedom and equality *are* in conflict, and that a new balance must be struck between them. It is important to understand, however, that the factors promoting such coalitions are weak. Moreover, the considerable repressive capacities of the Communist regimes are still a major element limiting the abilities of groups to organize politically for their own ends—and the USSR remains, judging by its actions in Afghanistan, quite ready to apply whatever forceful measures it deems necessary to guarantee the status quo in its East European backyard.

If prospects for the immediate future are dim, what of the longer term? Two points—a contingency and a trend—are worth noting. The contingency is the possibility that strong agitation for reform, emanating from and supported by either intelligentsia or workers, might result in a regime crisis sufficient to create, as just noted, the threat or reality of Soviet intervention à la 1968. Such circumstances provided the catalyst for worker-intelligentsia cooperation in that year in Czechoslovakia, and if the Polish situation deteriorated in the 1980's, they would probably do the same there. But this sort of catalyzing crisis, "resolved" in the end by Soviet power, ultimately entails drastic limitations of freedom for further actions by either group. The general defeat of reform and change is the greater fact; the final union-in-crisis of workers and intellectuals, the lesser one.

The trend involves the changing composition of the working class in the East European states. From its immediate postwar configuration—a small group composed of the surviving old proletarians—the working class expanded in size through the absorption of upwardly mobile peasants generally content with a lot far better than that of life in the villages. In the current third phase, a differentiated working class is, in its skilled and semiskilled components, increasingly populated by the children of the ex-peasants who made the transition from village to city, i.e., by people who have grown up in the working-class milieu. As the average educational level of working-class youth rises and as many find themselves remaining in the working class because of limited numbers of places in higher education, their receptivity to ideas of an abstract sort, to the programmatic language of the dissident intelligentsia, may grow. Certainly, the several years more of education that younger workers possess in comparison with their parents may help render the ideas of intellectuals more intelligible. A sufficient supply of such workers with a new "class consciousness" might provide the basis for the genuine working-class organization presently lacking.

The diversity of the present situations, country by country, presages a likely diversity in the future interplay of the forces discussed here. Stabilization is possible, if improbable, in Poland—just as exacerbation of the situations in other states to a "Polish" intensity is conceivable, if unlikely. Events often make fools of those who predict and project. For example, religion and nationalism, rather than a developing interclass cooperation, may prove the main challenge to the East European regimes in their fourth and fifth decades. What does seem probable, however, is that they will not pass through the 1980's without facing new tests of their durability.

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[63] Rakovski, op. cit., pp. 67–68.

Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways

By Zvi Gitelman

According to some Soviet Jews and Western observers, there has been an upsurge in antisemitism in the USSR in the last year or so. They attribute this development—coming at a time when the Soviet government has been allowing increasing numbers of Jews to emigrate—to various factors: Russian nationalism and xenophobia, official anti-Zionism and efforts to please Arab allies of the Soviet Union, maneuvering for leadership position in anticipation of Leonid Brezhnev's departure, or even popular resentment at the opportunity some Jews have had to emigrate to the West.[1] One commentator has gone so far as to say that antisemitism "is the official doctrine of the Soviet armed forces," and that the "Russian New Right" and their allies in the Communist Party "are openly proposing to make it the official ideology of the Soviet Union."[2]

Underlying such commentaries is the unstated assumption that both "unofficial" (or social, popular) antisemitism and government antisemitic policy can be adjusted as one might turn a faucet off and on.[3] It would seem more realistic, however, to view such sentiments and actions against Jews as the result of a complicated set of events and processes which feed on and interact with each other in ways not altogether different from the dialectic relationship between public opinion and public policy in more responsive political systems. It is misleading to speak of "more" and "less" antisemitism among Soviet people, because like all ethnic prejudices, this attitude tends to be deeply embedded, irrational, and therefore not easily changed. Where the main variance occurs is in the *manifestations* of the antisemitism long present in Russian and Soviet society. Certain external factors—events, official policies, and changes in the economic and social positions of Jews and non-Jews—may bring such attitudes to the surface. Yet the visibility and intensity of antisemitism need not depend on the objective situation of the Jews (or non-Jews), nor does the phenomenon require the presence of Jews. It was quite possible for the Polish government to stimulate an antisemitic campaign in 1968 when there were only about 16,000 Jews in a total population of over 30 million, and antisemites have even been known to "create Jews." Thus, the Nazis talked about the supposed Judaism of Franklin

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[1] Craig R. Whitney, "Many in Soviet Concerned Over a Surge in Anti-Semitism," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1979; and Kevin Klose, "Soviet Jews See Growth in Anti-Semitism," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 1979.

[2] Reuben Ainsztein, "Soviet Union Today: Anti-Semitism Institutionalized," *New Statesman* (London), Dec. 15, 1978 (also in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, Dec. 29, 1978).

[3] Steven Burg argues that the Soviet leadership employs antisemitism in a rationally calculated way as a means by which it "seeks to achieve its substantive policy goals." He develops what he thinks is a Soviet "calculus" of antisemitism, with 16 axioms, 2 diagrams, and a calculus formula. However, he can cite only one passing reference in a single *Pravda* editorial as evidence of officials' "moving against antisemitism," and his claim that the Soviet leadership "abandon[ed] antisemitism as a tool of policy in late 1969" is unsubstantiated. See his essay in Jeremy Azrael, Ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

Mr. Gitelman is Professor of Political Science and Associate of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI), and is spending the 1979-80 academic year at Tel Aviv University. He is the author of Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, *1972, and coauthor of* Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems, *1977. He has recently completed a book-length study,* Becoming Israeli: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants. *The author would like to thank the Center for Russian and East European Studies for assistance in preparing this article.*


ОТПУСТИТЕ НАС В ИЗРАИЛЬ
ВИЗЫ В ИЗРАИЛЬ ВМЕСТО ТЮРЕМ
ВИЗЫ В ИЗРАИЛЬ ВМЕСТО ТЮРЕМ

A demonstration outside the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1973 protests the Soviet refusal to grant exit permits to numerous Jews. The various signs say: "Let us go to Israel," "Let me go to Israel," "Visas to Israel instead of prison."

—UPI.

D. Roosevelt and others of their non-Jewish enemies, and reports from the USSR indicate that antisemites there consider some of the highest Soviet officials, Brezhnev among them, to be Jews or crypto-Jews.[4] The extent and intensity of antisemitism, or other ethnic prejudice, are therefore extremely difficult to ascertain or predict, since antisemitism does not depend only on objectively definable characteristics, on situations, or even on the greater or lesser presence or activity of its objects.

Efforts to determine the dimensions of antisemitism in the USSR are further hindered by the absence of empirical data on attitudes and human relations. Few surveys of ethnic attitudes have been taken by Soviet scholars, and, of course, none by outsiders. In fact, a screen of dogma is drawn over all interethnic relations. According to Premier A. N. Kosygin, "there is no, and there has never been, antisemitism in the Soviet Union,"[5] and that closes the subject to investigation or further discussion.

For the foreseeable future, as in the past, the only way to gather empirical data about ethnic relations in the USSR is to interview recent émigrés.[6] Obviously, this method has some intrinsic flaws: émigrés are not likely to be representative either of the Soviet population as a whole or even of their own ethnic group. One would expect them to be among the least satisfied of Soviet citizens—upset with, among other things, their experience as members of ethnic minorities. Thus, one cannot gauge the precise scope and intensity of antisemitic feelings in the Soviet Union on the basis of the reports of Jewish émigrés. Yet, this evidence should not be totally disregarded. As we shall see later, different groups of Jewish emigrants from the USSR (grouped according to age, sex, education, occupation, and area of former residence) differ in the ways they felt they were regarded by other Soviet people. These variations help to broaden our insight into the complex interaction of policy, popular attitudes, and reactions in this area of Soviet life.

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[4] For example, pamphlets appearing in Leningrad and Moscow in February 1979 charged that "Zionists" had seized control of the Politburo of the Communist Party and claimed that only three Politburo members (A. N. Kosygin, M. A. Suslov, and G. V. Romanov) were "real Russians." See Craig Whitney, loc. cit. Whitney notes that "in any other country, such pamphlets might be discussed as the work of lunatics. Here [i.e., the USSR] they raise the question of who allowed them to be duplicated—duplicating machines are strictly controlled—and handed out."

[5] Statement at a New York press conference in 1967, repeated in Ottawa and Copenhagen in 1971, quoted in William Korey, *The Soviet Cage*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1973, pp. 3, 329.

[6] The Harvard Project of the 1940's dealt with the subject to a limited extent. The "third emigration," in the 1970's, has also been tapped as a source of information about the USSR in general, and—to a very limited extent—about ethnic relations there. For a brief survey of studies basing themselves largely on interviews with recent Soviet emigrants, see Zvi Gitelman, "The Third Migration: Profile in Current Research," *Newsletter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies* (Columbus, OH), Summer 1978.

The focal point for any discussion of antisemitism in the USSR must be official Soviet government policies toward the country's Jews. As can be seen in the discussion which follows, these policies—while displaying some ambivalence and inconsistency—have over the years generally tended to place restrictions on the opportunities for Jews and to foster criticism of them. Such policies have been seen by Soviet Jews as indication of their inferior social and political status in official eyes. Moreover, whether intentionally or not, official policies have tended to reinforce or even be reinforced by popular antisemitism—or at least so believe many Soviet Jews. After examining these long-term continuities in Soviet policy, popular sentiment, and Jewish perceptions, we shall examine the dramatic shift in government policies which started with the launching of a strident campaign of anti-Zionism a decade ago. As popular antisemitism and Jewish sensitivities have risen, the Soviet government has taken other steps which, whether so intended or not, have only aggravated matters, until one can realistically speak of a qualitative change in the situation. In the conclusion, we shall briefly assess the implications of this change.

Continuities in Soviet Policies

Since the October Revolution, there have been a number of continuities in Soviet policies toward the Jewish population. The government has continued to identify Jews as a distinct ethnic group, to limit or control manifestations of Jewish culture, to combat the practice of Judaism, and to oppose Zionism.

Jewish nationality. Although before the October Revolution both V. I. Lenin and Yosif Stalin explicitly denied the nationhood of the Jews and favored their assimilation, Lenin's government declared the Jews a "nationality," and Lenin even approved the formation of Jewish sections in the Communist Party. While classification as a nationality implies some common cultural attributes among those designated as Jews, numerous persons who do not choose to associate themselves with Jewish culture are also officially identified as Jews. In fact, from the official point of view, being Jewish depends not on cultural, and certainly not on religious, affiliation, but simply on one's parentage. If one is the child of two Jewish parents, one has no choice but to be registered as a Jew, just as the children of two parents of any other nationality must take on that nationality when they receive their own internal passports. Only when the parents are of different nationality can the child choose the nationality of either parent.

The marked tendency of children of such mixed marriages to choose the nationality of the non-Jewish parent, especially if the latter is a Russian or a member of the dominant nationality of the particular region, already says a good deal about the social environment faced by Jews in the USSR. In a passage in a recently published novel, a Jewish narrator married to a Russian woman defensively explains his sons' choice of Jewish nationality:

> *Why are my sons registered as Jews? Is it respect for me? I think not. They respect their mother no less than me. But, you understand, the son of a Georgian* [*man*] *and a Russian* [*woman*] *generally registers as a Georgian, a son of an Uzbek* [*man*] *and a Russian* [*woman*], *as an Uzbek . . . . The husband doesn't take his wife's family name, but the wife takes the name of the husband, and the children, the name of their father. I think my children did the right thing.*[7]

The necessity to explain the choice of Jewish nationality suggests that such a choice is an unusual, even deviant, act. This surmise is confirmed by Soviet survey data.[8] It is only recently, since mass Jewish emigration began, that there has been any perceived advantage in being Jewish in the USSR. As a current Soviet witticism has it, "a Jewish wife is not a luxury but a means of transportation."

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[7] See Anatoliy Rybakov's *Tyazhëlyy pesok* (Heavy Sand), which appeared in successive issues of *Oktyabr'* (Moscow), Nos. 7–9, 1979. The quotation is translated from page 88 of the Yiddish version, *Shverer Zamd*, published in *Sovetish haimland* (Moscow), No. 6, 1979.

[8] See L. N. Terent'yeva, "Determination of One's Nationality by Youths From Families of Mixed Nationality," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1969. Mordechai Altshuler summarizes a number of Soviet articles (including Terent'yeva's) in *Kahibutz Hayehudi Bibrit Hamoatsot Beyamainu* (Soviet Jewry Today), Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1979. On p. 44 of his work he notes that data gathered in six areas of the USSR between 1960 and 1969 show that from 72 to 100 percent of those who had a choice chose non-Jewish nationality.

Cultural policy. The social disadvantages incurred by being identified as a Jew in the USSR are not compensated for by any of the cultural rewards that theoretically attend identification as a nationality. Jewish nationality is largely without content from a cultural point of view. Fewer than a quarter of Soviet Jews have any familiarity at all with Yiddish—the only language (aside from one or two very minor ones) that is officially recognized as the bearer of Jewish culture. Attempts to convey Jewish culture in Russian, the language of most Soviet Jews, have almost without exception been rejected by the authorities, except insofar as there are translations into Russian of Yiddish belles lettres. Moreover, because Jewish culture outside the USSR is suffused with concepts and values originating in the Jewish religion or pervaded by the assumptions that Jews do constitute a nation and that Israel is their national home or, at least, their major cultural center, the authorities have felt that Soviet Jewish culture, in whatever form, must be isolated from Jewish culture elsewhere. In the 1920's, the government promoted a uniquely Soviet secular Jewish culture. However, this effort was decisively rejected by the authorities in the 1930's, and most of its vestiges were eliminated in the cultural purges and parallel antisemitic campaigns of 1948-52, when leading cultural figures were arrested or murdered, all publications were closed, and even the type in the last Yiddish publishing house was melted down.[9]

Only in the late 1950's were some small, partial steps taken to revive this culture. During the last decade, there have been a few more small, largely symbolic, gestures in the direction of supporting Yiddish

Conservatoria

A scene from a performance of the play "Overseas," staged by the Moscow Jewish Drama Company in August 1970.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[9] On the attempt to develop a Soviet Jewish culture in Yiddish, see Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972.

ЛИТЕРАТУРНО ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННЫЙ
ЖУРНАЛ
СОВЕТИШ
ГЕЙМЛАНД
(СОВЕТСКАЯ РОДИНА)
ОРГАН СОЮЗА ПИСАТЕЛЕЙ СССР
זשורנאל
סאוועטיש
היימלאנד

This wall plaque identifies the Moscow editorial offices of the Yiddish-language publication Sovetish haimland.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

culture. A few amateur theatrical groups have been permitted tours of some major centers of Jewish population in the USSR, the Yiddish journal *Sovetish haimland* has become a monthly (since 1961 it had been a bimonthly), and a few Yiddish books are published. The true intent behind these gestures is suggested by the altered format of *Sovetish haimland*, which began to publish summaries of its contents in English and Russian. It is also the only Soviet journal which does not publish the size of its pressrun. Most of its circulation seems to be by subscription, and it is not readily available on street stands. All this points to the role of the journal as a propaganda and public relations vehicle, designed with foreign consumption in mind. Although *Sovetish haimland* has begun to publish more material of a consciously Jewish nature, including even articles critical of some of the more blatantly antisemitic fiction and reportage published in the USSR, it seems to be regarded by most Jews as a subservient mouthpiece of the regime and, hence, a collaborator in what are seen as the latter's anti-Jewish policies. While more than three quarters of a sample of 148 Soviet emigrants interviewed by the author in Israel said they had never read the journal, many were prepared to condemn it as "a quisling journal" or "a typical Soviet rag."

Despite these official gestures, the fundamental position of Yiddish culture has not changed. There is still not a single Yiddish school in the country (there were 1,100 in 1931), and the "teach-yourself-Yiddish" column in *Sovetish haimland* cannot ensure that Yiddish will be understood by future generations. In fact, since the centers of the Yiddish-speaking population—Vilnius, Riga, Chernovtsy, and other cities incorporated into the USSR after 1939—have contributed a disproportionate share to recent Jewish emigration (some of them may have lost more than half of their Jewish population), the number of both producers and consumers of Yiddish culture has declined considerably in the last decade. This is likely to be verified when results of the 1979 Soviet census are made available.

Position on Judaism. As regards official opposition to Judaism, this policy, in theory, should not affect the large numbers of Soviet Jews who have no involvement with Judaism, yet just as in the case of Muslims who no longer practice Islam or Lithuanians who are no longer Catholic, the Soviet public tends to identify Jews with their historic religion. In fact, this tendency is particularly strong when it comes to Judaism, which is not a "universal" religion like Christianity or Islam—practiced by diverse nations and ethnic groups—but is a "tribal" religion that, by definition, is practiced by Jews. The distinction between religion and ethnicity, a relatively recent and largely Western one, has not historically been made in the case of Judaism. In the Soviet context, this means that policies attacking Judaism and discussions critical of that religion are assumed, by Jews and non-Jews alike, to refer to Jews, the only nationality associated with Judaism. Therefore, even Jews who are avowed atheists are perceived as somehow associated with Judaism, and criticism of Judaism is taken to be applicable to Jews generally.

Over the years, Soviet opposition to Judaism has varied in intensity but not purpose. While the fall of N. S. Khrushchev in 1964 may have brought some abatement in the Soviet antireligious campaign, e.g., a halt to the mass closings of synagogues that took place in 1957-64, little has really changed. What few minor concessions there have been in recent years have apparently been designed to enhance the Soviet image abroad. Thus, two Soviet students were permitted to enroll in the Jewish Theological Seminary in Budapest in the mid-1970's (neither has yet returned to the USSR), and it is said that two others will shortly commence theological training in the United States. There are a few students in the Moscow "yeshiva"; but they are woefully ignorant of even the fundamentals of Judaism, and their main task seems to be to display themselves prominently at synagogue services.[10]

Popular association of Jews with Judaism also affects this ethnic group adversely because of the tendency of the Soviet media and the populace to link Judaism and Zionism. Communists have always pointed out that the Jewish religion is a source of Jewish nationalism; they argue that Judaism teaches the superiority of the Jews and their obligation to lead a separate existence. Such ideas are often associated explicitly with Zionism. Thus, in one recent commentary it is alleged that "the ideological sources of Zionist gangsterism originate in the scrolls of the Torah," the latter being described as "a textbook unsurpassed for betrayal, perfidy, and moral dissoluteness."[11] Practicing Jews who may have no aspiration to go to Israel are tarred with the brush of Zionism, even while secular Zionists are improperly linked to Judaism. Moreover, Jews who adhere to neither are stigmatized by association.

Despite the Soviet government's refusal to allow the publication or import of suitable texts, Levi Itzhak Gurevich, center, still carries on a small class in Jewish prayers and Hebrew language at the "Yeshiva" attached to the Arkhipova Street Synagogue in Moscow.

—Jesse Zel Lurie/Pictorial Parade.

Jews and Judaism in Soviet culture. Another way of discerning Soviet policy toward Jews is to see how this ethnic group is treated in Soviet culture generally. In this regard, an examination of all Soviet press articles dealing with Jews in the years 1968-77 fails to show any mention of the contributions of Jews as a group to the development of the USSR. Moreover, with only two exceptions (items on Soviet air force general Yakov Smushkevich and the philosopher Baruch Spinoza), articles lauding the achievements of individual Jews do not specify their nationality, although nationality is conventionally noted in such articles. For example, not one of the many articles on former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov indicates his (Jewish) nationality. In 47 articles that appeared in 1976-77 and referred to praiseworthy contributions by Jewish individuals, the nationality of the individual was never mentioned.[12]

In addition, another apparently exhaustive study reveals that after 1954, Jews and Judaism disappeared from Soviet history textbooks. Only in the late 1960's did Jews begin to reappear, and then only in a negative context. In texts on ancient history published after 1954, the words "Judea," "Israel," and "Jerusalem" were replaced by territorial designations such as Mesopotamia, Palestine, or, simply, "the provinces." Similarly, texts on modern history ceased mentioning the Jewish provenance of Heinrich Heine and Ferdinand Lassalle; and they quit connecting the Dreyfus affair to antisemitism, instead describing it in terms of class struggle or avoiding the subject altogether. Even in histories of most Soviet republics where Jews have played a significant historical role—the Ukraine, Moldavia, Lithuania, etc.—there is no attention at all to that nationality. The standard history of Belorussia is the exception. But all it says is that the Jewish Bund played a pernicious role in the republic, sabotaging the revolutionary movement and fomenting Jewish nationalism.[13]

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[10] On Soviet policy toward Judaism before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, see Zvi Gitelman, "The Jews," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1967. For the period after 1967, see Thomas E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, 1979, pp. 76-78.

[11] Vladimir Begun, *Vtorzheniye bez oruzhiya* (Invasion Without Arms), Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1977, quoted in William Korey, "Anti-Zionism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1978, p. 64.

[12] Based on a survey of all articles appearing in *Yevrei i yevreyskiy narod* (Jerusalem) for those years.

Although the Soviet Union's libraries are rich in Jewish materials, there is almost no scholarship on Jews. The modern period is ignored completely, except for attacks on the Bund, Judaism, Zionism, and the state of Israel, and only one scholar publishes regularly on ancient and medieval Jewish history and literature, with two or three others publishing on modern, especially Soviet, Yiddish literature. Most of this work appears in *Sovetish haimland* and thus—as we have seen—is largely inaccessible to the vast majority of Jews and non-Jews, and even to the Soviet scholarly community. Linguistics seems to be the discipline least restricted, and from time to time in Soviet journals and scholarly books one comes across articles on Yiddish and even Hebrew linguistic matters, almost all of them written by people of the older generation.

Since the early 1930's, Soviet authorities have demanded that all the arts and literature reflect the official view of Soviet reality. For this reason, Soviet belles lettres serves as a more accurate indicator of official outlooks than is the case with literature in most other countries. At minimum, Soviet literature reflects approved or tolerated images and ideas. Therefore, it is highly significant that an analysis of more than 300 novels and stories published in Russian in the USSR between 1963 and 1971 found a decline in the number of Jews appearing as characters, and when they did appear it was most often in a negative, even criminal, light—as swindlers, speculators, people without feelings of patriotism, cosmopolitans ready to sell out their country, rapists, or parasites.[14]

It is in this context that the publication in 1979 of the novel *Tyazhëlyy pesok* (Heavy Sand) in three issues of the magazine *Oktyabr'* drew so much international attention.[15] Not only does Anatoliy Rybakov's novel—not a very good one by literary standards—portray in detail the fate of the Jews during the Nazi occupation, but it devotes considerable attention to ethnic relations, with some idealization of the friendship which developed between Ukrainians and Jews in the 1920's and 1930's. However, there is no evidence that the appearance of Rybakov's novel signals a change in Soviet policy, literary or otherwise. It will probably remain an isolated case which Soviet apologists can cite for their purposes.

Jewish reactions. The Jews have varied in their reactions to these Soviet policies. During the 1917 revolution and ensuing civil war in Russia, many Jews turned to the Red Army and to "Soviet power"—the only organized forces then not engaged in systematic physical persecution of the Jewish population—as their saviors. When the Soviet regime removed all the restrictions that its Tsarist predecessor had placed on Jews, and when all educational, economic, and social barriers disappeared as well, many Jews eagerly seized the opportunities and achieved leading places in Soviet society. Many were perfectly content to trade their traditional way of life and actively renounce it in return for the values of modernizing Soviet society. By the end of the 1930's, when both traditional Jewish culture and the artificial, secular Communist Yiddish culture which was to substitute for it had declined, there was a significant Jewish presence in those areas of the country and in those sectors of the economy and society from which Jews had been barred by the Tsars. Most of these Jews were quite content with this trade-off. Even though the higher echelons of many Soviet hierarchies—the party, the military, the police, and the foreign service—were increasingly closed to Jews, access to higher education continued to present Jews attractive career opportunities in industry, science, and technology. Since 98 percent of the Jews reside in urban areas and are concentrated in the largest cities, their access to superior education has been greater than that of other groups. As late as 1972, there were nearly 68,000 Jewish "scientific workers" in the USSR, twice as many as there had been in 1960, though the proportion of Jews among "scientific workers" had been in steady decline since at least 1950.[16]

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[13] See Daniil Fish, "Jews in the High School Curricula on World and Russian History," *Yevreyskiy samizdat* (Jerusalem), Vol. 15, 1977, pp. 313–52.

[14] G. M. Manevich, appendix to "The Jewish Question and the Mideast Conflict," in ibid., Vol. 8, 1975, pp. 29–77.

The same author claims to have surveyed Soviet postgraduate dissertations written after 1945 in history and ethnography and to have discovered only two dealing with Jews, one written in 1948 and the other a dissertation by T. K. Kichko, "Contemporary Judaism and Its Reactionary Role." Kichko is the author of the notorious book *Iudaizm bez prikras* (Judaism Without Embellishment—1963) and later works on Judaism and Zionism.

On Jews in recent Soviet fiction, see also Anna Sergin, "Falsification and Hatred in Belles Lettres," *Shvut* (Tel Aviv), No. 6, 1978.

[15] In August 1979, an Israeli publisher secured permission to publish a Hebrew translation.

[16] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1922–1972 gg.* (The USSR National Economy in 1922–1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 105.

Yet such acculturation did not protect Soviet Jews from antisemitism. This was particularly apparent in the 1940's and 1950's, when the Stalinist terror and social pressure against Jews was at its height. In this period, many Soviet Jews felt their nationality to be a virtual "disease," that to be Jewish was to be an "invalid of the fifth paragraph" (referring to the fifth paragraph of one's identity card, which lists nationality). They sought to change their nationality, but this often proved impossible because of government policies. Nevertheless, they sought to sever all ties with Jews and Judaism and to pass themselves off as Russians.

Others tried to deny the existence of antisemitism. In the words of one recent emigrant,

> *I had never thought about being Jewish until 1943 . . . . We never thought about our nationality . . . . But after the war I did think about it a lot . . . because there were acts of discrimination against Jews, and we couldn't help discussing those cases and wondering . . . . But we thought it was a temporary thing . . . something that can't continue because it's so ridiculous and so strange and so against Marxism-Leninism and against the great slogans, you know.*[17]

It should be noted that there were still other Jews, particularly in Asian areas of the USSR and those peripheral regions annexed since 1939, who never renounced their Jewish culture and religion or sought to assimilate. And even before the 1970's, they were joined by persons who, as a result of continuing antisemitism, felt it necessary to "rediscover" their Jewishness as members of an emerging Jewish nationalist movement in the Soviet Union.

Fateful Policy Changes

Although the Soviet policies toward the Jews outlined above have generally continued to obtain to this day, there have been during the last decade or so two major, perhaps crucial changes. The first of these shifts was the launching of an intense anti-Zionist campaign in the late 1960's; the second was the easing (especially since 1971) of possibilities for Jewish emigration. Since all of the emigrants are ostensibly headed for Israel (indeed, of about 200,000 Jewish émigrés, about 160,000 have gone to Israel; the rest, mainly to North America), these policies seem to contradict each other. If the USSR is so hostile to Zionism, why does it permit the migration of its own citizens to the Zionist state, where, by all accounts, they make a significant contribution to Israel's economy and military capacity? It is not clear that Soviet policymakers intended to create this contradiction or are necessarily happy with it. Rather, the policies have gained a momentum of their own and have merged intentionally or unintentionally with deep strands of popular antisemitism to create a perhaps irreversible alienation of Soviet Jews from their society.

The anti-Zionist campaign. It is difficult to unravel the complex factors that led to and have sustained the current intense Soviet campaign against Zionism. Clearly, early Bolshevik efforts to combat Zionist ideology culminated and largely disappeared in the 1930's, once Zionism had been crushed in the Soviet Union. Establishment of the state of Israel after World War II revived the topic, yet even in the years immediately preceding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet press still gave Zionism only passing attention. The word itself almost never appeared in the titles of articles, and almost never was an entire article devoted to the subject. It was only after the 1967 war that Zionism reemerged as a major topic of official discussion (see Table 1).[18] Although foreign policy considerations—the requirement to assuage Moscow's friends—were apparently paramount at the outset, the extent and intensity of the campaign suggest multiple targets and purposes. For example, one careful analysis of anti-Zionist items published in the Soviet press in the period 1969–71 concludes that they were not connected directly to events in the Middle East, and that there also was no direct correlation between the intensity of the campaign and rates of emigration (the campaign might have served, inter alia, as a camouflage for stepped-up rates of emigration). Rather, the analyst perceptively concludes, the campaign was a kind of peculiar "dialogue" between the Soviet government and its Jewish subjects, with the former attempting to persuade the latter not to attempt to leave the country.[19] Indeed, it may be that because of the

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[17] From an unpublished transcript available to the author.

[18] This pronounced shift is acknowledged by V. V. Bol'shakov in "Criticism of Zionism in Soviet Historiography," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 9, September 1973. Bol'shakov writes: "Significant criticism of Zionism in the Soviet press began in 1968–70" with the articles and later the book *Ostorozhno sionizm!* (Beware Zionism!) by Yuriy Ivanov. The latter was termed "the first book in Soviet literature of the past 30 years to present a scientific critical investigation . . . of Zionism."

[19] Jonathan Frankel, "The Anti-Zionist Press Campaigns in the USSR, 1969–71: An Internal Dialogue?" *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), No. 3, May 1972. See also Zeev Ben-Shlomo, "The Current Anti-Zionist Campaign in the USSR," *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs* (London), May 1970, and the appended documents.

Table 1. Soviet Press Coverage of Zionism and Jewish Topics, 1963–77 (Selected Years)

	Zionism		All Jewish topics	
Year	Number of articles	Column inches	Number of articles	Column inches
1963	10		175	
1964	15		209	
1965	8		151	
1966	10	210	137	3,222
1968	36	1,485	343	6,875
1969	42	1,410	313	6,465
1970	204	7,465	592	4,025
1971[a]	61	1,920	125	2,995
1974[b]	19	1,615	147	2,890
1975	60	1,855	204	4,230
1977[a]	36	1,135	97	1,838

[a] Data available for six months only.
[b] Data available for nine months only.

SOURCE: These data are based on the multivolume *Yevrei i yevreyskiy narod* (Jerusalem), 1960ff., which reproduces in full articles from the central and provincial Soviet press that mention Jews or Jewish affairs. This table counts articles appearing under the rubrics of Zionism; Jewish religion, history, and culture; and Jewish history in Russia and the USSR. Articles on the state of Israel are *not* included, so that "Zionism" comprehends only those materials dealing with Zionist ideology or the Zionist movement. The table was compiled for the author by Amy Saldinger of the Department of History, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI).

high internal costs of coercive tactics and the prospect of attendant unfavorable publicity abroad, the anti-Zionist campaign is seen, at least in part, as a less controversial means of persuading Jews not to apply for exit permits. Not surprisingly, however, the campaign has acquired a dynamic of its own and has served as a vehicle for those motivated purely by antisemitism or by careerist ambitions and other considerations.

As Table 1 shows, the number of articles on Zionism and the space devoted to the subject rose steeply after 1967. Although there were fluctuations in the following years, Zionism was the main subject of at least half (and in some years almost two thirds) of the newspaper space devoted to Jewish topics.

Not only has Zionism become a steady and prominent feature in the press, but it is also the subject of books, brochures, films, and even television programs. Since 1962, at least 62 books and pamphlets dealing directly with Zionism have been published, and a few have been in editions of over 100,000. This is exclusive of materials on Israel, Judaism, and other themes which are almost invariably linked to Zionism, so that the amount of material disseminated on Zionism is several times greater than that found in publications directly treating the topic.[20]

Soviet materials devoted to Zionism may be divided into the scholarly and the journalistic-propagandistic, although sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The scholarly articles, appearing in academic journals and bearing references to primary source material, rarely attempt to link the Zionist movement of the past with current events. They give the impression that the "problem" of Zionism was solved by the Bolshevik revolution, and that it arose because of a specific domestic situation rather than as part of a worldwide movement. The publicistic articles, by contrast, are much more polemical. They focus on contemporary Zionism and approach the problem as international in nature.

In the scholarly literature, one may discern three approaches to the link between Jews and Zionism. One approach, rarely taken in recent years, describes the hardships and disabilities of the Jews under Tsarist rule, emphasizes their contributions to the revolutionary movement, and concludes that Zionism was the invention of the Jewish bourgeoisie and was decisively rejected by the Jewish workers. By portraying the Jewish proletariat sympathetically, this approach explicitly rejects the equating of Zionism with all Jews.[21] Other writers argue that not all Jews were persecuted under the Tsars and that Zionism enjoyed wide support among the Jews.[22] A third position holds that "objectively, Zionism played the role of ally to the most reactionary forces in the Russian Empire." In this view, the Jewish workers did not decisively reject Zionism, and only the October Revolution defeated this ideology, which, it is argued, had infected the great majority of Jews from all classes.[23]

While the scholarly articles offer Marxist-Leninist interpretations and render critical judgments of Zionism as it was or is, the publicistic articles do unrestrained violence to the facts themselves and have a highly polemical tone. The propaganda of the last decade attempts to link Zionism to fascism, racism, an international anti-Communist conspiracy, or Judaism—connections not made in the few articles on Zionism written before 1967. Outright falsifications abound. For example, a 1977 publication claims that "Zionists tried to persuade Jews in the [Warsaw] ghetto not to fight. Zionists justified fascist genocide. . . ."[24] In fact, the leadership of the 1943 uprising was largely from Zionist parties and youth movements and from the Bund. Even during its "anti-Zionist" campaign in 1968, the Polish regime did not try to deny Zionist leadership of the uprising, nor did it rename those Warsaw streets named for Zionist leaders of the revolt. But Soviet authors play fast and loose with the wartime events.

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[20] Based on an examination of *Novyye knigi SSSR* and *Knizhnaya letopis'*, both published in Moscow.

[21] A. V. Piaskovskiy, "Zionism in Prerevolutionary Russia," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 5, September-October 1973.

[22] L. Vostokov, "The Anti-People Activity of the Zionists in Russia," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3, March 1973.

[23] Ye. S. Yevseyev, "From the History of Zionism in Tsarist Russia," ibid., No. 5, May 1973.

The Bund is a particular bogey of Soviet propaganda. While only shadowy remnants of the Bund exist anywhere in the world today, it occupies such a prominent place in Soviet literature—much to the puzzlement of many Soviet readers who have no inkling of what the Bund is all about—that one gains the impression that it is a powerful anti-Soviet force. Anyone with the slightest acquaintance with Bundist literature (much of which was written in Russian—rendering irrelevant the complaint that "criticism of Zionism is difficult because much of the source material is written in Aesopian language and/or in Hebrew"[25]) knows the Bund was militantly anti-Zionist and was the main competitor of Zionism within the Jewish community. This fact has not deterred Soviet journalists from such statements as "Zionism . . . has undergone a tremendous metamorphosis from the petit bourgeois anti-Marxist national group of the Bund . . . to today's bandits of Moshe Dayan . . . ."[26]

What are the major themes of the anti-Zionist propaganda? There are only a few, and—as so often in such materials—they are repeated with only slight variations, giving the impression that there is a basic recipe for the product.

One prominent theme is the connection between Judaism and Zionism. Indeed, several books and pamphlets have appeared with titles such as *Iudaizm na sluzhbe sionizma* (Judaism in the Service of Zionism—Kiev, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1973), or *Iudaizm i sionizm* (Judaism and Zionism—Kiev, Znaniye, 1968) and *Sovremennyy judaizm i sionizm* (Contemporary Judaism and Zionism—Kishinëv, Kartia Moldoveniaske, 1964 and 1968). To be sure, there are some differences of opinion on this matter among Soviet writers. Some plainly equate Zionism with Judaism. They point out that the Bible is studied in Israeli schools and claim that Judaism is the "official religion" of Israel. The result is, in the words of one author, that "the evil system is a hybrid of Zionism with Judaism and is fostered by the darkest of evil forces, whose world center is in New York."[27] Other commentators maintain that Zionism manipulates and exploits Judaism for its own evil purposes. One writer, for instance, suggests that while "Judaism and Zionism are two sides of the same coin of capitalism and . . . stand shoulder to shoulder against the forces of progress and social justice," only the Zionists themselves (wrongly) equate Zionism with Judaism and the latter with Jews.[28] Another argues clearly that Judaism and Zionism are not the same thing, but form a mutually beneficial alliance. He notes:



This Soviet cartoon about Israeli actions in Lebanon makes the typical equation of Zionism and fascism: the bombs bear the letters of the Russian word for "Zionism." The cartoon was published in Bakinskiy rabochiy *(Baku), March 30, 1978.*

—Reproduced in Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, London, Hared Press, 1978.

> *Judaism is a religion, not the "civilization" of the Jewish people . . . . The alliance between Judaism and Zionism did not become very strong until recently . . . . Zionism is by its nature a political, not a religious, phenomenon.*[29]

V. Semenyuk holds that the Zionists, faced with an Israeli population he characterizes as a "motley collection of people . . . who had to be transformed into a monolithic mass," hit upon Judaism as a means of "achieving a unified militaristic spirit."[30] A third view, manifestly a minority one, contends that "it is clear to any unprejudiced person that the great majority of Jews . . . have long broken with Judaism . . . . The great majority of laboring Jews . . . decisively condemn Zionism but still remain Jews."[31] Even this, it should be underscored, is not an unequivocal denial of the Judaism-Zionism link. In sum, then, there is no doubt that the great majority of Soviet writings on the subject connect Zionism to Judaism, and both to Jews, in one way or another.

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[24] A. Teplitskiy, "In the Service of Imperialism and Reaction," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), July 1977, p. 63.

[25] V. V. Bol'shakov, loc. cit.

[26] K. Ivanov, "Israel, Zionism, and International Imperialism," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), June 1968.

[27] "For Believers and Nonbelievers," *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Mar. 20, 1968.

[28] Zenon Ryaboshapka, "The Exodus and Contemporary Life," *Sovetskaya molodëzh* (Moscow), Apr. 21, 1973.

[29] G. Bakanurskiy, "Hand in Hand: Zionism and Judaism in the USA," *Nauka i religiya* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1971.

Moreover, Zionism is seen not as the national movement of the Jewish people, but as a racist ideology premised on the belief in the superiority of Jews to all other peoples. Of course, the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism is cited extensively to support this theme.[32]

Another way of expressing the same notion, in a form even more odious to Jews, is the claim that Zionism is a variant of fascism. As one source puts it,

> *Many facts have convincingly demonstrated the fascist nature of the ideology and policies of Zionism. Fascism is disgusting in any of its guises. Its Zionist version is no better than the Hitlerite one.*[33]

Some commentaries take one step further, charging that Zionists collaborated actively with fascists and German Nazis.[34] The equation of Zionism (and by association, all Jews) with Nazism is especially galling to Soviet Jews, who know very well that nearly 2 million Jews died in the USSR during the Nazi occupation, that about half a million Jews served in the Soviet armed forces, and that over 150,000 died in combat.[35] Even anti-Zionist Jews cannot help but be revolted by this theme of Soviet propaganda.

Then there is the argument that Zionists seek world domination.[36] Of course, this is very much in the tradition of historic antisemitic imagery, including the infamous "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion," which originated in Russia.[37] According to such accounts, Zionism seeks world domination chiefly by financial and political means. In discussion of Zionism's aim at world domination, the distinction between Jews and Zionists is generally erased completely. Thus, non-Zionist and even anti-Zionist organizations (the Bund, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Agudat Yisrael) and thinkers (Simon Dubnow, Hermann Cohen, Henri Bergson) are labeled Zionists, and political opponents of Soviet communism, such as the Czechoslovak reformers Frantisek Kriegel and Eduard Goldstücker, are also placed under this rubric, much as their predecessors of the 1950's, such as Rudolf Slansky, were accused of collaboration with the Zionists even though they had devoted their lives to the Communist movement and were outspoken opponents of Zionism.

It is true that some Soviet scholars and propagandists have evinced discomfort at the easy equation of Jews and Zionists and have warned (though not in print) that "even in the United States the great majority of Jews are Jews, not Zionists," implying that this was all the more the case in the USSR. Objections have also been raised to terms such as "Zionist capital" and "international Zionist conspiracy" as counterproductive from a propaganda point of view.[38] But such views seem not to be accepted by the propaganda machine or even by the leadership of such scholarly bodies as the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Of course, one can be critical of Israel and Zionism

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[30] V. Semenyuk, "Zionism and Judaism," *Znamya yunosti* (Minsk), Feb. 24, 1971.

[31] M. Gol'denberg, "Zionist Battlers for the Truth," *Nauka i religiya*, No. 1, January 1973.

[32] The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1977 which condemned Zionism as a form of racism. For Soviet arguments along these lines, see, for example, Yu. Andreyev, "Zionism as a Form of Racism," *Socialism: Theory and Practice* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977; and A. Zuban, "Zionism, a Form of Racism," in *Nash otvet klevetnikam*, Kiev, Prapor, 1976. This book is a collection of short articles by "ordinary Soviet citizens" of Jewish nationality.

[33] *Nash otvet klevetnikam.*

[34] For 23 different citations from the Soviet press in 1975–78 making this claim, see Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, London, 1978, pp. 67–76.

[35] See Solomon M. Schwarz, *Yevrei v Sovetskom Soyuze: 1939–1965*, (Jews in the Soviet Union: 1939–1965), New York, NY, American Jewish Committee, 1966; and Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jews Under Tsars and Soviets*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1964.

[36] V. Ya. Begun writes of "the Zionist movement's main strategic goal of establishing domination over the world," and V. Skurlatov writes of Zionism's "aspiration to world power." Quoted in *Soviet Antisemitic Propaganda*, pp. 48–49.

[37] This work purports to be the minutes of a secret meeting of world Zionist leaders. It was written in Russia nearly 100 years ago and was widely circulated in Nazi Germany. Today it is widely available in Latin America and in such Middle Eastern countries as Saudi Arabia. See Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967.

[38] See "Protocols of the Anti-Zionist Elders," a report by E. L. Sol'mar on a meeting of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences held in February 1976, published in *Yevreyskiy samizdat*, Vol. 16, 1977, pp. 128–44.

Even A. Teplitskiy, loc. cit., criticized authors of a Soviet book on Zionism for displaying "carelessness in terminology, labeling Zionist and Judaic organizations Jewish."



A photo of the painting "Summer Theater" by Soviet painter Mikhail A. Savitskiy, displayed in the winter of 1978-79 in Minsk as part of a collection depicting the brutalities of the Nazi occupation of Belorussia during World War II. A Nazi officer and a Jewish trusty wearing the Star of David survey a pile of dead prisoners.

—The New York Times.

without being in the least antisemitic. But, as should be clear from the instances cited here, current Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda rarely distinguishes between Jews and Zionists, and even anti-Zionist Jews are described as Zionists. Moreover, even if one were to assume that some Soviet commentators would like to differentiate between Zionists and Jews, and that their criticism of the former implies no prejudice against the latter, the *perception* of non-Jews as well as Jews in the USSR appears to be that there is no such differentiation, that the anti-Zionist campaign is one against Jews. The Soviet media make it crystal clear to even the most unsophisticated person that Israel and Zionism are Jewish phenomena, and this concretizes the issue for the recipient of the message. Because there are Jews in the Soviet Union, the anti-Zionist cause is turned from an abstract campaign against some unseen, unfelt evil into an attack on tangible objects, real people. From the point of view of the regime, this is useful, for such propaganda can genuinely arouse passions and support for the official line, in contrast, say, to propaganda on behalf of a national liberation movement in Africa or of "oppressed British workers." Thus, even if the campaign were not antisemitic—and there is considerable evidence that it is—its effects unquestionably add up to an attack on Jews, including those living in the Soviet Union.

How have Soviet Jews reacted to this virulent new outbreak of antisemitism under the guise of anti-Zionism? Many are revolted by it, but others respond in more complex fashion. While they resent the message, they project their hostility onto Israel and Zionists. If the latter did not exist, they reason, the position of Jews in the USSR would be much more comfortable. Others react in the same way that communities under pressure, including the Jews, have done the world over. Some deny the existence of the pressure or pass it off as a temporary aberration; others resign themselves to it as one would to an incurable disease; still others try to deny their nationality, in this case by "acting as Russian as possible." However, the post-Stalinist relaxation of Soviet life and the example of open activity by Soviet political dissidents brought different reactions to antisemitism from many Jews. Facing up to the bitter realization that they could never be accepted as Russians, they have "come out of hiding" and have asserted militantly their Jewish identity and their right to fill it with meaningful social, cultural, and even religious content. The search for identity has led some younger Jews to Judaism, which they view as an integral part of Jewish civilization. For some, this new-found conviction has brought the travails of labor camps and prisons; for others, emigration. (Religious Jews in particular have chosen to emigrate, further diminishing the small number of practicing Jews.)

While we can only guess at the overall distribution of reactions to antisemitism among Soviet Jews, we are now able to draw a more accurate picture with respect to those who have emigrated. In four surveys encompassing in all about 3,200 recent Jewish émigrés from the USSR, about three quarters of the respondents claimed frequent or occasional personal encounters with antisemitism in the USSR. One third to one half of those interviewed said that they had experienced antisemitism "often." The surveys included interviews in 1972 in Israel with 148 male immigrants from the Soviet Union who had had at least a high school education; interviews in 1976 in Detroit with 132 recent arrivals from the USSR; a 1973 survey in Israel among 2,527 immigrants from the USSR (of whom 447 had been active in the Jewish national movement there); and a 1976–77 survey comparing over 300 émigrés in Rome (bound mainly for the United States) with more than 200 Israeli immigrants having similar demographic characteristics.[39]

In the interviews, there was an observable tendency for males to indicate more frequent encounters with antisemitism than females did, which may be connected with the fact that antisemitic encounters were reported most frequently in connection with job seeking and by those with higher education. In other words, it seems that better-educated males, those who aspired to jobs which had greater prestige and required greater preparation, perceived themselves more discriminated against than those whose vocational aspirations were more modest.

This supposition is further buttressed by the finding (in the Detroit survey) that those born in the 1930's and 1940's—precisely the group that would have been seeking employment and advancement in the decade or two before its emigration—were more likely to cite antisemitism as their primary motive for emigration than were those born before 1930, although the latter claimed to have encountered just as many instances of antisemitism as the former. The older group, having reached the limits of vocational and social mobility, was not as pushed to emigrate by the antisemitic factors as it was by other considerations—family, Jewish cultural considerations, etc.[40]

Émigrés from the Ukraine reported somewhat more frequent antisemitic experiences that those from the RSFSR or the Baltic did. However, the data do not really indicate great geographic differences in this regard.

Perhaps the most startling finding was that a quarter of the former Jewish nationalist activists interviewed said they had "never" personally experienced antisemitism (the figure was only 10 percent in the case of all other groups surveyed). This disparity tends to confirm the impression that émigrés may tend to exaggerate or emphasize Soviet antisemitism to reassure themselves that they made the right decision in leaving their birthplace or to convince the interviewer that they were, indeed, victims of persecution. The latter consideration is especially relevant to those located in or bound for the United States, where they are admitted as political refugees. Thus, in the fourth survey mentioned above, two thirds of those interviewed in Rome, i.e., those not going to Israel, cited antisemitism as their primary reason for emigrating, while only 39 percent of an Israeli immigrant group matched to the Rome émigrés on all relevant background variables made this claim. In contrast, the Jewish activists could cite more "positive" reasons for emigration—in particular, a desire to live in a Jewish state and cultural milieu.

It may also be that precisely those among the émigrés who had felt the most acculturated were those who felt the greatest sense of injury from antisemitism. They considered themselves Russians, not

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[39] The first two surveys were conducted by the author; the third represents the as yet unpublished findings of the Project on Rebirth of Jewish National Consciousness in the USSR, at the Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; and the final survey was by Elazar Leshem (see his "The 'Drop-out' Phenomenon Among Soviet Jews: Main Findings and Recommendations," Jerusalem, Center for Research and Documentation on East European Jewry, The Hebrew University, mimeo).

[40] For an elaboration of this point, see Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?" *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, No. 1, 1977.

Jews, and were deeply hurt by the discovery that Russians (and others) considered them Jews. The more conscious and committed Jews among the émigrés had fewer illusions on this score, were compensated by what they saw as the positive content of Jewish identity, and, while they may have wished to be accepted as equals, they did not wish to assimilate into the dominant population group.

Soviet policies regarding Jewish emigration. As noted above, one response of Soviet Jews to perceived antisemitism has been to seek to emigrate to less hostile environments, in particular to Israel. For reasons not altogether clear, Soviet authorities apparently decided in 1971 to permit limited and controlled emigration of Jews. The decision most likely resulted from a combination of internal and external pressures, coming to bear at a time when the USSR was anxious to reach agreements with the United States which would require ratification, and thus popular approval, in America. It is also quite likely that the Soviets calculated that a one-time gesture would be sufficient to exhaust the reservoir of potential emigration, placate Western opinion, and ease the pressures on the government. Obviously, this turned out to be a gross miscalculation, and all the subsequent experimentation with harassment, exile, imprisonment, "education taxes," and the like has not succeeded in stemming the flow of émigrés. Moreover, the apparent attempt to stem the emigration by intensifying the anti-Zionist campaign appears to have backfired—far from discouraging the growth of Jewish consciousness, it seems to have led more of the Soviet Union's Jews to conclude that their future lies outside the USSR.

Indeed, the mass exodus of Soviet Jews is a major historic development—one that has come to involve many diverse groups of Jews. The first group to leave were the least assimilated Jews and those from lower social strata. They included Baltic, Moldavian, Trans-Carpathian, and West Ukrainian Jews—people who had lived in traditional Jewish milieux until the 1940's and hence had not benefited from the opportunities enjoyed by secular Soviet Jews in the 1930's. They also comprised Jews from Georgia and Central Asia, who like their Christian and Muslim neighbors had preserved traditional outlooks and ways of life in Soviet society. The Jews of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, constituting nearly three quarters of the Soviet Jewish population, have tended to be more acculturated and initially showed much less inclination to depart the country, to which the vast majority were unquestionably loyal.

But in reaction to the doubtless unexpectedly large number of emigrants, the Soviet leadership adopted policies which adversely affected *all* Jews, those from the Russian heartland and the Ukraine as well as those from the periphery, those who were loyal Communists as well as dissidents. To the greatly increased propaganda against Zionism and Jewish nationalism, the deliberate erasure of Jewish history and culture, and the unflattering portrayal of Jews in the media, there was now added an obvious closing-off of educational and vocational opportunities. Between the 1970–71 and 1977–78 academic years, there was a 40 percent decline in the absolute number of Jewish university students, and an exactly parallel decline in the number of Jewish graduate students and in those enrolled in Moscow's higher educational institutions, generally considered the most prestigious in the country.[41] Clearly, such a strikingly consistent and strong trend can only be the result of a central policy decision. If we recall the rationale given by the authorities for imposition of an "education tax" on émigrés (compensation for the state's investment in their education), the reason for this decision becomes apparent: if Jews are going to emigrate, surely there is no argument to educate them. Why should the socialist fatherland prepare cadres for the Zionist state or any other capitalist country? Any Jew, whatever his geographic origins, cultural background, or political beliefs, becomes a potential émigré and must be treated as such.

Of course, this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. With the new policy, Jews who had always considered themselves proud and loyal citizens and who could ignore some of the disabilities imposed on Jews as long as the way to a nonpolitical professional career was open, were forced to confront the fact that they or their children would be treated as disloyal people and their vocational and social paths would be blocked. Indeed, the large number of émigrés from the RSFSR and the Ukraine in recent years, and testimony by some of them, make it clear that the closing of educational opportunities in reaction to the first wave of emigration has been the major factor in creating subsequent waves.

Thus, increasingly, Jews need not personally experience antisemitism to conclude that their future is limited in the USSR. For example, among the émigrés

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[41] For the all-Union data, see Central Statistical Administration under the USSR Council of Ministers, *Narodnoye obrazovaniye, nauka, i kultura v SSSR: Statisticheskiy sbornik* (Public Education, Science, and Culture in the USSR: A Statistical Collection), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 313. For the Moscow data, see Statistical Administration of Moscow City, *Moskva v tsifrakh 1917–1977 gg.* (Moscow in Figures, 1917–1977), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 144.



[redacted]
Виза [redacted] № 274435
[redacted]
Фамилия ПИЧХАДЗЕ
Имя Семен Рафиелович
Год рождения 1918г. один
В пункты ИЗРАИЛЬ
Цель поездки (в [illegible]) На постоянное жительство
Действительна для [illegible] СССР до 1ноября71г.
и въезд в СССР
через пограничные пункты СССР, открытые для [illegible] "Брест"
6/X-71г.
Брест 03

A photograph of an exit visa issued to Semën Rafiyelovich Pichkhadze by the Soviet government on October 6, 1971, for emigration to Israel.

—De Andrade/Magnum.

in the four surveys mentioned above, about half infrequently "felt at home" in the Soviet Union. While this feeling of alienation was especially strong among those with pronounced Jewish cultural and religious backgrounds and among those from the Western periphery of the country—who had become citizens only in the preceding 30 years or so and found themselves a "third nationality" behind (1) the dominant local population and (2) the Russians[42]—one can expect the feeling to grow even among Jews who had been assimilating for three or four generations in the Soviet heartland.

In effect, a vicious cycle has been created: the greater the number of Jews who emigrate, the more the authorities resolve that this "unstable element" is to be denied higher education; the more education is closed off, the more émigrés are "created." Like the Germans, the other Soviet nationality to emigrate in substantial numbers,[43] the Jews are now definitively regarded as a "fifth column," and it is not clear what even those Jews whose most desperate desire is to disappear into the Russian population can do to convince the regime of their "reliability." Emigration thus becomes a "cause" as well as a consequence of policies directed against Jews.

Moreover, Jewish emigration has aroused negative popular reaction, perhaps fanned by the extensive media coverage given to émigrés. This coverage has stressed the troubles experienced by Jews who have gone to Israel and the United States, rather than the actual process of emigration and the reasons for it. The main themes are the misery of immigrants in capitalist countries, which are so inhumane as not to provide employment, free education, and free medical care; the social isolation of the immigrants and the hostility they encounter; and the desire of émigrés to return to the Soviet Union. At the same time, there is little encouragement for them to return. Said one commentator:

> *Our motherland has a good heart. Good—but not all-forgiving. A motherland is not something you can set aside for a moment and then take up again when necessity arises.*[44]

Before 1971, the press always explicitly mentioned that the reason for emigration was reunification of families dispersed by World War II, and this was treated as a bona fide reason. When the emigration assumed mass proportions, emigrants were said to be leaving because they had been "deceived by Zionist propaganda," or else were unscrupulous opportunists whose main desire in life was to get rich quick, or fanatic enemies of the Soviet system.

No systematic evidence of popular reactions to emigration is available, of course, but from conversations with Jews and non-Jews who have no intention of emigrating and with those who have done so, one gets the impression that there are three types of reaction to the emigration. One reaction is simply jealousy:

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[42] For some data on how émigré Lithuanians and Germans perceive Soviet Jews and other nationalities, see Juozas Kazlas, "Social Distance Among Ethnic Groups," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States; Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

[43] For an interesting account of the Soviet view of Germans living in the Volga districts, see Richard Levine, "The German-Russians' Reaction to German Invasion," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1977–78.

[44] V. Sil'chenko in *Znamya kommunizma* (Odessa), Mar. 30, 1974. For examples of the literature on immigrants to Israel, see V. Gorbunov et al., "The Truth About the 'Promised Land,'" *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 12, 1972, and the pamphlet *Svidetel'stva obmanutykh* (Testimony of the Deceived), Moscow, n.p., 1972.



A photograph of two Jewish physicists who applied for Soviet exit permits but were turned down and then fired from their jobs.

—Jesse Zel Lurie/Pictorial Parade.

the Jews are lucky and privileged, for they are allowed to leave the country while others cannot do so. A second reaction is sincere puzzlement as to why anyone would want to leave the USSR, with the conclusion sometimes drawn that Jews are ingrates who by their act of emigration are insulting not only the state but all its inhabitants. One well-educated woman who was shocked to learn that her neighbor, a retired scientist, had applied to leave, did not grasp his explanations and denied that there could be any antisemitism because, "after all, my boss (*nachal'nik*) is Jewish." The strong patriotism, even chauvinism, of many Soviet citizens and their profound ignorance and suspicion of foreign countries and customs lead many who have no special feelings about Jews to take the latter's emigration as a personal blow, and they become more receptive to the negative images of Jews projected by the Soviet media. Russian nationalist groups seem to be ambivalent about the emigration of Jews and other minorities: on the one hand, it is a slap in the face to Russia, on the other, it is seen to free her of alien elements.[45] A third reaction, devoid of ambivalence, is "good riddance" to the Jews. One need not be a passionate antisemite to feel this way (though surely there are not a few persons who could be so described); one need only calculate that the departure of the Jews opens up jobs, apartments, and places in higher education to those whom Nikita Khrushchev once called "our own cadres."

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[45] One self-described antisemite says, "I welcome the emigration of Jews who leave hating or despising Russia. The emigration of the latter is not so much a blessing for Russia as it is for the Jews who remain here, since the émigrés can no longer infect them with their miasma." But, he continues, "Zionism is too secular an approach to the Jewish problem. The Jewish question can be solved only in the context of peaceful Christian theocracy, the sprouts of which have been distinctly revealed in Soviet Russia." Interview with G. Shimanov in *Yevrei v SSSR* (Jews in the USSR), reproduced in *Yevreyskiy samizdat*, Vol. 13, 1977, pp. 175–88. See also Dimitry Y. Pospielovsky, "The Jewish Question in Russian Samizdat," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, No. 2, 1978.

To sum up, then, what we appear to have been witnessing in the 1970's is a stiffening of Soviet anti-Jewish policies with an attendant increase in antisemitic sentiment. This marks a significant shift away from the more ambivalent policies which had pertained through much of the Soviet period. While the early Soviet leaders had spoken in favor of Jewish assimilation, they had accorded the Jews identity as a nationality. Although traditional Jewish culture had been repressed, by force when necessary, a substitute "Bolshevized" Jewish culture had been actively promoted. Then even that culture was repressed, but the doors were opened wide to Jewish participation and even leadership in the overall life of the Soviet Union. When the Jews were excluded from political leadership, they were still allowed a fair chance at cultural and scientific leadership. These fields, too, have now been greatly narrowed for Jews, and any chance for some version of Jewish cultural life has been eliminated. At the same time, however, Jews have been consistently denied the chance to assimilate, to "disappear" into the Russian or other populations. Official identification of Jews and the social importance of ethnicity in Soviet society leave the Jew suspended in an identity which has little, if any, positive value for him and which can have only "unpleasant consequences." The remnants of Jewish religion and culture are being forced to wither away, while the formality of Jewish identification is preserved.

In the past decade, the contradictions inherent in this situation have developed to the point of creating a profound qualitative change in the relationship between the Soviet regime and its Jewish citizens. It is not certain that this change was the result of any comprehensive policy decision. More, it appears to be the result of incremental changes, of cumulative policies. Whatever its origins, however, the change can be characterized as a final divorce between Jewish citizens and the Soviet system. Each has decided that it is unwanted by the other. The anti-Zionist campaign, which the authorities may have originally seen as an exigency of their overall Middle Eastern policy, has become an antisemitic campaign, whether or not it was so intended. It is in no small measure responsible, if not for the original thrust toward emigration, then certainly for the continuation of this mass movement, whose participants are no longer so much drawn to Zion as they are repelled by the country and the system which have in effect declared all of them to be untrustworthy and undesirable. Reconciliation between the regime and the Jews may be impossible, as each side feels injured and betrayed by the other.

Because of the large number of persons involved (there were more than 2 million Jews recorded in the 1970 Soviet census), the great majority of the USSR's Jewish population will remain in the country for the near term, if we assume no drastic easing of emigration restrictions. (In a decade, only some 10 percent of the Soviet Jews have departed.) However, the position of the Jews has been made sufficiently untenable that the 1980's are likely to see continued pressure for emigration and a concomitant worsening of the situation of those remaining. When the cycle will exhaust itself cannot be ascertained at the present time. But it looks as if, having been already erased from the pages of USSR history, the Jews will continue to disappear from the land itself.

Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement

By William M. LeoGrande

One of the clearest indications of the changing international system has been the rapid growth, in both size and influence, of the movement of nonaligned nations. When the nonaligned movement was founded nearly 20 years ago, its 25 member states constituted an island of neutralism in a sea of cold war politics. Buffeted by the waves of international tension between East and West, these states, lacking much in the way of economic or military might, sought an alternative to bloc politics and cold war.

When the nonaligned nations gathered in Havana in September 1979 for their sixth summit, the 94 delegations in attendance could note with satisfaction that their movement's membership included virtually the entire Third World. Their deliberations would set the agenda for the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly (in which they would constitute an overwhelming majority) and for the continuing North-South dialogue on global economic issues. Moreover, the superpowers, which had so often ignored their entreaties in the past, were jealously courting their goodwill.

The choice of Cuba as host for the sixth summit, and therefore as chairman of the nonaligned nations until 1982, symbolized another change in the movement—the dramatic shift to the left in its political center of gravity. When the world's leading neutralists banded together in 1961, their principal aim was to ease international tensions and, hopefully, preserve the peace of the world. By 1979, the priorities of the movement had shifted to the issues of decolonization and international economics—issues on which neutrality toward the blocs proved to be more formal than real.

In addition, the evolution of the movement has increased its internal conflicts. The increase in its membership has made the movement more heterogeneous, and the growth in its influence has made its decisions more weighty. Both have served to strain to the limits the tradition of decision-making by consensus. However, the movement's most serious internal tensions have resulted from its radicalization. From the outset, the nonaligned movement included both radical and moderate wings. A moderate majority steered the movement through its first decade, emphasizing the bloc-neutral issue of world peace. The 1970's brought a new majority, a new set of issues, and an increasingly anti-Western thrust to the movement. By 1979, the conflict between the movement's radical and moderate wings no longer seemed containable. As they convened in Havana, the nonaligned nations brought to the summit no less a question than how to define the future course of their movement.

The Emergence of Nonalignment

The nonaligned movement came into being in a global context which was to have important bearing upon its subsequent development. In 1955, the "Colombo group" convened the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian States, the first major gathering of Third World countries. The 29 nations in attendance addressed many of the issues which have since become

Mr. LeoGrande is Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Government and Public Administration, American University (Washington, DC). He has contributed articles on Cuba and on Latin America to such publications as Foreign Affairs, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Studies in Comparative Communism, Cuban Studies, *and* Journal of Strategic Studies.

Fidel Castro, Chairman of the Sixth Nonaligned Summit, discusses the progress of the conference with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

the dominant themes of the nonaligned movement. They denounced colonialism, spoke with urgency of the need to promote economic development in the Third World, and called for a relaxation of international tensions based upon the famous five principles of friendly cooperation and five principles of peaceful coexistence.[1]

Shortly after the close of the conference, two of its most prestigious participants, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, traveled to the Yugoslav island of Brioni for a summit with Josip Broz Tito, the only major "neutralist" leader not present at Bandung. Their joint declaration from the Brioni summit expressed support for the Bandung principles and, at Tito's urging, included a specific attack on the division of the world into hostile power blocs. The Yugoslavs, naturally, were interested in enlisting Third World support for their own antibloc foreign policy of "positive coexistence."[2]

It was not until 1961, however, that a major international conference brought together the Brioni theme of nonalignment and the Bandung themes of anticolonialism, economic development, and peaceful coexistence. In the intervening years, the cold war placed peace at the top of the international agenda and stimulated greater cooperation among the "neutralists" in the United Nations. One of the earliest peace initiatives by the neutralists was the 1960 joint resolution (from Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and President Sukarno of Indonesia) to the UN General Assembly calling for a summit meeting between US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to diffuse rising international tensions.

That joint venture was a precursor of the first nonaligned conference. At Tito's initiative, Yugoslavia,

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[1] Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1956, pp. 92–102.

[2] Lars Nord, *Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*, Stockholm, Raben and Sjögren, 1974, pp. 86–89.

Egypt, and India set about the task of organizing a summit for the leaders of all nonaligned nations. Invitations were to be based on four criteria of nonalignment: (1) an independent foreign policy dedicated to peaceful coexistence; (2) support for national liberation movements; (3) nonparticipation in military pacts deemed "instruments of the cold war"; and (4) unwillingness to grant military bases to the great powers. The first criterion was so general as to be open to multiple interpretations, the second was so politically divisive that it was ignored from the outset, and the third was interpreted loosely enough to accommodate even nations with close military ties to bloc powers. Only the fourth criterion was applied with any consistency. Over succeeding years, nonalignment has come to be whatever a majority of the movement's members say it is.[3]

The First Nonaligned Conference was held in Belgrade in 1961 with 25 nations attending. It dealt with the same basic themes as the Bandung Conference before it, but while Bandung's emphasis had been on decolonization and economic development, the Belgrade meeting's first priority was world peace.[4] This stress reflected not only the Yugoslav influence but also the Third World's desire to play a positive role in relaxing international tensions. The neutralism of nonalignment was based upon the realization that isolationism or uninvolved neutrality would provide no refuge from the ravages of thermonuclear war. Nonalignment was thus "positive neutralism," a position from which to exert moral suasion in the interests of peace and, on occasion, to act as an honest broker mediating conflicts which threatened to escalate into conflagration. At the same time, the emphasis stemmed from a desire to avoid entangling alliances with the great powers which might jeopardize the security of weaker states over issues not of their choosing.

From the outset, the nonaligned nations vehemently denied an intent to create a "third bloc." Their consensus was that the division of the world into opposing blocs was precisely the cause of world tension; the demolition of such blocs was their goal. In any event, the practical possibility of forming a unified bloc was quite remote in light of the diversity of interests and ideology among the nonaligned nations.

The thematic balance of the conference was an important political issue. Denunciations of the cold war

Some key participants at the First Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961: from left to right, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia; Sa'ib Salam of Lebanon; President Adan Abdullah Osman of the Somali Republic; Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan; Sheikh Suwayyil of Saudi Arabia; King Hassan II of Morocco; Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia; Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon; President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia; President Sukarno of Indonesia; President Oswaldo Dorticós of Cuba; President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud of Afghanistan; President Modibo Keita of Mali; and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

—UPI.

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[3] Ibid., p. 88.

[4] *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries*, Belgrade, Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, 1961.

could be bloc-neutral. The US and USSR were held equally to blame for international tensions, and pleas for peace could be directed at both without prejudice. However, denunciations of colonialism and underdevelopment were implicitly anti-Western. It was the developed capitalist countries which still held colonial possessions and dominated the international economic system to which the Third World belonged. Thus, so long as the nonaligned movement took world peace as its first priority, it could maintain a position equidistant from both East and West, but once the issues of colonialism and international economics came to the fore, nonalignment would tend to take on a decidedly anti-Western hue.

Among the great powers, both the USSR and China in general reacted favorably to the emergence of nonalignment. As for the former, peaceful coexistence had become the cornerstone of Khrushchev's own foreign policy, and the nonaligned nations' pleas for peace helped bolster his position against the ideological assaults of hardliners in both Moscow and Peking. Soviet policy toward the Third World was then also entering a more pragmatic and optimistic phase centered on the new concept of "national democracy," and even Yosif Stalin's legacy of animosity toward Tito was giving way to rapprochement.[5]

The Chinese were less sanguine about peaceful coexistence than were Soviet leaders, but given Chou En-lai's central role at Bandung and China's perennial desire to lead the Third World, the Chinese could hardly attack a Third World movement which was Bandung's lineal descendant. Consequently, China praised the nonaligned movement while warning against the illusion of peaceful coexistence with im-

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[5] See, for example, John S. Reshetar, Jr., "The Soviet Union and the Neutralist World," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, PA), November 1965, pp. 81–91.



Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signs autographs after the conclusion of the Conference of Afro-Asian States in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

—Wide World.

perialism.[6]

If the Eastern bloc regarded the emergence of nonalignment with equanimity, the Western bloc, led by the United States, tended to ignore the movement because the combined political, economic, and military power of its members was so negligible. In the 1950's, it is true, US policy had been actively hostile toward neutralism. Not only had John Foster Dulles had a strictly bipolar vision of world politics (i.e., friends or enemies), but the weight of Bandung's anticolonial and development principles had seemed to be directed against the West. However, US policy had begun to moderate as the size and influence of the neutralist camp grew and as it became clear that this camp was not merely a new anti-Western bloc. Although suspicions remained, US policy by the early 1960's was no longer openly antagonistic toward either neutralism or nonalignment.[7]

The second and third nonaligned summits (at Cairo in 1964 and Lusaka in 1970) did not differ markedly from the Belgrade meeting.[8] The promotion of world peace, which had been the original impetus for the movement's creation, continued to be its first priority. This was still the issue which united the movement rather than dividing it along ideological lines. The issues of colonialism and economic development, with their anti-Western thrust, were more contentious, and the ideological cleavages within the nonaligned movement became visible around them in Cairo and Lusaka. Moderate members (e.g., India, Kenya, Nigeria, Ceylon) tended to concentrate their attention on the cold war, while the more radical nations (e.g., Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Cuba) pressed for equal emphasis on the anticolonial and economic themes. In Cairo, the radicals fared well because the movement's newly independent African members were staunchly anticolonialist and because the summit followed close upon the historic 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—one of the early milestones of Third World solidarity on international economic issues.

In contrast, the Lusaka summit was quite conservative. In the six years between Cairo and Lusaka, the radical group in the movement lost nearly all of its most prestigious leaders; Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria all departed from the scene. As a result, the final declaration from the Lusaka summit was "depoliticized."[9] Avoiding economic issues, it condemned "big powers" but reserved no special opprobrium for capitalism or imperialism. Only on the issue of colonialism was the more radical tone of the Cairo declaration retained.

The Lusaka summit was the last meeting of the nonaligned movement which would be so moderate; it marked the end of the movement's initial stage of development. By the time the nonaligned nations assembled for their fourth summit in Algiers in 1973, the international environment had changed markedly. Cold war had given way to détente, with a consequent reduction in the urgency of the peace issue, and international economics had come to the fore as the most urgent issue for the Third World. The shift in the movement's major concerns was accompanied by the emergence of a new international leader whose prestige in the movement rivaled that of its founders—Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Cuban Nonalignment in the 1960's

Cuba was a founding member of the nonaligned movement and, during the 1960's, its only representative from Latin America. The island nation found itself caught in the cross fire of the cold war—a perilous situation that epitomized the fears which had given birth to nonalignment. The declarations from the early summits consistently called for the US to halt all hostile acts against Cuba and to withdraw from the Guantánamo naval base.

Despite this support, Cuba placed relatively low priority on its role in the nonaligned movement.[10] Faced with what it perceived as a formidable threat from the United States, Cuba would probably have preferred a formal Soviet commitment to its security—even if that meant ineligibility as a nonaligned nation. Furthermore, Cuban foreign policy was sharply at odds with the then-prevailing consensus within the movement. While the nonaligned summits focused on easing international tensions between the superpowers, Cuba remained deeply skeptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence unless and until it extended to coexistence between big and small powers. As one of the nonaligned movement's most radical members, Cuba consistently advocated putting greater emphasis on anticolonial and economic issues. Indeed, for the Cubans, the problems of cold war, colonialism, and underdevelopment all sprang from the same root—imperialism—and hence could not be successfully addressed in isolation *or* by the movement's continued neutrality toward the West.[11]

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[6] See, for instance, Harold M. Vinacke, "Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone," ibid., pp. 113–20.

[7] See, for example, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "The United States and the Neutralists: A Decade in Perspective," ibid., pp. 92–101.

[8] On these two gatherings, see respectively *Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries*, Cairo, n.p., 1964; and Nord, op. cit., pp. 90–163.

[9] Nord, op. cit., p. 141.

[10] The Belgrade and Cairo summits, for instance, were attended by President Osvaldo Dorticós instead of Fidel Castro; the Lusaka summit was attended by Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa.

In advocating a staunchly anti-imperialist view of nonalignment, Cuba had little tolerance for the movement's heterogeneity or its proclivity for papering over ideological rifts with bland generalities. Cuba's delegates were always urging the movement (usually in vain) to be bold in addressing world issues, to identify the nation's "responsible" for conflict, to formulate solutions to world problems, and to act forthrightly to make those solutions a reality. The Cubans were asking for more unity of will and purpose than the movement possessed.[12]

While Cuba's position at the early summits was consistently anti-imperialist, it was not explicitly pro-Soviet. In Belgrade and Cairo, President Dorticós never once mentioned the Soviet Union, and Cuba's specific recommendations on several issues (e.g., peaceful coexistence and the partial nuclear test ban treaty) were at odds with prevailing Soviet policy. At both meetings, Dorticós was careful to describe the Cuban revolution as a national liberation struggle, portraying the US-Cuban conflict in anti-imperialist rather than cold war terms:

> *The Cuban conflict emerges not from the tensions of the cold war between nuclear powers. . . .*
>
> *It is a conflict between an imperialist power accustomed to imposing its domination and exploitation of the nations of Latin America, and a people that decided to make a Revolution and to forge their true independence. . . .*[13]

Cuba's reticence to identify itself too openly with the USSR was due in part to very real differences between Cuban and Soviet foreign policies. In the mid-1960's especially, Cuba felt that the Soviets were not providing sufficient internationalist assistance either to national liberation movements or to "progressive" Third World governments.[14] But the reticence was also good practical politics. In the nonaligned movement of the 1960's, Cuba was already on the radical fringe; to have lauded the Soviet Union would not have improved Havana's standing.

Yet the logic of Cuba's anti-imperialist conception of nonalignment certainly implied that strict neutrality between East and West was an irrational policy for the Third World. If colonialism, underdevelopment, and world tension all stemmed from imperialism (i.e., the international *capitalist* system), then the Third World and the socialist camp obviously had many common interests. Some sort of cooperation against the developed capitalist nations would be a natural strategy for both.

It was not until 1970 (when Cuban-Soviet relations were on firmer ground and the nonaligned movement was at its most conservative) that Cuba finally articulated this logical corollary of its anti-imperialist stance:

> *The real division in the world is between exploited and exploiter countries; between oppressed and oppressor countries. . . . Let us not place the developed socialist countries and the developed capitalist countries under the same flag. The socialist countries are the strongest support and most pugnacious force of the anti-imperialist front, we cannot leave out or isolate them if we expect to engage in a battle with the imperialist countries headed by the U.S. . . .*[15]

In Lusaka, this view was distinctly in the minority. But its expression was a portent of things to come.

The Algiers Summit and Beyond

The 1973 Algiers summit inaugurated a new stage in the development of the nonaligned movement. In the years between the Lusaka and Algiers conferences, the global economic position of the Third World deteriorated precipitously. A series of droughts and floods in 1972–73 ended the world food surplus and sent world market prices soaring. The Third World's bill for imported food more than tripled. Simultaneous inflation and recession in the developed Western countries further aggravated the Third World's balance

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[11] See Dorticós' addresses to the Belgrade and Cairo summits, included in the published documents of the conferences cited in fns. 4 and 6.

[12] At times, the Cubans' frustration burst into the open. At Lusaka, Roa was moved to comment: "It calls for an enormous amount of tolerance to put up with some spurious nonaligned regimes made up of notorious murderers of the people." *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Sept. 27, 1970.

[13] Osvaldo Dorticós, "Position of Cuba at the 2nd Conference of Nonaligned Countries," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), Vol. 4, No. 39, November 1964, pp. 8–19.

[14] On Cuban-Soviet relations during this period, see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969; and Jacques Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

[15] Raul Roa, "Speech at the Nonaligned Conference in Zambia," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 27, 1970.

4ª CONFERENCIA CUMBRE DE LOS PAISES NO ALINEADOS
1973
4th CONFERENCE SUMMIT

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro addresses the Fourth Summit Conference of the Nonaligned Countries in Algiers in 1973; directly behind Castro is President Houari Boumediene of host country Algeria.

—Wide World.

of payments position; inflation pushed up the cost of the Third World's imports from the West, and recession shrank the West's market for Third World exports. Economic growth in the non-oil-producing nations of the Third World came to a virtual halt.[16]

The economic crisis unified the underdeveloped nations around the demand for a more favorable set of international economic relations. Earlier attempts to place this issue on the global agenda had failed, but the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel produced an unprecedented belief that through unity the underdeveloped world could overcome the developed world's reluctance to grant any real concessions. The high point of this new militance on economic issues was, of course, the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), advanced at the 1974 and 1975 Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly. It was at the nonaligned summit in Algiers, however, that the Third World forged its own unity, set its economic agenda, and mapped its strategy for these UN sessions.

With the cold war in abeyance as a result of the Soviet-American détente of 1972, international economics moved to the fore as the Third World's priority issue. Thus, the tone of the Algiers summit was considerably more radical than that of earlier conferences. The Economic Declaration of the Algiers conference opened with the bitter observation that détente, so long sought by the nonaligned nations, "did not have any beneficial effect on the developing countries and international cooperation." The reason, the conference concluded, was imperialism:

> *Imperialism is still the greatest obstacle on the road towards emancipation and progress of the developing countries. . . . Imperialism does not only oppose the economic progress of the developing countries, but also adopts a more aggressive attitude towards those who oppose its intentions, and endeavors to impose political, social, and economical structures which stimulate foreign domination, dependence or neocolonialism on them.*[17]

Behind such radical language, however, was a sharp disagreement over precisely who the "imperialists" were. The most dramatic issue of the 1973 summit was whether to cast global economic issues in a strictly North-South dimension, castigating both Western "imperialism" and Soviet "social-imperialism"; or whether to distinguish between the developed socialist and the developed capitalist countries, reserving condemnation for the latter. Draft resolutions for the summit, authored by Algeria, criticized both East and West, presenting a view similar to China's "three worlds" theory.[18] These prompted L. I. Brezhnev to respond in a message to the conference that the socialist countries were the "natural allies" of the nonaligned. The real division in the world, he advised, was "not between 'big' and 'small,' 'rich' and 'poor,' but between socialism and imperialism."[19]

In Algiers, Fidel Castro, attending his first nonaligned summit, led the opposition to Algeria and Libya's theory of "two imperialisms." Unlike Cuban spokesmen at earlier summits, who had avoided mention of Cuba's socialist character or its friendship with the USSR, Castro addressed these issues head on:

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[16] For discussion of these various trends, see Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977, pp. 149ff.

[17] *Nonalignment: Fourth Summit, Algiers*, Belgrade, NIP, 1973, p. 37.

[18] On the anti-Soviet tone of the conference's preparatory documents, see Fidel Castro, "Speech at the 4th Conference of Nonaligned Nations," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 16, 1973.

[19] For the text of Brezhnev's message, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 5, 1973.

> *I want to remind you that Cuba is a socialist country, Marxist-Leninist, whose final goal is communism. We are proud of this! . . .*
>
> *The theory of "two imperialisms," one headed by the United States, and the other allegedly headed by the Soviet Union . . . has been echoed . . . by leaders and spokesmen of nonaligned countries. . . .*
>
> *Any attempt to pit the nonaligned countries against the socialist camp is profoundly counterrevolutionary and benefits only imperialist interests. Inventing a false enemy can have only one aim, to evade the real enemy. . . . Any estrangement from the socialist camp means weakening and exposing ourselves to the mercy of the still powerful forces of imperialism. It would be a stupid strategy, a case of severe political shortsightedness.*[20]

Reviewing the resolutions of the first three nonaligned summits, Castro reminded the conference that it was the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism led by the United States which the nonaligned nations had consistently condemned.

Not only did Castro's performance elevate him to prominence as one of the movement's foremost leaders, but it also succeeded in defeating efforts to put the conference on record as condemning the Soviet Union. The final declaration was masterfully ambiguous in defining imperialism. However, every specific reference was to a developed Western nation, and the Economic Declaration singled out the "negative policies of developed countries with market economies." Only in the Political Declaration was there a single reference to the need for underdeveloped nations to maintain vigilance "against any kind of hegemony" ("hegemony," of course, being China's code word for Soviet domination).[21]

Cuba's new interest in the nonaligned movement grew directly out of the new activism of Cuban foreign policy in the early 1970's. Once internal equilibrium had been restored after the disastrous sugar harvest of 1970, Cuba emerged from the shadow of domestic preoccupations to play a major role in world affairs.

Initially, Cuba's new foreign policy appeared to be considerably more moderate than the policy of the previous decade. The failure of Cuba's attempts to export revolution to Latin America produced a strategy aimed at breaking Cuba's isolation by diplomatic rather than paramilitary means. Cuban tolerance for nations with different social systems rose markedly.[22]

In the Western Hemisphere, Havana's diplomatic strategy of normalizing relations with any willing moderate government proved to be a great success. The sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1963 began to erode, and pressure built within the inter-American system for Cuba's at least partial reintegration. By 1974, when the sanctions were finally relaxed, 11 governments had already recognized Cuba. Even in the United States, the emergence of détente produced the first faltering steps toward a normalization of US-Cuban relations: the signing of an antihijacking agreement in 1973 and the relaxation of the economic embargo for US corporate subsidiaries abroad in 1974.[23]

The transition from cold war to détente also reduced the direct security threat that Cuba perceived stemming from the US. Consequently, Cuban policymakers could pay greater attention to Cuba's larger, global relations, which had previously taken a back seat because of the immediate concern with deterring a US attack. Anticolonialism and economic development had always been part of the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution, but the circumstances of the 1970's allowed Cuba to pursue such matters with a vigor it had deemed impossible in the 1960's.

These changes in policy led naturally to an increased Cuban role in the nonaligned movement. The prominence of international economic issues and the anticolonial wars in Africa were moving the political center of nonalignment toward the left just when Cuban policy was adopting a more global orientation. Long on record as emphasizing colonial and developmental issues, Cuba became a leading voice in the movement when these issues came to the fore.

As Cuba's role in the nonaligned movement grew, the sensitive issue of Cuba's relationship with the USSR naturally became more prominent. By the time of the Algiers summit, Cuban-Soviet relations were extremely close, with the major tensions of the late 1960's having given way to close cooperation and a virtual identity of views. Thus, when Castro defended the Soviets against the theory of "two imperialisms," a few delegates questioned Cuba's credentials as a nonaligned nation.[24] In 1973, this was not a serious challenge, but subsequent events would raise it anew.

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[20] Castro, "Speech at the 4th Conference of Nonaligned Nations."

[21] *Nonalignment: Fourth Summit, Algiers*, pp. 25ff.

[22] Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall 1978, pp. 83–108.

[23] For an account of this process, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1978, Ch. 4.

[24] See, for instance, the comments by Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi, as reported in *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1973.

Despite the predictions of many Western commentators, Cuba's military involvement in Angola in 1975 did not damage its reputation in the nonaligned movement. Even though the operation was conducted in close cooperation with the Soviet Union, Cuba's long history of solidarity with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) blunted Western charges that the Cubans were merely Soviet puppets.[25] However, a more significant influence on the situation was South Africa's intervention. The bulk of Cuban combat troops arrived in Angola to repulse the South African invasion, and the Cuban presence was implicitly sanctioned by the condemnation of South Africa and recognition of the MPLA government by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[26] The nonaligned movement went even further at its 1976 conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, by openly praising the Cuban involvement:

> *The Conference congratulated the Government and people of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against the South African racist invaders and their allies, and commended the Republic of Cuba and other states which assisted the people of Angola in frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist regime and its allies.*[27]

The fifth summit was a victory for the Cuban view of nonalignment in other ways as well. Economic issues were defined as the "most acute problems" internationally. Their resolution was given the "highest priority," and the Western nations were held to be primarily responsible for "resistance" to the NIEO. "Imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Apartheid, racism, Zionism, and all forms of alien domination," were routinely denounced. But "hegemony" was notably absent from the list, and all the critical references to specific countries were to the Western nations (e.g., France, England, West Germany, Israel, and particularly the United States). As had earlier summits, the Colombo meeting deplored the US embargo against Cuba and the continued existence of the US base at Guantánamo. Moreover, the conference selected Cuba as the site for its next summit.[28]

Thus, even though pressing political matters on the home front (as well as a rumored security problem for him in Sri Lanka) prevented Castro from attending the Colombo summit, the outcome of this meeting brought the movement closer to the Cuban view of nonalignment than it had ever been before. No previous summit had put greater emphasis on economic issues or had been as explicit in its criticism of the West for its dominant position in the global economy, and no previous meeting had been clearer in its support for national liberation movements or in its implicit praise of the Communist camp's support of them. In the 1960's, statements by Cuban delegates had reflected the views only of the most radical wing in the nonaligned movement. By the 1970's, the movement itself had become so radicalized that Cuba's views were widely shared.

If the nonaligned nations had come to agree with Cuba on the essentially antagonistic nature of the Third World's relations with the West, there was considerably less certainty about Cuba's contention that the Communist camp represented a natural ally of the nonaligned. Cuba's deployment of combat troops in Ethiopia, accomplished with much greater Soviet involvement and cooperation than the Angolan intervention, catalyzed debate around this issue.[29]

Despite US attempts to brand the Cubans as "mercenaries" in Angola, most nonaligned nations had viewed Cuba's intervention there as a legitimate one. In Ethiopia, the diplomatic equation was more complex, and the outcome, less positive from Cuba's standpoint. The Soviet Union's readiness to replace the United States as Ethiopia's patron, even at the expense of its friendship with Somalia, struck many observers as crass geopolitical jockeying. Cuba's close cooperation with the Soviets in Ethiopia gave credence to Western charges that Cuban policy was being set in Moscow. Thus, the suspicions of Soviet motives in Africa that were harbored by many nonaligned nations tended to be generalized to Cuba.

Little of this sentiment was publicly expressed in Africa because the Cuban-Soviet intervention was justified as a defense of established borders. Nevertheless, the changing perception of Cuban-Soviet military cooperation became the principal topic of debate at the 1978 Belgrade meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers. Tito opened the conference with a speech which, though it never mentioned the Cubans by name, accused them of assisting the introduction of "new forms of colonial presence or bloc dependence in Africa." In the debates that followed, a number of delegates attacked, either directly or indirectly, the Cubans' role in Africa. India accused Cuba of "bringing in the cold war by the back door," and Egypt suggested that the site of the sixth summit should be changed, lest some members boycott it.[30]

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[25] On the history of Cuban ties to the MPLA, which dated to the mid-1960's, see William M. LeoGrande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh, PA), January 1980, pp. 1–45.

[26] Some Cuban troops did arrive in Angola before the South African invasion (estimates range from 500 to 3,000), but the major buildup came later. See ibid. On the OAU condemnation of South Africa, see *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1976.

[27] See the conference's Political Declaration, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC), Aug. 23, 1976.

[28] For the texts of the Colombo conference's declarations, see ibid., Aug. 23 and 24, 1976.

[29] See the discussion of the Belgrade foreign ministers' meeting which follows. Unlike the Angolan campaign, the Ogaden war was planned largely by the Soviet Union, which put several thousand advisers into Ethiopia in early 1978. See LeoGrande, loc. cit.

Cuba's answer to these charges was a preview of the conception of nonalignment which Cuba would later champion at the sixth summit. Its representatives at Belgrade argued that the movement had historically supported the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, and that Cuba's involvements in Angola and Ethiopia were undertaken in defense of these principles. Though the movement had consistently opposed cold war military blocs, the Cubans maintained, it had never construed the blocs as "equally enemies of the nonaligned countries . . . Cuba would never accept that"; on the contrary, the movement had always condemned the specific policies of the West, not those of the Communist camp. While the Cubans professed no desire to reduce the movement to an appendage of the Soviet Union, they called on its members to recognize that "the socialist countries, by

VIVA EL
INTERNACIO
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Cuban soldiers remain in the Ogaden assisting Ethiopian forces in October 1978. The message spelled out in the foreground is "Long Live Internationalism."

—Bernard Couret-Gamma/Liaison.

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[30] "Tito Addresses Nonaligned Ministerial Conference," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), July 25, 1978; *The New York Times*, July 26, 29, 30, and 31, 1978.

the very nature of their system and their politics, are natural allies" of the nonaligned.[31]

Despite Cuba's close cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Ogaden war, the nonaligned movement's moderates, led by Yugoslavia and Egypt, could not get the Belgrade conference to adopt even an implicit censure of Cuba's actions. Though some African states (notably Nigeria and Kenya) voiced concern about the prospect of a long-term Cuban military presence in Africa, none was willing to defend Somali aggression or, conversely, to protest too loudly the Cuban and Soviet efforts on Ethiopia's behalf. The Belgrade meeting reaffirmed Havana as the site for the sixth summit and rejected an anti-Cuban resolution condemning foreign military involvement in member states.[32]

Shortly after the Belgrade meeting, full-scale war erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia. Cuba's position on this issue proved to be much more damaging diplomatically than any of its African involvements. In the UN debate over Vietnam's active role in the overthrow of Pol Pot, no delegation was more vitriolic than Cuba's in its denunciations of Pol Pot and Norodom Sihanouk or more unwavering in its defense of Vietnam, Havana's longtime friend and ally. When the nonaligned nations composed a compromise resolution on Cambodia which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops (but did not mention the Vietnamese by name), Cuba opposed it.[33] Solidarity with Vietnam took precedence in this case over Cuba's support for the principle of territorial integrity, thus making Cuba's defense of the same principle in Ethiopia appear more expedient than sincere, the egregiousness of Pol Pot's terror notwithstanding. Hence, the stage was set for battle over the Cambodia issue at the Havana summit.

Toward the Havana Summit

Sensing that the sixth summit could prove to be as pivotal for the nonaligned movement as the 1973 summit in Algiers, a number of countries launched intense diplomatic efforts in early 1979 to influence its outcome. The radical wing of the movement, led by the Cubans (and including Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, among others), saw the upcoming summit as an opportunity to consolidate the leftward course the movement had been on since Algiers. Ideally, they hoped to win endorsement of their explicitly anti-imperialist definition of nonalignment, including, if possible, the thesis that the Communist camp constituted a "natural ally" of the nonaligned.

As host for the sixth summit, Cuba was responsible for preparing a draft of the final conference declaration, consulting with member states on revisions, and then submitting a revised draft to the summit's participants. Cuba's authorship of the initial draft obviously gave the radicals an important advantage, though it also placed upon the Cubans a consensus-building responsibility which forced them to be more conciliatory than they might otherwise have been.

The moderate wing of the movement, led by Yugoslavia (and including Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, and Egypt, among others), mobilized their own diplomatic efforts, aimed at countering Cuba's campaign in favor of its draft resolution. Yugoslavia lobbied particularly hard to prevent the movement from abandoning its nominal neutralism (however anti-Western in content) and endorsing the Cuban thesis that the Soviets were the "natural allies" of the nonaligned. President Tito himself made three major international trips and conferred with many additional delegations in Belgrade in his efforts to build a consensus around the Yugoslav position.[34]

The diplomatic maneuvering also extended beyond the bounds of the movement's membership. The Soviets lauded the increasingly anti-imperialist direction of the nonaligned nations and proclaimed their common interests with the Soviet camp. Beyond this, Soviet efforts seem to have been relatively restrained.[35] Since the central issue of the summit promised to be the movement's relationship to the USSR, an activist approach on the part of the Soviets might well have produced a backlash. Moreover, the Cubans, as hosts of the summit, were already engaged in extensive consultations with prospective participants, and since Cuban and Soviet views were virtually congruent, the Soviets could rest assured that their position would be well represented.

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[31] Isidoro Malmierca, "Speech at the Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries," and Carlos Raphael Rodríguez, "Statement during a Press Conference in Belgrade," *Granma Weekly Review*, Aug. 13, 1978.

[32] At the Khartoum OAU meeting just prior to Belgrade, Nigeria's head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, thanked Cuba and the USSR for its aid to African states but pointedly warned them "not to overstay their welcome . . . lest they run the risk of being dubbed a new imperialist presence." See *The New York Times*, July 20, 1978. The controversy on this point at Belgrade is summarized in ibid, July 26, 1978.

[33] On Cuba's opposition to the Security Council resolution on Cambodia, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), Jan. 15, 1979.

[34] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 29, 1979.

[35] Soviet press commentary dwelt mainly on the diplomatic efforts of the United States, characterizing them as an attempt to split the nonaligned movement and to drive a wedge between the movement and its natural allies. See, e.g., A. Klimov, "On the Havana Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1979, pp. 43–50; and the commentaries reported in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 9, 20, 21, and 28, 1979.

The Yugoslavs criticized the Soviets' public position (see especially the interview with Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milorad Pesic, *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 29, 1979) but did not mention Soviet diplomatic activities. This suggests that such activities were probably fairly limited, for the Yugoslavs did not hesitate to criticize both Cuba (see the Pesic interview) and the US (see the interview with Tito, *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 23, 1979) for efforts of this sort.

The United States, which had heretofore regarded the movement's triennial summits as having little real influence on global affairs, became deeply concerned about Cuba's efforts to further radicalize the movement, and deeply involved in the attempts to thwart it. A variety of factors converged to heighten US interest in the sixth summit. In the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger's foreign policy, the tangible assets of economic and military might had weighed heavily, and official declarations from the economically underdeveloped and militarily weak Third World had counted for little. But the Carter administration's greater sensitivity to world opinion (witness the human rights dimension of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy) made it more disposed to efforts aimed at revitalizing the image of the US among the nations of the Third World. The selection of Cuba as host for the sixth summit was a stark indication of how radicalized the nonaligned movement had already become and raised the specter of a Third World (non)aligned with the USSR. This specter, in turn, catalyzed a US response.

Washington, which had been feuding with Cuba ever since the Ethiopian-Somali war and the vitriolic public exchange between Castro and Carter over the 1978 Katangan invasion of Zaire (Shaba II), sought at first to undermine Cuba's prestige in the movement by focusing on Cuba's "alignment" with the USSR. The inability of Yugoslavia and Egypt to muster any real support for censuring Cuba at the Belgrade meeting, however, demonstrated the futility of this strategy. As the Havana summit approached, the United States shifted its diplomatic efforts toward influencing the text of the summit's final declaration. The US goal, like that of the movement's moderates, was to undo as much of the anti-imperialist language in the Cuban draft as possible.[36]

Substantively, the content of the draft (which Cuba circulated among the member states in July 1979) did not depart sharply from the positions adopted by the Colombo summit. In tone, however, it clearly reflected Cuba's anti-imperialist conception of nonalignment. Its condemnations of imperialism were more numerous and specific (naming particular countries) than those of earlier declarations; its analysis of international economics placed the blame for underdevelopment more directly on the developed market economies than ever before; and it spoke repeatedly of cooperation between the nonaligned states and the Communist camp (sometimes referred to elliptically as "peace-loving forces"). Nowhere, however, did it refer to the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the nonaligned nations. In their extensive consultations with member states, the Cubans had apparently discovered that the movement was not ready to break so openly with its tradition of neutrality toward the blocs. The absence of the "natural alliance" thesis from the Cuban draft provided the first indication that the question of the movement's relationship to the USSR would not be directly engaged but would instead be dealt with obliquely, through other issues.[37]

The Sixth Summit

As the sixth summit began, a sharp clash was expected between Castro and Tito on the issue of the nonaligned movement's relationship to the USSR. Tito's willingness to undertake the arduous trip to Havana despite his tenuous health was a good measure of the Yugoslavs' resolve to blunt the radical thrust Cuba seemed intent on imparting to the movement.

Castro's opening address to the summit, like his 1973 speech in Algiers, frankly set forth Cuba's views on the main issues under debate. He did not, however, dwell on the movement's relationship to the Communist camp or insist on the "natural alliance" thesis. He chose, instead, to emphasize the need for unity in the struggle against imperialism and to promise that Cuba would not "try to impose our radicalism on anyone."[38]

When Tito addressed the conference, he too stressed the need for unity and the need to "resist all attempts to insinuate alien interests into our ranks." "We have, from the very outset, been consistently opposed to bloc politics and foreign domination, to all forms of political and economic hegemony," he argued. "We have never been anyone's rubber stamp."[39] Tito's low-key address, delivered from a chair at the foot of the dais, was hardly the spirited rebuttal of Castro that many delegates had expected.

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[36] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1979.

[37] Accounts available to the author.

[38] Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Inaugural Session of the 6th Summit of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries," *Granma Weekly Review*, Sept. 9, 1979.

[39] "President Tito Addresses Havana Nonaligned Summit," *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 4, 1979.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro delivers an address to the Sixth Nonaligned Summit, to which his country played host.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

Yet it hardly needed to be. If it seemed anticlimactic, it was because the issue itself had no climax. Castro was unwilling to provoke a conflict over the "natural alliance" thesis because he was astute enough to know that the consensus of the movement was against Cuba on the issue.

Julius Nyerere's speech was a bellwether. Perhaps the most respected African leader and a consistent supporter of the liberation of Southern Africa, Nyerere could never be mistaken for an imperialist stooge. Yet on the issue of a natural alliance between the nonaligned movement and the Communist camp, he stood with the moderates, warning that such a course would cause the movement to "cease to be an influence on the world, and fall apart." His remarks drew long applause.[40]

In the final declaration from the summit, virtually all the draft's references to cooperation with the Communist camp were omitted. To the numerous condemnations of "imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, Zionism, and apartheid," the evils of "bloc politics" and "hegemony" were added. Finally, a large number of criticisms directed at the policies of specific Western countries were replaced by more ambiguous references to "imperialist forces." In short, though the substantive positions adopted on many global issues made the final declaration from Havana more "anti-Western" than any preceding declaration, it did not even implicitly embrace the Cuban thesis of a natural alliance between the nonaligned nations and the Communist camp.[41]

If the "natural alliance" issue produced less conflict than anticipated, the issues of Cambodia and Egypt generated more. The credentials fight over Cambodia proved most bitter, for on this issue, the Cubans were not prepared to lose. When Pol Pot had been overthrown, Cuba had broken with the majority of nonaligned nations by opposing the compromise resolution they had presented to the UN Security Council. In solidarity with Vietnam, Cuba had argued that Pol Pot's barbarity and Cambodia's border raids against Vietnam justified Vietnam's intervention and, implicitly, overrode the principle of territorial integrity.[42] Cuba had recognized the Heng Samrin government forthwith.

The question of which Cambodian regime the nonaligned movement should recognize arose first at the June 1979 meeting in Sri Lanka, held to prepare for the Havana summit. Cuba contended that Heng Samrin's government should assume Cambodia's seat, but this view was distinctly in the minority. Pol Pot's delegation was seated for the preparatory meeting, and the credentials issue was referred to the ambassadorial conference scheduled for the eve of the summit.[43]

The extent of Pol Pot's support was surprising, since there was virtually universal agreement that his regime had been genocidal. While many nations invoked the principle of territorial integrity in Pol Pot's defense, this was clearly only a partial explanation for their unwillingness to recognize Heng Samrin. No doubt some nations were genuinely uneasy about accepting a government brought to power by external intervention, especially when the old regime was still active on the battlefield. However, no one suggested that the movement should continue to recognize Idi Amin as the true representative of Uganda, even though the Tanzanian intervention there was as justified (or unjustified) as Vietnam's foray into Cambodia.

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[40] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1979.

[41] *Final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, 3–7 September 1979*, Havana, mimeographed, 1979.

[42] See *FBIS-LAM*, Jan. 12 and 15, 1979.

[43] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 28, 1979.

Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito pictured at the September 1979 summit of nonaligned states in Havana.

—Patrick Frilet-Sipa Press from Black Star.

Prince Sihanouk's active denunciation of the Heng Samrin government also contributed to Pol Pot's support, despite the Prince's acerbic descriptions of Pol Pot's reign.[44] Sihanouk had once been a highly respected neutralist leader, and his voice carried considerable weight. Moreover, there was strong precedent for the movement's refusing to recognize a de facto government in Cambodia. In 1970, the peripatetic Prince had succeeded in blocking the movement's recognition of the Lon Nol regime, which had ousted Sihanouk the year before.

But the main reason for the nonaligned movement's resistance to acceptance of the Heng Samrin government had little to do with the virtue of Pol Pot, the prestige of Prince Sihanouk, or the principle of territorial integrity. At root, Heng Samrin's opponents, led by Yugoslavia, saw the Cambodian credentials fight as a concrete manifestation of the general issue of the movement's relationship to the Soviet Union. Pol Pot's government was a renegade Communist regime brought down by Vietnam with close Soviet cooperation and support. For the moderates, it was this Soviet connection that rendered the Tanzanian-Ugandan comparison irrelevant. Tanzania's intervention had had nothing to do with bloc politics, but for those who viewed Vietnam (and Cuba) as nonaligned in name only, the Cambodian intervention was bloc intervention by proxy. Yugoslavia had helped inaugurate the nonaligned movement in large part to provide itself with a bulwark of world opinion to deter Soviet intervention against its own renegade brand of socialism. For Yugoslavia, destined soon to face the trauma of Tito's death, it was imperative that the movement refuse to legitimate the overthrow of Pol Pot in any way.[45]

As the ambassadors of the nonaligned nations assembled in Havana in late August, the general expectation was that the Cambodia credentials fight would end in a compromise patterned after the 1970 decision at Lusaka to leave Cambodia's seat vacant rather than give it to either Sihanouk or Lon Nol. Heng Samrin's supporters, including both Cuba and Vietnam, were advocating such a compromise, knowing full well they did not have the support to win full recognition for the new regime; however, Pol Pot's supporters were uncompromising. Hence, the summit opened on September 3 with the credentials issue still unresolved.

On September 6, the foreign ministers met to consider a Cuban resolution urging that the seat be left vacant. Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca, presiding over the meeting, asked for opponents of the resolution to speak against it; 16 delegations did. Then, rather than calling for a vote, Malmierca concluded that since only 16 nations were opposed to the resolution, it was approved. He adjourned the meeting and left the hall as a roar of protest erupted.[46]

Not to be defeated by such sleight of hand, the resolution's opponents (especially Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia, Yugoslavia, and India) appealed directly to Castro, demanding that the issue be reconsidered. That same night, a special meeting of the movement's 25-member Coordinating Bureau was convened. It proved to be the most rancorous meeting of the summit. Castro himself argued the Cuban case for the compromise resolution, and did so in the strongest terms. At one point, he accused Pol Pot's supporters of being "saboteurs, wreckers, and imperialist stooges." Over the vocal opposition of Malaysia and Singapore, the Coordinating Bureau accepted the Cuban compromise of leaving Cambodia's seat vacant pending a review of the issue at the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting. The heads of state, in turn, accepted the Coordinating Bureau's recommendation.[47]

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[44] See the excerpts from Sihanouk's speech to the United Nations, *The New York Times*, Jan. 12 and 13, 1979.

[45] Though the moderates' position was rarely stated explicitly in these terms, Pol Pot's supporters acknowledged in private that such was their perspective. Moreover, their view was only slightly veiled in their public comments. See the remarks by Singapore's Foreign Minister to *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1979; and the subsequent UN debate on Cambodia's credentials, as reported in *The Washington Post*, Sept. 20 and 22, 1979.

[46] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1979.

Though Cuba won on the Cambodian issue, it was a Pyrrhic victory. In no sense did the final outcome represent a genuine consensus within the nonaligned movement. When the issue of seating Cambodia came before the UN General Assembly just a month later, the compromise of leaving the seat vacant was soundly defeated, with many nonaligned nations voting in favor of Pol Pot. Moreover, Malmierca's handling of the foreign ministers' meeting on Cambodia engendered much bitterness. Charges that Cuba had used its control over arrangements to manipulate the meeting were voiced even by delegations which were not generally opposed to Cuba on the issues.[48]

Forging a nonaligned position on the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel proved to be nearly as contentious as the Cambodia credentials fight. The movement began the summit sharply divided. Radical Arab nations sought Egypt's expulsion as part of their general strategy of ostracizing Anwar al-Sadat, but the OAU, meeting prior to the summit, had resolved to oppose any outright condemnation of Egypt. Cuba seemed to favor some compromise. The draft declaration condemned the Camp David agreements and Egypt in no uncertain terms, but Cuba preferred some form of "censure" to outright expulsion.[49]

The moderate bloc at the conference, reinforced by African states, succeeded in deleting from the final declaration any explicit attack on the accords. At the last minute, however, Cuba introduced a resolution to suspend Egypt's membership in the movement for 18 months until the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting. The threat, of course, was that Egypt might be expelled from the movement at that time unless its foreign policy changed. After an all-night debate, the Cuban resolution was adopted.[50] The suspension of Egypt, which had challenged Cuba's credentials at the Belgrade meeting and had threatened to organize a boycott of the sixth summit, must have come as satisfying revenge for the Cubans.

Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, right, with Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of Guinea, at the September 1979 nonaligned summit in Havana.

—UPI.

Neither the radicals nor the moderates could claim the sixth summit as a clear victory. Given the nonaligned movement's history of consensus decision-making and the desire of both Cuba and Yugoslavia to avoid an open split, most issues were settled by compromise. The pivotal group at the summit turned out to be the states which were not so radical as the Cubans but more radical than the Yugoslavs (Tanzania being the most vocal example). Precisely because this middle group did not operate as a bloc at the summit, each issue found some of these states siding with the radicals and others with the moderates. In competing for the support of this middle group, both Cuba and Yugoslavia were forced to shift their own positions toward the center. Only the Cambodia issue proved unamenable to compromise.

The moderates scored some notable successes at the summit. Foremost among these was frustration of the radicals' desire to put the nonaligned movement on record as a "natural ally" of the Communist camp. The sixth summit did not fundamentally alter the movement's definition of its relationship to the power blocs. In addition, the moderates managed to tone down much of the final declaration's anti-Western rhetoric; to defeat Heng Samrin's bid for recognition;

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[47] *The New York Times*, Sept. 7 and 8, 1979.

[48] For a summary of the complaints over Cuba's handling of the conference, see ibid., Sept. 12, 1979.

[49] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 9 and 10, 1979.

[50] Ibid.

and to avoid any explicit denunciation of the Camp David accords.

Yet the Cubans and their radical supporters also had much to be pleased with in the summit's outcome. While Heng Samrin was not seated, neither was Pol Pot; though Camp David was not denounced, Egypt's membership was suspended; and while the movement would not explicitly ally itself with the Communist camp, the actual content of the summit's final declaration was more critical of the West than that of any previous declarations had been.

The language of the Economic Declaration provides a good illustration of the sorts of victories the radicals gained. This declaration generated much less intense debate at the summit than other matters because the member states remain united in their support of the NIEO. Most of the specific recommendations contained in the document conformed with those of the declaration issued by the Colombo conference. But where the 1976 declaration had blamed the *policies* of the developed market economies for the failure to achieve a New International Economic Order, the Havana declaration defined the problem as a *structural* one resulting from the dominant position of the developed market economies in the global economic system.[51] This difference is more than mere nuance. The linchpin of Cuba's position that the interests of the nonaligned and the Communist camp coincide (hence the basis of the "natural alliance" thesis) is the argument that an objective (i.e., structural) conflict of interest exists between the Third World and the West. Thus, the Havana summit's Economic Declaration took a quiet but not inconsiderable step closer to Cuba's view of nonalignment as anti-imperialism.

Cuba and the Future of Nonalignment

Cuba's objective at the sixth summit was to accelerate the movement's leftward shift, to make the membership recognize what Cuba regards as the inherently anti-imperialist content of its principles and interests. This, as it turned out, was more than the consensus of the movement could bear. While the Cubans did not hesitate to press hard for their positions on the Cambodian and Egyptian issues, they were unwilling to risk splitting the movement on the larger issue of a "natural alliance" with the Communist camp.

Cuba's views thus are still more radical than the movement's consensus. Nevertheless, despite concerted diplomatic efforts by the United States, the results of the Havana summit were more radical than those of any prior summit. The radicalization of the nonaligned movement continued, albeit not as rapidly as Cuba might have liked.

The greatest diplomatic problem generated for Cuba by the summit was an exacerbation of the fear that the Cubans would misuse the chairmanship of the movement, guiding it toward the sort of "natural alliance" with the Communist camp which the conference had clearly rejected. This fear, always present among the movement's moderates, was reinforced by Cuba's handling of the Cambodia issue during the summit itself.

In an obvious effort to assuage such concerns, Castro closed the conference with the promise that Cuba would never exploit the chairmanship to its own benefit, but would use it instead to "struggle and work for others."[52] In presenting the results of the summit to the UN General Assembly several weeks later, Castro emphasized his role as spokesman for the nonaligned movement rather than that of Cuban head of state, and he concentrated his remarks on international economics, the issue around which the movement was most united.[53]

Though his UN address was well received, Castro could not create greater unity among the nonaligned than their inherent ideological diversity would allow. The fragility of the consensus reached at Havana was quickly revealed at the United Nations, first in the defeat of the "nonaligned proposal" to seat neither Pol Pot's nor Heng Samrin's Cambodia in the General Assembly (Pol Pot won easily, gaining a substantial number of votes from nonaligned nations),[54] and later in Cuba's failure to win a Security Council seat. As chairman of the nonaligned, Cuba should have defeated Colombia with no difficulty, yet the election remained deadlocked through 156 ballots. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, Cuba's plurality eroded, and the nonaligned states themselves (led by India and Nigeria) engineered Cuba's withdrawal and the subsequent election of Mexico.[55]

If the tone of Castro's UN address is any indication, Cuba will probably be very cautious about exploiting the movement's chairmanship to give the movement a

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[51] Paragraphs 2f. of Economic Declaration, in *Final Declaration*.

[52] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 10, 1979.

[53] Fidel Castro, *Address Before the 34th Session of the General Assembly*, New York, NY, Cuban Mission to the UN, mimeographed, 1979.

[54] For a discussion of Pol Pot's victory, see *The Washington Post*, Sept. 22, 1979.

[55] Ibid., Jan. 11, 1980.

YES 71 NO 35 ABS 34
YES 71 NO 35 ABS 34

The Pol Pot delegation wins its credentials fight against the representatives of the Vietnam-backed government of Heng Samrin for Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations General Assembly in September 1979. The tally boards show 71 members voting "Yes," 35 voting "No," and 34 abstaining.

—Brian F. Alpert/Keystone.

more leftist cast than the resolutions of the sixth summit warrant. The setbacks at the UN on the Cambodia issue and the Security Council election demonstrate that the moderates among the nonaligned nations have reached the limits of their tolerance for radicalism. Though the Cubans will no doubt interpret the summit's resolutions in radical terms, they are unlikely to risk their newly won prestige by using the chairmanship to push the movement beyond those limits. This is especially true in the new international atmosphere created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Widely (though not universally) condemned in the Third World, the intervention has certainly put an end to any chance that the nonaligned movement will in the foreseeable future acknowledge the Soviet Union as its "natural ally."[56]

Yet neither is the Afghanistan intervention likely to produce a sharp reversal in the orientation of the movement. The leftward shift of the nonaligned movement since 1973 has not come about as the result of the beneficence of the Soviet Union or the diplomatic skill of the movement's radicals. The anti-Western (as distinct from pro-Soviet) consensus which has existed since 1973 is rooted in realities that John Foster Dulles recognized two decades ago: the issues of decolonization and international economics, even when expressed in bloc-neutral terms, tend to be inherently anti-Western in nature. As long as these issues dominate the priorities of the nonaligned movement, it is unlikely to become much more moderate. For now, the movement seems to have reached an uneasy equilibrium in which the radicals content themselves with implicit criticisms of the West, while the moderates are satisfied with having avoided the movement's abandonment of explicit neutrality toward the blocs. Unless Cuba tries to use its chairmanship of the movement to upset this balance, the nonaligned nations will probably maintain their tenuous and imperfect unity.

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[56] Nigeria's UN ambassador, Akporode Clark, commented: "I think that after Havana, the nonaligned movement is undergoing tremendous strain. But in the end, certain things become clear. There are no natural allies." See ibid.

The movement's future attitude toward the West depends primarily on the dynamics of the decolonization and economic issues. While the number of colonies in the world has dwindled greatly over the years, the remaining colonial issues (as the *nonaligned* define them) include some of the world's most intractable political problems—e.g., Namibia, South Africa, and the Middle East. Though they may be few in number, these issues consistently produce the most vociferous denunciations of the West at nonaligned summits.

The North-South dialogue on global economic relations is rarely couched in explicitly anti-Western terms; nevertheless, its development has contributed greatly to the Third World's animosity toward the West. While the Third World's grievances against the developed nations may, in theory, apply equally to both the advanced capitalist and advanced socialist countries, most of the Third World's economic linkages are in fact with the West. Thus, the real antagonisms generated by international economic issues have tended to be between the nonaligned nations and the developed *capitalist* ones.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan does not change these realities—rather, it adds a new dimension to them. Through the past decade, the stance of the nonaligned movement has reflected the Third World's uneasy relations with the West. The Soviet Union has rarely been a principal in the issues which are close to the hearts of the nonaligned. Thus, while it has avoided condemnation, it has also been unsuccessful in persuading the nonaligned that it is their "natural ally," despite the movement's anti-Western consensus. The future, however, will surely bring deeper Soviet involvement in the Third World, both politically and economically. As that happens, the Soviets will run the risk (as the example of Afghanistan dramatically demonstrates) of producing among the nonaligned a new set of grievances which are anti-Soviet rather than anti-Western in character.

In its first decade, the nonaligned movement's politics were defined by the cold war conflict between East and West; in its second decade, its politics were defined largely by the members' grievances against the West alone. As the movement enters its third decade, its politics and policies will increasingly be determined by an interaction with both of the world's power blocs that is more complex than that which characterized the movement's first two decades.

Books

Soviet Energy: Supply vs. Demand

By Edward A. Hewett

ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. *Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry.* Baltimore, MD, and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

JEREMY RUSSELL. *Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy.* London, Saxon House, D. C. Heath Ltd., and Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1976.

IAN F. ELLIOT. *The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and Alternative Power Sources.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD. *Soviet Natural Gas to 1985.* QER Special No. 24. London, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 1975.

JOSEPH T. KOSNIK. *Natural Gas Imports from the Soviet Union: Financing the North Star Joint Venture Project.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER. *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

FUNDAMENTALLY, two issues motivate Western interest in Soviet energy, particularly Soviet oil and gas. One is the prospect that the Soviet Union and the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) collectively will very soon begin to buy more oil than they sell on world markets. By 1985, CMEA's net addition to world oil demand could be substantial—possibly 5 to 6 percent—exacerbating an already bad situation.[1] Consequently, in predicting future supply and demand conditions in the world oil market it is increasingly important that we learn as much as possible about developments in the supply and demand for oil, as well as for other energy sources, within the CMEA countries.

A second issue of interest is how much energy Eastern Europe will be able to buy from the USSR, and conversely how much it will be forced to buy on world markets for hard currency. The European members of CMEA[2] have by and large industrialized on the basis of cheap primary products, including plentiful and cheap oil, which they obtained mainly from the USSR in exchange for manufactures, many of which could not be sold on Western markets. This is an exchange with rapidly escalating costs for the Soviets. New oil is costly to extract and ship, and any oil shipped to Eastern Europe represents considerable hard-currency sales forgone. The question therefore is just what the Soviets will (or can) do to reduce the costs to themselves of this exchange, and hence increase the costs to Eastern Europe.

These should be treated as separate issues. It is of no consequence to world oil markets whether the Soviets ship their oil to Western Europe and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) supplies all of Eastern Europe's oil plus West European needs not covered by Soviet shipments, or the Soviets ship their oil to Eastern Europe and OPEC covers all of West European oil demand plus the East European demand not covered by Soviet oil shipments. Either way, world supply and demand for oil are the same, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe enter as net buyers of oil in the early 1980's. But it is of great consequence for Eastern Europe which of these alternative scenarios comes to pass. A Soviet decision to shift more of its oil exports toward the West would place enormous stress on the hard-currency trade balances, and therefore the economies, of Eastern Europe.

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[1] See the prediction in US Central Intelligence Agency, *The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985*, ER 77-10240 U, Washington, DC, April 1977, p. 15.

[2] In light of varying usage for such terms as Eastern Europe and CMEA, clarification is in order. In this article, "CMEA" refers to Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. For this analysis, Vietnam was excluded because it was not a member during the period for which data are available (it joined in June 1978). Also, for reasons of comparability of statistics, I have included Cuba in all data on CMEA, even those before 1972, when Havana joined the Council. "Eastern Europe" refers to the six East European members of CMEA.

Aside from these issues of international consequence, the Soviet oil and gas industries are interesting for the insight they offer into the general principles of the operation of central planning in the USSR. They are major industries built upon large reserves, and are seemingly amenable to central control. Yet, as we shall see, they manifest several of the major flaws of the Soviet economy—the emphasis on quantity over quality and difficulties in achieving advanced levels of production technology.

Each of the six studies under review touches on at least one of the three issues mentioned here. While the authors treat numerous other issues, the present essay will focus on what the authors have to say about these three matters. At the conclusion, there will be some suggestions about the most necessary and potentially fruitful areas for future research.

AS INDICATED at the outset, the issues of the volume and of the distribution of Soviet energy exports are separable though related. To arrive at a prediction with respect to the former, one must forecast both the supplies of each energy carrier and domestic demand—the difference between the two being the exportable surplus. On the supply side, such an analysis requires an understanding of the geology of the particular energy carrier and also the policies of central planners regarding investments, research and development, and imports of advanced technology. The demand side requires simultaneous analysis of the demand for *all* primary energy sources, because oil, gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power are all somewhat substitutable for each other. Again, in the case of the USSR, government policy plays a prominent role here. If, for example, Soviet planners decide to push lignites as substitutes for oil and gas in electricity generation, that suppresses domestic demand for oil and gas, freeing up production for export.

The studies under review are for the most part concerned with supply prospects for Soviet energy. Robert Campbell's book, which supplements his earlier work,[3] is a first-rate piece of research on the Soviet oil and gas industries. Jeremy Russell's study covers all primary energy sources in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and hence tends to be somewhat less comprehensive than Campbell's on the USSR per se. Ian Elliot's book is a straightforward account of the Soviet energy balance as of the early 1970's, based exclusively on Soviet sources, which he trusted rather more than he should have.[4] The piece on the Soviet gas industry by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is a competent one, but the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has more recently published a somewhat better analysis.[5]

Reviewers in This Issue

EDWARD A. HEWETT—Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Texas (Austin, TX); author of *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, 1974, and of many articles on CMEA and the economies of the USSR and East Europe; the research on which this essay is based was funded in part by a grant from the US Department of Energy.

KIM WOODARD—Research Associate at the Resource Systems Institute of the East-West Center (Honolulu, HI); author of a forthcoming book on *The International Energy Relations of China* and of articles on international relations and energy policy.

PETER GROTHE—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, CA); former foreign relations adviser to the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey; author of *To Win the Minds of Men*, 1958, and a forthcoming book on Scandinavian attitudes toward the United States.

VLADIMIR SOCOR—Doctoral Candidate in History and Member of the Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University (New York, NY); author of articles on international politics in Eastern Europe and Soviet-East European relations since World War II; currently teaching Soviet foreign policy at the New School for Social Research (New York, NY).

ANTONI M. KAPCIA—Senior Lecturer in Spanish and Latin American Studies, The Polytechnic Wolverhampton (Wolverhampton, England); contributor of articles to such journals as *Variedades*, *Cuadernos Americanos*, *Bulletin of the Society of Latin American Studies*, and *Survey*; now engaged in research on the Latin American intellectual origins of Cuban revolutionary ideology.

JOHN K. COOLEY—currently the defense correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* (Washington, DC); formerly the *Monitor's* Middle East correspondent from 1965 to 1978; author of *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs*, 1974; *East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive*, 1965; and *Baal, Christ, and Mohammed: Religion and Revolution in North Africa*, 1964.

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[3] Robert W. Campbell, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968.

[4] For a more satisfactory examination of the energy balance itself, see Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Fuel and Energy Balances*, Research Report R-2257, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1978.

[5] US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Development of the Gas Industry: A Research*

(continued on page 55)

Since the problems of the Soviet oil and gas industries differ in several important ways, I shall discuss them separately. Turning first to oil, we find that much is known about the determinants of Soviet supplies of this commodity, thanks to Campbell's work and to release and public discussion of the CIA's work on this subject.[6] Output in old fields in the USSR is declining very rapidly, so increments to output from new fields must first replace the losses in the former before supplying net additions to total output. One factor contributing to the precipitous decline in output in existing fields is the heavy Soviet reliance on high-pressure water injection techniques to force crude from the basins, an approach that yields high output for a period of time but decreases the total output from the field over its life. Eventually the water breaks through to the well itself before a good deal of the crude is recovered. Submersible electric pumps are a traditional solution to this, and about one third of Soviet crude production comes from the use of such a technique. But Soviet submersible electric pumps are unreliable; therefore, the USSR has had to rely on imported equipment, especially from the United States.

Russell and, especially, Campbell discuss a number of other technology-related bottlenecks impeding attainment of higher oil production in the USSR. One of the more interesting ones mentioned by Campbell is related to the fact that the Soviets are being forced to drill deeper wells. The turbodrill—on which they rely quite heavily—is not well suited to such undertakings. Indeed, it was selected for use in drilling wells in the first place because it did not require the high-quality (too high for Soviet industry) parts that other drilling technologies did. Now the Soviets must face up to the problem of producing such parts or, more likely for the present, importing the needed machinery and equipment from the West.

The problems of technology in the oil industry are in some degree a function of the way in which the Soviet economic system itself is structured. Incentives for the maximization of current output encourage the use of wasteful techniques such as high-pressure water injection and discourage both application of new technologies in the field and exploration. As Campbell shows, there has actually been a decline in exploration in recent years. As a consequence, not only is the reserves/production ratio falling, but so too is the ratio of proved to total reserves.

None of these studies makes a serious attempt to predict Soviet oil production in the near future, although some venture guesses.[7] More disappointing, however, is the fact that none engage in any serious analysis of the current or future domestic demand for oil. Such one-dimensional analyses can hardly be a reliable basis for assessing prospects for Soviet oil exports. Yet, this emphasis on supply-side problems in the oil industry is characteristic of almost all studies of the export problem. Even the CIA's prediction that the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia will, by 1985, be importing (net) 3.5 to 4.5 million barrels of oil a day from the world market was based on a carefully documented and complex analysis of Soviet oil supplies but apparently only on a simple demand equation linking Soviet and East European oil demand to gross national product. While CIA spokesmen subsequently clarified the estimated range of imports, it remains clear that the demand analysis in this study was much cruder than the supply analysis.[8]

The gas industry in the USSR differs substantially from the oil industry—a point on which Campbell, Joseph Kosnik, the EIU, and the CIA are all in agreement. Reserves are huge, easily a third of the world's proved and probable reserves, with over half located in the northern part of Tyumen' region. The major difficulties in this industry are, therefore, not the reserves but getting them out of the ground under what are frequently very harsh climatic conditions and then shipping them to users. These reflect in part the problem of finding sufficient investment resources to manufacture (or import) and lay pipe, and to install compressor stations. But technological problems are important bottlenecks as well. Soviet-built compressors are unreliable, and it is necessary to import Western-built compressors to guarantee smooth functioning of the pipes. Furthermore, for the quantities of gas the pipes will be shipping, the most economical type is 48 inches, or greater, in diameter. Soviet technology associated with using that kind of pipe, particularly in severe northern climates, is not yet fully developed (compressors the problem again).

Paper, ER 78-10393, Washington, DC, July 1978. For discussion of the original CIA estimates and clarifications in subsequent studies, see United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Soviet Oil Situation: An Evaluation of CIA Analyses of Soviet Oil Production*, Staff Report, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978.

[6] US Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production*, ER 77-10270, Washington, DC, April 1977.

[7] For example, Russell estimates that oil production will be 640 million tons in 1980 (p. 57). This obviously high figure was evidently a result of simple extrapolation.

[8] See the sources cited in fn. 5.

Soviet natural gas production in 1977 was 320 billion cubic meters (bcm), up from 40 bcm in 1960—a 13 percent per annum growth rate. Net exports, which were insignificant in the 1960's and negative in the early 1970's, were 14 bcm in 1977.[9] The EIU predicts natural gas production will reach an annual output of 630–645 bcm in 1985 (p. 12), and that net exports will reach approximately 38 bcm in 1985 (p. 25). The CIA is somewhat more pessimistic regarding production, predicting output of 560–600 bcm in 1985; but it expects net exports to reach 46.8 bcm in that year.[10] The differences between the two analyses seem to flow from different assessments of how much capital and hard currency the Soviets will commit to breaking the bottlenecks in this industry, and of what the growth of domestic demand for natural gas will be. Nevertheless, whichever estimate one accepts, it is obvious that the natural gas industry will expand rapidly enough to satisfy domestic needs and provide substantially increased exports, which will replace some of the export proceeds lost as oil exports fall.

One of the unknowns in natural gas is the role large Western-financed projects will play in Soviet energy in the 1980's. Kosnik gives a competent review of one possible project of this sort, North Star (the piping of Siberian gas to Murmansk for export in liquefied form). He shows that it is feasible and potentially profitable but that US government participation in the financing is an important precondition. In spite of the energy crisis, the political and environmental barriers facing a US-USSR agreement on liquefied natural gas are formidable; consequently, Kosnik's book is for now of mostly academic interest.

Table 1. Gross Consumption and Net Exports or Imports of Energy, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1975

(millions of tons of standard fuel[a])

	Apparent consumption	Net exports (+) or net imports (−)	Ratio of net exports (imports) to consumption
Bulgaria	41.5	−27.7	−.67
Czechoslovakia	97.7	−31.3	−.32
East Germany	119.2	−29.8	−.25
Hungary	35.5	−13.2	−.37
Poland	150.0	+12.1	+.08
Romania	74.5	−5.1	−.07
Eastern Europe (total of above)	518.4	−95.0	−.18
Soviet Union	1,481.8	+199.5	+.14

[a] One ton of standard fuel = 7 million calories.

SOURCES: Jeremy Russell, *Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, Saxon House, D. C. Heath Ltd., and Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1976, p. 116; and Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Fuel and Energy Balances*, Research Report R-2257, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1978.

HAVING pondered the issue of how much oil and gas the USSR will be *able* to export in the early 1980's, we come to the question of *destination*. How much of the USSR's exportable oil and gas will be shipped to CMEA, and how much of it will be sold for hard currency in the West? Simply assembling the data to think intelligently about this issue is a formidable task. One must establish the recent history of energy demand and supply in Eastern Europe, the Soviet role in satisfying East European demand, and changes in Soviet demand and supply. To do so requires the use of many sources in different languages, with data which, at times, diverge for identical variables. Moreover, it seems certain that the future will differ substantially from the past; hence, there is guesswork involved as well.

A good introduction to the subject is Jeremy Russell's very useful overview of the individual energy balances of the USSR and of the countries of Eastern Europe and how they intermesh. Unfortunately, the book is not as useful as it might have been, because the numerous tables are either not footnoted at all or footnoted so cryptically as to be virtually useless for someone wishing to replicate the numbers.[11] Also, some of the numbers appear to be off by a full decimal place, which means one must be especially careful in using the data.[12]

Table 1 combines data from the Russell book and a recent report by Robert Campbell to provide a general view of Eastern Europe's energy balances relative to the USSR for 1975. In the mid-1970's, the six East European countries considered here collectively consumed about 18 percent more energy than they produced, while the USSR produced about 14 percent more energy than it consumed. The indication is thus of a current self-sufficiency in energy for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe combined, and that remains true even if one adds Cuban demand, which amounts to about 13 million tons standard,[13] all covered by Soviet oil. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland still receive most of their energy from domestically produced coal, and Polish coal reserves are sufficient to support net energy exports. Romania is virtually self-sufficient, and consumes virtually all of its domestically produced hydrocarbons.

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[9] US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Development of the Gas Industry* . . . , p. 65.

[10] Ibid., pp. 26 and 78.

[11] Not only is there a problem with footnoting of tables, but it would also seem that some tables were left out. For example, on pp. 42–44 Russell refers in both text and tables to Tables 2.5–2.6, neither of which appears in the book.

[12] For example, Russell says that Romanian natural gas reserves are 4,000 bcm (p. 104), when they are 400 bcm, and that Czechoslovak natural gas reserves are 1,000 bcm (p. 99), when they are 100 bcm.

Table 2. Trade of CMEA (Exclusive of the USSR) and of the USSR in Crude Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Natural Gas, 1970 and 1975

Commodity	CMEA (exc. USSR)[a] trade with all countries	USSR trade with other CMEA countries	USSR trade with non-CMEA countries
		(millions of tons)	
Crude oil			
Exports			
(1) 1970	.3	39.1	27.7
(2) 1975	.8	65.1	28.0
Imports			
(3) 1970	43.7	0	0
(4) 1975	75.9	0	6.5
Oil products			
Exports			
(5) 1970	9.8	7.4	21.6
(6) 1975	12.0	6.8	30.5
Imports			
(7) 1970	9.5	0	1.1
(8) 1975	8.6	0	1.1
Net trade in oil and oil products			
(9) 1970	−43.1	46.5	48.2
(10) 1975	−71.7	71.9	50.9
		(billions of cubic meters)	
Natural gas			
Exports			
(11) 1970	.1	2.3	1.0
(12) 1975	.1	11.3	8.0
Imports			
(13) 1970	2.7	0	3.6
(14) 1975	10.4	0	12.4
Net trade in natural gas			
(15) 1970	−2.6	2.3	− 2.6
(16) 1975	−10.3	11.3	−4.4

[a] Comprising, for purposes of this table, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Data for most CMEA states (exclusive of the USSR) are from Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member Countries of CMEA), Moscow, 1977, pp. 333–90. However, for Romanian exports and Bulgarian imports of oil products, I have substituted data reported in the US Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, *International Oil Developments: Statistical Survey*, Washington, DC, Mar. 10, 1977, p. 27. Data for the USSR are from *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik* (Foreign Trade of the USSR: Collection of Statistics), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1971 and 1976; and *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR: itogi devyatoy pyatiletki i perspektivy* (Foreign Trade of the USSR: Results of the Ninth Five-Year Plan and Prospects), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1977, p. 123.

Row 9 is the sum of rows 1 and 5 minus rows 3 and 7. Row 10 is the sum of rows 2 and 6 minus rows 4 and 8. Row 15 is row 11 minus row 13, and row 16 is row 12 minus row 14.

Almost all of the East European energy deficit is covered by oil and gas imports. Table 2 shows the importance of Soviet oil and gas exports in meeting CMEA's deficit in these critical products in the years 1970 and 1975.[14] Traditionally, the USSR has covered all of CMEA's *net* demands for crude oil and oil products. Thus, in 1970, the Soviet Union exported to CMEA 39.1 million tons of crude oil and 7.4 million tons of oil products, for a total of 46.5 million tons; CMEA's net imports of crude oil and oil products from all sources were 43.1 million tons. The difference reflected net exports of petroleum products by East European countries to the West. Essentially the same situation prevailed in 1975, although at higher levels of shipments. To be sure, in neither year did Soviet exports of petroleum and petroleum products fully cover *gross* CMEA imports. For example, in 1975, CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) imported 75.9 million tons of crude petroleum and 8.6 million tons of petroleum products, a total of 84.5 million tons, while Soviet exports to its CMEA partners totaled 71.9 million tons. In effect, the latter states imported 12.6 million tons of crude and products from non-Soviet sources and then reexported it in the form of oil products. Table 2 also shows the beginning of a substantial increase in natural gas shipments to Eastern Europe. Although I have not compiled a set of similar data for 1976, I suspect they would tell the same story. Since 1976, it has become much more difficult to construct this picture because in 1977 the Soviets stopped publishing data on quantities for all energy trade (and, in fact, for much of primary products trade).

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[13] One ton of standard fuel = 7 million calories.

[14] This table illustrates a typical problem with data relating to energy trade. Soviet data show natural gas exports to Eastern Europe in 1975 of 11.3 bcm, which is higher than the 10.4 bcm natural gas imports from *all* countries reported in East European data. This discrepancy probably reflects different procedures for dating the shipments of Soviet gas, but I cannot prove that.

In 1976, oil consumption for CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) was at 95 million tons, up from 59 million tons in 1970—amounting to an annual growth rate of 8.2 percent. It is evidently generally accepted that oil consumption for these countries will reach 120-140 million tons in 1980, which implies an annual growth rate between 1976 and 1980 of something between 6.0 and 10.2 percent. Production of crude in CMEA (exclusive of the USSR) was 17.5 million tons in 1976 and has grown at about 1 percent a year.[15] Thus, one can predict that in 1980 these countries as a group will be a net importer of some 100-120 million tons of crude petroleum and petroleum products. The question is: How much of that will the USSR supply?

If there is a way to answer these questions aside from sheer guessing, it is in the study of what Arthur J. Klinghoffer calls the "politics of oil." This is an extremely difficult subject to explore, because the Soviets have consciously revealed almost nothing about how they reach decisions on the countries to which they will export their oil. In such a situation, all one can do is study Soviet actions in an attempt to infer the criteria they use to make their decisions. This is what Klinghoffer sets out to do—covering all Soviet oil trade. It is too bad for our purpose that the best parts of the book are the chapters on Soviet trade with countries *other than* those in CMEA. The book contains a number of interesting hypotheses that deserve serious empirical inquiry, but unfortunately there is not the space to discuss most of them here. One that deserves comment, however, is his contention that the Soviets will continue to cover most of the needs of the other CMEA members for oil and oil products—even if that means importing and then reexporting oil—because oil shipments give the Soviets leverage over CMEA. Klinghoffer was writing during a period when the Soviets were importing record (for them) amounts of oil, and he may have been unduly influenced by that. Still, he could be right that the USSR's gross oil exports to Eastern Europe will continue to grow even in the face of a domestic production slowdown and the consequent need for higher oil imports. The Soviets, though, are not saying what they will do. They continue to push the East European states to conserve, to find other oil sources, and to invest in Soviet energy industries. So far, conservation seems to have had little effect; the major Soviet investment projects recently completed or contemplated are for gas and nuclear energy, not for oil; and the USSR still covers net imports to the bloc.

None of the studies that touch on Eastern Europe—those by Klinghoffer, Russell, and (tangentially) Campbell—really succeed in fully delineating the dilemmas the USSR now faces in its economic relations with the other CMEA countries, what options the USSR has in dealing with those dilemmas, and what it has chosen to do so far. There is not space to go into all dimensions of these problems here. But let us—for purposes of illustration—consider the problems regarding the oil trade. Historically, the Soviets have shipped oil to the other CMEA countries in exchange for "transferable rubles" (TR's), the unit of account in intra-CMEA trade. Then the Soviets have used the TR's the only way they could: to buy East European manufactured goods. In this trade, the nominal price of oil has stayed close to the world market price multiplied by the exchange rate, but the nominal prices of the manufactures have stayed above those of comparable products in world markets multiplied by the exchange rate.[16] Because East European manufactures are generally salable for hard currency only at large discounts, this arrangement amounts to a large Soviet subsidy to East European oil purchases. Had East European states been forced to sell their machinery and equipment on Western markets for what they were really worth and to purchase oil with the proceeds, the result might have been to double the effective price they would have had to pay for oil.[17] For Eastern Europe that would have meant sharply reduced living standards, temporary unemployment, and, almost certainly, political upheavals. The price increases posted by

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[15] This is apparently an estimate by Polish economists. It has been cited several times in the Hungarian press, e.g., in *Figyelo* (Budapest), May 24, 1978, p. 11.

[16] See, for example, my *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, Ch. 2, for a discussion of this point.

[17] This assumes that on the average East European manufactures sold now in intra-CMEA trade could be sold in the West only for one half of their nominal CMEA price. No one seriously has tried to estimate this figure; it could easily be 35 or 60 percent, although I doubt that it is much higher than 60 percent.

OPEC beginning in 1974 increased the subsidy element involved in the Soviet practice of shipping oil to Eastern Europe in exchange for TR's, and the Soviets responded by upping the price in 1975 from about 18 TR's a ton to 36 TR's a ton. This action increased the effective price (in manufactures) to Eastern Europe of Soviet oil, but at the same time it allowed Eastern Europe to continue to purchase oil with its manufactures. From the point of view of East European leaders, such an arrangement is the best of those realistically available for the early 1980's. It permits them to maintain the current structure of industrial output and employment, to effect gradual increases in living standards, and to avoid political upheavals. However, it is a very costly alternative for the USSR, which continues to give up enormous earnings of hard currency (and thus imports of high-technology equipment) to the degree that it ships oil to Eastern Europe instead of to the West.

Of course, every time the OPEC price for oil goes up, so does the implicit Soviet subsidy to Eastern Europe. What the Soviets receive in exchange is politically stable, loyal allies. But this exchange must now be undergoing the deepest scrutiny by Soviet leaders. Soviet domestic growth rates are falling rapidly. That situation and recurrent harvest difficulties mean substantial hard-currency requirements. Therefore, the Soviets can be expected to pressure Eastern Europe further in an effort to see how much "slack" there is to be taken up in the subsidy—that is, how much it can be reduced by forcing Eastern Europe to buy more oil in the West, by requiring more East European investment in the USSR (which can also entail hard-currency outlays), and by pushing Eastern Europe to increase the quality of its exports to the USSR. Indeed, casual observation suggests that all these things are already occurring, but much more research is needed to document precisely what is happening and what the apparent effects are on Eastern Europe.[18] In addition, we need a serious attempt to ascertain how Soviet decisions on matters such as this are reached, and what the various competing positions are. Regrettably, Klinghoffer does not even attempt to analyze the internal dynamics of the Soviet policymaking process concerning oil exports. Although this task is admittedly very difficult and would require pulling together shreds of widely dispersed evidence, it seems essential to any quest to understand Soviet intentions concerning future Soviet-CMEA links.

IN THESE SIX studies, and in other more recent work on similar topics, the focus has been almost totally on the supply of Soviet energy. As a result, much more information is available on the prospects for Soviet energy supplies than was available even 10 years ago. But prediction of energy supply is useful only if we also can predict energy demand, and very little effort has gone into the study of the Soviet demand for energy. In the near future, this is where the majority of research time on the Soviet Union should be directed. There are two basic questions here: (1) What are the possibilities for moderating the growth rate of total energy demand in the USSR? (2) What are the possibilities for substitution among the various fuels (for example, gas and coal for oil)?

The first question has received little attention to date, but it can no longer be ignored now that Soviet planners are apparently making serious efforts to conserve energy.[19] Leslie Dienes is one analyst who has given serious thought to the second set of issues, quite appropriately emphasizing the geographic character of Soviet supply and demand problems.[20] But much more could be done here too. There exist numerous econometric studies of Western countries which employ approaches potentially useful for studying supply of and demand for energy in the USSR. And it must be emphasized that truly useful predictions of Soviet export prospects for a particular energy source—oil or gas—cannot be obtained until we have filled in the picture with adequate studies of Soviet energy demand.

Likewise, very little is known

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[18] East European investment in the USSR is being channeled primarily through five-year plans in CMEA, which are drawn up by CMEA's powerful Joint Committee for Cooperation in Planning. The best known of the projects in the 1976–80 CMEA five-year plan was the Orenburg Gas Pipeline, to which Moscow's CMEA partners donated labor (in some cases) and equipment (purchased with hard currency).

The Soviet campaign to upgrade the quality of the manufactures it is receiving through CMEA is alluded to frequently in Western press reports, but its most tangible manifestation was in a recent speech Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin gave to the 33rd Session of CMEA. He called for a committee to study the technical standards of manufactures traded in CMEA. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 28, June 1979, p. 5. For more details on the five-year plans, see Edward Hewett, "Recent Developments in East-West European Economic Relations and Their Implications for U.S.-East European Economic Relations," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 174–98.

[19] See, for example, the recent lengthy decree on energy conservation and increased production, in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 14, 1979.

[20] L. Dienes, "The Soviet Union: An Energy Crunch Ahead?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1977; and idem, *Soviet Energy Policy and the Hydro-Carbons* (American Association of Geographers Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, No. 2), Syracuse, NY, 1978.

about the supply of and demand for energy in the other CMEA states. This means that in order to produce carefully documented forecasts of net CMEA energy imports it will be necessary to do for those countries the type of demand studies suggested above for the USSR. Moreover, a great deal of effort will be necessary merely to generate projections of CMEA energy *supply* comparable in quality to those which we now have for the USSR. Obviously, East European energy supplies are inadequate for domestic needs, and energy production is growing only slowly. But it is still necessary to forecast these production growth rates and, in particular, to assess the possibilities of increasing lignite production in those countries (particularly, Poland) where considerable efforts are being undertaken in that direction.

Finally, since Soviet leaders are likely to allocate oil exports to CMEA or the West in light of their perceptions of the probable impact of such decisions on the overall health of the East European economies and hence on political stability in the region, it is important for the analyst to develop better tools for considering such matters. As for the economic dimension, it is essential to build econometric models of the East European countries which incorporate the results of the supply and demand studies discussed above and which highlight the interrelationships between energy imports, economic activity, and the balance of hard-currency trade. With such models, it would be possible to simulate the impact of various Soviet energy export policies on East European economies. On the basis of such simulations, one could venture some guesses about the consequences of Soviet policies for political stability.

Unfortunately, quantitative studies such as those suggested are seriously hindered by growing difficulties in assembling data on Soviet and East European energy. As noted, the USSR has not released any data since 1976 on quantities of energy exported or imported. Moreover, it no longer publishes important data on the production of individual energy carriers by (Soviet) region. Data for other CMEA countries are scattered sporadically throughout their respective statistical yearbooks. The CMEA yearbook provides some assistance.[21] But only a few of the most useful data series can be found there, and even they are sometimes incomplete.

This is what makes the recent releases by the CIA so welcome. Few private scholars can match the information-gathering capabilities of this organization, and it really makes little sense to try. It would be a genuine service to the scholarly community at large, however, if data bases with longer time series such as are useful in econometric research could be provided. Moreover, it would be desirable to have better documentation for the data offered. All too frequently the interesting CIA publications on Soviet or East European energy are full of unfootnoted tables with numbers that (unexplicably) differ somewhat from what the outside scholar can derive from published sources with which he is familiar.

What we find, then, is a challenging set of economic puzzles in an area of immense importance. Western observers and analysts have a long way to go before they can make reliable predictions concerning the future direction of the foreign trade of the USSR and its CMEA associates with regard to the critical energy carriers, oil and gas. To the extent that the present volumes help in this task, they are welcome, but much still remains to be done.

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[21] Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member-Countries of CMEA), Moscow, annual.

China's Energy Prospects

By Kim Woodard

H. C. LING. *The Petroleum Industry of the People's Republic of China*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

CHU-YUAN CHENG. *China's Petroleum Industry: Output Growth and Export Potential*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

VACLAV SMIL. *China's Energy: Achievements, Problems, Prospects*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

SELIG S. HARRISON. *China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

RANDALL W. HARDY. *China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

SEVINC CARLSON. *China's Oil: Problems and Prospects*. Washington, DC, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1979.

AS WE ENTER the 1980's, China's energy development, petroleum industry, oil export potential, and technical cooperation with foreign countries in energy-related fields are topics that stimulate considerable interest the world around among scholars and government leaders alike. There are, of course, legitimate scholarly and academic reasons for studying any aspect of Chinese society, historical or contemporary, and all of the studies listed above address themselves to our purely academic interest in China's energy development, satisfying the criteria of research, format, and documentation normally applied to such works. A specialized scholar pursuing in-depth knowledge of China's energy development would want to be familiar with all of these works, as well as with the growing number of journal articles on the subject.[1]

At the same time, as with many areas of research, studies of China's energy policies have important policy implications. These revolve around the answers to the following questions: (1) What are the key *constraints*—in terms of resources and domestic and international economics and politics—that critically affect the pace of China's energy development and the scope of policy options available to Chinese energy planners? (2) What is China's present and potential role in regional and global energy commodity markets (i.e., what is its oil export potential)? (3) What is the present and potential role of foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program (which is part of the broader question of the role of such capital and technology in the overall Chinese program of accelerated modernization)? (4) How does the present and future pace of China's energy development affect that country's role in regional and global strategic balances? The reviewed works contribute to our general store of knowledge on the underlying facts of China's energy situation and, in some cases, draw policy inferences suggested by these facts.

THE BOOKS by H. C. Ling and Chu-yuan Cheng are both primarily descriptive studies of the Chinese oil industry. Ling provides a relatively brief and aggregate analysis of petroleum resources, production, refining, and transportation, followed by translations of 24 documents from the Chinese press on various aspects of the oil industry. Cheng's volume includes a far more detailed analysis of the petroleum industry. Particularly valuable are his histories and descriptions of individual oilfields, refineries, and equipment manufacturing plants. The Cheng work also includes a chapter on the role of petroleum within the Chinese economy and another on oil export potential. Unfortunately, the statistics in both books are—through no fault of their authors—now seriously out of date and should not be used for reference purposes.[2] Moreover, since both of these volumes are limited in scope to the petroleum industry and are oriented backward, rather than forward, in time, their utility is restricted to rather narrow technical questions, and they contribute little to analysis of the policy issues raised above.

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[1] The reviewer provides an extensive list of English-language articles on China's energy in the bibliography of his forthcoming book, *The International Energy Relations of China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

From a technical viewpoint, Vaclav Smil's book is unquestionably the best study currently available on the entire Chinese energy sector. The broad energy perspective that he adopts is critical to an understanding of such issues as the potential substitution of coal for petroleum within the domestic economy (thereby releasing petroleum for export). Smil reviews each major Chinese energy industry in turn. His chapters on the hydropower industry and on noncommmercial[3] energy fuels are unique in the literature. The last chapter in the book attempts some energy balance projections through the year 2000. Although Smil based these on fixed exponential growth rates and did not employ a computer model, the general range and conclusions of these projections are in close accord with the reviewer's own computer-based projections. While Smil clearly recognizes the constraints operating on China's energy development, the technical background and interests of the author have prevented him from addressing in any systematic way most of the policy issues raised above. However, the book does provide a good point of departure for an understanding of domestic energy development in China, and Smil continues to flesh out the details in articles appearing on a regular basis in the energy literature.[4]

Although Selig Harrison and Randall Hardy might each find the other a strange companion, their volumes should be considered together. Both address themselves, once again, just to the petroleum industry, and—unlike the authors previously mentioned—both make a serious effort to raise most of the policy-relevant questions listed above. But the conclusions of the two authors differ radically, especially with regard to the question of China's oil export potential.

Harrison's book and an earlier article[5] have been partly responsible for the excitement that has surfaced in recent years over China's prospects as a major oil exporter. Harrison's book begins with us seated in the US National Security Council as the likes of Henry Kissinger and David Packard debate the implications of an American offshore drilling rig's operating in contested waters off Taiwan. From that point, the drama accelerates to hints that China's continental shelf may constitute another Persian Gulf in terms of oil reserves, to a projection that there is a 50 percent chance of China's reaching its target of 400 million tons a year (8 million barrels a day) of crude oil production by 1990,[6] and on to darker predictions of hostility and possible conflict over the issue of who owns the as yet undiscovered sea of oil beneath the contested waters of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Despite its dramatic flair, the book is carefully researched and is based almost entirely on interviews conducted throughout East Asia. It is also beautifully written and addresses in a serious vein the regional and global political implications of rapid offshore oil and gas development along the Chinese continental shelf.

Hardy, like Harrison, raises the issue of China's oil export potential in a basically political framework, but his conclusions could scarcely be further removed from Harrison's optimism regarding the prospects for offshore oil development and substantial exports of crude oil. As his title implies, Hardy's expectations regarding China's future oil production and export potential are guarded and modest. He carefully documents the reasons why we should not expect China to be producing 400 million tons of crude oil by 1990 and devotes a chapter to the constraining effect of domestic energy consumption requirements on oil export potential. Although he does not provide any original energy balance projections or energy commodity trade statistics, his general observations about China's energy future are, I believe, accurate and concisely stated.

Sevinc Carlson's monograph on the Chinese oil industry provides yet another recent overview of the subject. Like Hardy, Carlson is cautious in her analysis of the prospects for China's petroleum industry and petroleum exports. In addition, the monograph provides some rich detail on energy-related political developments since 1975. However, Carlson's work is seriously marred by errors and inconsistencies in her handling of the data, only some of which are corrected by the errata sheet circulated after its publication. On page 24, Carlson reports a 28 percent increase in crude oil production capacity in 1978, while on page 62 she reports an 11.1 percent increase for the same year. Electric power in 1977 is variously reported at 203 billion kilowatt-hours (p. 25) and 223 billion kilowatt-hours (p. 79). Inconsistencies occur even within a single sentence, such as "In energy production, coal output increased by 12.4 percent, from 483 to 618 million tons . . ." (p. 25). The 483-million ton figure Carlson assigns to 1977 is actually the figure for 1976, and the growth rate mentioned is a compounded rate for the two-year period 1976–78. The nonstatistical analysis is also internally inconsistent at various points in the text. In short, the Carlson monograph should be handled with care by specialists and avoided by general readers.

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[2] Beijing has only recently begun to publish official output statistics for some of the major energy industries. Studies published by foreign experts prior to 1978 are subject to a wide margin of error in data estimates, and more recent studies should be used whenever possible for statistical purposes.

[3] "Noncommercial" energy commodities include firewood, crop residues, dried dung, and other miscellaneous agricultural fuels.

[4] See, for example, Vaclav Smil, "China's Energy Performance," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1977, pp. 63-67; Vaclav Smil and Kim Woodard, "Perspectives on Energy in the People's Republic of China," in Jack M. Hollander, Ed., *Annual Review of Energy*, Vol. 2, Palo Alto, CA, Annual Reviews, Inc., 1977; and Vaclav Smil, "China's Energetics: A System Analysis," US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 323-69.

[5] Selig S. Harrison, "China: The Next Oil Giant," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Fall 1975, pp. 3-49.

[6] Harrison cites Japanese sources for this unofficial production target (p. 268, fn. 6). The target is frequently mentioned to foreign visitors to Taching oilfield and may date to as early as 1970.

ANY EFFORT to assess the key *constraints* on the pace of China's energy development immediately reveals the enormous complexity of the Chinese energy system. By the end of the 1970's, China already ranked as the world's third largest energy producing and consuming country, comparable to Saudi Arabia in primary energy production and to Japan in aggregate energy consumption. Two thirds of the Chinese energy system is still supported by the coal industry, which ranks with the coal industries of the United States and the Soviet Union as one of the three largest in the world. China's crude petroleum and natural gas industries, which boomed during the 1970's, are still not large by world standards. Furthermore, the growth rate of those two industries is declining rather sharply, from maximum annual increases of 20–25 percent to a range of 8–10 percent a year.

This decline in growth rates, overlooked by so many authors in assessing the future prospects of China's petroleum industry, is a natural event in the life cycle of petroleum industries around the world. Slowing in the pace of growth results from a combination of the scale effect (the same growth rate requires increasing capital inputs as the industry expands) and of basic resource constraints. China's recoverable crude-petroleum resources are now estimated at between 10 and 20 billion metric tons (70–140 billion barrels) by most foreign analysts. The total crude-petroleum resources of the United States, recovered and recoverable, amount to roughly twice this range.[7] As any petroleum industry matures, new deposits become more difficult to discover and tend to be located deeper in the ground and at sites more remote from the principal industrial centers — raising the average cost of extraction and slowing the growth rate for crude petroleum production. For a variety of technical and geological reasons, crude oil output reaches a peak or an extended plateau when about one third of recoverable resources have been extracted from the ground. Recent reports suggest that the largest of China's oil-producing zones, the Taching oilfield in the Northeast, is already in its plateau phase.[8] While other oilfields are being discovered and developed, the incremental cost of further increases in crude petroleum output is rising, and the growth rate is falling. This trend should continue, regardless of the pace of offshore development. It simply reflects the maturing of China's petroleum industry and has ample precedents among oil industries around the world. The resource constraint and the falling growth rates for the petroleum industry mean that attainment of the official production target of 400 million tons a year by 1990 is not even unlikely; it is virtually impossible.

The constraint imposed by limited oil and gas resources cannot easily be overcome by substitution of other energy sources, such as coal and hydropower. China's coal and hydropower resources are indeed among the largest in the world, and sufficient to sustain the coal and electric power industries for centuries to come. But, in the case of these resources, the production infrastructure can be expanded only slowly and at a cost in terms of capital inputs that is high relative to annual output levels. China's coal production capacity is already stretched taut at current output levels. New output requires the addition of new capacity, at very high costs in capital and time. Moreover, even if all the new coal mines originally slated to be constructed by foreign companies under the modernization program were completed, they would add less than 100 million tons of new capacity over a five-year period, the equivalent of about a 6 percent annual increase. As it is, many of the foreign projects have been delayed,[9] and China's own capacity for manufacture and installation of coal production equipment is not likely to be able to take up all the slack. In addition, the coal industry in China is fundamentally constrained by a limit on the demand for its products, just as is the case with coal in the United States. There are a limited number of applications in industry for coal, and petroleum enjoys substantial advantages in transportation and agriculture. The substitution of coal for petroleum is therefore constrained on both the production and consumption sides of the energy balance.

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[7] See Woodard, op cit., p. 326.

[8] V. G. Kulkarni, "Mission Impossible for China: 400 Million Tons by 1990," *Petroleum News: Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong), October 1979, pp. 8–9.

As for hydropower, it does indeed represent a huge and still largely untapped energy resource in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite three decades of development, hydropower still contributes only about 1 percent to the consumption of commercial energy fuels in China.[10] At the same time, the contribution of hydropower to total electric power output is rising steadily.[11] Nevertheless, hydropower, like coal, is capital-intensive and slow in construction. China's energy planners also face serious locational constraints on the development of large-scale hydropower projects: e.g., the possibility of displacement of valuable agricultural land in the north and east and the distance from major industrial centers of potential sites in the west.

BEYOND THESE constraints on the production side of the energy balance, there will be over the next several decades important constraints on the consumption side which will further limit China's potential energy exports. Despite its large aggregate energy capabilities, the PRC is still a Third World country in terms of per capita energy consumption. Efforts to raise personal standards of living imply rising public consumption of commercial energy. The large and still growing population therefore exercises a systemic constraint on the amount of energy commodities available for export. In addition, the very high growth rates in China's "modern" economic sectors — industry, transportation, and the cities — as well as pressure for mechanization of agriculture, place a high premium on domestic consumption of commercial energy commodities, particularly petroleum products. The trend on the consumption side of the energy balance, which can be readily documented from China's energy and economic growth statistics, is toward greater use of commercial energy commodities for each additional increment of economic growth.

All of these constraints operate in roughly the same direction: to place a ceiling on China's oil export potential. Even allowing for substantial offshore development, the reviewer's own energy balance projections for the PRC indicate that crude petroleum exports should reach a plateau of about 25–40 million tons a year (0.5–0.8 million barrels a day) sometime between 1985 and 1990.[12] If we assume that recoverable petroleum resources are in the range of 10–20 billion metric tons (70–140 billion barrels), crude petroleum exports should then *decline* during the 1990's under the pressure of domestic consumption requirements and slowing primary energy production. China's crossover to a situation of net petroleum imports might be reached by about the year 2000. If offshore discoveries are unexpectedly large and recoverable petroleum resources are double the most optimistic foreign estimates, then crude petroleum exports would reach a plateau at about 60–80 million tons a year (1.2–1.6 million barrels a day) during the 1990's. Coal exports could peak at 15–20 million tons a year in the 1990's, and petroleum product exports at 3–5 million tons a year (60,000–100,000 barrels a day) somewhat earlier.

These figures make clear that while energy commodity exports may be important to China from the point of view of foreign exchange earnings, there is virtually no hope that the PRC will become another major source of petroleum for the world market. Even if China were to attain tomorrow the peak projected value under the highest resource scenario, it would be providing less oil to the international market than would be needed to compensate for the decline in Iran's oil exports during 1979.

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[9] As part of a general retrenchment in Beijing's 10-Year Development Plan (1976–85), many of the 120 industrial projects in the plan are being delayed or canceled. The precise impact of this retrenchment on the coal industry is not yet clear as regards individual projects. But the general effect would be to delay, or even cancel, some contracts for foreign construction of coal mines in China. For discussion of the retrenchment, see "China's New Economic Priorities," *China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July-August 1979, pp. 36–39.

[10] "Commercial" energy commodities are produced and distributed on a national or regional basis and are part of the money economy. They include coal, petroleum products, natural and manufactured gas, and electricity. Commercial energy is to be distinguished from "noncommercial" energy commodities produced and distributed on a local basis in rural areas (see fn. 3). The latter fuels may account for as much as a third of total energy consumption in some Asian countries.

[11] The 1978 contribution of hydropower is about 25 percent of total electric power output (256 billion kwh), or 65 billion kwh.

[12] Woodard, op. cit., p. 335.

At the same time, Chinese oil exports may be significant within the framework of the regional petroleum market in Asia. Crude petroleum already ranks as the largest commodity by value in trade between China and Japan. China also provides crude petroleum and petroleum products to North Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand.

WHAT ABOUT the prospects for foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program? While there is insufficient space here to discuss the issue in much depth, I feel the outlook is generally more favorable for energy plant and equipment purchases than for energy commodity exports by China. Maintenance of a rough balance between the two appears to be a basic element figuring in China's planning for the energy and trade sectors. From the early 1960's until the end of 1978, the PRC purchased about US$4 billion worth of foreign energy plants and equipment, including construction services and chemical fertilizer plants. This figure was almost exactly matched by oil revenues earned from 1973 through 1978.[13] One can expect this relationship to continue into the foreseeable future. With the sharp rises in world crude petroleum prices during 1979, Chinese crude is now selling at over US$20 per barrel, expanding earning capacity even in the absence of further increase in crude oil exports.

As is well known, Beijing during 1978 embarked on an ambitious program of contracting with foreign companies for plant and equipment. This aspect of the modernization program was sharply curtailed during 1979, and many of the orders were canceled. But these events do not spell the end of significant energy plant and equipment purchases by the PRC. They simply amount to a readjustment that reflects more realistically the constraints on China's foreign exchange earnings and domestic ability to absorb massive inputs of foreign technology.

Perhaps the most promising area for an expansion of the use of foreign capital and technology in China's energy development program is in joint offshore projects. As of the end of 1979, joint offshore development activity was expanding at a steady, if cautious pace. A dozen American, French, British, and Japanese companies are engaged in seismic surveys of designated zones stretching from the Pohai Gulf to Shanghai and from an area southwest of Taiwan to the Gulf of Tonkin. Chinese rigs engaged in preliminary drilling report significant discoveries in the Pearl River delta and near Hainan Island.[14] If the seismic surveys reveal promising structural profiles of the offshore sedimentary basins, we should expect a rash of joint venture exploration agreements during 1980 or 1981.

Joint offshore ventures have a number of advantages from the Chinese perspective. Economically, they bring rapid introduction of advanced foreign technology and hence sharply reduce the time required for offshore exploration. The joint offshore ventures also relieve China of at least part of the capital risk entailed in offshore exploration, which is a very expensive process in its early phases. Joint offshore exploration is likewise a way of holding foreign corporations at arm's length while taking advantage of the technology they offer, for offshore operations can be based at coastal enclaves such as Hong Kong or Shanghai, thereby insulating the PRC from unwanted foreign pressure and cultural influence. In many ways, the situation resembles the comprador system of the 19th century.

Joint offshore development provides important political dividends for Beijing too. The involvement of American and Japanese companies, even in uncontested areas of the continental shelf, tends to strengthen China's jurisdictional claims in contested areas. To be sure, Gulf Oil Corporation is apparently operating in both a Taiwan concession and in a Chinese zone closer to the coast.[15] But it is very unlikely that it or any of the other companies involved in joint ventures with China would do anything to upset Chinese claims to offshore areas in contested waters.

Moreover, in the long run, joint offshore ventures may in some instances offer a relatively easy way out of the thorny political and legal problems involved in settling jurisdictional claims to the continental shelf. If joint exploration agreements were reached, for example, between Beijing and various Japanese companies for exploration in the areas claimed by the two countries, designation of formal sovereignty over the disputed areas would become a largely academic affair. Division of the discoveries through contract arrangements would replace division of the shelf through treaties. Such an arrangement would speed exploration of the entire shelf and might set an important precedent for settlement of similar disputes elsewhere in the world.

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[13] Ibid., pp. 506–07, 545.

[14] China's offshore discoveries in the South China Sea are reported by numerous sources. See, for example, Roger Gale, "Offshore China: Oil Surveys Nearly Complete," *Energy Daily* (Washington, DC), Dec. 5, 1979, pp. 1–3.

[15] "Disputes in the South China Sea," *Petroleum News: Southeast Asia*, October 1979, Supplement.

THE FINAL, and perhaps most important, policy problem raised by China's energy development is the likely impact of that development on China's strategic position in the global community. This strategic question can be approached from two directions—the *vulnerability* of China's energy infrastructure and the *strategic capabilities* of the Chinese energy system.

To a great extent, the analysis of future vulnerability and capabilities rests on the accuracy of projections of the Chinese energy balance. This balance can be projected under a variety of assumptions and scenarios but cannot be *predicted*. Prediction implies the selection of a single projected scenario, and assignment to that scenario of a probability of 1.0. Under a variety of scenarios, my projections indicate that by the end of this century China should be expected to achieve energy system capabilities roughly comparable to those of the Soviet Union in 1975. On the assumption that the size of the domestic energy system bears some relationship to the economic and political power of a country, this means that we should expect a world with three superpowers within the next two decades.

No other country is in a position thus to rival the Soviet Union and the United States within such a short time frame. There are many parallels between China's path of energy development and the paths already trod by the two superpowers—operation from a massive fossil resource base; near self-sufficiency in the initial stage of energy development; development of diversified energy equipment manufacturing industries; enjoyment of a temporary petroleum "export bubble," followed by decline in petroleum exports and eventual crossover into net energy imports. If history is any guide, the period of rapid energy development and basic self-sufficiency in energy supplies is accompanied by industrial growth and expansion of both conventional and nuclear military power. On the basis of the current pace of development in the Chinese energy system, one should anticipate further expansion of the PRC's industrial and military capabilities.

The same developments that promise to bring China superpower status may, paradoxically, also increase that country's strategic vulnerability. China's commercial energy infrastructure is already characterized by a high level of vulnerability to attack from the Soviet Union because of its concentration in the geographically exposed provinces of the northeast. Although China's coal and electric power industries are gradually being dispersed geographically, this process is slow and will have only a marginal effect on China's strategic exposure over the next two decades. Offshore oil and gas development would do little to ease the vulnerability and might exacerbate it unless China develops naval capabilities sufficient to protect its offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Joint offshore ventures, however, could conceivably mitigate the exposure by placing a cordon of foreign (particularly American) equipment and personnel around China's coastal perimeter.

Beijing is attempting to lessen China's strategic vulnerability by promoting a highly visible alignment with Western Europe and the United States against Soviet "hegemonism." The PRC hopes to distract Soviet concern from China's sensitive northern border and to focus that concern on the strategic confrontation with Western Europe. Despite the cool reception of Premier Hua Guofeng during his recent tour of Western Europe, the prospects for a tacit security alignment between China and the West are still improving. The movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's January 1980 tour of Chinese defense facilities seem to point in the direction of closer Sino-American military cooperation. But both sides appear to be approaching their security relationship with caution born of experience.

China is pursuing a second line of response to its strategic vulnerability that is perhaps both quieter and more effective. This second line of response is the careful construction of regional coalitions, involving Japan and the market economy countries of Southeast Asia. Petroleum exports to neighbors within the region are just one of many strands of the web of relationships that Beijing is attempting to weave around its perimeter. Trade relations, cultural exchanges, political support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a low-key approach to remaining differences are all part of the policy of regional coalition.

Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia was a direct challenge to this policy, and precipitated China's punitive war against Vietnam in early 1979. Indeed, political forces in East Asia appear to be gradually shifting toward a realignment along two axes—a Sino-Japanese axis and a Soviet-Vietnamese axis. Countries throughout the region are being pressured to declare for one side or the other and are by and large moving toward the Sino-Japanese axis for a variety of political and commercial reasons. These events tend to reinforce the impression that China's international energy policies have a strong regional bias.

ON BALANCE, we can say that China is becoming an energy giant, but a hungry one. The massive development needs of China's own population are at the root of both the country's strength and its weakness. Those needs stimulated the rapid expansion of the PRC's commercial energy system and tore China loose from dependence on either the West or the Soviet bloc. But the same needs continue to place demands of very high priority on the products of that system, constraining the progress of energy relations between China and the rest of the world.

Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe

By Peter Grothe

DAVID ABSHIRE. *International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy.* Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

BURTON PAULU. *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe.* Minneapolis, MN, The University of Minnesota Press, 1974.

MAURY LISANN. *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union: International Politics and Radio.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

GERHARD WETTIG. *Broadcasting and Détente: Eastern Policies and Their Implications for East-West Relations.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977.

ZEV KATZ. *The Communications System in the USSR.* Cambridge, MA, MIT Center for International Studies, 1977.

GERTRUDE JOCH ROBINSON. *Tito's Maverick Media: The Politics of Mass Communication in Yugoslavia.* Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1977.

MANY OF Lenin's teachings have been abandoned by Soviet leaders over the years for pragmatic reasons, but his warning that "ideas are more fatal than guns"[1] is apparently of the same relevance to the current Politburo as it was to Lenin during his time. An estimated 40 to 60 million persons in the USSR, and millions more in Eastern Europe, listen to "ideas" on Western radio, and according to David Abshire, Chairman of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, concern over the effects of these broadcasts is so great that in 1971, for example, the USSR spent six times as much money jamming them as it did on its own international radio transmissions. In the same year, according to Burton Paulu, a single station, Radio Liberty, was attacked by the Soviet media on 416 separate occasions. These and similar data suggest that Western radio is more than just a minor irritant to the Soviet leadership.

The reason for this is simple. The major Western stations—the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFE-RL), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle, and RIAS (an American-funded station broadcasting to East Germany from West Berlin)—provide the only systematic, continuous, and effective breach of the information barrier which Communist rulers have attempted to erect around their states. Western radio is a full-fledged major competitor to the Communist media, and to the extent that Western radio is believed, the credibility of the Communist media, and, indeed, the authority of the Communist parties themselves, is challenged. Abshire, reflecting on the possibility that George Orwell's fictional society, *1984*, might come into being, quotes the conclusions reached 15 years ago by Ithiel de Sola Pool:

> *Most of the things of a positive character that are happening in the Soviet Union today are explainable only in terms of the influence of the West, for which the most important single channel is radio. There is now enough communication to . . . assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication, and above all by international radio.*[2]

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[1] Lenin wrote: "Why should a government which is doing what it believes to be right allow itself to be criticized? It would not allow the opposition to buy lethal weapons, and ideas are more fatal than guns." Cited in Paulu, p. 8.

[2] Abshire, p. 53. The citation is from Ithiel de Sola Pool, "1965 Address in Workshop of Communications with the Peoples of the USSR," Nov. 19, 1965, New York School of Education, Department of Communications in Education, and Radio Liberty Committee.

SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS have speculated for three decades about the impact of Western broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but only during the last several years has it been possible to formulate a more clearly etched picture of what the impact actually is. In part, the increased information available to Western analysts is a result of an explosion in the number of radio sets in use in the USSR. In 1950, there were 3.5 million sets in the Soviet Union; in 1974, the figure was more than 60 million.[3] This enormous increase has produced an expansion in audience for Western as well as Soviet broadcasts and greater ease (and interest) in obtaining audience feedback. The Soviets themselves have taken polls which reveal a lot about Soviet citizen reaction to domestic and Western media, and some of these polls have been published.[4] In addition, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have conducted polls about the listening habits of their respective target audiences.[5] Finally, as the dissident movement has become bolder and more active in the USSR and Eastern Europe, it too has provided considerably more feedback.

The books under review here, especially those by Maury Lisann, David Abshire, and Gerhard Wettig, plus other published material using this expanded data base, suggest a variety of results of Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. First, they indicate that dissident intellectuals have received a powerful shot in the arm as a result of their use of Western broadcasts to the Communist countries. Authors of *samizdat* materials, for instance, who used to reach thousands of people with their views, can now reach millions by seeing to it that their manuscripts reach Radio Liberty, which regularly broadcasts such materials—or excerpts therefrom—back into the USSR. In like manner, when leading dissidents want to reach millions of their fellow citizens, they release information to Western reporters, whose printed reports are picked up by the radio stations beaming signals back into the Communist-ruled states.

Of greater long-run concern to the Kremlin leadership, despite the fact that the human rights dissident movements receive the bulk of public attention in the West, is the status of the non-Russian nationality groups within the USSR, and Western radio, by broadcasting to the non-Russian nationalities, has played a significant role here also. By providing news about the lives and traditions of these peoples, in their own languages Western stations have helped non-Russian peoples preserve their national identities and aspirations.

Western radio—especially Radio Free Europe—has played a similar role for the East European states. Abshire sums up his findings in this regard as follows:

> *It [the USSR] particularly sought to undermine their sense of national identity, attempting to eliminate a major source of potential resistance to Soviet influence. By allowing the peoples of Eastern Europe uncensored access to the facts about their own lives . . . international broadcasting has helped to preserve national heritages, defend legitimate interests, and widen the sphere of intellectual-cultural freedom.* (p. 67)

According to a former member of the Polish government and other informants, Warsaw Pact governments have enjoyed somewhat more leverage in their dealings with the Soviet government because of the availability of information broadcast on Western radio. That is, they have had a wider range of options in many cases because they have not had to rely on the Soviets as their sole source of information.

Finally, an important and intriguing aspect of Western radio transmissions to the Soviet Union and the East European states is the effect the Western stations have on the media policies of those states. The Communist regimes are finding that, because of competition from Western radio, they have to make their media products more lively and timely. Further, they often have to publish their own versions of events discussed on Western radio even though they probably would have preferred to pass over many of these in silence.

The pressure to respond to Western broadcasts is especially great since even Western estimates of the number of people who listen to Western radio are unlikely to do justice to the impact these stations actually have on the populations of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Because of what Paul Lazarsfeld has called the "two-step flow of communication,"[6] foreign broadcasts can be expected to influence many more than just original listeners. News heard on foreign radio but not found in the domestic media is quickly spread by word of mouth. In fact, it is no secret that Soviet and East European officials themselves often talk openly with one another and with foreign visitors about reports heard on the various Western stations. The officials need not agree with the substance of the reports in order to recognize their impact.

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[3] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 7, 1974, p. 6.

[4] See Lisann's compilation of information from Soviet polls, p. 147; and Pavel Gurevich, "Concrete Sociology: The Thirst for Information," *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), August 1968.

[5] See Lisann, pp. 163–65.

[6] Lazarsfeld developed this notion at length in Paul Lazarsfeld and Elihu Katz, *Personal Influence*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1965.

BY FAR the most important of the volumes under consideration here is Maury Lisann's *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union*. This book is an admirable piece of scholarship, filled with valuable information, and ought to be required reading for any serious student of the East-West competition of ideas. Lisann devotes considerable space to the four major means which the Soviet Union uses to try to deal with the problem of Western broadcasting: (1) jamming, which usually involves simply the broadcasting of noise but which is very expensive; (2) diplomacy, aimed at persuading the "offending" country to change the content of the broadcasts; (3) attacks on the credibility of Western radio by attempts to "expose lies" in its broadcasts; and (4) improvement of the Soviet media to make them more lively and timely. But he also points out the limitations of each of these strategies. There are especially formidable built-in restrictions on how timely the Soviet media can be, since "the line" on how to handle important stories must come from the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership. The difficulty such an arrangement can create is illustrated by the fact that the death of Nikita Khrushchev, the man who had led the Soviet people for a decade, was announced to the Soviet people by Western radio *two days before* it was briefly noted in *Pravda* and subsequently on Radio Moscow. Lisann's interesting description of *Mayak*, a more lively Soviet station intended to compete for listeners with the Voice of America, makes it clear why VOA continues to enjoy great popularity.

A topic which Lisann approaches but, alas, treats all too briefly is the extent to which Kremlin thinking on sensitive issues can be discovered by monitoring the content and intensity of Soviet reactions to various Western broadcasts. Perhaps the answer is "very little," for as Lisann points out, it is not necessarily the content of the broadcasts that disturbs the Soviet leadership most:

> *The aspect of foreign radio broadcasts that bothered them most was simply the constant supply of hard news, in itself not necessarily anti-Soviet or politically oriented, but constantly holding the Soviet press up to an unfavorable comparison and thereby undermining public confidence in the credibility of all aspects of the regime's dealings with the people.* (p. 13)

Abshire, in his lucid and concise *International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy*, covers much of the same ground as Lisann, though not as thoroughly. However, whereas Lisann restricts himself to the USSR, Abshire includes an investigation of radio's considerable impact on East European listeners. Noted American worker-philosopher Eric Hoffer once quipped that authors write everything they know in short, concise books and try to conceal everything they do not know in long books.[7] Abshire's short study is highly recommended for those who want a well-written thumbnail sketch on this subject.

In *Broadcasting and Détente*, German scholar Gerhard Wettig, of the prestigious Federal Institute of Eastern and International Studies (Bonn), focuses his attention on the five American and German radio stations transmitting from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His principal findings support many of the conclusions of Lisann and Abshire. But he goes into greater detail than either of these two American authors in his discussion of the strenuous attempts, diplomatic and otherwise, made by the USSR to cut off or alter at its source the flow of information from West to East. For example, he describes with insight perhaps only available to members of his government-related research institute the threat of the USSR and the East European countries to boycott the 1972 Munich Olympic Games unless Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, both located in Munich, were closed down. Unfortunately, Wettig is occasionally guilty of overstating his case and of being too polemical in his examination of Soviet behavior.

Burton Paulu's *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe* also contains some useful information on Western broadcasting to Communist countries, but as is the case with the Katz and Robinson volumes as well, such information is incidental to the author's main purpose. Paulu seeks to provide a comprehensive discussion of the theory and practice of domestic broadcasting in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and his book includes an immense amount of information on subjects such as program objectives, technical facilities, stations and networks, audience research, and international broadcasting by the Communist states themselves. The book fulfills its purpose and provides Western observers additional perspective on how the Communist states have shaped their own media in response to the radio challenge from abroad.

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[7] Hoffer made his remark during a 1978 interview on American television with the Public Broadcasting System.

Zev Katz's *The Communications System in the USSR* is a competent, concise overview of all aspects of the Soviet communications system, of which radio is only a part. Katz touches only briefly on the subject of foreign broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the core of Gertrude Joch Robinson's *Tito's Maverick Media* is a study of the Yugoslav media rather than an examination of Western information flows into Yugoslavia. Professor Robinson contends that the Yugoslav "government's control over information collection and distribution is minimal and informal, rather than centrally structured, as in the Soviet Union" (p. 11). She is right in concluding that there is a world of difference between control of the media in Yugoslavia and in the USSR, but she seems throughout to be describing the pre-1972 Yugoslav situation. Between 1972 and 1974, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia cracked down on the media and removed a number of liberal-minded editors from their posts. There is now a definite "line" on certain sensitive matters, and when push comes to shove, the party steps in to impose the official view. The Ministry of Information formally issues media policy guidance, and adherence to it is expected. Still Robinson's premise that the Yugoslav media are substantially freer than those in the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe is correct. The effect of Western broadcasting under these conditions is a subject which still awaits systematic investigation.

IN SUM, then, it seems that Western broadcasting to the East is having a greater impact in the USSR and Eastern Europe than ever before. There are certainly more receiver radio sets capable of picking up Western signals. And there are more broadcast hours in more languages and from stronger transmitters than there were in the first decade of Western attempts to use radio to break the government monopoly on information in Communist-ruled states. Concerted Soviet and East European efforts to suppress or counter the impact of Western broadcasting are probably the best indicators of its effectiveness.

What will the future bring? Developing technology will in all probability make it possible to transmit television programs via satellite directly into private homes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since, according to proverb, a picture is worth a thousand words, it is not surprising that Soviet spokesmen have already expressed extreme uneasiness over this imminent technological advance. Their discomfort is indicative of the extent to which they continue, as Lenin instructed, to fear the free flow of "ideas."

Sourcebooks on European Communist States

By Vladimir Socor

BORYS LEWYTZKYJ and JULIUSZ STROYNOWSKI, Eds. *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries: A Biographical Encyclopedia of 10,000 Leading Personalities in 16 Communist Countries.* New York, NY, and Munich, K. G. Saur Publishing, Inc., 1978.

JOSEPH L. WIECZYNSKI, Ed. *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History.* Vols. 1–10. Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1976–79.

BOGDAN SZAJKOWSKI, Ed. *Documents in Communist Affairs—1977.* Cardiff, Wales, University College Cardiff Press, 1978.

RICHARD F. STAAR, Ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs—1979.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

MICHAEL B. PETROVICH. *Yugoslavia: A Bibliographic Guide.* Washington, DC, Library of Congress and US Government Printing Office, 1974.

European Bibliography of Soviet, East European, and Slavonic Studies, 1975. Birmingham, England, University of Birmingham, 1977.

STEPHEN M. HORAK, Compiler. *Russia, the USSR, and Eastern Europe: A Bibliographic Guide to English-language Publications, 1964–1974.* Littleton, CO, Libraries Unlimited, 1978.

HARRY G. SHAFFER. *Periodicals on the Socialist Countries and on Marxism: A New Annotated Index of English-language Publications.* New York, NY, and London, Praeger, 1977.

WILLIAM S. HEILIGER. *Bibliography of the Soviet Social Sciences, 1965–1975.* Troy, NY, Whitston, 1978. 2 Vols.

PAUL L. HORECKY and DAVID H. KRAUS, Eds. *East Central and Southeast Europe: A Handbook of Library and Archival Resources in North America.* Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford, ABC Clio Press, 1976.

STEVEN A. GRANT. *Scholar's Guide to Washington, D.C., for Russian/Soviet Studies.* Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977.

THE EXPANSION and diversification of Soviet and East European area research during the 1970's were reflected in a corresponding proliferation of sourcebooks in the field. Some of these are apt to spur further primary and secondary research, thus creating a mutually reinforcing cycle. Certainly, the sourcebooks under scrutiny here, differing widely in their disciplinary affiliation, content, and objectives, underline the growing diversity of research in the field, though they also attest to increased specialization and compartmentalization. The volumes belong, simultaneously or separately, to the social and political sciences, economics, and the humanities. Some of them are intended to take stock of, or draw upon, the specialized research accumulated in recent years; others, to open up vistas to unexplored or insufficiently exploited areas. Some are in the nature of general surveys and compendia systematizing basic information, while others seek to establish bibliographic inventories of secondary sources. Still others investigate resources available for primary research. We will discuss these three categories in order.

THE IMPOSING 736-page volume *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries* possesses the greatest scope and comprehensiveness of all reference works of this genre which have appeared to date. This is true both in terms of geographic area covered and in terms of investigative depth. It is the first Who's Who of all the Communist-ruled states of Eastern Europe plus the USSR; moreover, since the cutoff date for new information was mid-1977, all Asian states currently ruled by Communist parties are included in the volume's purview. The biographical selections cover a wide political and professional spectrum, ranging from party, government, military, police, economic, and diplomatic officials, on the one hand, to prominent individuals active in the spheres of arts and letters, the humanities, and the sciences, church leaders, and key members of intellectual dissent and human rights movements, on the other. The inclusion of many notable figures in the last area is an innovation and represents a significant addition to the value of this reference tool. For purposes of research on Soviet current affairs, this volume supersedes those previously issued by the Munich-based Institute for the Study of the USSR, as well as Borys Lewytzkyj's own *Sowjetische Kurzbiographien*.[1]

In a work of such magnitude and complexity, a number of omissions are perhaps unavoidable. Herewith are a few that in the reviewer's judgment are more consequential. A not inconsiderable number of individuals from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who occupy salient positions in important spheres of activity and whose work has frequently brought them to international attention are not listed. Absent, for example, are some prominent diplomatic and foreign trade officials (e.g., Dzhermen Gvishiani, Lev Mendelevich, Viktor Sukhodrev), a number of leading official scholars and analysts of contemporary international affairs (e.g., K. N. Brutents, Ya. S. Khavinson, M. A. Mil'shtein, A. I. Sobolev, Milika Sundic, N. N. Yakovlev), and important military and police commanders (e.g., José Méndez, Mihai Pacepa, K. K. Pashuk). Nor are there listings for certain still-living former ranking party and/or government officials purged in recent years or identified with various reform or opposition groups (e.g., Jerzy Albrecht, Begir Balluku, Vlado Dapcevic, Károly Király, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Huber Matos, Ion Serb). Finally, some prominent dissident intellectuals and leading figures in human rights, religious, or nationality rights groups are inexplicably left out (e.g., Rudolf Bahro, Dmitri Dudko, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Paul Goma, Jacek Kuron, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Frane Miklavcic, Valentin Moroz, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Gennadiy Shimanov).

There are also important omissions and errors in some of the biographies which are included (e.g., those on Cornel Bogdan, Robert Havemann, Vladimir Maksimov, Pavel Reimann, Miko Tripalo), and several entries are long outdated (e.g., on such leading figures of the 1968 Czechoslovak reform movement as Cestmir Cisar, Frantisek Kriegel, Bohumil Simon, and Josef Spacek). A number of methodological inconsistencies and derogations are noticeable as well. The subjects' ethnic and religious backgrounds are absent as often as they are provided, and occasionally the information which is provided is inexact, even though such data, particularly in Eastern Europe, are often highly significant for elucidating personal careers and the configuration of political issues. One example should illustrate the point. The national affiliation of leading military commanders has emerged as a political issue in Yugoslavia, yet this information is missing from most of the relevant biographies in Lewytzkyj and Stroynowski's encyclopedia. The book can also be confusing with respect to *noms de plume* and *noms de guerre*, and in some cases, prewar and wartime careers are neglected altogether.

Still, this volume represents a notable achievement and testifies to the skill of its editors and the breadth of their expertise. It will benefit all those concerned with Communist countries—government officials, businessmen, journalists, area specialists, and exchange scholars. Ideally, this undertaking will be continued, with an expanded editorial team reflecting the complexity of the work, by sequels updated and issued at regular intervals.

The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History (hereafter *MERSH*) is just such an ongoing project. The first 10 volumes, covering letters "A" through "Es," represent but the initial stage of a massive, long-term undertaking, projected for some 50 volumes, with supplements already contemplated, to be published at a rate of three to four volumes annually. Its aim is to create the most comprehensive reference encyclopedia for the study of Russian and Soviet history ever developed in the English language. Compared to the major corresponding Russian-language reference series, primarily the *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia) and the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), this encyclopedia, even though of lesser physical dimensions, promises to be more inclusive in the scope of topics covered and, particularly, in its source base, as well as more balanced and more free of normative constraints in its treatment of many topics. Designed to serve a wide and varied readership, *MERSH* is intended to provide information on all major events, personalities, ideas, and institutions important to the history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, without becoming involved in details of interest only to the research specialist or devoting entries to narrowly specialized topics.

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[1] *Who's Who in the USSR*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, and London, Scarecrow Press, 1966, and *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1968 (with a quarterly supplement, *Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities*, 1968–1971); Borys Lewytzkyj and Kurt Muller, *Sowjetische Kurzbiographien*, Hannover, Verlag für Literatur and Zeitgeschehen, 1964. For a running update, compiled by the Borys Lewytzkyj research bureau in Munich, consult the biannual *Current Soviet Leaders: A Cumulative Guide to Officials and Notables in the USSR*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, which since 1975 has listed changes in personnel and institutions, with biographical information concerning new personnel.

The authorship of *MERSH* is twofold. One category of contributors consists of several score scholars from the English-speaking world—mostly American, although the editor hopes eventually to elicit a more diversified Western participation. For the most part, these are younger and rising figures in the field. Much information, however, is also taken from Russian-language — especially Soviet— standard reference series, information or entries from which are reproduced in English in condensed form in the corresponding *MERSH* entries. The Russian source most extensively used in this way is the *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya*, selections from which are credited to their individual Soviet authors and are frequently supplemented with Western bibliographic citations provided by the compilers of *MERSH*. The relative proportion of Western and Soviet authorship is difficult to determine, but the two components seem about evenly balanced.

The truism which holds uneven quality to be a well-nigh inevitable concomitant of aggregate authorship finds itself confirmed in *MERSH*. Nevertheless, most of the individual contributions by Western specialists are solid pieces of scholarship and succeed in being informative and concise at the same time. Among the many distinguished contributions to the first eight volumes, some which will attract particular attention and interest, are those on anarchism, antisemitism and several related aspects of the Jewish question, the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, Reinhold and Yan Berzin, Bolshevism, M. M. Borodin, the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, church-state relations, the collectivization of agriculture, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and Anglo-Russian relations and the diplomacy of the Eastern Question. A few entries are less illuminating, however—for example, those on the Baku Commune, the Basmachi, Bukhara, Georgi Dimitrov, and Sergei Eisenstein.

By contrast, the overall quality of contributions of Soviet provenance does not justify their enlistment to the extent determined, apparently, by editorial policy. Many entries are affected by the spirit of *partiynost'*, are one-sided in their bibliographic sources, suffer from arbitrary omissions, and gloss over critical issues. Thus, entries on the nationalities of the Soviet Union (e.g., Abkhazians, Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Belorussians, and Buryats) contain primarily data of ethnographic nature, while the ritualistic, if summary, recitation of ideological formulas occupies space which could be devoted to much-needed information on modern nationalism, territorial issues, and 20th-century political history. Soviet selections on the October Revolution and the subsequent Civil War basically adhere to interpretations imposed by later political developments in the USSR. Most entries in *MERSH* on military operations during the Civil War and particularly during World War II are by Soviet authors, and these too are characterized by lacunae and various types of *parti pris*. Many other entries culled from Soviet sources, especially on topics concerning Soviet political institutions and Russian foreign relations, are marked by similar deficiencies. Compensatory references to Western bibliography are usually adequate to provide a more objective picture for those who consult additional sources, although in some cases such references are sparse or entirely missing (e.g., on the Aland Conventions, the Barbarossa Plan, the Constitutions of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Crimean Operation of 1944). The encyclopedia's objective of convenience and expeditiousness of reference is defeated by the inadequacy of the text in such cases. One additional collateral effect of the insufficiently critical incorporation of material originally written in Russian is errors in the spelling of proper names retransliterated out of Cyrillic back into the Latin alphabet, as in the entries on Abo, Austerlitz, Balaton Operation, "Bauzen," and the East Pomeranian and East Prussian Operations of 1914 and 1945.

As editor Joseph Wieczynski rightly cautions, a work of this magnitude can hardly avoid unintentional omissions. This reviewer would signal the absence of entries on Grigoriy Aleksinskiy, A. A. Andreyev, Armenia and the Armenians, Capitalist encirclement, Carpatho-Ukraine, the Chelyuskin cruise, Coexistence, *Cordon sanitaire*, Cult of personality, Dal'niy, Dmytro Doroshenko, and Il'ya Ehrenburg; other reviewers might offer a different list. In addition, a few entries, such as those on Agitprop, Aktiv, Apparat, and Dictatorship of the Proletariat, are far too parsimonious to do justice to their subjects.

Most of the imperfections in these initial volumes can undoubtedly be rectified in supplements and the volumes to follow. But if this series is to fulfill its purpose and put at the disposal of its readership a uniformly reliable body of information on Russia and the Soviet Union, it is urgent that the qualitative imbalance between Eastern- and Western-generated content be redressed by enlisting from Western scholars contributions on those topics for which the existing Soviet literature fails to meet the standards of critical scholarship. Then *MERSH* would achieve the success and reputation for which an excellent editorial initiative, a basically sound methodology, and very fine cooperative scholarly effort so well qualify it.

ANOTHER innovative undertaking, this one in the field of comparative communism, is *Documents in Communist Affairs—1977*. This is a collection of official pronouncements on doctrinal and political matters by ruling and nonruling Communist parties, international communiqués and agreements between various Communist parties or regimes, and statements by human rights and dissident groups within Communist polities, all issued during 1977. That year witnessed many critical developments in Communist and international politics, among them the discussion and enactment of the new constitution of the USSR, renewed momentum for intellectual dissent and human rights movements in the countries of Eastern Europe, the resolution of the succession crisis in post-Mao China and the historic reorientation of policies in the People's Republic, politico-military realignment in the Horn of Africa, intensified debate on Eurocommunism, and renewed efforts to establish a Marxist-Catholic dialogue. The documents in this volume, selected from original sources, illustrate the theoretical views and the policies of Communist parties and other participating actors on these and similar issues. Divergent viewpoints are presented in juxtaposition.

Unfortunately, several key issues of inter-Communist and international relations, particularly in Europe, are not represented in the collection. I have in mind institutional developments in Communist interstate relations and views on integration, and the problem of European security and force reductions in Soviet, East European, and West European Communist perspectives.

Apart from this limitation, the selection of documents is judicious both in terms of issues and of balance, and imparts to the volume the enduring value of an anthology. This volume is intended as the first in a series of annual surveys. Up to now, there has been no publication of this type, and the present one has the potential of becoming a standard source for both basic and advanced research on contemporary communism and international relations.

Such a documentary collection would prove particularly useful as a companion to the Hoover Institution's *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*). The high level of achievement of *YICA*'s 1979 edition—which covers the year 1978—is on a par with that of its predecessors, whose organization and methodology it essentially follows. A total of 99 Communist parties plus the principal international front organizations are profiled individually by acknowledged area experts. Party profiles cover leadership and organization, mass and auxiliary organizations, communications media, membership and electoral strength, domestic political activities, doctrinal orientation, relations with other parties, international position, and relations with competing radical left groups. Valuable innovations of this edition that may be expected to become permanent features of the series are the coverage of Communist interstate institutions in Eastern Europe and the inclusion of biographies of selected Communist personalities who have risen to positions of world prominence during the year.

With its unique scope and its wealth of data, which would require a separate review to treat adequately, *YICA* represents a truly indispensable reference source to all students of Communist comparative and international politics, Soviet foreign policy, and international relations, as well as to those involved in the formation, execution, or analysis of public policy. *YICA* provides more than a survey of recent developments, although it does this admirably. It also provides the foundation, and often the impetus, for further inquiry and analysis.

BY THEIR NATURE, bibliographic guides reflect work completed more than they do work in progress or waiting to be done, and the guides considered here are no exception. The five works, published between 1974 and 1978, are of widely varying topical, chronological, and geographic ambit.

The series of bibliographic surveys on the countries of East Central Europe issued since 1963 under the aegis of the Library of Congress[2] continues with Michael B. Petrovich's study on *Yugoslavia*. Professor Petrovich undertakes a critical survey of the core of the enormous corpus of literature on that country. His selection of over 2,500 items is weighted primarily in the direction of history, reflecting not only the relative preponderance of historical writing in Yugoslav scholarship but also the author's own professional interest and a judicious choice of historiography for in-depth coverage as a humanistic discipline inherently relevant to many other scholarly fields. Petrovich displays a marked preference for publications in the languages of Yugoslavia as opposed to those in Western languages.

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[2] Previous surveys in this series, whose organizational scheme and methodology the present volume basically follows, were devoted to *Romania* (edited by Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, 1963), *Bulgaria* (edited by Marin V. Pundeff, 1965), and *Czechoslovakia* (edited by Rudolf Sturm, 1968).

It is clear that Petrovich, who is an eminent American authority on Yugoslavia, labored under serious limitations of space imposed by the format of the Library of Congress series and by Yugoslavia's complex national, linguistic, cultural, historical, and political configuration. This necessitated an emphasis on general and standard works and a rigorously selective approach rather than an all-inclusive one. Coverage is restricted almost entirely to books, and even here quite a few users, particularly research specialists, will note the absence of many items pertaining to their individual areas of concern. For example, those interested in the history of the country's agrarian economy and land reform will miss references to works on the *zadruga*, or the prewar writings of Rudolf Bicanic or Otto von Franges; and researchers of right radical movements and the history of World War II will find only a few citations on the Ustasa movement and the Croatian wartime state. Professor Petrovich's coverage of American literature is much wider than his coverage of work done in Western Europe, but even some important American contributions in history and the social and political sciences have failed to make his list—e.g., major works by Stanko Guldescu, Paul Shoup, and M. George Zaninovich. Microfilmed American doctoral dissertations on Yugoslavia were apparently not considered.

Despite these limitations, the survey does attain its intended scope and objectives and remains a detailed, authoritative, and convenient reference tool. Its chief qualities are an outstanding historiographic section and a judiciously balanced distribution of the materials selected among Yugoslavia's national cultures. This volume should be used in conjunction with the section on Yugoslavia (to which Petrovich is a contributor) in Paul L. Horecky's bibliography on Southeastern Europe, published in 1970, which covers partly the same ground but includes journal articles and whose cutoff date—1968—is the same as that of the present volume.[3]

Since 1968, the literature on Yugoslavia has continued to grow, with the area of World War II history particularly enriched by new additions. Moreover, major developments, reflected to some extent in the literature, have taken place in Yugoslavia in the spheres of foreign relations, the military, politics, ideology, economics, and culture. This would make a new, updated edition of Professor Petrovich's guide quite useful, especially in view of Yugoslavia's widely acknowledged potential for once again becoming a prime focus of international politics and a major source of systemic reverberations.

Aside from Petrovich's volume, the only bibliographic guide under investigation here which is devoted primarily to European rather than North American (and other English-language) literature is the *European Bibliography of Soviet, East European and Slavonic Studies*. The inaugural volume, covering works published in 1975, marks the debut of a collective, international undertaking intended as an annual series. The series is designed as the successor of two former annual national bibliographies, *Travaux et publications parus en français sur la Russie et l'URSS* and *Soviet, East European and Slavonic Studies in Britain*,[4] and in addition incorporates contributions to the field from the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. The nearly 4,000 titles of books and articles are drawn more or less evenly from French, British, and German-language sources. Coverage is remarkably wide-reaching and comprehensive and provides a unique panorama of Western Europe's scholarship in the Soviet and East European field. A particularly notable additional asset of the volume is its recognition of the scholarly contribution of prestigious Russian and East European intellectual magazines and journals published in Western Europe — e.g., *Posev, Grani, Kontinent, Cahiers de l'Est, Kultura, Svedectvi, Limite*, and *Ethos*.

The *European Bibliography* represents an indispensable vehicle for the cross-national dissemination of scholarship, and one hopes that it will continue to appear. Its value could be further enhanced if its purview were expanded to incorporate contributions originating from other West European countries making significant contributions to the field, especially the Netherlands (with its English-language publishing houses and journals) and Italy. Such expansion might also help secure adequate financial resources to ensure continuation of the series.

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[3] Paul L. Horecky, Ed., *Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1969. For a recent and more up-to-date survey of literature on Yugoslavia which is highly selective and focuses on the contemporary period, see John J. Horton, Ed., *Yugoslavia*, Santa Barbara, CA, and Oxford, England, ABC Clio Press, 1977.

[4] The first was previously published annually by *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (Paris, 1963–74); the second, as a yearly supplement to *ABSEES—Soviet and East European Abstracts Series* (Glasgow, 1971–74). No equivalent bibliographies exist for Germany or Austria.

In contrast to the multilingual approach of the *European Bibliography*, Stephen M. Horak's *Russia, the USSR, and Eastern Europe* offers a selective listing—roughly 1,600 titles—of recent books in English only. Horak's declared intent is to update the coverage of English-language publications provided in the 1960's by Paul L. Horecky's outstanding bibliographies.[5] Most of the works Horak has chosen are by Western scholars, but some entries are translations of the works of Soviet and East European authors. Each listing is accompanied by one concisely excerpted review of the book in question, with the reviews gleaned from North American and British professional journals, or in instances where no published reviews could be found, by annotations supplied by Horak himself. This feature is the distinguishing characteristic of the volume and apparently its main raison d'être. Unfortunately, it is also the source of its weakness. The criteria for selecting the reviews and especially for isolating the excerpts reproduced are not spelled out—beyond a justifiable general preference for reviews published in *Slavic Review* as a guarantee of quality. And there are no citations from reviews in political science journals, even though many of the books listed are in that discipline. Moreover, the review fragments reproduced are more often descriptive than analytical, and the brevity of excerpts and the choice of their content frequently prevent the user from forming an adequate image of the book's argument and findings or of the reviewer's judgment of the book's merits.

THE FINAL two bibliographic guides to be examined here are quite different in nature from those discussed thus far. They attempt to do more than summarize work already completed, by indicating sources which can be expected to continue to provide new information. In *Periodicals on the Socialist Countries and on Marxism*, Harry Shaffer has given us an expanded version of a volume first published in 1971 by Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change. Shaffer attempts a systematic inventory of the plethora of English-language periodicals in the social sciences and the humanities that appear both in Communist-ruled states and in the West and that are concerned primarily with contemporary Communist affairs. Pertinent bibliographic data, general content profile, and full acquisition information are provided for each title. From the standpoint of subject matter, the single largest group of periodicals seems to be devoted to economic affairs, and most of these are issued under official governmental auspices in both East and West—perhaps a reflection of policy priorities on both sides. Communist official publications clearly appear to outnumber their Western counterparts, and Marxist publications, both East and West, outnumber ideologically independent ones.

The compiler of this index may have been unduly generous in incorporating into his list a host of tourist, film, sports, and other similar magazines issued by Communist governments. But if the effort is to be all-encompassing, why exclude on unconvincing grounds almost all periodicals published in the West by Trotskyist and other radical left groups? These frequently offer original perspectives and insights on contemporary socialist theory and practice, and the decision to omit them is likely to be questioned by many specialists. There are also several apparently inadvertent omissions, notably the *International Review of Social History* (Amsterdam) and *Conflict Studies* (London). In view of such lacunae and the general sort of information it contains, this volume is likely to be of greater value to institutional and public libraries and perhaps to business organizations than to individuals engaged in advanced research.

The *Bibliography of the Soviet Social Sciences*, in contrast, is of necessity aimed at the specialist. The role of academic expertise in the formation of Soviet foreign policy has received growing recognition and attention over recent years, as has the gradual maturation in analytical sophistication of Soviet scholarship. Consequently, there has been a felt need among many students of Soviet foreign policy and international relations for an inventory of recent Soviet writing on international affairs. This bibliography attempts to provide an inventory for 1965–75 of the analytical output concerning contemporary world affairs by the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR specializing in the social and political sciences, international relations, and individual regions of the world. The titles of nonperiodical publications sponsored by the various institutes—books and pamphlets, as well as conference papers and degree theses—have been extracted from the Academy's own *Yezhegodnik izdaniy*. Titles of journal articles are systematically arranged according to subject and area specialization for each journal covered.

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[5] In addition to *Southeastern Europe*, cited in fn. 3, Horecky edited *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1965; *East Central Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1969; and *Basic Russian Publications: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Russia and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

The comprehensiveness of this potentially invaluable source is seriously diminished in relation to its intended scope both chronologically and in terms of territory surveyed. Coverage of most publishing outlets, for both journals and nonperiodical publications, falls short (in some cases far short) of the bibliography's announced time span. For example, publications of the Institute of the International Workers' Movement are given for the years 1967–72 only; and articles in *SShA*, the journal of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, only for 1970–74. Moreover, some leading journals published by the Academy's institutes are omitted altogether, even when other publications of the institutes in question are listed. Among those absent are journals which invite the sustained attention of the student of Soviet foreign policy, e.g., *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir, Latinskaya Amerika, Narody Azii i Afriki,* and *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*. An additional gap results from the exclusion of the sizable Soviet printed output on specific topics of contemporary international politics, such as the revolutionary setback suffered in Chile (despite the fact that this has been an object of protracted and in-depth discussion, both analytical and prescriptive, in Soviet journals). The criteria for selection of materials and the reasons for the chronological and substantive gaps remain unexplained.

Nevertheless, the idea of providing the specialized researcher with a guide to the vast corpus of Soviet publications in the social and political sciences, international relations, and area studies is an excellent and timely one, and the effort in this direction should undoubtedly be continued by efforts to update this work at periodic intervals. But a far greater degree of comprehensiveness would be required to ensure its value as an inclusive and reliable reference source for area experts and decision-makers.

AFTER AN examination of the survey and bibliographic literature which we have at hand, there can remain little doubt that archival and library resource guides are the most forward-looking of the sourcebooks in the field in terms of opening up new vistas for research by signaling materials available and suggesting unexplored areas. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, under contract with the Office of Education of the then US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *East Central and Southeast Europe* offers a survey of the leading library and archival collections in the East European field in the United States and Canada.[6] A total of 43 academic and public depositories are profiled individually, the aim being to provide area and subject guides to the resources of each rather than exhaustive listings of holdings. Descriptions of each collection are supplied on a country-by-country basis, with further subdivisions according to scholarly discipline. All pertinent information on access, organization, published catalogs and internal finding aids, conditions of usage and borrowing, and various library services is systematically supplied.

Given the scope of their undertaking and the space available, editors Paul Horecky and David Kraus must have found sacrifices in comprehensiveness inescapable. Perhaps the principal limitation of the volume is the exclusion from the *Handbook*'s sphere of concern of collections and holdings on the Baltic region and the Ukraine. Quite apart from their intrinsic interest, such collections contain much material of value to specialists on Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. Also missing are some important archival collections, such as the rich Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History at Columbia University in New York City, and the University of Pittsburgh's Archive on Political Elites in Eastern Europe.

In fact, the *Handbook*'s overall emphasis falls markedly on library resources at the expense of archival ones. The primary beneficiaries and most likely users of this handbook will be the nonresident scholar planning research trips to major library collections and the graduate student seeking to correlate academic affiliation with individual specialization and area interests.

The imbalance of the Horecky-Kraus effort in favor of library resources is to some extent redressed by Steven A. Grant's

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[6] In fact, all but two of the collections are situated in the US. For a comprehensive survey of major Canadian collections, see Bohdan Budurowycz, *Slavic and East European Resources in Canadian Academic and Research Libraries*, Ottawa, National Library of Canada, 1976.

Scholar's Guide to Washington, D.C., for Russian/Soviet Studies. This product of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute in Washington performs a signal service to the scholarly community. It presents for the first time in systematic fashion a general inventory of the vast resources of the Washington area in the field of Russian and Soviet studies, providing descriptions and evaluations of holdings, general reference aids, and introductions into the modi operandi of each of the depositories and organizations surveyed. A probably exhaustive total of 277 institutions and organizations is included, ranging from public and private libraries; archives; art collections; music, film, and photographic repositories; and data banks to US and foreign government agencies; academic and professional associations; cultural and scholarly exchange organizations; academic research centers; publications and media; specialized bookstores; and ethnic and émigré cultural societies and church groups.

In recent years Washington has become the locus of the largest aggregation of material for Russian and Soviet studies in the country and perhaps all of the Western world, and this guide is a must for the nonresident American or foreign scholar planning to benefit from the resources of the American capital. Washington's various depositories and organizations hold—and continue to generate—resources of comparable magnitude for East European studies, and the Kennan Institute has undertaken to produce a similar systematic inventory of these materials. In particular, the collections of the National Archives—above all those recently opened and still being opened to researchers under the 30-year archival rule—are of unique importance to the student of the Soviet Union and contemporary Eastern Europe, international communism, comparative revolution, the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe and US policy toward the region, American-Soviet relations, and the beginnings of the cold war. They should greatly enrich our knowledge of all these topics.

Of all the sourcebooks discussed, this guide is perhaps the most stimulating in that it points to a domain where much of the future of primary research in the field, whether historical or policy-oriented, undoubtedly lies. It is a particularly valuable "tertiary source" in a field in which large amounts of primary material still go unexploited despite a proliferation of secondary literature—as the contents of the sourcebooks available in the field suggest.

The Cuban Enigma

By Antoni M. Kapcia

MARIO LLERENA. *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1978

JORGE L. DOMÍNGUEZ. *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1978.

HEINRICH BRUNNER. *Cuban Sugar Policy from 1963 to 1979.* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.

OSCAR LEWIS et al. *Four Women—Living the Revolution: An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba.* Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1977.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, Ed. *Cuban Communism,* 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1977.

LESTER A. SOBEL, Ed. *Castro's Cuba in the 1970's.* New York, NY, Facts on File, 1978.

CUBA IN 1979 celebrated the 20th anniversary of its Revolution with characteristic eccentricity. Just as "détente" with the United States had apparently been postponed indefinitely by differences over Africa, President Fidel Castro reopened the issue by his unexpected overtures to the exiles (the old *gusanos*) and the release of hundreds of political prisoners.[1] If nothing else, these actions proved that the Revolution and Fidel Castro were as unpredictable and as enigmatic in 1979 as in 1959. Nothing, it seemed, had changed.

Yet much has in fact changed in Cuba and the world. The Cuban Revolution has now endured for 20 years and, in this reviewer's eyes, is an established fact of life. Cuba has also evolved an "alternative" revolutionary model to that of the USSR, and it seems to be slowly, if tentatively, reducing some of the elements of dependence on the Soviet Union that marked the Revolution's early years. To understand the nature of the new situation, we need a historical approach to the Revolution.

THE FIRST POINT of interest—by no means an unfamiliar issue—is what happened in 1959 and why, how Batista fell and Castro emerged as leader. Here we must have answers of greater analytic depth than many sources provide. Mario Llerena and Jorge Domínguez both address these questions, with the former focusing on Castro himself and the latter concentrating on the longer-term background. Llerena's discussion, in this writer's opinion, is the less satisfactory of the two, for it is informed by notions that Castro was a "megalomaniac" and that "communization" of the revolutionary forces took place *prior to 1959* (a judgment based on a confusion between communism and the vague, though radical, socialism of Che Guevara and Raúl Castro). Although ostensibly an "insider's" account of the Revolution, Llerena's book is less than that. The fact is that from 1956 on there was only *one* group of "insiders"—the guerrillas around Castro. Other participants such as Llerena, though active, were ultimately only peripherally involved. Despite its deficiencies, however, Llerena's volume does highlight the way in which, almost by default, the anti-Batista leadership passed to Castro. By 1958, the existing political groups in the country had become irrevelant to the real issue: Fulgencio Batista or Castro? In the vacuum, Castro emerged unchallenged.

But the origins of the fall of the Batista regime are to be found in larger contexts. In this regard, Domínguez concentrates on the loss of political legitimacy. He takes issue with earlier analyses of Batista's overthrow that stress economic dependence—the weakness of the Cuban bourgeoisie, the Cuban economy, and Cuban nationality prior to 1959[2]—and argues that on the eve of 1959 the United States had reduced its role in Cuba and national entrepreneurship was on the rise.

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[1] On Aug. 31, 1978, Havana announced the release of several hundred political prisoners, and the following Nov. 11, it indicated that it intended to increase the total to 3,000, at a rate of 400 a month. In addition, it would free 600 illegal emigrants and 425 "war criminals." By way of explanation of this change in policy, the Castro government stated that Cuba was not only Marxist-Leninist but also nationalist and patriotic. *Keasing's Contemporary Archives* (London), Jan. 19, 1979, p. 29408.

Certainly, as Domínguez contends, the 57-year-old republic had suffered a permanent crisis of legitimacy, with a destabilizing US "presence," dual power bases (Havana and Washington, the military and Congress), and an irrelevant and corrupt "democracy." Hence, in 1959 a movement claiming "moral legitimacy" had a timely appeal. Nonetheless, this *political* explanation should not blind us to a fundamental aspect of the prerevolutionary economy: namely, that Cuba's economic system was not geared to the country's real needs. As Brunner demonstrates, the dilemma lay in the fact that neither an inefficient closed-market system tied to the United States nor an unstable free-market one stimulated stable development. This situation was compounded by the American sugar quota system, which, while not the "evil" of Cuban nationalist mythology, trapped the island. Success in expanding sugar exports deepened dependence on the United States, while only decline in sugar production aided diversification. Thus, Cuban prosperity in the 1950's was fragile and was dissipated in recession in 1958—which in turn swelled the ranks of the disaffected and disadvantaged (and, consequently, the ranks of Castro's movement).

Moreover, explanations of the Castro triumph should be sought not in Cuban history alone but in the broader Latin American milieu. Here I have in mind not so much *caudillo* or populist traditions as the eclectic ideology of the "third way," which, through the Peronista and Aprista movements in Argentina and Peru profoundly influenced a generation of Latin American youth, including the Cuban *Ortodoxos* (to which Castro belonged). In short, Castro's early "humanism" had a continental socialistic, anti-imperialist pedigree.

AS FOR the swift radicalization of the Revolution after 1959, explanations are many. These include the political and ideological vacuum, US hostility, the guerrilla experience, Castro's uncompromising personality, the availability of the (Communist) *Partido Socialista Popular* PSP as an instrument to carry out reforms, and the presence of the USSR in the wings waiting for an opening to exploit. Here it should be noted that there is little evidence of Castro's commitment to socialist ideas at the time. Rather, he seemed to believe in some sort of reformed capitalism, based on the ideas of the Cuban patriot, José Martí, and on a polyclass alliance. Most of all, however, what "pushed" the process leftward, as Domínguez observes, was the Revolution's own dynamic — the leadership's awareness of the need and pressures for fundamental and rapid change, its perception that to make the (costly) break with the United States would necessitate pursuit of a policy of autarky or reliance on other markets and sources of aid (it actually tended to follow a zigzag course between the two), and its belief that the purely "social" revolution must take precedence over economic restructuring. Although this order of priorities held obvious dangers, it ultimately guaranteed the Revolution's survival, for it succeeded in winning for the Revolution a base of popular support that remained steadfast through 20 years of austerity.

It is the social transformations, then, that should be examined first. These transformations, especially in health, education, and welfare, are now an accepted fact, and they have recently received the stamp of approval of the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America and visiting American notables. Both Oscar Lewis and Domínguez add their endorsements. (The latter, it should be noted, then goes on to examine the central issue of the degree to which these transformations have succeeded in producing Guevara's "new man.")

However, Cuba's impressive commitment to, for example, education does not resolve questions of quality, precepts, and purposes.[3] Greater literacy has undoubtedly raised consciousness and participation, but it has also assured political control because of the limitations of the program. Likewise, the government's strong dedication to racial and sexual equality may say little of actual implementation or responses. The value of the Lewis volume is its focus on contradictions and confusions with regard to the latter issue at both the national and individual levels. A radical legal position contrasts with conservative social attitudes (though Cuban women have been considerably "liberated" by the demands of labor and defense). Furthermore, "equality" is mainly a matter of the incorporation of *all* the population into the work force. Even the Family Code of 1974[4] is primarily an instrument for ensuring revolutionary order.

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[2] Two exponents of this view are James O'Connor. *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1970; and Robin Blackburn, "Prologue to the Cuban Revolution," *New Left Review* (London), October 1963.

[3] See, for instance, Arthur Gillette, "Cuba's Educational Revolution," *Fabian Research Series* (London), No. 302, June 1972.

THE PRIMACY of social concerns is especially important. As Brunner points out (pp. 34–35), it rendered industrialization, diversification, and rationing as much social as economic decisions. This also applies to the agrarian reforms of May 1959 and October 1963. The early prominence of the National Institute of Agrarian Reforms (INRA), which was under Castro's guidance and run by the Rebel Army, made the reforms social and political tools. INRA constituted *the* rural administration mobilizing the hitherto ignored rural work force.[5]

In light of this priority, moreover, the tardiness of economic progress was hardly surprising. Only after the post-1970 "rectification"[6] did growth take place and trade increase. (Previously, growth had been subordinated to distribution.)

At the same time, the economic situation has obviously not been as simple as these bald facts might suggest. The Revolution began (and continues) with a paradox. Sugar constituted both a cause of dependence and a source of wealth. Thus, it was vital in the short term but harmful beyond that. The Cubans' failure to solve the dilemma created by this paradox resulted in economic confusions and "zigzags" and in the economic debacle of 1960–63. (Blame for the latter must be apportioned equally to the Cubans—who took unrealistic political decisions and displayed ideological confusion—and to the Russians.)[7]

Brunner masterfully demonstrates the soundness of Havana's "return-to-sugar" strategy in 1963–70, linking the Cuban "model" (what one might call "export-led distribution") to Alfred O. Hirschman's "unbalanced growth."[8] Furthermore, he implies that post-1970 economic policy was different less in strategy than in implementation. Certainly, the problem with the 1970 harvest campaign (*zafra*) lay in its scale, not in the concept behind it. To be sure, the production target set was an inflexible political goal and had little economic rationale, given the world market's limits. In addition, the venture was costly, for it constituted a drain on other sectors (1.2 million workers were mobilized to cut the cane), reduced productivity,[9] and damaged morale and credibility. Nevertheless, the effort was fundamentally sound. One basic difficulty plaguing Cuba was the persistent instability of the price of sugar. As Brunner argues, Cuba's reliance in that period on the fluctuating world market led to cuts in advantageously priced sales to the USSR if the world price fell, for Cuba then had to sell more on the world market in order to maintain its foreign exchange earnings. (This situation, incidentally, gives the lie to Cuba's supposed dependence on the USSR during the 1960's.) By ensuring a large harvest, Havana sought to make certain it had enough sugar available to keep up its foreign exchange earnings and still sell large quantities to the Soviet Union at favorable prices.

Cuba probably had little choice with regard to its economic strategy. It had only sugar to sell, and in light of the instability of the price of sugar on the world market, the USSR represented its only reliable customer. Likewise, Guevara's "moral economy" was largely a matter of necessity, because there was no money for differentials and incentives and there were no goods to buy. For these reasons, the economic strategy was "correct." Indeed, the righting of the economy by 1972 seems to confirm the strategy's soundness.

AT ROOT, the problem that came to the fore in 1970 was political, and the political damage resulting from the failure of the harvest campaign was more serious than the economic damage. Since 1961, active dissent had been minimal, with opposition silenced by exile (Domínguez observes that the US acceptance of the exodus helped unify the Revolution[10]), imprisonment,[11] or defeat.[12] But there was a

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[4] The Mar. 8, 1974, code guaranteed full sexual equality and established women's rights to participate in political, cultural, and economic life.

[5] William M. LeoGrande has observed that INRA served as the basis for many of the Revolution's organizations. See his "The Politics of Revolutionary Development: Civil-Military Relations in Cuba, 1959–1976," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), December 1978.

[6] This term is Sergio Roca's. See his "Cuban Economic Policy in the 1970s: The Trodden Paths," in the volume edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, p. 289.

[7] Brunner's analysis of this period reinforces that of K. S. Karol in *Guerrillas in Power*, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1970.

[8] See Hirschman's *Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1958.

[9] The Cubans subsequently admitted that there was 20 percent absenteeism from work in August–September 1970, and they therefore designated 1971 the Year of Productivity (Dominguez, p. 275). According to the Labor Ministry, moreover, the harvest had cost Cuba three times its worth on the world market. See the volume edited by Lester A. Sobel, p. 65.

[10] In 1965, the US government began an "airlift" of Cubans who wanted to leave the country, and by 1970, the number of persons who had availed themselves of this opportunity had reached 560,628 (Sobel p. 70).

[11] In 1967, Castro admitted that there were 20,000 political prisoners in Cuba, but in June 1977 he placed the figure at more than 15,000 at some time in the past (Sobel, p. 156). By 1978, the actual total still admitted to be under confinement had fallen to 3,238 (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Jan. 19, 1979, p. 29408).

Fn. 12 follows on p. 83.

greater degree of passive dissent because of frustration at the unstructured, improvisational mode of governance, which, even though it had answered the Revolution's early needs, had proved incompatible with a more complex institutional setting.[13] The profusion of organizations had undermined active participation. Thus, the signal problem of 1970 was the elite's failure to adapt to new demands. Its fear of institutional rigidity overlooked the fact that morale could not be maintained indefinitely on promises and a siege mentality. New demands on a "war weary" work force battered by 15 years of austerity could, and did, create deep resentment, with dangerous implications for the Revolution's credibility.

In this respect, however, the "watershed," the period of greatest need not only for morale but also for a more coherent system, was 1968, not 1970. The year 1968 witnessed the paradoxical Revolutionary Offensive, the nationalizing of all remaining private industry and trade (55,636 businesses). An attempt to raise morale and the "high point" of the Guevarist phase of the Revolution, this offensive disrupted the economy, increased absenteeism, reduced participation, and (despite the antibureaucratic campaign) swelled the bureaucracy. The excesses of 1970 were the logical sequel.

What Castro failed to absorb in 1968 but finally learned from the 1970 experience—"that the art of governance is considerably more complex than is the art of insurrection"[14]—did then produce fundamental political changes. Indeed, the *zafra* separated two political strategies. The first subordinated everything to *survival* in circumstances of a real or imagined siege, while the second subordinated everything to *stability*. Replacement of INRA by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1976 eloquently symbolized the shift from one to the other.

Developments since 1970 have been fully documented,[15] but the underlying trends still need to be analyzed. One of the more obvious of these is the relative success of Cuba's economic endeavors. This has been the result of a number of factors: Soviet aid;[16] the favorable price of sugar on the world market; stabilization and reorganization of the economy; devolution of economic decision-making; and, perhaps above all, the effects of the 1963–70 efforts. Of the readjustments, the introduction of the standard of profitability of enterprises (*cálculo económico*) in 1978 as part of the New System for the Direction of the Economy may yet prove to be the most significant.[17] Yet the economy's underlying weakness, dependence on sugar, remains. In 1974, sugar accounted for 90 percent of Cuba's export receipts.[18]

Institutionalization of the Revolution has also been quite apparent. Major landmarks in this process have included the First Congress of the Communist Party on December 17–22, 1975, the enactment of the Constitution in 1976, and the elections to the Popular Assembly in 1976.[19] But what have been the effects of this trend? It seems now that the fundamental nature of power in Cuba has not really altered. Elections have been more of a concession, an expression of confidence, than a legitimation. Indeed, the *poder popular* system lacks autonomy except at the local level, and even here its role is confused with that of the long-existing Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Similarly, as Domínguez notes, the activism of the trade unions (CTC) has declined from its peak in 1970. Lastly, "democratization" of the various organizations has not altered their functions as "transmission belts" for decisions passed down from on high, but has simply increased consultation as a safety valve and sounding device.

Whether the post-1970 period has witnessed "sovietization" of the Cuban political and economic system is much less certain, although debate on this subject has been as vehement (and unhelpful) as arguments over the character of the Revolution that took place during the Revolution's early years. Cuba's economic reliance on the Soviet Union—for cheap oil, stable sugar prices, credits, and favorable loans[20]—is, of course, undeniable,

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[12] Dominguez claims (p. 346) that between 1960 and 1965, the number of insurgent bands in the country averaged 179. However, he says that these comprised no more than 1,000 individuals altogether.

[13] Edward Gonzalez's observations on this matter are valuable. See his *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*, New York, NY, Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

[14] Irving Louis Horowitz, "Introduction to the Second Edition (1972)," in Horowitz, p. 12.

[15] The Sobel volume contains a wealth of meticulous detail. See also the Dominguez volume; Gonzalez, *Cuba under Castro* . . . ; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*, 2nd ed., Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1978.

[16] According to Brunner (p. 123), this amounted to US$1 million a day. Another source puts Cuba's indebtedness to the USSR in January 1971 at $2,200 million (Sobel, p. 37).

[17] Other aspects of the NSDE concerned interest rates and consumer demand. See *Latin American Economic Report* (London), Sept. 22, 1978, p. 294.

[18] See Sobel, p. 189.

[19] After elections were conducted on an experimental basis in Matanzas in 1974, nationwide popular power *(poder popular)* elections were carried out on Oct. 11, 1976, for 169 municipal assemblies, 14 provincial assemblies, and 1 national assembly. Altogether, 5 million voters participated in these elections.

[20] In 1972, the USSR agreed to restructure Cuba's debts accumulated prior to the end of 1972, consenting to extend the time frame for those past due and to accept repayment on an interest-free basis. Sobel, p. 193.

and has been acknowledged by the Cubans themselves. But the degree of that dependence and its impact are less clear. Certainly, in this writer's view, it falls far short of the strong dependence on the US economy prior to 1959,[21] and Havana is now more deeply involved in the setting of sugar prices. Moreover, diversification of output, though limited in scope, has undoubtedly helped cushion blows (such as the precipitate fall in the price of sugar in 1974–76 from 65.3 cents a pound to 7.5 cents a pound) that before 1959 would have been disastrous for the Cuban economy.

The extent of political dependence, however, is more difficult to gauge. Here Cuba's foreign policy should be considered, because of its apparent Soviet orientation. Since 1959, Cuba's main foreign policy concern has been the United States, but now, after a decade of severe hostility and then fitful moves toward an improvement of relations since 1970 (the course of which the Sobel volume traces admirably), a full rapprochement seems only a matter of time. Hence, the need for Soviet support has diminished somewhat. With regard specifically to Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union, Africa becomes especially relevant. Many factors led to Cuba's involvement in Angola in 1975, but the most likely stimulus for it would seem to have been Havana's Third World policy. In this reviewer's opinion, the two other leading explanations—that the USSR used economic blackmail to induce Cuba to act as a proxy for it and that political infighting within the Cuban leadership contributed to the intervention[22]—offer much but miss more. Indeed, the former seems particularly untenable in light of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's rejection of the idea that the Cubans had been forced into the intervention (Sobel, p. 119). It is probably most accurate to see the whole episode as part of Cuba's long-standing "internationalist" policy and relationship with several Arab and African movements, including the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*.[23] The timing of the crisis was opportune for Cuba. The situation gave Havana the chance to reaffirm its "revolutionary" credentials to an audience made skeptical by Cuba's apparently pro-Soviet stance (especially after Castro's defense of the USSR at the Fourth Conference of Nonaligned States in Algiers in September 1973), to revive its (former Latin American) policy of *conciencia revolucionaria*[24] in the African context, and to continue its long-standing policy of acquiring "leverage" with the Soviet Union, through a dramatic gesture of solidarity that the USSR had to support. Thus, the Angolan affair was more a case of coincidence of perceived Soviet and Cuban interests than of Cuban responses to Soviet pressure.

THE POLITICAL credits that Cuba earned abroad from its Angolan venture had a parallel at home, for the public tended to view the undertaking as a new challenge and a source of national pride. Recognizing this fact, the leadership proceeded to use the Angolan operation as yet another means of morale building and mobilization, identifying it with such earlier efforts as the literacy campaign of 1961 and propagating the myth of the "return of the slaves."[25]

This issue of mobilization raises a familar but still relevant question: what sort of revolution is the Cuban Revolution (within the framework of its clear socialist orientation)? Interpretations emphasizing Castro's "personal" role, though still evident,[26] have now become less common. Yet even though this role is less important today than it was in the 1960–68 period, it is still central to the Revolution. True, it is clearly no longer accurate to speak of *Fidelismo*, for the organizations (the party included) are dominated less by Fidelista loyalists than by an elite made up of the Rebel Army elite of 1959. It was this elite that, after the "Escalante affair" of 1962,[27] strove to prevent the growth of a power base for a competing elite and to preserve the "guerrilla mentality" (through an "elitism" based on the Guevaran concept of a *foco*, or revolutionary center, and the shared Sierra experience). Castro's early dismantling of his rebel movement and his anti-PSP moves were both part of this attempt to ensure the direction of the Revolution by the old elite, with himself at the helm. The current composition of the party leadership together with the power that Castro wields by virtue of his roles as head of the Cuban Communist Party, President of the country, President of the Council of State, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and head of a variety of other bodies[28] shows that this aspect of the situation has not changed. Since 1970, in short, Castro has again proved his ability (as in 1953 and 1956) to turn defeat into victory. Institutionalization has actually strengthened his hand. Hence, decisions can still be his alone, and he is still able to determine the direction of policy, although in overall terms he continues in some senses to *react* to events rather than to *direct* them. The substantial government changes in January 1980, and the manner in which they came about, seem to reinforce these judgments.

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[21] According to Sobel (p. 188), US-Cuban trade in 1958 amounted to 71 percent of Cuba's exports and 64 percent of its imports. At its peak in 1962, Havana's trade with the whole of the Communist world accounted for 82.9 percent of Cuba's total trade turnover, but by 1974 the figure had dropped to 58.8 percent, with the USSR accounting for 40.7 percent.

[22] See Edward Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1977, pp. 1–15.

[23] From this same perspective, Horowitz would seem to be in error in asserting that Cuba's support for the Arab side in the Middle East followed Soviet policy. See "Authenticity and Autonomy in Cuban Communism," in Horowitz, p. 122.

[24] Roca (in Horowitz, p. 192) views the post-1970 period as one of *conciencia económica* at home and *conciencia revolucionaria* abroad.

[25] See *Latin American Political Report*, Apr. 14, 1978, p. 110. The whole question of the linkage between Cuba's African involvement and domestic mobilization is treated by the author in "Cuba's African Involvement: A New Perspective," *Survey* (London), Spring 1979.

[26] See, for example, J. N. Goodsell, Ed., *Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba: 1959–1973*, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.

[27] In 1962, old-line Communist Anibal Escalante was accused of "sectarianism" for attempting to "stack" the new Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), a precursor of the Cuban Communist Party, with members of the old PSP.

A popular recent characterization of the Revolution is that it has been "militarized." Horowitz described such a trend in 1967 (see Horowitz, p. 26), but his analysis was based more on subjective criteria—for example, the "military" nature of the original revolution—than on solid evidence. Moreover, his view of the original revolution, in this writer's eyes, represented a misreading that paralleled Guevara's. It ignored the fact that Batista's demoralized army had not so much suffered defeat as collapsed, along with the regime itself.

Yet the Rebel Army and its successor, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), have certainly been central to the Revolution. This was especially true early on, when the Rebel Army, the *real* power in the country, constituted the only viable instrument for meeting the urgent needs of defense, productivity, and organization. It was the Army (not the PSP) that emerged intact, loyal, organized, and popular from the battle with the Batista regime; the Army that performed the party's role, that ran INRA, and so on. Since then, it has remained a key source of manpower and means of mobilization, education, and politicization. In 1968, for instance, 46 percent of the FAR regulars were involved in the *zafra*; in 1970, the figure rose to 64 percent (Domínguez, pp. 357–58).

This is not "militarization," however. The use of the rhetoric of "struggle" has clear precedents in, say, Great Britain during World War II, and the military in Cuba is not a separate caste or elite, imposing its definitions on the whole of society. Rather, the military draws in practically the entire population in one way or another and *reflects* rather than *directs*, being "civilianized" by a long, close identification with the population (Domínguez, pp. 341ff, refers to the "civic soldier"). Certainly, such was the case at least until the Angolan venture, which constituted the first really conventional military action of the FAR. But by 1975, it should also be pointed out, the FAR's representation on the Central Committee of the party had declined from what it had been in 1965.[29]

In this reviewer's opinion, the military's role in Cuba can best be viewed as a facet of the country's "mobilization politics." These, as a result of the Revolution's unstructured, unorthodox character, its reactive, eclectic ideology, and its stress on "theory through action" (as opposed to the traditional Marxist-Leninist emphasis on "action through theory"), have produced an "alternative" revolutionary model.

The most distinctive means of mobilization has undoubtedly been the "personal" relationship between Castro and the populace, fortified by rallies, media coverage, and impromptu tours. But this means has not been the basic one employed. That role has fallen to the many revolutionary organizations which, together, assure the involvement of almost the entire population. These include the ubiquitous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution,[30] the Federation of Cuban Women,[31] the CTC, the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), and the Young Communists (UJC) and the Union of Cuban Pioneers.[32] All are characteristically bifunctional in nature—that is, they serve as instruments for both mobilizing and controlling (consultation/participation and execution of decisions).

Another means of mobilization from the outset has been a revolutionary mythology—myths concerning links with Martí and the revolutionary tradition, Castro's attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago on July 26, 1953, the guerrilla experience in the Sierra, the rise of new generations, and the concept of struggle (Angola included). Likewise, the Revolution's almost uninterrupted series of "campaigns"—some mundane (the Havana greenbelt), others dramatic (the literacy campaign); some factional (antisectarianism), others national (the 1970 *zafra*)—has been essential to mobilization. During the early years, they occurred frequently because of the initial impetus and enthusiasm behind the Revolution. Later, they became more sporadic and reflected the need to recreate this original enthusiasm, as the contrast with the pre-1959 society became less relevant to a new generation and less effective with the old one. In this sense, Angola was a godsend.

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[28] Dominguez argues that this concentration of power is more in keeping with a Latin American than with a socialist tradition.

[29] LeoGrande (p. 282) gives figures of 57 percent in 1965 and 30 percent in 1975.

[30] Incorporating 4.8 million persons, or 80 percent of the eligible population, in 1976 (Dominguez, p. 262).

[31] Whose membership was 2.18 million persons, or more than 80 percent of the eligible population, in 1977 (Dominguez, p. 268).

[32] The Pioneers embraced 98.7 percent of all schoolchildren in 1975 (Dominguez, p. 279).

WHAT, THEN, can be said in summary about the Revolution today? Its pattern is clear. The Revolution has assumed the character of nationalist "mobilization politics" (as Domínguez maintains), with adapted elements of socialist models and an agrarian, export-led distribution economy.

In regard to the future, prediction is difficult. The same actors that have determined the Revolution's course over the last two decades could once again cause a change in its direction. For instance, the United States might decide to revive its currently dormant policy of détente with Cuba. The USSR, for its part, might miscalculate and suffer a defeat in Africa. Castro himself might take some unforeseen decision or simply die. In this regard, however, one suspects that his death would not be as critical to the Revolution now as it would have been in the early years.[33]

If the essentials of the current situation continue to prevail, though, it seems likely that Havana will try to play the United States and the USSR off against each other. The political importance of Cuba to both will in all probability facilitate such a development. For the United States, Cuba constitutes a key factor in a viable Latin American and Caribbean policy in the wake of the transfer of the Panama Canal to Panama. For the USSR, Cuba serves as proof of the Soviet "revolutionary" commitment.

As early as 1975, Cuba already had taken its first tentative steps toward independence from the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Angolan involvement, the strengthening of the position of Castro and of the Cuban elite more generally by institutionalization, the moves toward détente with the United States (including the adoption of a friendlier stance toward the exiles), and Cuba's achievement of an end to sanctions by the Organization of American States and participation in the Latin American economic system—all mark 1975 not as the final stage of Cuba's emergence as a Soviet satellite, but as a tentative beginning of a new independence. With détente with the United States holding out the brightest hope for obtaining advanced technology and consumer goods, Cuba might conceivably decide to proceed further along this path, even if doing so might dissipate a major unifying force, the country's "siege" mentality.

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[33] Edward Gonzalez addresses the question of succession in the Horowitz volume, pp. 537–69.

Conflict Within the Iraqi Left

By John K. Cooley

HANNA BATATU. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

TAREQ Y. ISMAEL. *The Arab Left*. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1976.

RONY GABBAY. *Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq*. London, Croom Helm, 1978.

MAJID KHADDURI. *Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968*. Washington, DC, The Middle East Institute, 1978.

IRAQ IS EMERGING as a major Arab power. Not only has it invested its oil revenues in both development and arms (the latter bought mainly from the Soviet Union and France), but since the March 26, 1979, peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn al-Takriti, while increasing trade and technology transfers from the Western world and keeping a healthy distance from the USSR, has tried to make Iraq's ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) party into a vanguard of militant Arabism. With its vast oil wealth, second only to Saudi Arabia's, moreover, Iraq has the potential to become a major power in the Third World as well.

However, Iraq suffers from internal sectarian and social tensions that keep Iraqi society and politics near the boiling point. The turmoil in Iran since the Shah's departure in January 1979 has exacerbated these tensions.

The four books under review here, though they went to press before the Iranian revolution, all help to explain why Iraq is today such an explosive cauldron. Since Iraq's old pro-Western Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in 1958, various groups, all claiming to speak with a leftist voice, have competed to lead Iraq out of the isolation which her special identity has helped to impose. Of these, the most important have been the Baath and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).

Both the Baath and the ICP originated in the days when France ruled Syria, Britain was predominant in Iraq, and social inequalities were rampant. The ICP was founded in 1934 as a rural peasant movement. However, it was able to put down lasting roots only in Iraq's cities, among the workers and unemployed. The Baath, a transplant from Syria, was a party of middle-class intellectuals and, in Iraq, for the most part of Sunni Muslim army officers. Deadly rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian Baathists has had its repercussions to this day, and Michel Aflaq, one of the party's two Syrian cofounders, now lives in exile in Baghdad, an aging figure from the party's remote, romantic past.

In 1958, the ICP, remembering the martyrdom of several of its founding members such as Yusuf Sulayman Yusuf (known as "Fahd") at the hands of the Hashemite monarchy and eager to establish its anti-imperialist credentials, cooperated with Abdel Karim Qasim, the dictatorial army officer who overthrew the royal government. Soon, however, the ICP and an array of other opponents, from right-wing landowners and businessmen frightened by Qasim's populism to supporters of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's brand of pan-Arab nationalism, were locked in political battle with Qasim. During the course of the struggle, the Communist-inspired "Peace Partisans" clashed with nationalist army factions in the northern, Kurdish oil town of Mosul.

This same episode marked the beginning of efforts by the clandestine Baath party to undermine Qasim. Led then by Ali Saleh al-Saadi, a brawling adventurer, the Baath organized a clandestine network inside the Iraqi armed forces (which helps to explain the Baath's present-day sensitivity about any non-Baathist infiltration in the armed forces, especially if it is Communist). The secret Baathist military committee was headed by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a retired officer (he was later reinstated in the army and accorded the rank of general, and he subsequently became president of the Republic until Saddam Husayn took over supreme power in July 1979). By February 1963, the Baathists were able to carry out a successful coup d'état, with the help of the air force, whose Baathist pilots bombed and strafed Qasim's forces into submission. A month later, the Baath seized power in Syria too.

While the Baath was immersed in internal conflict and a bitter quarrel with Nasser in Egypt, however, a rightist nationalist faction under Abdel Salam Arif, another general, seized power. The Nasserists twice tried to wrest power away from Abdel Salim Arif and later from his brother, Abdel Rahman Arif. During this period, there were also many efforts to curtail Iraq's increasing trade and political ties with the Soviet Union, patron of the ICP. These failed when a wave of popular resentment swept through the Arab world against the United States, because of its backing for Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

ON JULY 17, 1968, a Baathist junta toppled President Abdel Rahman Arif and elected Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr president. By the end of the summer, a group of men, including Saddam Husayn and Bakr, all from the town of Takrit, in north central Iraq, had control of the party, state, and military machinery. From then until July of 1973, the Baath party managed to stay in control of all three.

It was during this period that Iraqi-Soviet relations reached their zenith and that the ICP came as near as it has ever come to sharing power with the Baath. President Bakr visited the USSR in September 1972 to celebrate the signing of the 15-year Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and alliance. Considerably before that juncture, a struggle within the ICP between a pro-Moscow faction, headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Azziz Muhammed, and a pro-Peking group, led by Azziz al-Hajj, had been resolved in the Moscow group's favor, and the ICP's second national conference, in 1970, had affirmed the preeminence of Soviet influence. In 1973, the ICP, after some Soviet prodding of both it and the Baath, agreed to form a progressive National Front with the Baath and the main Kurdish ethnic party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Though the ICP complained bitterly about the continuing lack of land reform and civil liberties in the country, it followed as best it could the shifting winds of Iraqi-Soviet relations during this period.

These winds began to blow more coldly with the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. True, the USSR gave Iraq diplomatic support during that war, and in May 1974, Moscow came out on the side of the Baghdad government against Barzani, who had, with help from Israel, Iran, and the US Central Intelligence Agency, renewed the Kurdish insurrection a month earlier. But the USSR supported Egypt and Syria in their efforts to reach a negotiated solution with Israel after the 1973 war and seemed to be urging the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take the same path. Iraq, in contrast, opposed any compromise involving recognition of Israel and sought to set up a "rejection front," although it viewed this as more political than military in character. These different approaches were reflected in the noncommittal nature of the communiqué issued when Saddam Hussayn, then Vice President of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council, visited Moscow in April 1975.[1]

The USSR also declined to support Iraq in its perennial dispute with Iran over their common water boundary, the Shatt al-Arab, and disagreed with Baghdad on how best to end the Kurdish conflict (the Soviets, aware that many ICP leaders were Kurds, at times sought to restrain the violence of Baathist military expeditions against the Kurds). Moscow's efforts in 1973 to mediate between Iran and Iraq brought no results, but when Algerian President Houari Boumediene tried his hand and helped bring about an agreement on March 6, 1975, that ended Iranian backing for the Kurdish rebellion, the Soviets reproached the Iraqis for acting without consultation with Moscow, as they felt the Iraqis should have done under the 1972 treaty of alliance. The chill was felt all the way to Baghdad when Saddam Hussayn cut short his above-mentioned visit to Moscow without being received by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Equally unproductive were Soviet attempts, carried out at Saddam Husayn's request, to mediate in the dispute between Iraq and Syria over the waters of the Euphrates River.

Despite these differences and difficulties, Iraqi-Soviet military relations grew closer in 1976–77. Military leaders of the two countries exchanged visits, and in November 1976, Soviet naval units made their first serious show of force in the Persian Gulf, hitherto a Western lake as well as the outgoing sealane for 70 percent of the Western world's oil supplies, by visiting the

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[1] *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), Apr. 20 and 21, 1975.

Iraqi port of Um Qasr. On January 31, 1977, Saddam Husayn journeyed to Moscow at the head of a 100-member delegation that included major military figures. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's subsequent trip to Jerusalem in November, termed "traitorous" by Baghdad, led to an increased flow of Soviet arms to Iraq, with MIG-23 fighters, TU-22 bombers, IL-76 long-range transport planes, and missiles among the items supplied.

THE REAL breakdown in Soviet-Iraqi relations, and consequently in the coalition between the Baath and the ICP, began in 1978. Its first sign was the Iraqi request to the Soviet embassy in Baghdad to move. The embassy, situated in a building near the presidential palace from which it could eavesdrop on discussions in the palace with electronic listening devices, refused. Then the Iraqis cut electricity and water to the building until the Soviets complied with the request. Next, the Iraqi weekly newspaper *Ar Rased* on May 5, 1978, published an unprecedented editorial criticizing the USSR's attitude on the Middle East crisis. It rejected the Soviet theory that any settlement must be based on the recognition of Israel within its 1948 borders.

Sometime the same month, 21 Iraqi soldiers were executed for having tried to organize Communist cells inside the army. In acknowledging the executions, Naim Haddad, a member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, claimed that all the men had been condemned in 1975, 1976, or 1977.[2] According to some sources, however, the actual number of persons put to death exceeded many times over the 21 admitted by Iraqi officials.[3] Moreover, Amnesty International, the London-based, nonpartisan organization which seeks to save political prisoners in all countries, reported on July 31, 1979, that the ICP had been experiencing repression. Those soldiers executed in May 1978, Amnesty said, had been subject to the provisions of a law imposing the pain of death for non-Baathist political activities within the armed forces, but in July 1978 the death penalty had been extended to all those who had left the army since the Baath took power in July 1968 and who were active in other political groups. Moreover, in the wake of the executions of May 1978, "the Iraqi authorities conducted a sweeping campaign of intimidation against sympathizing members of the ICP, whose activities outside the armed forces have however been authorized since 1973 [when the Progressive National Front was formed]. There have reportedly been more than 20,000 arrests. There have been neither trials nor sentences; those arrested have reportedly been tortured, to the point of death in certain cases."[4] Thus, the 1978 crisis in Iraqi-Soviet relations also provoked a major crisis within the Arab Left in Iraq.

While, by some accounts, Soviet secret police (KGB) agents helped Iraqi Communists to flee abroad, especially to the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen (where some of them were pursued by agents of the Baathist government, and at least one, a teacher, was murdered under mysterious circumstances), the friction between the Baathist regime and the Soviets surfaced in some rather esoteric ways. On May 24, 1978, the official Iraqi newspaper *Al Jumhuriya* for the first time attacked a Soviet ally, Poland, for "complacency" toward Israel. *Al Jumhuriya* accused the Polish government of attaching unusual importance to the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Warsaw ghetto (March 17). A Jewish delegation, including Israeli representatives, had visited Poland and been received by the chief of state. Just before publication of the *Al Jumhuriya* article, the Iraqi government forbade its nationals to travel to Poland because of "ill-treatment" that it said they were receiving from Polish authorities.[5]

A further irritant was continued Iraqi aid to the Eritrean nationalists fighting the Marxist military regime in Ethiopia. This conflict had produced curious alignments. Soviet, Cuban, and Israeli aid went to the Ethiopians (for differing reasons, of course), while most Arab states backed the Eritreans. (The Israeli concern was, quite simply, that a Somali victory in the Ogaden and a local nationalist success in Eritrea would mean that the Red Sea would become an Arab lake, endangering Israel's southern sea approaches).

On May 25, 1978, the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Siyassa* reported, without being contradicted by Baghdad, that Saddam Husayn had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Moscow if the Soviets persisted in providing massive aid to Ethiopia—which had already included a Soviet airlift for which Baghdad had denied the USSR refueling or staging rights in Iraq. Three days later, the Iraqi Information Minister confirmed the difference with the Soviets over Eritrea, and added that Iraq's position on a Middle East settlement was in contradiction with that of the USSR because of the latter's recognition of Israel's right to exist.[6]

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[2] Radio Baghdad, monitored by the author in Athens, May 21, 1978.

[3] Private interviews with Iraqi refugees in Damascus and Beirut.

[4] Amnesty International release, reprinted in *The Guardian* (London) and *The Times* (London), Aug. 1, 1979.

[5] Radio Baghdad, Mar. 13, 1978.

The Soviets preferred turning the other cheek to making a harsh response. On June 3, 1978, special ambassador M. L. I. Mendelevich arrived in Baghdad to discuss bilateral problems. Three days afterward, however, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khadham asserted that Iraq was "on the verge of abrogating its friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR and expelling the Soviet experts working on Iraqi territory" (mainly oil technicians and some military instructors training the Iraqi armed forces on new Soviet equipment).[7] Perhaps partly because the charge had been made by the rival Syrian regime, a member of the Iraqi Baathist Revolutionary Command Council, Naim Haddad, denied the assertion as a "vulgar insinuation." Iraq, he said, was not in the habit of making treaties in order to break them. Indeed, Iraq considered the USSR a "strategic ally."[8]

A month later, Saddam Husayn brought the Iraqi-Soviet dispute into full public view by telling *Newsweek*, in an interview published on July 9, that "the Soviet Union will not be satisfied until the entire world becomes Communist." The execution of 21 Iraqi Communists, he added, should be taken as a warning against any interference in Iraq's domestic affairs. This interview, however, was not published in Iraqi newspapers.

Again, the Soviet Union made no public response. Instead, Moscow tried to pour oil on the troubled waters. On July 14, in an article about the 20th anniversary of the Iraqi revolution, *Pravda* stressed the "fruitfulness" of Iraqi-Soviet cooperation. Shortly before, an ICP delegation had been received in Moscow but given only medium-grade treatment. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation to Baghdad in mid-July for the 10th anniversary celebration of the Baathist takeover in Iraq was instructed to "wish the Iraqi CP success in its national activities,"[9] a modest slogan for such a solemn occasion.

Saddam Husayn continued to press the Iraqi offensive on July 21 with the warning that "no country, whether friend or enemy, can decide Iraqi policy,"[10] but a slow improvement in relations seemed to set in thereafter. In September 1978, Iraqi Vice-President Taha Muhi-al-Din Ma'ruf visited Moscow and discussed the Camp David negotiations with Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin. On October 17, 1978, Saddam Husayn took a conciliatory stance:

> *The Soviets are our best friends. The USSR always sides with the Arabs. We act accordingly. But we should not fall in love with the Soviet Union if it renounces us. Well, this has never happened, even though our views differ, for example on Eritrea's conflict with Ethiopia.*[11]

During the weeks that followed, Saddam Husayn and his top aides as well as other Iraqi leaders, including the navy commander, traveled to Moscow. Saddam Husayn saw both Brezhnev and Kosygin and signed two new Soviet-Iraqi agreements on economic and technical cooperation. In a joint communiqué issued December 12, 1978, the two governments condemned the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David process and called for "unity of all forces in the Arab world opposed to the policy of capitulation," and the Soviets expressed willingness to "strengthen Iraq's defensive capability."[12] At one point during the visit, Kosygin stated that Iraqi-Soviet cooperation "is not affected by momentary ups and downs."[13]

Since then, however, neither Soviet-Iraqi relations nor those between the Baath and the ICP have bettered noticeably. Indeed, hundreds of Iraqi Communists have fled to South Yemen, Western Europe, and (when they could not reach the West) Syria, and there has been no offer of any amnesty to the ICP. Furthermore, Baghdad's links with Moscow have cooled to the freezing point in early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

FROM THE WINTER of 1978 on, events in Iraq began to be dominated by the revolution against the Shah in Iran. Saddam Husayn had cultivated reasonably good relations with the Shah, and the militant Shi'a Muslims' victory in Iran was a double embarrassment to the Iraqi Baath. First, the secular Baath, whose leadership consisted mainly of army officers, was now faced by a powerful theocracy across its border with the capacity to stir up serious trouble, if not worse, among the 60 percent or so of Iraqis who were Shi'a Muslims (the two Shi'a holy cities, Qarbala and Najjaf, are in Iraq). Second, the Arab minority in Iran's Khuzistan, the province where the main oilfields and Iranian Gulf tanker ports are located, looked to the Baath in Iraq for support in their drive for autonomy, which by the summer of 1979 had developed into something approaching a full-scale revolt.

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[6] Ibid., May 28, 1978.

[7] Briefing by Khadham to newsmen in Damascus, June 6, 1978.

[8] Radio Baghdad, June 10, 1978.

[9] Radio Peace and Progress (Moscow), July 15, 1978.

[10] Radio Baghdad, July 21, 1978.

[11] Ibid., Oct. 17, 1978.

[12] Radio Moscow in Arabic, Dec. 12, 1978.

[13] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1978.

The Baath party (rather than the army or other official government organs) seems to have channeled arms and perhaps some personnel into Iranian Khuzistan during the tense summer of 1979, when Arab oilfield workers (the same 67,000 or so whose general strike had been decisive in bringing down the Shah in January 1979[14]) committed acts of sabotage in the oilfields and port installations. What is not clear is whether there was close liaison between the Iraqi Communists and the Iranian Tudeh, the old, traditional pro-Soviet party, which claimed several thousand supporters in Khuzistan. At any rate, pitched battles developed between Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's Islamic guards and the Arab guerrillas in Ahvaz, Abadan, and Khoramshahr, Khuzistan's main cities (both of the last two directly face Iraqi territory on the Shatt al-Arab estuary leading into the Persian Gulf). Sheikh Taher Khagani, spiritual head of the Khuzistan Arab People's Organization, warned that disorders in the oilfields, which had resumed production after the long interruption that helped to bring on the world energy crisis, "would provide a pretext for certain quarters [meaning Iraq] to intervene in Iran's domestic affairs under cover of protecting the Arab minority."[15]

At the same time, Shi'a religious riots in Iraq led Saddam Husayn to send troops to most of the Shi'a towns, including Qarbala and Najjaf. Baghdad also declared southern Iraq's own oilfields and port areas a military zone, and Iraqi fighter planes raided Kurdish villages on the Iranian side of the northern border. By the end of 1979, the situation along the land border between Iran and Iraq, and the battle for influence in the Persian Gulf between the ayatollah clerics of Tehran and the secular Iraqi Baathists, had the potential for a major explosion.

The Iraqi and Syrian Baathists, along with other secular Arab leftist movements and the Marxists and Communists both in Iran and Iraq, consider Khomeyni's rule a religious dictatorship and even, to quote one Sunni Arab diplomat, a "cancer in the body of Islam." The attitude is not surprising, for the Islamic world is dominated by Sunni Muslims, numbering about 700 million people. The Shi'a community, inside and outside Iran, totals only about 80 million. This Sunni dominance, however, is shaky in all the Arab Gulf states, and particularly in Iraq. Iraq is nearly 70 percent Shi'a, and most of the Arab Gulf states have either substantial Shi'a minorities or slight Shi'a majorities. Their nervous Sunni rulers, especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, view these Shi'a as potential fifth columns which might some day, in alliance with radical Palestinian residents, sabotage the countries' existing oil installations.

ONE OF THE MANY virtues of the impressive encyclopedia-length book of Professor Hanna Batatu is that its exhaustive narratives of Iraqi people and movements, especially the Communists and the Baath, provide ample background to understand what is now going on within Iraq. In the clandestine, downbeaten, yet tough Iraqi Communists of the pre-1958 monarchy, we recognize some of the same traits now seen in the leftist Arab guerrillas of Khuzistan or the imprisoned Communists who await the pleasure of Saddam Husayn's courts and hope for better days. Anyone who ever attended Batatu's lectures on Iraq, and especially on Iraqi Communists, at the American University of Beirut knows how vast his knowledge is. Whether dealing with the minutiae of what gave Iraq's old feudal, landowning classes their power (one pre-1958 landlord is described as drawing his from ownership of "25,905 dunums of land and the Pepsi-Cola distributorship for Iraq") or the detailed history of the Iraqi Communist Party, Batatu's scope is immense.

In his incisive biographical sketch of strongman Saddam Husayn, Batatu swiftly and surely draws the profile. Like his former lesser Baathist partner in power, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (President from 1968 until just before Saddam Husayn's July 1979 purge), Saddam Husayn was born in the al-Begat section of the Albu Nasir tribe near Takrit. (The term "Takriti mafia," first used by veteran correspondent David Hirst of *The Guardian* to describe Iraq's present rulers, comes from the dominance of Takritis in the party. Saddam Husayn, sensitive about this appellation, dropped Takriti as his third name and forbade its use.) Saddam Husayn, Batatu discovers, is the foster son, nephew, and son-in-law of Khairallah al-Talfah, governor of Baghdad, and is a first cousin of Bakr. Batatu says that Saddam Husayn "surpasses al-Bakr in boldness, strength of will, and nimbleness of mind," and "is of a tougher fibre" than his fellow Takritis. After one of the gun battles that took place during the rise of Baathist power, he took a bullet out of his own leg with a knife. His ruthlessness toward the ICP matches that of Qasim. Batatu aptly points out that since defeating their last opponents, "the Takritis rule through the Baath party, rather than the Baath party through the Takritis."

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[14] Personal interview with Ardeshir Zahedi, former Iranian ambassador to the United States, Oct. 20, 1978.

[15] Arab Press Service, Beirut, Sept. 18, 1979, and various news agencies, Sept. 18–21, 1979.

Like the other authors, Batatu acknowledges the turmoil of Iraq's politics, which he attributes in large part to the role of foreign interference—especially that of the fallen Shah of Iran. He shows how the Shah's intrigues, until the 1975 deal with Saddam Husayn, encouraged the revolt of northern Iraq's 3 million Kurds and prevented their reconciliation with their Sunni Muslim Arab rulers in Baghdad, and he cites the "not-so-secret entente" between the Shah and Irael, prior to 1975, to keep Iraq "as weak and as tied down as possible for as long as possible" by fanning Kurdish and also Shi'a dissidence. At the same time, along with Tareq Ismael and, to a lesser extent, Rony Gabbay and Majid Khadduri, Batatu sets down a fair account of the Baath's undoubted achievements in education, culture, and agrarian and social reform.

Batatu's thorough history of the Communists in Iraq is well supplemented in small ways by Gabbay's recapitulation of how the ICP, founded in 1934 as a rural, peasant movement, paradoxically succeeded only in the cities. Batatu's case histories of individual Communists illustrate the general points made by Gabbay and by Tareq Ismael. Batatu, however, shows much more knowledge and sympathy for his subject.

In his scholarly treatise, emphasizing diplomatic and political events rather than the social and economic circumstances that Batatu stresses, Khadduri gives the reader the same impression that some auditors have gained from his lectures: he knows more than he tells. He is at his best in general observations about the mind and character of Arabs, specifically Iraqi Arabs. For example, he observes:

> *The Arabs, it is suggested, often speak of freedom and equality as two inseparable words meaning the same thing, but if they were to choose one of the two, it seems that the choice of the great majority would be in favor of equality rather than freedom.*

The main contribution of Tareq Ismael's brief volume is its account of the "radicalization" of Arab nationalism, both inside and beyond Iraq's frontiers. He sorts out in concise fashion the real, as well as the purely doctrinal, differences among the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Baath; the Syrian Social National Party (PPS), a movement born in Syria and Lebanon and often described as "neo-Fascist" despite its leftist pretentions; and the ubiquitous Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM), a clandestine, pan-Arab group which first followed Nasser's star and then, disillusioned after Egypt's defeat by Israel in 1967, conceived the radical Palestinian guerrilla group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, now headed by George Habbash. In general and specific terms, Ismael also draws upon the confused currents of the Leftist-Palestinian side in the Lebanese civil war of 1975–77 to describe the rise of what he calls the "New Arab Left," committed neither to orthodox communism nor to Maoism (nor, for that matter, to any other "non-Arab" doctrine).

All four of these books went to press too late to record the failure of a serious attempt by the two Baath parties, in Iraq and Syria, to bury their old feuds and unite against President Sadat's peace moves of 1977–79. In 1978, Saddam Husayn sponsored two Arab summit conferences which produced a series of inter-Arab reconciliations. Most important, Iraq subscribed for the first time to a general Arab consensus on the conditions for peace with Israel, giving its first tacit consent to the formula embodied in UN General Assembly Resolution 242 as a basis for peace negotiations. In October 1978, President Hafiz al-Assad flew to Baghdad to meet Bakr and announce a Syrian-Iraqi "charter of joint action," designed to end their decade of strife.[16] By mid-1979, some of the charter's provisions had been fulfilled—mainly, the formation of committees to oversee political, economic, and military cooperation (though the watchful Israelis saw no sign of genuine military cooperation, e.g., joint staff work or stationing of Iraqi troops in Syria). In addition, the 650-kilometer oil pipeline between northern Iraq's oilfields and the Syrian port of Baniyas was reopened after being closed for two years; and plans were formulated on paper for a full union of the two countries, with one name, one flag, and one president (alternately Syrian and Iraqi).

This reconciliation was dealt a possibly fatal blow by Saddam Husayn's discovery, in July 1979, of what he believed was a Syrian-sponsored plot against him. More than 30 Iraqi Baathists, some high in the leadership, were executed. An Arab emissary from outside, who tried to mediate between the rival Baathist factions, told this writer that Saddam was convinced that the conspirators, with the blessing of Damascus, had planned to jump the gun and proclaim the *instant* union of Syria and Iraq, with Assad as president and a member of the "pro-Syrian" Baathist faction in Iraq, Abdel

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[16] Radio Damascus, Oct. 21, 1978.

Khalik Samarrai, as vice-president. Most signs that Iraq was prepared to join a new "eastern front" against Israel faded, and Saddam Husayn appeared to be turning his attention more and more to the Gulf instead.

THE PICTURE of the Iraqi Baath that emerges from its years of internecine struggle and its battles with Communist and other challengers is that of a group of secular civilian ideologues using military means to work toward the goal of an ideal Arab socialist commonwealth. Its slogans are the three basic principles of unity, socialism, and Arabism that the Syrian Christian schoolteacher Michel Aflaq, the Baath founder, laid down. The Iraqi Baath's map of the world envisages that all Arabs will ultimately live under Baathist leadership. To fulfill this vision, the Baathists believe, a tough, efficient government in Iraq must first assume leadership of Arab foreign policy. The next step is to fill any political or ideological vacuum in the Arab world—e.g., that created by a coup against a king or some other breakdown of authority in an Arab country.

From the time it returned to power in 1968, the Iraqi Baath has always tried to strike a delicate balance between civilian and military wings. Five years of work and intrigue by Saddam Husayn tipped the balance in favor of the civilian wing, by gradually eliminating from powerful positions key Baathist field generals. Saddam Husayn groomed Gen. 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, his cousin and brother-in-law, to become Defense Minister when Bakr vacated the post to become President. Talfah has now emerged as Saddam Husayn's heir apparent.

Nevertheless, violence and expediency, rather than the idealism of Iraq's early leftist struggles, have become the main determinants of the fate of Iraq's patient, (and some would say) long-suffering people. The Baathists of Baghdad believe that ruthless violence, when necessary, breeds popular obedience at home and—combined with oil wealth—respect abroad. In truth, since Sumerian and Babylonian times, Iraq's history has been one of successive oppressors and oppressed, with most governments made and broken by bloodshed. Just as the ruling monarch and his pro-Western Prime Minister, Nuri Said, were massacred in the 1958 revolution, their successors were killed by other opponents. And from 1968 until the present day, Saddam Husayn, in his actions against any who might threaten him, has demonstrated again that might, in Iraq, makes right.

Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

THE USSR, CHINA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Edward E. Azar ("Soviet and Chinese Roles in the Middle East," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1979) has performed a service by focusing attention on the complex Sino-Soviet relationship in the Middle East. I concur in his assessment (with some reservations with respect to Soviet arms supply) that "neither the USSR nor China has managed to demonstrate to the peoples of the Middle East that it is critically relevant to the region's needs." Though the Soviet Union has at times managed to establish at least a partial patron/client relationship with several Middle Eastern states (Egypt for over two decades from the mid-1950's; South Yemen today and, to a lesser extent, Syria and Iraq), Beijing's presence in the region is less evident than Moscow's—especially following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

I disagree, however, with Professor Azar's basic thesis that the roles of both China and the Soviet Union have visibly diminished in the Middle East during the 1970's. It depends on where and at what one is looking. Despite setbacks, the Soviet Union continues to exercise considerable influence in some parts of the Middle East (Syria and South Yemen are obvious examples, in addition to Afghanistan). As for China, presence is not the criterion. Beijing's actual influence is rather more extensive and contains greater potential than Professor Azar describes. Professor Yitzak Shichor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem wrote recently (*The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-1977,* London, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 192):

> *If we try to evaluate Chinese achievements in the Middle East in traditional terms of power politics, then China's Middle East policy must be admitted a complete failure. Yet, if we bear in mind that Peking has never sought direct involvement and presence in the Middle East, nor economic or other gains, the conclusion would be somewhat different.*

China's role in the Middle East cannot be measured only in terms of diplomatic or trade presence there, or ability to provide aid. The PRC's major leverage in the region has always been its potential as an alternate backer which area states and groups can use to pressure the Soviet Union. That function continues, enhanced as China evolves into a major power with a more activist foreign policy. Indeed, since it entered the UN in 1971 and assumed a seat on the Security Council, China has been considered a great power by many Middle Easterners. Today, although China has little economic or military leverage in the Middle East outside Pakistan, it does have a good deal of prestige and potential political influence in Egypt and to a lesser extent in the Yemen Arab Republic and Iraq and among various Palestinian groups.

With the normalization of Sino-US relations, China has acted at times as a supporter and even interpreter of US policy in the Middle East. Despite US efforts during 1979 to maintain a policy stance not aligned with China against the Soviet Union, Beijing on more than one occasion portrayed itself to Middle Easterners as an "independent ally" of the US. Beijing desires, as Washington does, stability in the region and an overall peace settlement so as to thwart Soviet "fishing in troubled waters." Beijing's media comment favorably on US provision of arms to Middle Eastern states and have backed US restraint in the hostage situation in Iran.

Both Beijing and Moscow recognize the Middle East as the world's most volatile region. As an increasingly articulate, credible, and activist China continues its encouragement of Third World nations to oppose Soviet "hegemonism," we are seeing the Middle East become a more important arena of Sino-Soviet competition. Contrary to Professor Azar's statement that there is a "low level of Soviet and Chinese concern with finding sources of raw materials . . . ," Moscow—due to its emerging energy shortage—is finding the Middle East of growing importance. The world's energy situation also provides grist for the Chinese accusation of a Soviet southward expansion to gain access to oil production areas and control of energy shipment routes so as to gain a stranglehold on the economies of the Western world and Japan. Beijing, in keeping with the reactive characteristic of modern Chinese foreign policy, strengthens its efforts to achieve leverage in any area into which it sees the Soviets apparently pushing.

In the March-April 1979 issue of *Problems of Communism,* David Lynn Price's article, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf," examined Soviet policy in the Middle East and concluded that the Soviet Union is still forced to follow events there rather than direct them. Whether or not we can agree with this view in light of recent events in Afghanistan, the question in regard to China is: How successful do the Chinese think the Soviet Union has been in what Beijing regards as a grand design to gain control of the

Middle East? The answer is "very successful," and this perception has led in recent weeks to a more aggressive (because frustrated) Chinese response, which not only openly criticizes the US for what Beijing perceives as failure to stand up to Israeli pressuring, but is surely one reason for the recent Chinese public support for Pakistani nuclear development and, most recently, to renewed affirmation of ties by China with the Palestinians. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong, Dec. 7, 1979, p. 36), in a somewhat hyperbolic statement, described this trend as "a new dynamic phase" in China's Middle East diplomacy.

Finally, I have a question about the accuracy of Professor Azar's data base. This, I admit, arises in part from disaffinity for mechanical devices for interpreting history. However, I am also disturbed by the evident gaps in the compiled information. For example, Professor Azar lists no cooperative economic interaction between China and Israel for the 1948-62 period, thus omitting the 1954 Israeli trade delegation to China. I am more greatly astonished by the low marks given Sino-Egyptian political cooperation in the post-1973 period. Beijing and Cairo have never had better rapport, their relationship having grown steadily closer since China stepped in with offers of aid and renewed friendship when Cairo abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in early 1976. China's political support for Cairo on the issue of the treaty with Israel has been steadfast and has extended from defenses by the New China News Agency for Egypt's support of Palestinian rights to arm twisting on behalf of Cairo in connection with the recent nonaligned summit in Havana.

LILLIAN C. HARRIS
China analyst
US Department of State
Washington, DC

EDITORS' NOTE: Ms. Harris wished us to state that the opinions expressed in her letter are her own and do not necessarily reflect official US government positions.

MR. AZAR REPLIES: I appreciate having the opportunity to respond to Ms. Harris's letter to you regarding my article in *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1979). I want to emphasize two (among many) reasons for my response. First, Ms. Harris failed to understand my argument, and hence, my derived conclusion. Second, her letter exhibits lack of knowledge regarding the interface between "analytical approaches" and "research tools and techniques" in the area of social research. Allow me to explain.

First, my article stated that I expect the generalized influence and presence of the USSR and the PRC (as well as the US) in the Middle East to be dependent on a number of variables, two of which are (1) the past and present level of conflictive and cooperative behavior in the region and (2) the ability of these world powers to effectively help in solving the complex local problems that preoccupy the leaders and peoples of the Middle East. These local social problems are the Arab-Israeli protracted social conflict (with its ethnic and sociocultural components in addition to its political and military ones) and the issue of structural development of the region (with its built-in social constraints such as population explosion and issues of economic underdevelopment). To my thinking, these problems cannot be solved from outside but must be solved from within the region, and they require general cultural and political transformation. Thus, the USSR and the PRC (and even the US at times) appear to be unable to help solve these problems, at least in the foreseeable future. Since my data show that, relative to the US, the USSR and the PRC are not doing so well in political, economic, and even military relations with the region, especially since 1973, and given my own knowledge and experience in judging trends in international relations, I argued that "it would appear probable that the influence of the USSR and China in the Middle East will not grow significantly in the foreseeable future. Indeed, their roles in the region may even diminish further." Neither Ms. Harris's letter to you nor any of the articles, studies, or books that I have read on the USSR and the PRC in the Middle East have convinced me of the opposite conclusion. If we were to rank acceptance of external actors in the region, one would have to conclude that, of the three, surely Americans have the greatest chance of being accepted as exogenous parties.

Soviet and Chinese failures and damaging experiences elsewhere, in Africa, support this. My past contacts with many Arab leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens have convinced me of the validity of my conclusion. Events in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and even Afghanistan add weight to my thesis. Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is to me a sign of failure and frustration—not a sign of success—on the part of the USSR in dealing with its neighbors. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have shown any ability to help solve the pressing problems of the Middle East. I agree with Ms. Harris that China is very young in the business of politics in the Middle East. That is why I think that, in the next 10 to 15 years, China's role in the Middle East will be very marginal. The PRC has nothing to offer the Arabs and Israelis toward the resolution of either the Palestinian-Israeli social conflict or the overall protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. China has too many developmental problems of its own to be able to contribute much to the regional and national development of the Middle East. But, if you want to talk about the nuisance value of the USSR and the PRC in the Middle East, that is a different matter altogether.

Secondly, the greatest disservice which Ms. Harris renders to the research community that reads *Problems of Communism* is her naive criticism of an area that she appears to know very little about, namely, empirical and quantitative research. She admits that she is unhappy with my conclusions because of her "disaffinity for mechanical devices for interpreting history." I have never stated that this is how I arrived at my conclusions, and so she accuses me incorrectly. In fact, there are no such devices in existence. Researchers who

CORRECTIONS

In the last paragraph of page 58 of the article, "Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations" (*Problems of Communism*, September-December 1979), the figure for the area of land disputed by the Soviet Union and China in the Pamirs should be 20,000 square kilometers, not 10,000. In the photo of Zhenbao Island on page 59 of the same article, the arrow *does* indicate the direction of flow of the Ussuri River.

In the "Correspondence" section of the September-December 1979 issue, the editors inadvertently demoted Soviet naval chief S. G. Gorshkov. His official rank is "Admiral of the Fleet of the USSR," not "Admiral of the Fleet."

view the introduction of quantitative analysis into some aspects of the study of international relations as "mechanical" bring harm to both qualitative and quantitative work.

When Ms. Harris writes that she is not sure whether my data are accurate, I cannot help but urge her to go back into her own State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), files and dig up the study which was conducted for INR by Professors Michael O'Leary and William Coplin in 1975. In this study—since published by them in a book entitled *Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting* (New York, NY, Praeger, 1975)—the authors compared my publicly collected data with the State Department's "confidential" data regarding the study of violence in the Middle East. They found that my data collection compared favorably with that obtained at State. Since the early 1970's, there have been hundreds of articles and books written using my data, and much time and effort have been invested in creating what is the largest public data bank in the world. We have tried to be careful and systematic and have studied the problem of data validity and reliability very many times. I would also wish that Ms. Harris showed more acquaintance with what her own governmental unit has been doing in the area of computerized and noncomputerized data libraries.

In conclusion, my article in *Problems of Communism* was based on the use of data, analytical criteria, and personal observation and experience in the analysis of international relations. In the article, I described briefly the data base, the method of collection, and the procedure for analysis. Of course, different people prefer to have their data sets stored and managed differently. I have chosen to store it on computer disc in order to be able to have access to it faster and more easily. Other people prefer to clip cables, newspapers, and documents for storage in filing cabinets or books of one sort or another—a procedure used by some people at INR and elsewhere. These differences are not terribly important, but what is important is what we do with the data and how we give it meaning. It is not uncommon for two scholars to arrive at different conclusions even when looking at the same data base, but it is important not to discount findings contrary to one's own conclusions on the basis of hasty and poorly thought-out criticisms of another's methodology.

EDWARD E. AZAR
University of
North Carolina
at Chapel Hill

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Problems of Communism

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March-April 1980 VOL XXIX

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Cover: Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito in December 1976 on the occasion of a visit to Belgrade by Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. Photo by Vincent Mentzel.

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IN THE MARCH–APRIL ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Decision-Making in Yugoslavia
Steven L. Burg

Since the mid-1960's, in response to Yugoslavia's long-standing ethnic and regional differences, the Yugoslav leadership has evolved a characteristic pattern of decision-making, based on interregional consultation, compromise, and consensus. This evolution has seemed to point toward continued stability in the post-Tito period. But if the rotation of officeholding in party and government at the regional level recently advocated by Tito is implemented, the stability of the post-Tito system may well be threatened. Tito's successors may therefore have to undo this last of his initiatives.

Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe
Ernst Kux

Despite the appearance of relative stability in Eastern Europe in recent years, tensions have been building there. The USSR has failed to create a genuine "socialist community" in the area, and effective cooperation in the political, military, and economic realms has proved elusive. Moreover, the domestic situations of most of the countries are now in considerable flux, with both new and revitalized old forces and tendencies in play. Thus, there is potential for major turmoil in the region.

Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam
Alexandre Bennigsen

Events in Afghanistan and Iran have altered interaction between Soviet Muslims and the greater Muslim world in ways perhaps not anticipated in the Kremlin. Since Stalin's death, Soviet leaders have made controlled use of the USSR's officially accepted Soviet Islamic leaders to foster ties with conservative Muslim states and groups. In the last two years, however, Moscow has suddenly faced the possibility that some of its 43 million Muslim subjects may see in nationalistic Muslim rebellion and revolution abroad an example for their own efforts to diminish Russian control over their lives.

• • •

Essay-reviews

Whither the Soviet System?
Robert F. Miller

Although the data base is admittedly slim, it is important to look at the sort of political system that will operate in the USSR after Brezhnev leaves power. While extremes of xenophobic reaction or technocratically inspired reform cannot be ruled out, the most likely outcome is a continuation of what one author calls "welfare-authoritarianism"—in which policies justified as advancing the welfare of the general populace and hence as legitimating the regime are arrived at through competition among various institutional interest groups within the ruling Communist elite.

How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered

T. H. Rigby

Recent memoir literature reveals the informal power relationships, prevalent attitudes, and standard behavior patterns of the obkom secretaries of the USSR and makes clear the importance of patron-client networks and mutual support among the Soviet elite. It is probable that many of the top Soviet leaders of the 1980's will, like their predecessors, have been "tempered" by experience as an obkom secretary. Tomorrow's Soviet leaders, then, while perhaps better educated, may not prove to be of a very different cast from today's.

Religion and Nationalism in the USSR and China

Dennis J. Dunn

Religion is a force of prime importance across the broad heartland of Eurasia, as is evidenced by the measures taken by Communist regimes to suppress it. One reason is that throughout the region, religion is strongly identified with minority nationalism. In their attempt to strengthen their hold, Communist regimes strike at religion in order to lessen the potential threat represented by minority nationalism.

Perception and Misperception in US-Soviet Relations

William Potter

Misperceptions of each other continue to bedevil relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, recent years have witnessed some improvements in this situation on both sides, although the relatively subtle perceptions of the United States articulated by at least some Soviet Americanists may not be widely shared in the USSR.

GDR Foreign Policy

John M. Starrels

Lacking the protective garb of the traditional nation-state and heavily dependent on the Soviet Union to ensure its survival, East Germany has nonetheless sought to establish and further its own "national" goals. Thus far, it has looked to Europe as the primary arena in which to pursue these, but the potential political and economic benefits to be derived from a more active role in the Third World may cause it to shift its focus to there in the future.

A Window on Poland's Social Transformation

Maurice D. Simon

Empirical studies conducted since the 1950's by Polish sociologists provide much useful information on many aspects of the "transformation" of Poland into a "socialist society." But there seems to be little effort—at least in the research available to outside observers—to explore systematically the relationship between changes in social structure on the one hand and politics on the other.

Decision-making in Yugoslavia

By Steven L. Burg

Both Yugoslavs and foreign observers of Yugoslav affairs have been asking "What will be after?" for the past 20 years. No one familiar with the Yugoslav scene has ever responded by asking "after *what?*" Implicit in the question itself is the recognition that President Josip Broz Tito has provided an ingredient essential to the survival of the Yugoslav state in the past, and that his death will call that survival into question.

At present, both international conditions and domestic conditions in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) are in a state of flux, and it is difficult to predict with confidence the precise character of the post-Tito system. Any attempt to do so, however, must invariably reckon with the question whether the Yugoslav political leadership will be able, in the absence of Tito, to overcome the ethnic, regional, economic, and political differences that will continue to divide the country.

In response to past conflicts based on these differences, Tito and the rest of the Yugoslav leadership have attempted to create a political system that strikes a balance between recognition of the country's diversity of regions and peoples, on the one hand, and the degree of centralization requisite to the maintenance of a unified state, on the other. Over the years, they have wrestled with this problem in a variety of ways, including the introduction of a succession of organizational and procedural changes at various levels of party and government.

Since 1966, Yugoslavia's leaders have established a pattern of decision-making characterized by decentralization, interregional consultation, and consensus. In 1979, however, they introduced certain changes, and announced their intention to introduce other changes, that conflict with established decision-making practices. These changes represent yet another attempt by Tito to ensure political stability after he is gone. But that stability will be in the hands of his successors, and to ensure it, the post-Tito leadership may have to undo the changes initiated by Tito.

In order to appreciate fully the significance of Tito's latest changes and proposals, the current principles and practices of decision-making in Yugoslavia must be traced back to their origins in the mid-1960's, when the sporadic attempts at federalization of the 1950's and early 1960's gave way to a more lasting effort to achieve a federal solution to the problem of Yugoslavia's diversity.

Emergent Decision-making Principles

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a series of reforms partially decentralized the organization and operation of the economy and partially democratized the political system in Yugoslavia. These changes were supported by Tito and by a majority of the top political leaders of the party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). But they were strongly and effectively resisted by elements within both the party leadership and the rank and file who adhered to a more centralized vision of the system.

In the mid-1960's, it was not unreasonable for the leaders of this resistance to expect that a majority in the party leadership might soon support a return to more "orthodox," and therefore more acceptable, policies. That had happened several times during the previous decade when reforms had proved difficult to implement or had had undesirable unintended conse-

Mr. Burg is Assistant Professor of Politics, Brandeis University (Waltham, MA). He has written widely on Yugoslav and Soviet politics in such journals as Survey, Publius, *and* Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique.

The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia meets on March 5, 1980, to discuss the country's foreign activity and efforts to affirm the principles of nonalignment in international relations. Pictured from left to right are: Josip Vrhovec, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Veselin Djuranovic, President of the Federal Executive Council (Premier); Vidoje Zarkovic and Fadilj Hodza, members of the Presidency; and Lazar Kolisevski, Vice-President of the Presidency, who presided over the meeting.

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quences. In 1966, however, the liberal majority in the party leadership responded not by retreating, but by identifying and moving against the source of resistance to its policies. In July, Aleksandar Rankovic and his closest supporters were removed from their positions in the state and party leaderships, and a series of changes that altered the organization, operation, and very character of the party was set under way.

During the period between the ouster of Rankovic and the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969, power in the party passed from the central leadership to the leaderships of the eight regional party organizations. Explicit formulas for representation of the regional organizations in central party organs were established. At first, these called for proportional representation based roughly on the size of the organizations. But proportionality was rapidly replaced by the principle of "parity," which required equal representation of the six republic organizations and "corresponding"—less numerous—representation of the two autonomous provincial organizations. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the party organization in the Army was allocated representation equal to that of a provincial organization. Each regional party organization gained control over the appointment of both party cadres in its own region and its representatives in central party organs, heretofore prerogatives of the central leadership. As a result, members of the central party organs thenceforth owed their allegiance not to their colleagues at the center, but to their respective regional organizations. This dramatically reduced the independence and authority of the central party organs.[1]

During this period, the central party organs were also increased in size and required to meet less often. Even more important, however, the Presidium, the most authoritative of the central organs, came increasingly to require a consensus among the regional representatives who composed it before it could adopt any decision or take any action.[2] This made it possible for any single regional leadership to prevent the adoption of policies to which it was opposed, and established the basis for paralysis of the party leadership in the face of interregional conflict.

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[1] League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), Central Committee (CC), *Peta Sednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i izlaganja na sednicama CK SK u republikama* (Fifth Session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Speeches at the Sessions of the CC's of the Leagues of Communists in the Republics), Belgrade, Komunist, 1966, pp. 19, 24, 26, 53; idem, *Deveta Sednica Centralnog komiteta* (Ninth Session of the Central Committee), Belgrade, Komunist, 1968, pp. 103ff.

Other changes carried out during this period applied the same organizational and procedural principles to state institutions. However, while the changes in the party had been initiated by representatives of the developed regions, those in the state were initiated largely by representatives of the underdeveloped regions. Heretofore, the Chamber of Nationalities, the institutional locus for direct representation of the republics, provinces, and nationalities in the federal parliament (Federal Assembly), had been restricted to a largely symbolic role in the governmental process. The party leadership, intent on controlling interregional conflicts, purposely prevented the discussion of such conflicts in the Chamber because the Chamber was a public forum.[3] But by 1967, the party leadership had become preoccupied with the abovementioned internal reorganization of the party and could neither exercise such control nor resolve such conflicts. Consequently, interregional conflicts over government policy breathed new political life into the Chamber as an alternative arena for their resolution.

In 1967 constitutional amendments were adopted that reaffirmed and strengthened the role of the Chamber by increasing the range of federal decisions that required its approval. In 1968, the jurisdiction of the Chamber was expanded still further by additional amendments, which required that all federal legislation be approved by it. Although the 1967 and 1968 amendments did not alter constitutional provisions that called for majority voting by individual delegates in the Chamber, the practice of voting by regional "blocs" of delegates nevertheless developed very quickly. It was not long before informal rules of procedure required the approval of all eight regional "blocs" before the Chamber could take formal action.[4]

In the federal government, policymaking authority passed from the Federal Executive Council to the executive councils of the republics and provinces in a process that paralleled developments in the party. In 1967, the Federal Executive Council introduced the practice of holding "consultative meetings" with representatives of the regional executive councils to define the position it would adopt on "more important socioeconomic questions." As the jurisdiction of the Chamber of Nationalities expanded and as regional control over it increased, the need to secure interregional agreement before submission of draft federal legislation to the parliament also increased. Consequently, the Council soon could not take a position on "a single more significant issue" before it had been discussed and approved at a "consultative meeting" of representatives of regional governments. In 1969, this practice was formally institutionalized within the Federal Executive Council with the creation of a permanent "Coordinating Commission," composed of representatives of federal, republic, and provincial executive councils.[5] At the same time, the formula for membership on the Council as a whole was changed. Before 1969, an informal agreement had assigned three positions on the Council to each of the three largest republics and two positions to each of the three smaller ones. Now, the regional leaderships agreed that each republic would have three positions and each autonomous province one, a formula similar to that adopted for the central party organs.[6]

These changes in party and government devolved enormous power to the regional political leaderships, so that by the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 not only the organization of decision-making institutions but also the process of decision-making had been transformed:

> *Important decisions now no longer were made at the federal summit, but rather by direct contacts among representatives of the republics* [and provinces] *in the form of bilateral and multilateral interpersonal visits and discussions among republic* [and provincial] *state and party delegations.*

This left no effective, independent central leadership in either the state or the party, except for the personal leadership exercised by President Tito. As a consequence, during this period Tito "all the more frequently received delegations of the republics [and provinces]" or travelled to the various regional capitals "for political discussions and in this way created a [common] platform for political decisions."[7]

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[2] *Deveta Sednica . . .*, pp. 116–18.

[3] See the comment by Edvard Kardelj in Firdus Dzinic, Ed., *Izborni sistem u uslovima samoupravljanja* (The Electoral System in the Conditions of Self-management), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1967, p. 334.

[4] Pavle S. Nikolic, *Savezna Skupstina u Ustavnom i Politickom Sistemu Jugoslavije* (The Federal Assembly in the Constitutional and Political System of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Savez Udruzenja Pravnika Jugoslavije, 1969, pp. 39–40. See also Marjan Vivoda, "The Organization and Method of Work of Committees of the Federal and Republic Assemblies After the Adoption of the Constitution of the SFRY and the Constitutions of the Socialist Republics," in Borislav T. Blagojevic, Ed., *Mesto i uloga odbora i komisija predstavnickih tela* (The Place and Role of the Committees and Commissions of Representative Bodies), Belgrade, Institut za Uporedno Pravo, 1960, pp. 96–106.

[5] Nikola Stjepanovic, *Upravno Pravo u SFRJ* (Administrative Law in the SFRY), Belgrade, Privredni Pregled, 1973, p. 166.

[6] *Politika* (Belgrade), Apr. 3, 1969.

Response to Domestic Conflict

This "federalization" of political power in the state and party took place in the context of rising popular nationalist sentiments among all the peoples of Yugoslavia and increasing incidents of violent interethnic conflict.[8] These tensions, in turn, strained relations between representatives of the regions in central political organs. At first, each regional leadership simply suppressed open manifestations of nationalism in its region, emphasized the significant concessions to cultural heterogeneity already made by the regime, and stressed interregional cooperation and common interests.[9] But this strategy became more difficult to maintain as nationalist attention shifted from traditional cultural concerns to the defense of regional economic interests. On these issues, nationalist pressures reinforced already existing divisions within the leadership that arose out of continuing disputes over the economic powers and policies of the federation.

All the regional leaderships more or less supported the division of political power that followed the ouster of Rankovic. Although the leaderships of the economically more developed regions generally offered the strongest backing, the leaderships of the less developed regions also gave their endorsement. Indeed, at the time of the 1968 constitutional reforms it was the Macedonian leadership that was most outspoken in its support for regional power.[10]

However, the regional leaderships found it more difficult to agree on what policies, over which each had acquired a veto, the federation would pursue. With time, the Croatian leadership grew increasingly insistent on its demands for further reform of the banking system to reduce the power of the formerly federally controlled central banks, for changes in the foreign currency exchange and foreign trade systems that would allow those who earned foreign currency to retain a greater share of it, and especially for devolution of greater control over investment decisions to the self-managing enterprises that generated investment capital.[11] Until mid-1969, the leaderships of Slovenia and Vojvodina also supported these demands, for fullfillment of such demands promised an increase in the proportion of resources that remained in the economically more developed regions for reinvestment. The leaderships of the economically less developed regions, in contrast, sought "the concentration of resources at the federal level and their redistribution to lesser developed national, or republic areas." Each side backed up its position by referring to principles embodied in the programmatic documents of the party. The former pointed to the ideological commitment to increase the scope of self-management in the economy, while the latter referred to "the principle of solidarity and help by the developed for the underdeveloped."[12]

In 1969, the growing intensity of the mutually reinforcing national, economic, and ideological conflicts that divided the regional leaderships led President Tito to attempt to limit the process of federalization and to restore some degree of central authority in the party. Despite "certain reservations" among them, Tito won the regional leaderships' approval for the creation of an Executive Bureau of the Presidium, to be composed of himself, two representatives from each republic organization, and one representative from each provincial organization. The new 15-member Executive Bureau, established at the Ninth Congress, was intended to function as a more effective integrative central organ than the full 52-member Presidium: it was smaller, it immediately enjoyed enormous prestige as the apparent institutional successor to Tito, its members did not have other responsibilities and could focus their full attention on solving divisive political problems, and it was to make its decisions as an independent collegial body, taking into account the interests of all the regions.[13] Its creation represented an attempt to break the deadlock in the central party leadership without abandoning the organizational and procedural principles of decision-making that had evolved since 1966.

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[7] Dusan Bilandzic, *Ideje i Praksa Drustvenog Razvoja Jugoslavije 1945-1973* (Ideas and Practice of the Social Development of Yugoslavia, 1945-1973), Belgrade, Komunist, 1973, p. 271.

[8] See, for example, the reports contained in *Republicko savjetovanie Saveza komunista o nekim obiljezjima politicke situacije u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Republic Consultation of the League of Communists on Certain Characteristics of the Political Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, Oslobodjenje, 1968.

[9] Reference here, of course, is to the reaction to the Croatian "Declaration" and Serbian "Proposal" episode of 1967. See "Politics, Not Linguistics," in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb, Dalmatian edition), Mar. 19, 1967; the speech by Tito reported in ibid., Mar. 26, 1967; and League of Communists of Serbia, CC, *Aktuelna pitanja i zadaci komunista u borbi za reformu (9. Sednica CK SK Srbije)* (Current Questions and Tasks of Communists in the Struggle for Reform [Ninth Session of the CC of the League of Communists of Serbia]), Belgrade, Biblioteka Saveza komunista Srbije, 1967, pp. 19-20, 127-31.

[10] Slavko Milosavlevski, "Contribution to the Question of Further Development of the Political Organization of the Yugoslav Federation," in Ljubisa Stankov, Ed., *Karakter i funkcije federacije u procesu konstituisanja samoupravnog drustva* (Character and Functions of the Federation in the Process of Constituting a Self-managing Society), Belgrade, Institut za politicke studije VSPN, 1968, pp. 70-79.

[11] Ivan Peric, *Suvremeni Hrvatski nacionalizam* (Contemporary Croatian Nationalism), Zagreb, August Cesarec, 1976, p. 52.

[12] Ibid.

The explosive potential of the divisions that plagued the leadership was forcefully demonstrated only a few months later by the "Slovenian road-building crisis." That crisis stemmed from popular resentment that had been building up in Slovenia since the economic liberalization of 1965 over the federal government's apparent disregard of the interests of the economically advanced Slovenian republic in favor of the interests of the underdeveloped regions of the country.[14] In July 1969, a decision by the Federal Executive Council to delay the financing of certain road construction projects in Slovenia and to finance instead other projects in underdeveloped regions triggered a wave of public protest meetings in Slovenia, meetings marked by highly nationalistic and even separatist sentiments. Popular complaints that the decision had been made by illegitimate methods, and demands for its immediate reversal, were supported and reinforced by a number of Slovenian governmental bodies and social, economic, and political organizations. The strength of the protests compelled even the republic party leadership to offer at least some support to the protesters.

In short order, the conflict spread beyond the borders of the republic. The demands raised in Slovenia were seconded by the government of Croatia, another developed republic in which similar popular grievances against the federation existed, but were almost simultaneously condemned in Serbia and by the political leadership of Macedonia, an underdeveloped republic.[15]

One week later, as the conflict grew in scope and intensity, an Executive Bureau meeting, to which the country's entire party and governmental leadership was summoned, convened under Tito's chairmanship. The results of this meeting were anticlimactic. Both the substance of the Federal Executive Council's decision and the procedures by which it had been made were approved.[16]

The Slovenian party leadership then undertook action to support the decisions of the Council and to suppress nationalist discontent in the republic.[17] More important, a month later the Slovenian governmental leadership admitted that it deserved much of the blame for the crisis. It had failed, it acknowledged, to act quickly to explain and defend a decision in whose preparation its representatives had participated and to which it had agreed in advance. In explaining its failure, the Slovenian leadership observed that "political pressures make sober judgment difficult."[18]

But domestic political pressures in the form of worsening relations between the nationalities and intensifying interregional conflict over federal economic policies continued to mount in the period after the Slovenian crisis. Despite the warning signal provided by that crisis, the Croatian leadership continued to press its policy demands at the center. Now, however, it no longer received the backing of the other leaderships. Because of the "road-building crisis," for example, the Slovenian leadership had become acutely sensitive to the dangers of allowing interrepublic conflict to continue for very long, and it grew increasingly reluctant to support Croatian positions. As a result, the Croatian leadership rapidly became isolated in the central political organs of the country.[19] Unable to achieve the adoption of its positions as federal policy, it therefore acted to prevent the adoption of any other positions.

With the central political organs of the state and party stalemated, the Croatian leadership sought to achieve its objectives by launching a campaign, first, to remove those policy areas of most direct concern to it from the decision-making authority of central political organs and, second, to strengthen the role of regional representatives in all remaining areas of federal decision-making authority.[20] It was able very rapidly to achieve the latter. In April 1970, it won formal recognition by the party Presidium of the principle of unanimous decision-making "as a rule" in both state and party organs.[21] It also obtained the party's commitment to "equalization" of regional representation in all federal bodies.[22] Although these decisions were not adopted without lengthy and serious interregional debate over the precise formulas for representation and procedures for decision-making, they were supported in the end by all the regional leaderships because the power of each was enhanced by them. Moreover, the decisions did not represent a departure from the previously established pattern of change.

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[13] LCY, *Deveti kongress SKJ: Stenografske beleske* (Ninth Congress of the LCY: Stenographic Record), Belgrade, Komunist, Vol. 1, 1970, pp. 49–50. "Reservations" are reported in *Politika*, Mar. 25, 1969.

[14] See the results of a public opinion poll concerning the consequences of the reform, reported in *Jugoslovensko javno mnenje 1966* (Yugoslav Public Opinion 1966), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1967, pp. 34, 36, and 39.

[15] *Politika*, July 31, 1969. See also *Borba* (Belgrade), Aug. 2, 5, and 8, 1969; and *NIN* (Belgrade), No. 969, Aug. 3, 1969.

[16] *Borba*, Aug. 9, 1969.

[17] Ibid., Sept. 3, 1969.

[18] Ibid., Sept. 6, 1969.

[19] Peric, *Suvremeni Hrvatski nacionalizam*, p. 54.

[20] A campaign launched at the famous 10th Session of the Croatian Central Committee. See Milovan Baletic and Zdravko Zidovec, Eds., *Deseta Sednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske* (Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia), Zagreb, Vjesnik, 1970.

[21] LCY, Presidium, *Osma Sednica Predsednistva SKJ* (Eighth Session of the Presidium of the LCY), Belgrade, Komunist, 1970, p. 11.

[22] Ibid., p. 13.

Nevertheless, agreement on the precise issues requiring interregional unanimity and on the redivision of decision-making authority between the federation and the republics was more difficult to achieve. During 1970, a special working group of the party leadership, a group composed of representatives of each regional leadership and under the chairmanship of Edvard Kardelj, convened a series of closed meetings to develop proposals for implementing the principles adopted by the Presidium in April. This group generally agreed that additional constitutional reforms to transfer certain functions from the competence of the federation to the competences of the individual regions were required. The regional leaderships remained bitterly divided, however, over precisely what competences would be left to the federation and over whether each region would retain a formal veto over all federal decisions or would simply be represented in, and consulted during, the federal decision-making process.[23]

This dispute took place against the background of a continuing, and in some respects intensifying, interregional deadlock in the policymaking organs of the state and party. In an effort to break this deadlock, Tito consulted with "a few comrades from the highest leadership," and together they decided to create a collective state presidency organized on the same principles as the Executive Bureau of the party.[24] In

Some of the participants at a July 1969 meeting of the Executive Bureau of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: from left to right, Veljko Vlahovic, Miko Tripalo, Mijalko Todorovic, Edvard Kardelj, and Dimce Belovski.

—EUPRA.

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[23] See Kardelj's report on the work of this group in LCY, *Aktuelni problemi daljeg razvoja politickog sistema* (Current Problems of the Further Development of the Political System), Belgrade, Komunist, 1970.

[24] Ibid., p. 129.

September 1970, in a public speech proposing the establishment of a collective presidency, Tito emphasized that it was to be composed of "the best people from the republics," but that its members were not to function as "republic advocates." Rather, the members were to function collectively as "an independent factor" that would resolve interregional conflicts in the interest of the Yugoslav community as a whole. This new collective body, he added, would relieve the party leadership of day-to-day involvement in the operation of the state. It also would serve as his institutional successor in the state, just as the Executive Bureau was to do in the party.[25]

By publicly proposing creation of a collective state presidency, Tito accelerated the pace of constitutional reform. Despite continuing differences over the precise formulas for federal decision-making, a month of intraparty discussion, debate, and compromise following Tito's speech established a tenuous consensus among the regional leaderships on the broad outlines of the reforms to be adopted.[26] This allowed the central leadership to proceed to the preparation of specific constitutional amendments for the reorganization and operation of the federation. The federal parliament's Joint Commission for constitutional questions created three "working groups" to prepare proposals concerning the immediate issues raised by the continuing interregional stalemate and by the initiative to create a collective presidency: reorganization of the organs of the federation; reformulation of relations between the federation, the republics, and the autonomous provinces; and specification of the economic functions of the federation. These groups were composed of one representative from each republic and province and one from the military. Because the military transcended regional and national divisions, its representative could legitimately represent an "all-Yugoslav" position in the deliberations of these groups. All other members were appointed by, and required to represent the positions of, their respective republics or provinces. The task of these groups was *not* to reconcile conflicts among those positions. Rather, it was simply to draft alternative formulations of constitutional amendments on the basis of those positions.

Reconciliation, or "harmonization," was to take place in another, more authoritative body created by the Joint Commission, its Coordinating Commission.[27] The Coordinating Commission was headed by Kardelj and composed of three representatives from each republic and two from each autonomous province. Its 22 members were determined by the regional leaderships themselves and consisted of individuals whose personal political authority permitted them both to represent the views of their respective regions and to reconcile these views with those of the others. They included 7 of the 15 members of the party's Executive Bureau and 13 of the 52 members of the party's Presidium.[28]

Discussions in the Coordinating Commission were highly contentious, for they focused not only on differences between constitutional formulas proposed by the regional representatives in the working groups but also on the frequently contradictory objective economic interests of the regions.[29] At certain key points in the work of the Commission, a subgroup of its members—probably the seven members from the LCY's Executive Bureau—met separately in closed sessions to resolve particularly difficult issues or to expedite the functioning of the Commission. The Commission as a whole operated on the principle of consensus. Consequently, its decisions were often the product of compromises.[30]

This commission corresponded closely in function to the commission of the same name that had been established earlier in the Federal Executive Council. It provided a highly authoritative forum for the resolution of interregional conflicts before such conflicts became subject to public discussion. Indeed, the entire organization and operation of the constitutional drafting process reinforced the decision-making pattern that had been evolving in state and party bodies since 1966, namely, the adoption of consensus as the basis for decision-making in negotiations among representatives of the regions.

The 1971 constitutional amendments that resulted from these deliberations have already been described in detail in this journal.[31] But it is important to note again that although they transferred to the republics and provinces a substantial proportion of the decision-making authority that had heretofore rested with the federation, they did not dramatically alter either the principles or existing practices of decision-making at the federal level. They formally established prior consultation, interregional negotiation, and "harmonization" of regional interests as the bases of decision-making, even in areas that ostensibly remained in the competence of the federation. Yet the chairman of the working group for relations between the federation, republics, and provinces acknowledged that "such is the practice even now" and suggested that the amendments simply "institutionalized" the existing pattern of decision-making.[32]

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[25] Text in ibid., pp. 5–12.

[26] See the discussion in ibid. Cf. the Serbian positions reported in *Borba*, Sept. 25, 1970; and *Politika*, Oct. 23, 1970.

[27] *Informativni Bilten Savezne Skupstine* (Belgrade; hereafter *IBSS*), No. 32, Nov. 30, 1970, pp. 26–28.

[28] Ibid., p. 27; and *Borba*, Nov. 7, 1970.

[29] See *IBSS*, No. 42, Feb. 20, 1971, pp. 2–3; and the lengthy report on the Commission's work in LCY, *Ustavne promene (sesnaesta sednica Predsednistva SKJ)* (Constitutional Changes [16th Session of the Presidium of the LCY]), Belgrade, Komunist, 1971.

[30] *IBSS*, No. 42, Feb. 20, 1971, pp. 2–3.

[31] See Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1972, pp. 25–27.

The principle of "harmonization of interests," or consensual decision-making, was also applied to the collective Presidency established by the amendments. Its members were to "work on the basis of adjustment of views." But they were not expected to make many formal decisions themselves. Rather, they were to identify interregional conflicts and act quickly to facilitate the resolution of such conflicts by other organs.[33] In other words, they were expected to perform collectively the role of interregional "broker" that Tito had up to then been performing individually.

That task was made more difficult, however, by the size of the Presidency and the diversity of its membership. The 1971 amendments incorporated the principle of regional representation in central decision-making bodies as it had evolved since 1966, and applied it to the collective state Presidency as well as to the Federal Executive Council and its interrepublic committees. All were to be constituted on the principle of equal representation of the republics and "corresponding" representation of the provinces. (Even the military command was to be determined according to the principle of "the most proportional representation" of the republics and provinces.)[34] In the case of the Presidency, representation of the *multinational* character of Bosnia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo was also deemed necessary. Consequently, each republic was to have three representatives, and each province, two.[35] With the inclusion of Tito, the size of the Presidency reached 23 persons. Some regions selected their most powerful leaders for membership in the Presidency, while others selected less authoritative figures in their leaderships. The presidents of the eight regional parliaments were *ex officio* members. Both their large numbers and diversity of political statures would later make it very difficult for the members of the Presidency to achieve either the degree of unity or corporate authority required for them to perform their prescribed role.

Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito during a September 1971 visit to Ludbreg, Croatia. At left, Tito's wife Jovanka; at right, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, then President of the Central Committee of the Croatian League of Communists.

—EUPRA.

Adoption of the amendments in June 1971 led to reorganization of the Federal Executive Council in July. As called for in the amendments, the Council established interrepublic committees to take over the role performed since 1967 by its Coordinating Commission. One committee was created for each of the five broad areas of federal policy on which interregional conflict during the preceding years had focused and for which the amendments required interregional consensus: development policy, the monetary system, foreign trade and the foreign currency exchange system, finance, and regulation of the market. However, even though the amendments called for equal representation of the republics and only corresponding representation of the provinces, each committee was actually composed of a president drawn from among the members of the Federal Executive Council and one representative appointed by each of the regional executive councils—a structure duplicating precisely that of the working groups that had prepared the draft amendments. At the same time, the Coordinating Commission of the Federal Executive Council was retained as a higher and more authoritative arena for the handling of those conflicts that could not be resolved in the committees.[36]

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[32] LCY, *Ustavne promene . . .*, p. 200.

[33] Ibid., pp. 56–57.

[34] Amendment XLI, in Federal Executive Council, Secretariat of Information, *Constitutional Amendments XX–XLII*, Belgrade, Prosveta, 1971.

[35] See the report of the chairman of the working group for organs of the federation in *Ustavne promene . . .*, p. 218.

None of the organizational and procedural prescriptions for the resolution of interregional conflict contained in the 1971 amendments proved effective in the short term. The collective Presidency, the newly reorganized Federal Executive Council, and the interrepublic committees fell victim to the same interregional deadlock over substantive policy issues that had paralyzed the state and party leaderships during the preceding four years. In fact, the process of constitutional reform in many ways exacerbated the regional economic, ethnic, and political conflicts that divided the leaderships. Nationalistic forces throughout Yugoslavia used discussions of constitutional questions and, later, public forums organized for the discussion of draft amendments to propose highly provocative constitutional formulas of their own and to raise highly explosive issues that heretofore could not legitimately have been raised publicly.[37]

Croatian Crisis and Its Aftermath

The exacerbation of national conflict was most pronounced in Croatia, where already well-organized nationalistic forces—both Croat and Serb—grew dramatically in size, gained increasing popular support, and became politically more active during the spring of 1971. The rise of an organized Croatian nationalist movement and of nationalistic sentiments among the masses in Croatia during the period 1969–71 have been well documented elsewhere and need not be treated in any detail here.[38] It is important to note, however, that the Croatian party leadership could not agree on how to react to these developments. Some Croatian leaders, confident that they could control the more extreme elements among the nationalists, attempted to use popular nationalist pressures as leverage against the leaderships of other regions in order to win further concessions on substantive policy and constitutional issues. Among them, these individuals occupied almost all the most authoritative positions in the party apparatus and other sociopolitical organizations of the republic, and they used their authority to ensure the adoption of positions sympathetic to nationalistic demands. The entire leadership had accepted and approved this strategy in late 1969 and had put it into effect in early 1970. But by early 1971, some Croation leaders began to see the growing power of the nationalist organizations and especially of the Matica Hrvatska as a threat to the party's political monopoly, and increasingly nationalistic sentiments in the populace as a threat to the unity and stability of the Yugoslav state. These leaders, although themselves occupants of high positions in the republic party organization, could not effectively oppose the policies of the former group, who could invoke the principles of party discipline to enforce compliance.

Although the 1971 amendments reflected almost complete acceptance of the positions formulated by the Croatian political leadership, including even the establishment of an effective regional veto over federal decision-making, nationalists in Croatia remained unsatisfied. They advanced additional demands in new areas, some of them separatist in all but name. These demands contributed to the growing uneasiness of some members of the Croatian leadership, the leaderships of the other republics and provinces, and President Tito. In a series of closed meetings, all three demanded that those in command of the Croatian party apparatus support more forcefully adoption of the amendments (in whose preparation they had participated), move decisively against the increasingly oppositional Croatian nationalist movement and its leaders, and proceed to the negotiation of the solutions to the pressing problems confronting the central organs of the state and party. But all three refrained from explicit public criticism of events in Croatia and the policies of the Croatian party, for they remained convinced that those in command of the Croatian party retained control over the nationalists and would on their own take the action necessary to enforce agreements negotiated in the central party organs.[39]

By July 1971, a majority of the Croatian party's Executive Committee sought more resolute action against the nationalists. In August, this majority embarked on a determined struggle to wrest control of the party away from those sympathetic to the nationalists. By early November, however, it became convinced that by itself it could not win control of the Croatian party organization and that those who did control this organization could no longer control either the growing nationalist fervor in the republic or the growing power of the nationalist movement. Consequently, that majority appealed to President Tito to support its bid to overturn the top leadership of the Croatian party.[40]

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[36] *Sluzbeni List* (Belgrade), No. 32, July 28, 1971; No. 37, Aug. 26, 1971; No. 21, Apr. 20, 1974.

[37] See, for example, the report of a discussion organized by the Law Faculty section of the Association of University Instructors in Belgrade, in Bilandzic, op. cit., pp. 287–88.

[38] See, for example, Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, Berkeley, CA, The University of California Press, 1977, pp. 273ff.

[39] This is evident from the material in League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju u Savezu komunista Hrvatske u odnosu na prodor nacionalizma u negove redove (Izvestaj usvojen na 28. sednici Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske, 8. svibnja 1972. godine)* (Report on the Situation in the League of Communists of Croatia with Respect to the Penetration of Nationalism into Its Ranks [Report Adopted at the 28th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, May 8, 1972]), Zagreb, Informationa Sluzba Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske, 1972.

If Tito required additional evidence that such action was necessary—and the record strongly suggests that he did not[41]—events of the following weeks provided it. The nationalist leadership of the Croatian student movement escalated its essentially separatist demands and, to support them, launched a strike at Zagreb University.[42]

Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the strike, the entire political leadership of the republic was summoned to a meeting with President Tito. After 20 hours of argument, the now-famous 21st Session of the central party Presidium was convened on December 1.[43] For the first time since the Slovenian "road-building crisis," the entire political leadership of the country was assembled to criticize events in a single republic and the shortcomings of that republic's leadership.[44] For the first time ever, that criticism was made public. The text of Tito's opening remarks, in which he characterized the Croatian nationalist movement led by the Matica Hrvatska as counterrevolutionary and severely criticized the Croatian leaders for their failure to control it, was broadcast while the meeting was still in progress.[45] Both this and the text of his equally critical closing remarks were published immediately after the meeting.[46]

The antinationalist majority in the Croatian leadership now moved to force the resignations of those leaders compromised by too close an association with the nationalist movement and to assume control of the party itself. Capitalizing on the force of Tito's public condemnation, the backing of the military (which Tito controlled), and the leadership of Vladimir Bakaric (the most influential individual in the Croatian party), the new Croatian team conducted a widespread purge of the party, government, and other sociopolitical and cultural organizations in Croatia. It did so in order to reassert the authority of central leadership organs over local and regional organizations in the party and to restore party control over the social, cultural, and political institutions of the republic.[47]

At the same time, a coalition of regional and central political figures, headed by Tito, pursued a similar policy at the center. In an effort to improve the cohesiveness of central party organs, Tito took over direct supervision of the central Presidium and Executive Bureau.[48] In January 1972, the Executive Bureau was reduced from 15 to 9 members, and its heretofore bimonthly rotating chairmanship was replaced by a permanent Secretaryship. Stane Dolanc, who had been Chairman during the recent crisis and had proved himself a loyal and capable executor of Tito's policies, was appointed Secretary of the Bureau.[49] At the 10th Party Congress, held in May 1974, the Bureau was expanded to 12 members and was made the Executive Committee of the Presidium.[50]

The Tito-led coalition also reasserted the right of central party organs to monitor and, if necessary, intervene in the affairs of the regional organizations. In September 1972, even though this coalition may not yet have commanded the support of a majority of the leadership, it put recalcitrant regional leaders on notice by circulating a letter to all party organizations in which it condemned the transformation of the LCY into "an unstable coalition of republic and provincial organizations," emphasized the responsibility of regional leaderships for the implementation of central policy, and affirmed the right of central organs to ensure that implementation.[51] In October, it began a series of such interventions by forcing the leaders of the Serbian republic organization to resign.[52] Over the course of the next year, leadership or cadres changes followed in all the other republic and provincial organizations. By the time of the 10th Congress, 24 of the 52 members of the Presidium elected in 1969 had been replaced—11 of them for having come into

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[40] Ibid., pp. 76–105.

[41] Dennison Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," Part 4, *American Universities Field Staff Report*, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. 19, No. 7, 1972, p. 11.

[42] For the events of the strike, see *Hrvatski Tjednik* (Zagreb), No. 32, Nov. 26, 1971, and No. 33, Dec. 3, 1971; and daily reports in *Borba*, Nov. 23–Dec. 3, 1971.

[43] *Borba*, Dec. 3, 1971; and League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju* . . . , p. 112.

[44] *Politika*, Dec. 9, 1971.

[45] Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," p. 16.

[46] *Borba*, Dec. 3 and 4, 1971.

[47] League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju* . . . , pp. 127–29.

[48] LCY, *Druga Konferencija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Second Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Komunist, 1972, p. 4.

[49] LCY, *Deseti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: Dokumenti* (Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Documents), Belgrade, Komunist, 1974, p. 498.

[50] Ibid., p. 564.

[51] Text in LCY, *Nova Inicijativa u SKJ* (New Initiative in the LCY), 2nd ed., Belgrade, Komunist, 1975, pp. 7–14.

[52] See texts in ibid., pp. 15–50.

Josip Broz Tito, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), and Stane Dolanc, then Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, at the party's 10th Congress, in May 1974.

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"conflict with the course of the LCY."[53]

These changes have been widely and correctly characterized as a recentralization of power in the party. Nevertheless, it is important to note that that recentralization was limited. To be sure, the Tito-led coalition established the right of central organs independently to determine their own internal organization and operation, to expel individuals from their ranks, and to remove regional leaders from office. But it did *not* assert the right of central organs independently to appoint either their own members or the leaders of regional organizations. That appointment power, as well as the power to control cadres assignments in lower-level party organizations, remained in the hands of the regional leaderships themselves. Even after the 10th Congress, the central party organs continued to be made up of individuals appointed by, and therefore responsible to, their respective regional or military party organizations. In addition, the Executive Bureau was reorganized in January 1972 so that it consisted of younger and less influential party functionaries. This limited the accumulation of power by this potential "party center." Moreover, the Tito-led coalition did not abandon the principle of consensual decision-making, based on interregional consultation and "harmonization" of positions, that had evolved in the party since 1966. Indeed, during the period after the 10th Congress, that process became a central element in the effort to restore cohesiveness to the central party leadership.

Nor did the postcrisis leadership abandon the principle of consensual decision-making in the state and government that was embodied in the 1971 amendments. In fact, many issues on which the federal government had earlier been stalemated were now resolved in the interrepublic committees that had been established for that purpose in July 1971. Two weeks after the 21st session, for example, an agreement was reached on the foreign-currency retention quota and exchange system—matters that had been of central concern to the nationalist press in Croatia and a bone of contention between the Croatian and other regional leaderships for several years. This agreement was but the first of more than 120 solutions to interregional conflicts forged in these committees during the first seven to eight months of 1972.[54]

During the postcrisis period, issues on which these committees could not reach agreement were referred to the Coordinating Commission of the Federal Executive Council and, if still unresolved, to the Council as a whole. If the issue could not be resolved by the Council, it was then referred to the collective state Presidency. However, the Presidency was reluctant to consider any but the most intractable issues, and in almost all cases the Council or its Coordinating Commission proved able to resolve the conflict.[55]

The Presidency itself operated on the principle of "harmonization" of regional interests, but even solutions devised by the Presidency and supported unanimously by its members could be rejected by the regional representatives in the interrepublic committees or Federal Executive Council. In such situations, the Presidency was empowered by the 1971 amendments to impose a temporary solution with the force of law. During the first 18 months of its operation, however, it was compelled to do so only once.[56]

As this suggests, the Federal Executive Council and its staff played an increasingly important role in the resolution of interregional conflicts in the postcrisis period. Its representatives in the deliberations of interrepublic committees took positions that were developed in permanent commissions composed of members drawn from the Council itself, from federal organizations and institutions, and from "other organizations that carry out activity on the entire territory of Yugoslavia."[57] They viewed issues from the perspective of "all-Yugoslav," or "federal," interests rather than regional interests. In turn, they counterposed federal interests to those advanced by the regional representatives, with whom they participated on an equal basis in the interrepublic committees. This proved to be a highly effective strategy for the resolution of interregional conflicts.

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[53] LCY, *Deseti kongres . . . .* pp. 488–89.

[54] Bilandzic, op. cit., p. 291.

[55] *IBSS*, No. 102, Feb. 20, 1973, pp. 3–10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] *Sluzbeni List*, No. 37, Aug. 26, 1971. See also the rules of procedure adopted by the Council in June 1972, in ibid., No. 33, June 30, 1972.

Such a strategy, however, relegated the Chamber of Nationalities of the federal parliament to an insignificant role in the federal decision-making process. The Chamber and its committees were excluded from the deliberations of the interrepublic committees and Federal Executive Council. By the time proposals reached the Chamber, they already reflected the compromise of conflicting regional interests and carried the approval of the republic and provincial governments. Because any substantive changes of a proposal would necessitate its return to an interrepublic committee for additional "harmonization" of regional interests, the members of the Chamber were both reluctant to make changes in, and under pressure from their respective regional leaderships not to alter, the proposals that appeared before them.[58]

The Constitution of 1974

Questions such as the role of the Chamber became a central concern of the groups that drafted the text of a new constitution incorporating and extending the principles adopted in 1971. Even as the 1971 amendments were being drafted, the leadership had acknowledged that their adoption would necessitate preparation of another constitution. In July 1971, that task was entrusted to a new, smaller Coordinating Commission, composed primarily of the politically less powerful members of its predecessor.[59] This Commission could not begin serious work, however, until the larger political crisis was resolved.

In February 1972, the drafting process got under way in earnest. Its organization and operation were almost identical to that whereby the earlier amendments had been hammered out. Three groups that had been established in December 1970 to work on longer-range reforms of the assembly system, the commune, and the system of self-management were subordinated to the new Coordinating Commission. These groups had originally been composed of one representative from each of the eight regions. When they resumed work in 1972, however, a representative of the military was added to their memberships. This addition brought their composition into line with the groups that had drafted the 1971 amendments, but it also reflected the increased direct participation of the military in the political life of the country after the crisis. Representatives of sociopolitical organizations on the federal level and functionaries of the federation also participated in the work of these groups.[60] This departure from earlier practice reflected the effort then taking place in the permanent commissions of the Federal Executive Council to include representatives of "all-Yugoslav" interests in the formulation of federal policy, and it presaged the later creation of "federal councils" in which direct consultation and negotiation would be carried out among both regional and all-Yugoslav interests under the auspices of the Federal Executive Council and the collective state Presidency.[61]

During preparation of the new constitution, "quite different and sometimes even fundamentally contradictory" positions were expressed with regard to institutional and procedural arrangements for federal decision-making in areas requiring interregional agreement.[62] To resolve these conflicts, the Coordinating Commission in May 1972 appointed a special working group to review both the functions of, and the methods of decision-making in, the federation and to recommend a solution to the political emasculation of the Chamber of Nationalities. The group was composed of one representative appointed by each republic and province and the military and was under the chairmanship of the Vice-President of the federal parliament. Five of these ten individuals had served in 1970 and 1971 on either the working group for organs of the federation or the working group for relations between the federation and the republics and provinces, and they were already fully committed to the transfer of authority to the regions that was provided for in the amendments drafted by those groups. Members of the earlier groups who had opposed that devolution were not included among the new working group's members.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this group recommended that federal decisions requiring interregional agreement be adopted by unanimous vote of the regional parliaments acting separately rather than

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[58] See the report of a speech to the parliamentary leadership by the President of the federal parliament, in *IBSS*, No. 74, Feb. 10, 1972, pp. 3–4.

[59] *IBSS*, Nos. 58/59, July 30–Aug. 10, 1971, p. 4; and No. 93, Sept. 30, 1972, p. 4.

[60] Ibid., No. 77, Mar. 10, 1972, p. 2; and No. 93, p. 5.

[61] *Sluzbeni List*, No. 41, July 26, 1973.

[62] Edvard Kardelj, *Osnovni uzroci i pravci ustavnih promena* (Basic Sources and Directions of Constitutional Changes), Belgrade, Komunist, 1973, p. 106.

President Josip Broz Tito attends a session of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly in 1972.

—EUPRA.

by a central parliamentary body composed of representatives of the regions.[63] Nor is it surprising that the Coordinating Commission, half of whose members were the presidents of the regional parliaments, at first endorsed this proposal,[64] for this solution represented a logical continuation of the devolution of authority to the regions carried out in 1971.

Unlike the earlier amendments, however, the draft constitution was prepared during a period in which a coalition in the central party leadership was striving to restore central authority in the country. Under the chairmanship of Kardelj and with the participation of two other members of the party's Executive Bureau who were at the same time members of the Commission plus another "representative" of that Bureau, the Coordinating Commission decided to preserve the existence of a federal parliamentary body through which the republics and provinces would formally express their agreement on, or opposition to, federal policies.[65] Other changes embodied in the 1974 constitution drafted by the Commission also strengthened central authority in the state and government, but in a fashion parallel to the strengthening of central authority in the party. That is, they were limited by the retention of principles and practices that reinforced the power of the regions. The 1974 constitution, for example, explicitly forbids members of the Federal Executive Council from receiving or acting on instructions from their respective regions. Council members are required instead to act in the interest of the country as a whole. At the same time, however, the Council is composed according to a formula that requires the representation of each region, and it operates according to rules that require both the participation of regional representatives in its deliberations and the adoption of decisions by consensus.[66] Similarly, the new constitution strengthens the cohesiveness, reinforces the decision-making capabilities, and increases the authority of the collective Presidency by reducing it from 23 members to 9, while preserving the membership in it of the President of the LCY. But the 8 remaining members are elected by the regional parliaments—a situation that places their selection under the effective control of the regional leaderships.

Nowhere is the tension between central and regional authority more obvious than in the provisions for the organization and operation of the new federal parliament and especially its Chamber of Republics and Provinces, successor to the Chamber of Nationalities. The retention of a central parliamentary body with decision-making competence in areas that require interregional agreement compels delegations elected by the regional parliaments to come together, rather than meet separately, to express and defend the positions of their respective regions. This permits representatives of the Federal Executive Council to exercise influence over the discussion and adoption of the Council's proposals by the regional assemblies, just as they do over preparation of the proposals, for they perform precisely the same role in the deliberations of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and its working bodies as they do in the deliberations of the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils of the Federal Executive Council itself. The constitution provides that delegates in the Chamber retain their membership in the parliaments that elect them, keep those parliaments informed of developments in the Chamber, and participate in the deliberations of those parliaments. In

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[63] Text of the proposal in *IBSS*, No. 92, Aug. 1–Sept. 1, 1972.

[64] Ibid., Nos. 88/89, June 30–July 10, 1972, p. 4.

[65] Kardelj, *Osnovni uzroci . . .*, pp. 107–09.

[66] See Article 362, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1974, p. 279. See also *Sluzbeni List*, No. 21, Apr. 30, 1975, and No. 47, Sept. 26, 1975.



Mika Spiljak, Chairman of the Chamber of Nationalities, reads the proclamation of Yugoslavia's new Constitution in the Central Hall of the Federal Assembly on February 21, 1974.

—Keystone.

practice, such provisions have meant that delegations in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces not only represent the interests of their respective regions but also function as channels for the exercise of central influence over their respective regions.[67]

At the same time, the constitution makes important concessions to regional authority by setting limits, in its provisions for the organization and operation of the federal parliament, on the centralization of power. For instance, on issues subject to interregional negotiation, voting in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces is by regional *delegation*, and adoption of a proposal requires the approval of each delegation. No discussion of an issue that requires interregional agreement may take place in the working bodies of the Chamber unless all regions are represented. Both the delegations and the individual delegates are required to represent the positions of their respective regional parliaments in such discussions, and all decisions on such issues must be adopted unanimously.[68] These provisions institutionalize the informal practices that evolved in the period after the 1967 and 1968 amendments, and introduce a formal veto into the federal decision-making process. With the inclusion of the Chamber and its working bodies in the preliminary deliberations of the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils of the Federal Executive Council,[69] the Chamber as a whole is protected against being reduced to a rubber stamp.

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[67] Assembly of the SFRY, Chamber of Republics and Provinces, *Neka zapazanja iz dosadasnjeg rada Veca republika i pokrajina (period od 15. Maja 1974. do kraja 1975. godine)* (Some Observations from the Work to Now of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces [Period from May 15, 1974, to the End of 1975]), Belgrade, Strucna sluzba Veca republika i pokrajina, June 1976, p. 4.

[68] Articles 296 and 297, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution . . .*, pp. 245–46; and Articles 48, 50, and 52, in idem, "Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces," *Rules of Procedures of the SFRY Assembly*, Belgrade, 1975.

Patterns of Decision-making

Since the 10th Congress and the adoption of the new constitution in 1974, tension between central and regional power and authority in the party and state has been a persistent feature of Yugoslav politics. Detailed study of the decision-making process in the federal parliament since the adoption of the new constitution suggests that in the state the power of the center—that is, of the Federal Executive Council—has been increasing.[70] A large part of this power derives from the Council's near-monopoly over the scientific, technical, and bureaucratic resources of the state and over the agenda of federal decision-making. The former enables it to amass an overwhelming amount of evidence and material in support of its position on any given issue, and the latter enables it to avoid confronting issues with which it is unwilling or unable to deal. But an important source of this power has been the ability of the Council and its representatives to formulate compromise solutions to conflicts in the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils under its control and in the working bodies of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.

The responses of the Council and its representatives to interregional conflicts in the Chamber suggest that the Council follows a relatively simple strategy for regulation of such conflicts. It attempts at each stage in the decision-making process to preserve its own proposal against amendment by any region. To accomplish this end, it either attacks the substance of the amendments themselves or enlists the self-interested opposition of other regions. When amendment becomes necessary, it normally seeks to minimize the substance of the amendment by offering a less specific and more complicated formulation of the disputed proposal that appears to satisfy both or all of the regions in conflict. Alternatively, it tries to link together its proposals on several issues to form a package deal in which concessions to regional interests offset one another. It is not unlikely that the Council follows the same strategy in the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils during the preparation of draft proposals.

The Council's ability to impose such solutions depends in large part on the willingness of regional representatives in these various organs and institutions to compromise. However, the Council does possess some leverage to encourage such willingness. If interregional conflicts in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces prevent the adoption of a proposal the Council deems "indispensable," the Council can, with the approval of the collective Presidency, initiate a procedure for adoption of the proposal as a "temporary measure." That procedure calls for a vote of the full Chamber of Republics and Provinces by individual *delegates* rather than by *delegations* and requires only a two-thirds majority for passage.[71] This makes it possible to pass a measure over the unified resistance of delegates from two of the republics or from one republic and both of the provinces, and the pressure that would be brought to bear by the combined support of the Federal Executive Council and the Presidency for such a move would make it unlikely that unified resistance could be maintained in any but the most extreme of circumstances. Consequently, it is not surprising that when the working bodies and leadership of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces appear to reach a deadlock, additional and more authoritative members of the Council join the discussions or the discussions are transferred to the Council itself. The increased participation of the Council, then, almost always results in interregional agreement.

Nevertheless, the role of regional representatives in the federal decision-making process of the state now appears secure. During recent months, for example, this role has been affirmed. In the summer of 1979, the Federal Executive Council undertook a series of regulatory measures aimed at stabilizing the economy, and the Council's seeming independence of action led the editors of the party's own organizational journal to ask whether the federation was not "turning full circle" and to warn that "earlier experience should not be ignored."[72] Almost precisely 10 years earlier, such administrative actions by the Council led to the "Slovenian road-building crisis." Now, however, the Yugoslav press was careful to point out that "there is no doubt that [the Council] . . . simply placed its signature under decisions already harmonized politically

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[69] Assembly of the SFRY, Chamber of Republics and Provinces, *Neka iskustva iz dosadasnjeg rada Veca republika i pokrajina i njegovih radnih tela* (Some Experiences from the Work to Now of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and Its Working Bodies), Belgrade, Strucna sluzba Veca republika i pokrajina, January 1975, pp. 12–14.

[70] Author's research in progress.

[71] Article 302, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution* . . . , p. 249.

[72] As cited in *NIN*, No. 1494, Aug. 26, 1979.

The building in Novi Beograd (New Belgrade) that houses the Federal Executive Council and federal Presidency of Yugoslavia.

—Keystone.

at the beginning of the summer."[73]

In the party, by contrast, there has been continuing tension between central and regional power since the 10th Congress. The 12-member Executive Committee appointed at that congress was composed of six members of the Presidium and six nonmembers, drawn from the Central Committee. In February 1975, the six nonmembers were elevated to Presidium membership, thereby increasing the authority and prestige of the central executive organ. At the same time, however, it was necessary to add three other members of the Central Committee to the Presidium in order to preserve the representational balance among republics, provinces, and the military.[74] The dilution of authority and the reduction in effectiveness of decision-making that probably resulted from this expansion of the Presidium from 37 to 48 members may have led to a proposal (alleged to have been under consideration in June 1977) to establish a small, Politburo-like central organ.[75] That such a body has yet to be created is not surprising, for its creation inevitably would have been opposed by the still-powerful regional leaderships.

Nonetheless, central authority was enhanced at the 11th Party Congress, which met in June 1978, by reduction of the Presidium to its 24 most powerful members, by appointment of Stane Dolanc as Secretary of the Presidium, and by appointment of nine "executive secretaries."[76] It was also strengthened by changes in the party statutes that exempted the Presidium from the requirement for leading organs to replace one third of their members at each election, that prohibited the exclusion of any Central Committee member from the party without the knowledge and participation of the Presidium, and that affirmed the right of central organs to maintain direct communication with, and "extend help" to, local party and other sociopolitical organizations throughout the country.[77] These changes increased both the authority and autonomy of the central leadership and legitimized its intervention in the affairs of lower party organizations.

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[73] Ibid.

[74] *Politika*, Feb. 21, 1975.

[75] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1977*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977, p. 92.

[76] *Politika*, June 24, 1978.

All the same, the power of regional party organizations was not formally diminished. The new Presidium included the presidents of the regional party organizations, and it was constituted on the basis of the explicit formula for regional representation that had first been established 10 years earlier. Moreover, the "executive secretaries" were selected from each of the regions and the military.

Indeed, new rules in the party statute adopted at the 11th Congress affirmed the role of regional leaders in the operation of the Presidium. These new rules required participation of representatives of the regional central committees in the determination of changes in Presidium membership between congresses and stipulated that the President of the LCY must discuss current issues with, and the Presidium must coordinate its activities with, the regional leaderships. Although such provisions simply formalized existing practice, they clearly represented an attempt to make it more difficult to exercise central authority in the absence of interregional consensus. A change in the rules to prohibit reelection to "executive-political" positions in the party also constrained the further growth of central power by preventing any of the executive secretaries of the Presidium from consolidating their positions.

During the year after the 11th Congress, a series of organizational and procedural changes in the central party organs imposed additional restrictions on the exercise of central authority. In November 1978, *Politika* reported that the Presidium had "recently" adopted new rules of procedure by which a new post of Chairman of the Presidium was created. The Chairman would share many of the powers and responsibilities of the Secretary and would take over the most important of them completely.[78] With the establishment of this post, the powers, authority, and prestige of the Secretaryship declined dramatically. Six months later, in May 1979, Dolanc, the incumbent Secretary since 1972, was replaced "at his own request."[79] The Chairmanship and Secretaryship of the Presidium were now to rotate among the Presidium members and among the executive secretaries from each of the regional organizations on a yearly and biyearly basis, respectively. It appears that the representatives of the military are not to be included in this rotation. Their exclusion from these posts reflects the demotion of the military at the 11th Congress to a status inferior to that of a provincial organization.

The application of a principle of rotation to the leading postions in the Presidium was consistent with a new campaign for collective leadership. President Tito initiated this campaign in November 1978, when in a speech before a trade union congress he suggested that yearly rotation should be applied to almost all organs and organizations "from the commune to the Federation."[80] In April 1979, the Central Committee endorsed the idea.

But this principle was inconsistent with past efforts to establish and maintain a strong party center capable of mediating conflicts among the regional leaderships. Given a high level of agreement among the regional representatives who compose the Presidium, an autonomous party center might be unnecessary. However, recent Central Committee discussions indicate that the regional leaderships in Yugoslavia continue to be divided by conflicts arising out of the contradictory economic interests of their respective regions.[81] Even under such circumstances, the application of a principle of rotation to the leading positions in the party does not by itself undermine the decision-making principles and practices that have emerged in the country since 1966. Indeed, rotation of control over the executive powers of the Presidium and expansion of collective participation in the work of the President of the LCY can be seen as an attempt to reinforce this approach. Were the campaign for collective leadership limited to these changes, the system of decision-making based on regional representation, interregional negotiation, and consensus might prove remarkably stable in the post-Tito period. However, other proposals for change already adopted as part of that campaign strike at the very foundations of that system.

Rotation in the Regions

Following the death of Edvard Kardelj early in 1979, the Presidium adopted a set of conclusions that carried the principle of collective leadership still further. At its June meeting, it called for political leaders to divest themselves of multiple political functions and for the principle of rotation to be applied to leading positions in the state and party organizations of the republics and provinces and to "the most responsible functions" at the federal level. The Presidium scheduled the rotation in the regional party organizations for completion one year before the next round of party congresses and conferences—i.e., by late 1980—and in the regional parliaments and executive councils before the end of the current mandate period—i.e., by 1982.[82]

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[77] Cf. statutes in LCY, *Deseti kongres . . .*, pp. 335ff.; and idem, *Jedanaesti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: referat i zavrsna rijec Predsjednika Tita, Rezolucije, Statut SKJ* (11th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Report and Concluding Speech of President Tito, Resolutions, and Statute of the LCY), Belgrade, Komunist, 1978, pp. 203ff.

[78] *Politika*, Nov. 10, 1978.

[79] Ibid., May 17, 1979.

[80] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1979.

[81] Note the division of regional views at the Sixth Session (*Politika*, June 29, 1979) and the Eighth Session (ibid., Oct. 19, 1979).

The divestiture of multiple positions in the leadership began later that month when three members of the collective Presidency were dropped from the Presidium.[83] A reduction in the overlap between the memberships of these bodies may make a marginal contribution to effective decision-making by the Presidency. As the official rationale suggests, these changes will allow at least some of the Presidency's members to concentrate on their responsibilities as final arbiters of interregional conflicts in the state.

But the changes that are likely to result if the proposals for rotation are implemented could well undermine the operation of the system. As the Presidium is structured at present, rotation of the presidents of the central and provincial committees of the regions will produce an annual turnover of one third of the Presidium's membership. Yet the pattern of political changes in Yugoslavia since 1966 suggests that a system of political decision-making based on regional representation, interregional negotiation, and consensus requires stable regional party leaderships if it is to operate successfully. Stability of leading cadres in the regions, and especially of regional representatives in the Presidium, permits development of the kind of mutual personal trust and understanding that allows regional leaders to make the concessions that are often necessary to bring about agreement and to do so with confidence that these concessions will be reciprocated in some as yet unspecified way in the future.

Even more important, long tenure permits regional political leaders to consolidate their control over their respective party organizations. In the aftermath of the "Croatian crisis" of 1971, Western and Yugoslav analysts and some members of the Croatian leadership agreed that one condition that had made that crisis possible was the weakening of leadership control of middle- and lower-level party organizations in the republic. Rotation of the regional leaderships undoubtedly would weaken their control over lower organizations in their republics, just as rotation at the level of the Presidium weakens central control over the regions. If rotation is applied at the same time to lower-level party organs, as was suggested at the October 1979 meeting of the LCY Central Committee, the degree of control exercised by the regional leaderships over their respective territories will diminish even further.

Any weakening of control over lower-level party organizations also raises the possibility of a revival of nationalist activity in the country, especially because the introduction of rotation in state institutions will require yet another revision of the constitution. Well aware of past events, the Presidium therefore emphasized in its June decision that the present amendment process "must be restricted to immediate questions of the organization and composition of organs, as well as the length of the mandate of the president or chairman."[84] But still more important is the prospect that a weakening of the regional leaderships may jeopardize their ability to enforce in their own territories agreements reached in the Presidium. Yugoslav experience suggests that the inability of a regional leadership to enforce decisions arrived at through interregional negotiation and consensual decision-making will imperil, if not destroy, the system.

Whether rotation will actually be implemented in the regions remains in doubt. In January 1980, President Tito underwent leg surgery, and before he could recover, life-threatening complications set in. By March, his condition was critical, and it was uncertain how long he might live. But it was certain that he would never again play the role in Yugoslav politics that he had in the past.

Prospects for the Post-Tito Period

The death of Tito will remove the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts from the Yugoslav system. In the past, Tito's support for any position in a situation of deadlock guaranteed its adoption as policy. Moreover, his personal authority over the military ensured that substantial coercive force could be mobilized to enforce that policy if necessary. His death, however, will not mean the abandonment of interregional negotiation and consensus as the basic principles of Yugoslav decision-making. Instead, it will mean that consensus will become a necessary condition not only for routine decision-making, but for crisis management as well.

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[82] *Politika*, June 27, 1979.

[83] Ibid., June 29, 1979.

[84] Ibid.



Members of the federal Presidency, proclaimed elected by a joint session of both chambers of the Yugoslav parliament on May 15, 1979. Pictured from left to right (in parentheses, the republic or province represented): Stevan Doronjski, (Vojvodina), Vladimir Bakaric (Croatia), Fadilj Hodza (Kosovo), Cvijetin Mijatovic (Bosnia-Hercegovina), President Josip Broz Tito, Sergej Krajger (Slovenia), Vice-President Lazar Kolisevski (Macedonia), Petar Stambolic (Serbia), and Vidoje Zarkovic (Montenegro).

—Eastfoto.

The continuing success of the system will therefore depend on the continuing unity of the Yugoslav leadership after Tito.

That leadership has already demonstrated its ability to govern successfully without the full participation of Tito. After the 10th Congress, Tito began to withdraw from direct involvement in domestic decision-making processes. On key questions, such as the selection of individuals for the posts of Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium, it appears that Tito continued to exercise personal control. He also continued, through frequent public speeches and exhortations, to lend support to the policies adopted by the leadership and, through periodic affirmations of its stability, cohesiveness, and competence, to reinforce the authority of that leadership. But by 1976, he was no longer presiding over routine meetings of either the Presidium or the Presidency. During an interview granted in June 1976, a member of his personal cabinet assured this author that Tito was kept "fully informed" of the work of the collective Presidency. However, Tito's comments at the October 1979 meeting of the party Presidium suggest that by then his knowledge of the routine activities of the leading organs of the party was limited to the information contained in formal reports.[85] If this decreasing involvement in the day-to-day operation of the leading organs of the party and state is any indication, then, Tito's death may not detract from the routine domestic decision-making capacity of the leadership.

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[85] Ibid., Oct. 24, 1979.

In recent years, Tito has retained more personal control over the direction of foreign policy than over the direction of domestic policy. Even in this realm, however, the post-Tito leadership is likely to maintain a pattern of consensual decision-making. First, that pattern carries important benefits in two of the most important areas of Yugoslav concern: in relations among Communist parties and states and in the nonaligned movement. In both these areas, the Yugoslav diplomatic corps benefits from its domestic experience in the art of negotiation and consensus-building. Second, Yugoslav resistance to current Soviet actions aimed at establishing hegemony in both these areas must surely reinforce the Yugoslav commitment to maintaining consensual practices at home. Conversely, the successful maintenance of negotiation and consensus as the basis for domestic decision-making must stiffen Yugoslav resistance to efforts to undermine those principles in relations between states.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has magnified the long-standing threat of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia and has thereby reinforced the unity of the Yugoslav leadership. The effect of such external incentives to unity, however, may be short-lived. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, threatened Yugoslavia much more directly than have Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and it resulted in a much more dramatic upsurge in popular patriotism throughout Yugoslavia. Yet that invasion was followed less than three years later by the conflicts and crisis of 1971.

Thus, it would seem that the fate of post-Tito Yugoslavia will be determined largely from within, by the ability of the regional leaders who together compose the country's central leadership to reach consensus on the issues that divide them and to implement their decisions. But the decision to apply rotation to the regional leaderships, adopted in June 1979 as part of the campaign for collective leadership initiated by Tito, undermines that ability. The members of the post-Tito party Presidium, therefore, are likely to confront a paradox in the immediate aftermath of Tito's death. The consensual system of decision-making that has evolved since 1966 may justifiably be called Tito's legacy; to preserve it, however, the post-Tito leadership may have to abandon his last major initiative and thereby run all the risks accompanying the reversal of a policy so closely associated with his name so soon after his death.

Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe

By Ernst Kux

Although our world seems to be getting more turbulent, with a "seismic" area now running from South Korea and Southeast Asia to the Middle East and Africa and on to Latin America, things appear all quiet on the original eastern front. That is, Eastern Europe at present looks like an extinguished volcano. Yet appearances may well be deceptive.

From the late 1940's, this area, the main epicenter of the cold war, again and again experienced heavy tremors—Josip Broz Tito's break with Yosif Stalin, a chain of Berlin crises, and the revolutions in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. One of the main aims of the policy of détente was to end East-West confrontation in Europe and to pacify this "arc of crises" between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. With the German "East treaties," the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, and the Final Act of the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), this goal seemed to have been achieved. As the price of this pacification, the West formally accepted Soviet hegemony, Communist rule, and socialist systems in the East European countries, and it also undertook to support the status quo there through economic cooperation and credits. However, the Communist side held that the West's willingness to seek pacification of the area reflected a "change of international power relations in favor of socialism" and the success of cooperation within the "socialist community."

Is this pacification of Eastern Europe permanent, or are there forces at work that one day could produce changes or new eruptions? Can Eastern Europe, for example, be isolated from the sort of developments that have been causing upheavals elsewhere around the globe? If détente gives way to a new cold war, what will be the impact on the status quo in Eastern Europe? What consequences will the Soviet Union's increasing engagements in its eastern and southern rimlands have with regard to its posture on its western flank? Apart from the disruptive effects of the international atmosphere and other outside influences, are the domestic situations of the East European countries sufficiently settled to ensure calm? We know that many sources of tension continue to exist within these states. Could these generate new tremors? And if internal or external forces start to shake the tranquillity of Eastern Europe, will a major transformation of the landscape follow?

These questions are not purely hypothetical, and the problems that they touch upon are not imaginary. Such issues frequently come up in discussions with East Europeans. Indeed, behind the facade of economic development, stable political systems, accepted party leaderships, and unassailable Soviet hegemony, there exists strong potential for instability in Eastern Europe. The repeated attempts at long-range stabilization and unification of the area and the ways and means that Moscow has used to further this purpose have wound up producing new difficulties and tensions there. To be sure, there remain great differences among the East European countries. But to a greater or lesser degree they share many problems, problems rooted in their identical political systems and in their collective dependence on the Soviet Union with regard to political control, planning and economic supplies, and defense and foreign policies.

To understand the potential for instability in Eastern Europe today, it is important to begin by looking at the general status of the so-called "socialist community." Creation of this "community" through the Red Army's

Mr. Kux is Specialist for Communist Affairs, Neue Zürcher Zeitung *(Zürich), and Professor of Political Science, St. Gall Graduate School of Economics, Business, and Public Administration (St. Gall, Switzerland).*

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reviews East German troops during the 30th anniversary celebration of the German Democratic Republic in October 1979. To the right of Brezhnev is Socialist Unity Party First Secretary Erich Honecker, and to the left is East German Minister of National Defense Heinz Hoffmann.

—Regis Bossu/SYGMA.

occupation of the East European countries and the installation of Communist regimes in them was the great accomplishment of Soviet postwar policy. Moscow thereby recovered the defensive glacis in the middle of Europe that the tsars had possessed—and used it as the basis to build up the USSR's own power. Eastern Europe became a source of economic development for the Soviet Union and a stepping-stone for Moscow to exert pressure and influence in Western Europe.

The Contextual Situation

This "socialist community" the Soviet leadership depicts as an "utterly new, hitherto unheard-of phenomenon,"[1] as a "well-knit family of nations,"[2] and even the "foundation of the future worldwide brotherhood of nations."[3] But there remains a great gap between the theoretical concept of the "socialist community" and reality, for the USSR dominates the other members of the "community." Precisely this contradiction between theory and praxis is the main obstacle to effective functioning of the "community." On the one hand, the "community" constantly has to demonstrate "unity, cooperation, and joint action";[4] on the other, it has to make allowances for national, economic, and social differences among its member countries.

By definition, of course, the "process of all-round drawing-together," which operates as an "objective law" in all the socialist countries, produces "gradual levelling of . . . economic development[,] . . . ever increasing mutual connection and mutual dependence of national economies[,] . . . intensification of the political and ideological interaction of the fraternal states[,] . . . growing similarity in their social and political life" and "topples the antagonism between the national and international and creates preconditions for harmonizing the national-state interests of socialist countries."[5] In essence, this concept of total integration means adaptation to the Soviet model of "real existing socialism."

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[1] Leonid Brezhnev, speech in Warsaw at a session of the Polish Sejm, July 21, 1974, in L.I. Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1979, p. 130.

[2] Leonid Brezhnev, Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mar. 30, 1971, in Leonid Brezhnev, *On the policy of the Soviet Union and the international situation*, New York, NY, Doubleday, 1973, p. 93.

[3] Leonid Brezhnev, speech in Warsaw at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Dec. 7, 1971, in L.I. Brezhnev, *The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 268.

[4] Leonid Brezhnev, speech at a joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin Palace, Dec. 21, 1972, in Brezhnev, *On the policy of the Soviet Union* . . . , p. 217.

Yet commonalities such as the exercise of leadership by a Communist party and the existence of the socialist property system did not bring about a new form of cooperation among Communist countries that is qualitatively different from alliances between capitalist states, or even a real "drawing-together" of the "community" members. What has emerged in the 30 years since the establishment of the "socialist community" is a network of bilateral friendship treaties and two multilateral bodies, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. These institutions of a so-called "union of a totally new type"[6] have not worked differently or more effectively than those of other alliance systems, and they have not overcome "antagonism between the national and international."

Even with the same type of public ownership, countries of the "socialist community" have not grown together into anything like a "world socialist economy" with "joint international ownership."[7] The principal and decisive form of their production relations remains the national economies. Indeed, these states have not even managed to set up a genuine system of joint planning.

The present "socialist community" also falls well short of the worldwide "union of Soviet republics" that Vladimir Lenin envisioned[8] or the confederation of "future Soviet-Germany, -Poland, -Hungary, -Finland with Soviet Russia" that Stalin had in mind.[9] Moscow has not yet tried to incorporate the East European countries into a greater Soviet Union. It is even questionable that the Soviet leadership truly wants to absorb them into this kind of extended system of "real socialism." In fact, the USSR has up to now seemed eager to keep its "brother countries" at a distance, and the famous iron curtain between East and West appears to be more porous today than the barriers within the "socialist community."

For a short time under Nikita Khrushchev, the USSR tried to treat the socialist community as a loosely knit "commonwealth of socialist states" without a leading center or a prescribed model, but the impact on Soviet control of the area was disastrous. Consequently, his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, has since 1965 pushed for unification of the "community" in all spheres, from the ideologic to the economic. Although this effort has been less drastic in execution than what Stalin attempted earlier, it has proved more effective.

Thus, the relationship of the East European countries with the Soviet Union has become more cohesive during the last 15 years, but through subordination and domination rather than through the development of harmonious solidarity. The expression of this relationship is the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which both gives Moscow the right to intervene in "socialist" countries and restricts their sovereignty. In signing the Final Act of the CSCE, the West formally accepted this state of Soviet hegemony with the expectation that the outcome would be greater respect for human rights on the part of East European regimes and, more broadly, increased attention to the welfare of local populaces. While Soviet leaders for their part gave up some means that the USSR had in the past used to heighten the fears of East Europeans and to try to convince them of the need for Soviet protection—i.e., invocations of an "imperialist threat" or of "German revanchism"—Moscow did not subsequently fulfill Western expectations and loosen its hold on Eastern Europe. Instead of capitalizing upon détente to introduce needed reforms, the Soviet leaders prevented most changes and insisted upon a high degree of conformity within the "socialist community" as a precondition and basis for dealings with the West.

This subordination has constituted the main factor for stability in Eastern Europe, but at the same time it has given rise to fundamental problems there. The contradictions between the theory of "friendship and fraternal cooperation between peoples on the basis of equal rights"[10] and the reality of subordination to

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[5] I. Dudinsky, "The Present Stage of the CMEA Countries Cooperation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1978, p. 14.

[6] Leonid Brezhnev, *The World of Socialism—The Triumph of Great Ideas*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p. 508.

[7] B.N. Ladygin and N.A. Zotova, *Sotsialisticheskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya* (Socialist Economic Integration), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, p. 19.

[8] V.I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 2nd ed., Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1928, Vol. 25, p. 290. Brezhnev, in his Dec. 21, 1972, speech in the Kremlin Palace, drew a parallel between Lenin's project of "uniting the Soviet Republics in a single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 50 years ago" and the current tasks of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and CMEA.

[9] Yosif Stalin, "Letter to Lenin, 1 January 1920," in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 25, p. 624.

[10] Brezhnev, *The World of Socialism* . . ., p. 4.

The current leaders of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe: above, from left to right, Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak, and East Germany's Erich Honecker; on the opposite page, from left

Soviet dictate, between Communist promises of economic growth and social welfare and the actual shortcomings and exploitation, produce considerable tensions within the "socialist community." These tensions require extended discussion.

Sources of Tension

At the beginning of the 1980's, it has become increasingly evident that in all three major areas of interaction within the "socialist community"—party relations, the Warsaw Pact, and CMEA—effective cooperation has proved highly elusive. Indeed, the means and methods by which this cooperation has been pursued have eroded the political, social, and economic bases of the "community," thereby sapping its strength and enlarging the gap between its aims and performance.

Party relations. According to official claims, the special feature, the binding link of the "community" is the rule of Communist parties in all its states. Because these parties have a common commitment to "scientific socialism," the argument goes, there is a solid foundation for bringing about close cooperation.

Yet this supposed advantage has turned out to be more of a liability. In the first place, all the Communist parties of the "community," including the Soviet one, have long since lost their revolutionary dynamism and have become essentially reactionary forces, clinging to the existing status quo in their countries. Ideological commitments have merely served to reinforce this ossification. Thus, the parties have shown little capacity to make the changes necessary in their states to adjust to evolving global circumstances.

Furthermore, interparty ties have posed a dilemma for the East European parties. Should they behave in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the peoples of their countries, or should they obey Moscow's orders and represent Soviet interests in their own countries? It is not easy for East European leaders to assert greater independence from Moscow, for in the final analysis their rule is dependent not on the trust of their peoples but on Soviet support. Their guarantee of survival is precisely the Brezhnev doctrine, which protects them from spontaneous changes or real revolutions at home in return for obedience to Moscow.

In recent years, a number of developments have sharpened this dilemma. As we shall explore in more detail later, many or all the East European states have confronted a revival of national consciousness, growing economic and social problems, and the emergence of a latent opposition motivated by concerns with human rights, religion, or sociopolitical conditions. While it is difficult to assess the impact of

to right, Hungary's János Kádár, Poland's Edward Gierek, and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu.

—Photos of Zhivkov and Kádár by Vincent Mentzel; of Ceausescu by Eastfoto; the rest by Photoreporters.

"Eurocommunism" or of the independent stance of the Yugoslav party within the "socialist community," they have clearly had an influence in Eastern Europe. Romania's steadfastness in its maverick line affords but one illustration. Despite incantations of "proletarian internationalism" and calls for more conformity with Moscow by other East European parties, the Romanian party at its 12th Congress in November 1979 affirmed that "each party must independently establish its policy line, and its revolutionary strategy and tactics, in accordance with the realities prevailing in its own country."[11]

Finally, interparty links have made East European rulers heavily dependent on Moscow to stay in power, and shifts in leadership in the USSR have tended to produce corresponding shifts in Eastern Europe. Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, for example, brought about the ouster of some East European leaders and installed in office men more congenial to them after they themselves took over in the USSR. The impending succession to Brezhnev is likely to have similar results. All the present East European leaders except Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria and János Kádár of Hungary gained authority during the Brezhnev era. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, only Nicolae Ceausescu was born after World War I, and even he is in his early 60's. (It should be noted that the current leaders of the two East European countries outside the "socialist community," Yugoslavia and Albania, are older yet, so

Table 1: Top Soviet and East European Leaders

Leader (country)	Year of birth	Party chief since	Head of state since
Leonid I. Brezhnev (USSR)	1906	1964	1977
Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria)	1911	1954	1971
Erich Honecker (GDR)	1912	1971	1976
János Kádár (Hungary)	1912	1956	—
Edward Gierek (Poland)	1913	1970	—
Gustav Husak (Czechoslovakia)	1913	1968	1975
Nicolae Ceausescu (Romania)	1918	1965	1967
Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia)	1892	1937	1953
Enver Hoxha (Albania)	1903	1941	—

SOURCE: Borys Lewytzkyj and Juliusz Stroynowski, Eds., *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries*, New York, NY, K.G. Saur Publishing, Inc., 1978.

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[11] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Nov. 25, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Dec. 6, 1979, p. H/13.

these states too face an imminent shift at the top.)

If the changing of the guard in the Kremlin does indeed cause a similar shift in Eastern Europe, a fairly chaotic situation could develop. To date, the East European parties have appeared to temporize about their own succession problems, waiting to see what happens in Moscow. As a consequence, their leaderships, while not quite as old as the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), have become rather aged; moreover, many members of them show signs of exhaustion or poor health. In short, there is no experienced younger generation of leaders around. Under such circumstances, the transition to a new generation of leaders could prove a troubled one, with the emergence of surprises like Prague 1968 a distinct possibility.

Military relations. During the Brezhnev era, the military system of the Warsaw Pact came to be looked upon as the main tie with the "socialist community" and the "main center for coordinating the foreign policy activity of the fraternal countries,"[12] and the Pact's troops were the executioners of the Brezhnev doctrine, as in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the tremendous buildup and modernization of the Pact's conventional forces, along with the introduction of the new Soviet "Eurostrategic" weapons (the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber), constituted the "socialist community"'s major successful endeavors. These developments have greatly added to the political weight that the "community" enjoys vis-à-vis Western Europe and NATO.

In the military realm, Soviet domination and control are more pronounced than in other areas of cooperation. The Warsaw Treaty Joint Forces, which include the East European national armies, are under the command of Soviet marshals and generals. Timid proposals by East Europeans for greater participation of their representatives in the military decision-making process—such as the Romanian suggestion that the supreme command be rotated—have all been brushed aside.[13] In the final analysis, the Warsaw Pact is nothing but a pretext and justification for the permanent presence of Soviet troops in the East European countries, with the exception of Romania. The task of these troops is not so much defense of "socialist gains" against "imperialist aggression" as protection of Soviet interests and support of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This political function of the Soviet units prohibits Moscow from participating in effective measures for troop reduction and disarmament in Europe, for their withdrawal would weaken Moscow's hold in Eastern Europe and endanger the Communist regimes there.

Romanian President and Communist Party General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu signs the declaration at the conclusion of a November 1978 Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The maintenance of such a huge Soviet military force in Eastern Europe, however, has had negative consequences for the cohesion and development of the "socialist community." On the Soviet side, it has made Moscow extremely reluctant to accept the forms of multilateral cooperation that prevail within NATO—to say nothing of operating in accordance with the principle of "equality" that is much touted within the "socialist community." There is the constant fear that one or another "fraternal army" may join in a popular uprising, as Pál Maléter's troops did in Hungary in 1956. Even in those cases where the Soviet leadership does not doubt the reliability and fighting power of the "fraternal armies," it finds unthinkable the notion that these forces could be used in any capacity other than as auxiliary troops or might be allowed an independent command, control over the Soviet troops on local territory, or possession of nuclear weapons.

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[12] Brezhnev, Report to the 24th CPSU Congress.

[13] *The Observer* (London), May 22, 1966; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, London, 1979, p. 13.

On the East European side, there is the permanent worry that the Soviet comrades-in-arms could one day become the medium for the extension of "brotherly help" such as that which Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan have experienced in recent years. Moreover, support of an imposing military machine places a great burden on the East European economies and impedes their development. It involves not only large defense budgets to pay for national armies and to offset the cost of Soviet troops stationed in the area, but also expenses to maintain a logistical infrastructure—roads, railways, airfields, and pipelines—that does not always correspond to local economic needs. In addition, the financial share required of the East European countries for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and for the production of conventional and strategic weapons in the USSR must be high and constitute a great drain on their economic resources, although the precise figure remains a secret. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the massive buildup of the Warsaw Pact forces, and of the Soviet army in particular, has caused stagnation in the economic sphere and thus weakened the economic and social underpinnings of the whole "community."[14]

Economic relations. The "socialist community" is

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[14] It is very difficult to calculate the defense expenditures of the Warsaw Pact members and to relate these to the members' normal budgetary outlays, but figures put out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies show a substantial rise in per capita defense spending since the mid-1970's for all the Pact countries except Romania, at a time when these countries were experiencing a slowdown in their economic growth. See *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, p. 94. At the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in November 1978, Moscow demanded that the East European members agree to be responsible for a greater share of the Pact's defense spending. Only Romania refused to accede to this demand. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1978*, London, 1979, p. 114.

On the viewing stand of the May 1979 "Shield '79" joint exercise of forces from five Warsaw Treaty Organization members—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the USSR. From left to right are: Hungarian Defense Minister and Army General Lajos Czinege; President of the Presidential Council Pál Losonczi, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Secretary Sándor Borbély, and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Combined Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov.

—Eastfoto.

Table 2: Annual Growth Rates of Gross Industrial Production of CMEA States, 1971–79

(in percent)

	1971–75	1976–80 (planned)	1976	1977	1978	1976–78	1979
Bulgaria	9.1	9.0	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.5
Czechoslovakia	6.7	5.3	6.5	5.6	5.0	6.2	3.7
GDR	6.5	6.8–7.2	5.9	4.8	4.7	5.1	4.8
Hungary	6.4	6.7–7.0	4.1	6.8	5.2	5.5	2.8
Poland	10.4	8.5	9.3	7.5	4.8	7.0	2.8
Romania	12.9	10.7	11.4	12.5	9.0	11.1	8.0
USSR	7.4	7.0–7.8	4.8	5.7	4.8	5.1	3.4

SOURCES: For the 1971–78 data, see *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi 1979* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1979), Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, 1979, p. 67. For the 1979 data, see the year-end figures as reported respectively in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Feb. 21, 1980, p. C/3; Jan. 25, 1980, p. D/4; Jan. 23, 1980, p. E/8; Feb. 4, 1980, p. F/5; Feb. 11, 1980, p. G/9; Feb. 12, 1979, p. H/4; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 26, 1980. For the 1976–80 plan figures, see Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 15, Jan. 18, 1980, p. 2, for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; Erich Honecker's report to the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party, *Neues Deutschland* ([East] Berlin), May 19, 1976, for the GDR; Aleksey Kosygin's report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in *Pravda*, Mar. 2, 1976, for the USSR.

supposed to be "the world's most dynamic economic force, developing at a high, steady pace,"[15] but the current economic situation in Eastern Europe belies such a claim. Although the present five-year plans of CMEA countries (for 1976–80) on the average set lower rates for the growth of gross industrial product than were recorded in the last five-year period, fulfillment of these plans is now clearly impossible (see Table 2). Economic stagnation has become rampant in Eastern Europe, and there is even potential for a recession in some countries. For example, Poland's Central Statistical Office announced on February 8, 1980, that national income produced had declined by 2 percent in 1979.[16]

This state of affairs reflects a variety of problems from the East European standpoint. First, despite much talk about integration of the national economies of CMEA countries and about a division of labor among them, there has been only slow progress toward coordination of their five-year plans and long-term programs and toward the development of an interrelated planning and production area and a unified socialist market. Hungarian Deputy Premier József Marjai complained recently:

> *A rapid and spectacular further development of the division of labor we have established with the socialist countries is hampered to some extent by the temporarily limited nature of our partner's export capacity, particularly with regard to energy and raw materials. . . . A problem is also caused by the fact that the methods of our economic cooperation do not keep up in every respect with the changed conditions of the division of labor. Under today's intricate system of conditions in trade, joint ventures and technical-scientific cooperation, finding joint interests and the means to fulfill joint interests has become a more complicated task than before. . . . The forms of organization and motivation in these trends of cooperation, whose complexity was inconceivable in the previous period, do not as yet keep pace with requirements today.*[17]

The main obstacles to development, integration, and reforms in the CMEA system lie, in the absence of a functioning market and pricing mechanism, in the national planning and control institutions and the no less bureaucratic and cumbersome apparatus of CMEA programming and coordination.

Such a gap between theory and reality leaves strong grounds for doubt that the acceleration of economic growth and the improvement in living standards that the East European member states of CMEA experienced in the early 1970's reflected integration within the CMEA framework. Probably much more influential were the intensification of East-West trade and the availability of credits and advanced technology from the West. For instance, those CMEA members that pursued a more independent foreign policy (like Romania) or a fairly distinctive economic policy (like

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[15] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24, 1980.

[16] Despite this dip, Poland experienced a 3 percent increase in popular consumption of material goods. To sustain this, the planners had to countenance an 8.2 percent drop in investment outlays. See Warsaw PAP broadcast in English, Feb. 8, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 11, 1980, pp. G/9–10.

[17] *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Nov. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 12, 1979, p. G/1.

Poland and Hungary) traded more with advanced capitalist countries than did other CMEA members (see Table 3), and even though one cannot establish a statistical correlation, they by and large appear to have had higher growth rates than did other East European states (see Table 2). Indeed, Romania, the CMEA member that traded most extensively with the capitalist countries, registered a more rapid increase in industrial production than did any other member of the "socialist community."

Second, economic relations within the "socialist community" are highly unbalanced. About half of the USSR's deliveries to East European CMEA members consist of fuel and raw materials. The major exception is in the case of Romania, which is not dependent on Soviet oil and has kept the share of raw materials to roughly 30 percent of total imports from the USSR. For their part, the East European states export finished goods, high-grade technology, and consumer articles to the Soviet Union.[18] Such an arrangement tends to serve the development of the USSR far more than it does that of the East European CMEA members, for these East European countries are by no means underdeveloped areas. In fact, their development in some sectors exceeds that of the USSR's "most highly developed socialism" (see Table 4). If one takes per capita output as a measure, for example, in 1978 the Czechoslovaks produced more steel than did the Soviets; both the Poles and Czechoslovaks mined more coal; the East Germans generated more electricity; the Bulgarians, East Germans, Poles, Romanians, and Czechoslovaks turned out more cement; the East Germans produced three times as much fertilizer; the Hungarians, East Germans, Romanians, and Czechoslovaks manufactured more machine tools; and the East Germans, Poles, and Czechoslovaks turned out more cars. Even more striking is the picture with respect to agricultural output. For instance, the Hungarians produced more grain than the Soviets, and all the East Europeans produced more meat and eggs.

Third, the dependence of the East European CMEA states on raw-material, and especially oil, deliveries from the USSR has made their economic growth rates a captive of what limitations Moscow imposes on these deliveries and what price it charges for them. That this dependence has been growing, rather than decreasing, is quite clear. According to one Soviet source, for instance, CMEA members were to import 368 million tons of oil, about 100 billion cubic meters of gas, and 67 billion kwh of electricity from the USSR in 1976–80—the bulk of which was to go to East European members of the organization. These totals amounted to 1.5 times those for 1971–75.[19] Later sources give corrected figures of 88 billion cubic meters of gas and 64 billion kwh of electricity.[20] According to these same sources, Soviet deliveries enable CMEA countries to meet 80 percent of their import requirements for oil and oil products, 99 percent of those for natural gas, 75 percent of those for ores (iron, chrome, and manganese), and 75 percent of those for cotton. Another

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[18] See I. Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," *International Affairs*, February 1980, p. 12f.

[19] "The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance—30 Years," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1979, p. 19.

[20] Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," p. 14.

Table 3: Distribution of CMEA States' Foreign Trade by Groups of Trading Partners, 1970–78[a]

(in percent)

	Intra-CMEA trade			Trade with other Communist states			Trade with advanced capitalist states			Trade with the developing states		
Country	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978
Bulgaria	74.4	70.2	78.4	3.4	2.0	1.9	16.6	17.4	12.4	5.6	9.7	7.3
Czechoslovakia	64.2	61.0	68.5	5.8	5.1	4.2	22.4	25.9	20.7	7.6	8.0	6.6
GDR	67.3	61.0	68.8	4.3	3.1	3.3	24.4	30.9	22.7	4.0	5.0	5.2
Hungary	62.1	59.0	52.1	3.2	3.2	4.0	28.4	30.5	34.8	6.3	7.3	9.1
Poland	63.1	47.0	54.7	3.1	2.4	2.7	27.1	44.4	36.2	6.7	6.2	6.4
Romania	49.3	34.7	39.7	6.7	6.5	6.9	35.8	45.4	(?)[b]	8.2	13.4	(?)[b]
USSR	55.6	48.9	55.7	9.7	5.2	4.1	21.2	31.3	28.0	13.5	14.6	12.2

[a] The dates 1970, 1974, and 1978 were chosen as, respectively, the year immediately preceding the 1971–76 plan period, the year of the low point for intra-CMEA trade for all countries listed except Hungary, and the latest year for which the volumes in the cited statistical series provide data.

[b] For 1978, the cited series does not apportion the 53.4 percent non-Communist share of Romania's trade between the advanced capitalist states and the developing states.

SOURCES: *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), volumes for 1971, 1975, and 1979, Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, pp. 342, 333, 373, respectively.

Table 4: Per Capita Production of Selected Commodities in CMEA Countries, 1978

Commodity	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Soviet Union
			Industrial commodities				
Steel (kg)	280	**1,010**	416	363	550	539	580
Coal (kg)	796	**4,278**	—	942	**4,855**	479	1,860
Electricity (kwh)	3,572	4,559	**5,727**	2,391	3,301	2,940	4,600
Cement (kg)	**584**	**674**	**747**	446	**618**	**636**	486
Fertilizer (kg)	77.5	81.2	**276.0**	**95.7**	74.9	**113.0**	90.5
Machine tools (per 10,000 inhabitants)	17.4	**22.6**	**11.5**	**11.9**	7.9	**12.4**	9.1
Cars and trucks (per 10.000 inhabitants)	—	**143.0**	**124.0**	0.6	**109.0**	52.7	79.4
			Agricultural commodities				
Grain (kg)	860	735	591	**1,266**	623	873	908
Meat (kg)	**82.4**	**101.0**	**108.0**	**143.0**	**89.5**	**70.0**	58.8
Milk (kg)	227	**377**	**442**	220	**488**	256	362
Eggs	**247**	**310**	**311**	**444**	**243**	**288**	242

SOURCE: *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi 1979* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1979), Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, 1979, pp. 138f, 271f, and 334f. Figures in bold type indicate per capita output higher than that in the Soviet Union.

calculation places Soviet supplies of fuel to the CMEA countries in 1976-80 at 800 million tons (standard equivalent), 43 percent more than in 1971-75. It also states that whereas in 1975 the CMEA countries aside from the USSR needed roughly 580 million tons of fuels and met 70 percent of this from their own production, in 1980 they will need 780 million tons of fuels and will be able to supply only 60 percent by themselves.[21]

In January 1980, the Soviet Union announced plans to provide CMEA members with "almost one billion tons of fuel" during the next (1981-85) plan period.[22] This will involve a slower rate of increase in Soviet oil deliveries than during the current planning period. Whether Moscow will fulfill even this promise remains open to doubt in light of an expected slowdown of Soviet oil production.

Since escalation of world oil prices began in 1973-74, the USSR has greatly upped the price that it demands for the oil that it exports to Eastern Europe. Whereas Poland paid a nominal price of 16.55 rubles for a ton of Soviet oil and oil products in 1971, the figure rose to 39.50 rubles in 1975 and then to 42.03 rubles in 1976. Between 1971 and 1976, the price that the USSR charged for a ton of oil went up from 14.60 to 37.51 rubles for Bulgaria, from 16.64 to 44.73 rubles for Hungary, from 16.23 to 34.08 rubles for Czechoslovakia, and from 13.60 to 32.06 rubles for the German Democratic Republic. It is impossible to determine the post-1976 price increases, for the USSR has stopped publishing figures on its oil exports to Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, an official Soviet source has indicated that in 1978 as compared with 1971, imports of fuel from the USSR absorbed a higher percentage of total imports from the Soviet Union for every one of the East European countries, and that for most of the countries the share had doubled.[23] Because, according to the so-called "Bucharest formula" introduced in 1975, nominal contract prices within CMEA are fixed on the basis of world market prices and are readjusted annually to a five-year moving world price average, the fuel costs of the East European countries will inevitably escalate further in 1980 when the spectacular rise in prices charged by oil-producing states in 1979 enters into the calculation of CMEA prices.

While the contract prices for certain Soviet raw materials like iron ore have remained relatively stable, other commodities imported from the USSR have clearly become more expensive. For example, in 1971 Poland had to pay only 684 rubles for a ton of raw cotton, but by 1978 the price had reached 1,051 rubles. During the same period, Poland confronted a

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[21] *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Jan. 8, 1980, as reported by MTI in English, Jan. 8, 1980, in British Broadcasting Company, *Survey of World Broadcasts* (London), SWB/EEW/1066, Jan. 17, 1980, p. A/9.

[22] *Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1980.

[23] For precise figures for 1971, 1975, and 1976, see *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR* (USSR Foreign Trade) for 1971 and 1976, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1972 and 1977. The volume of this source for 1978 provides the more general data for the comparison between 1971 and 1978.



Assembly of EC-1040 electronic data processing units at the ROBOTRON works in Dresden, East Germany, in August 1979. Some 100 such units have been delivered to the Soviet Union. Computers from the plant are exported to more than 60 countries.

—Eastfoto.

price rise of nearly 100 percent for a ton of paper, from 123 rubles to 220 rubles.[24]

In 1979, the rising cost of oil, as well as other economic pressures, forced a number of East European countries to increase consumer prices. Hungary in July announced price changes for basic food products, consumer services, fuel and energy, building materials, furniture, leather products, and motor vehicles. At the same time, Czechoslovakia upped prices for gasoline fuel and electricity and for postal services. In November, Bulgaria followed with rises in retail prices for basic foodstuffs, power and fuel, and postal services. In March 1980, Poland drastically increased domestic prices for gasoline, diesel oil, lubricants, and motor oil. The GDR, instead of raising prices directly, switched to a new three-level pricing system that in fact ups prices for technical and luxury goods.[25]

With these measures, the East European countries began to abolish their subsidization of consumer goods and services.[26] These new price adjustments are in fact a restoration of a domestic price system as the primary method of consumer rationing, and they bring the existing inflation more into the open. This enforced income redistribution represents a fundamental change in social policy within Eastern Europe.[27] To a certain degree, it will also level out the differences that exist between living standards and supplies for consumers in Eastern Europe on the one hand and the USSR on the other.

The official explanation of the pressures to which these measures represent a response is that "socialism is not spared the caprices of nature and the crisis of the capitalist world,"[28] but this is essentially a defensive reaction. To be sure, the recession in capitalist countries and the pricing policy of the oil-producing states have had an effect in the CMEA area—despite earlier protestations that the socialist system protected it against crisis, inflation, and international market forces. Yet the present difficulties of the East European CMEA members are not so much imported from the West as they are created by inefficient planning systems and the postponement of needed reforms.

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[24] *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR* for 1971 and 1978.

[25] See Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Reports* (Munich), Hungary, No. 15, Aug. 1, 1979, pp. 1ff; Czechoslovakia, No. 22, July 24, 1979, p. 1; Bulgaria, No. 14, Nov. 13, 1979, p. 1f; Poland, No. 7, Mar. 20, 1980, p. 6f. The new price system for the GDR was announced by Erich Honecker in his report to a Central Committee plenum of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), *Neues Deutschland* ([East] Berlin), Dec. 14, 1979.

[26] In the summer of 1979, Politburo member Miklós Óvári revealed that state subsidies in Hungary had over the previous decade risen from 15 billion florint to about 45 billion florint. Without the price adjustments instituted, they would have amounted to 75 billion florint in 1979. See Radio Budapest, Aug. 1, 1979.

[27] H. G. Trend, "Consumer Price Increases in Eastern Europe," Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Reports*, No. 167, July 26, 1979.

János Kádár came close to admitting as much when he told the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) on March 24, 1980:

> *Despite our efforts, owing to conditions which were decidedly less favorable than foreseen, the expected results of our economic development are lagging behind the provisions of the Fifth FYP. National income and consequently the standard of living, are growing at a slower rate than planned. The situation is more complicated today, and economic work therefore now requires greater effort and better organization than hitherto. We must also see that the unfavorable changes in external economic conditions are bringing out in sharper relief the weak points of our economy and the faults of our work. In the face of the adverse development of the conditions we must and can act effectively through the alteration of production structures and selective industrial development. The practice of economic direction, however, has not been able to make sufficiently quick and elastic adaptations to the changed circumstances.*[29]

Like the USSR, all CMEA countries suffer from an

≡Letzte Sektion≡
Vorstrecken und Verschweissen am 23.5.7

Workers from the German Democratic Republic near completion of work on a sector of the Orenburg gas pipeline in the western Soviet Union in mid-1977. The writing on the pipe reads: "Last Section—Laid and Welded on May 23, 1977." The line now delivers Soviet natural gas to points in Eastern and Western Europe.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[28] Speech by Konstantin Chernenko, CPSU Politburo member, at a friendship rally in Sofia, Bulgaria, on Dec. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 11, 1979, p. C/8.

[29] MTI in English, Mar. 25, 1980, in British Broadcasting Company, *Survey of World Broadcasts*, SWB/EE/6382, Mar. 28, 1980, p. C/14.

The bustle of traffic in downtown Budapest suggests the impact of consumerism on Hungarian society.

—Vincent Mentzel.

increasingly tight energy-supply situation, bottlenecks in transport, and insufficient food and consumer production.[30] Instead of addressing these problems squarely, the East European states in the 1970's attempted to avoid them by relying upon readily available capitalist surplus value. This policy left a number of them with sizable foreign debts that must now be serviced.

When one looks to the future, the prospects for improvement of the economic circumstances of the East European CMEA member states during the next five-year plan period (1981–85) appear dim. Even Edward Gierek has recently conceded:

> *Some factors contributing to the high growth rates in the 1970's—including a large labor reserve, the possibilities of increasing investment outlays, the obtaining of suitable loans abroad and the purchase of cheap raw materials and cheap fuels—all these have been exhausted.*[31]

Thus, the East European countries will probably come under increasing pressure from two fronts. On the one hand, they must improve their trade with the West to at least pay off the huge credits that they have accepted. On the other hand, they face the necessity of obtaining vital fuel and raw materials from the USSR in the context of increased scarcity and hence higher prices. This imperative may well force them to invest heavily in Soviet development. Indeed, the long-term programs for CMEA call for the East European states to take a greater part in the development of fuel and raw-material resources in the USSR and to provide capital and labor forces for such joint ventures.[32]

Plainly, then, the relative satisfaction of consumer demands and the visible rise of living standards that have in the past led to a degree of acquiescence on the part of the East European peoples, and thus constituted an important factor of stability in the area, seem at an end, and harsher times and a period of strict austerity appear to be beginning. Hungarians, for example, have already been warned that "for some years we must reckon on no change at all or at best, only a marginal rise in the living standards."[33] There have even been hints that as a result of new East-West tensions and the "recent unpropitious decision of NATO to complete its armament," it may become necessary for the Communist countries "to expand essential defensive measures and to slow down the growth of the standard of living."[34]

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[30] With regard to the Soviet Union, see Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on Nov. 27, 1979, in *Moscow News* (Moscow), No. 48, 1979, Supplement, pp. 2ff.

[31] See his speech in Katowice on Dec. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 13, 1979, p. G/6.

[32] Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," p. 14.

Such prospects could have major domestic consequences. Without doubt, as a Polish source puts things, the measures that East European countries have already taken to deal with the situation confronting them will have a "negative influence not only on the living standard, but also on the . . . political climate, on the activity of the working masses and on their readiness to overcome difficulties."[35] Hungarian Prime Minister György Lázár has even gone so far as to say that "a more consistent assertion of our principles, involving more differentiated distribution of the means of development and wages, will lead to more conflicts between social and group interests and those of individuals than we have hitherto experienced."[36]

The last time that the East European peoples faced a decline in their incomes and a reduction of the goods available for them to purchase, the outcome—e.g., in Poland—was major social unrest. Unless the party leaders in Eastern Europe decide to introduce the economic reforms that they have thus far evaded (fearing that such changes would weaken their rule), they could once again find themselves having to deal with such unrest.

Impact of the USSR's Global Goals

Moscow's attempts to expand the "socialist community" into a "socialist world system" have also generated tensions within the "community." The USSR has sought to use Eastern Europe as a supply base. CMEA has now expanded beyond its original seven European members to encompass Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam as well. Moreover, Yugoslavia and North Korea have become associate members, and Laos, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Angola participate as "observers." In addition, CMEA has concluded cooperation agreements with Finland and Mexico. The East European countries have provided these "fraternal states" with financial and technical aid and with advisers. For instance, Mongolia finances about half of its investments with credits from CMEA.[37] Such assistance has constituted a drain on East European monetary resources and manpower; thus, it has not been very popular with the party leaderships of the area. Indeed, some party leaderships are known to have voiced opposition to extending aid to underdeveloped "socialist" countries.[38]

The USSR has likewise endeavored to use Eastern Europe as a reservoir of auxiliary troops, particularly for advances into the Third World. To date, Kremlin attempts to expand the jurisdiction of the Warsaw Pact beyond Europe by making such states as Mongolia or Vietnam members have been rejected by the East Europeans.[39] Nonetheless, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, and recently Afghanistan—plus, in a looser way, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola—are indirectly connected with the Warsaw Treaty Organization through military clauses in their bilateral friendship treaties with the Soviet Union for protection of their "socialist gains" and through their acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine, and they are all receiving large amounts of weapons and military aid from the organization.[40] Discussions within NATO about extending its security interests beyond the North Atlantic area might even give Moscow a pretext to raise a formal umbrella of "brotherly help" over at least some of these states. Here again, such involvement outside Europe places heavy burdens on the East European countries, as well as on the USSR.

The only case in which the Soviet Union has proved relatively successful in gaining solid backing from its East European "comrades-in-arms"—with the notable exception of Romania—has been in its approach to China. East European leaders know, of course, that Chinese claims that the peoples of Eastern Europe will rise one day against their Soviet "oppressors," that "national wars against large scale aggression, en-

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[33] MTI in English, Nov. 9, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 13, 1979, p. F/5.

[34] *Rude pravo* (Prague), Jan. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 15, 1980, p. AA/1.

[35] *Polityka* (Warsaw), Nov. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 12, 1979, p. G/1.

[36] Speech to the HSWP Congress, MTI in English, Mar. 25, 1980.

[37] Yumjaagiyen Tsedenbal, "Hallmarks of Socialist Cooperation," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Prague), February 1980, p. 159. For more extended discussion of the economic assistance furnished non-European "fraternal states" by Eastern Europe, see Ernst Kux, "Eastern Europe's Relations with Asian Communist Countries," in Kurt London, Ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 277ff.

[38] Information from private discussions.

[39] Information from private discussions.

[40] *International Affairs*, March 1979, p. 18, and May 1979, p. 6. The USSR delivers arms to Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Benin, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Cuba. See *The Military Balance 1979–1980*, pp. 104ff.

Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin, standing at right, addresses the 33rd Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which opened in Moscow on June 26, 1979. Delegations were headed by the premiers of the respective CMEA member states.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

slavement and slaughter by a superpower are not only possible and probable, they are inevitable, progressive and revolutionary,"[41] have no chance of becoming reality at the moment. Nevertheless, China is the sole Communist country that does not accept the status quo in Eastern Europe and presses for "national liberation" there. Moreover, the existence of the Chinese challenge gives the East Europeans a certain leverage on Moscow. For their support against Beijing, Moscow has to pay a price, especially to refute Chinese accusations of "hegemonism." Thus, the Soviet Union's engagement on its Asian flank affects its position in its East European backyard, and will continue to do so in the future.

New Local Pressures

Finally, the internal situations in at least most East European states are now in considerable flux, with both new and revitalized old forces and tendencies in play. Human rights activists and intellectual dissidents, whom the rigid and ossified parties condemn as "antisocialist elements," exist in all the East European countries, and even if their numbers are small and they have been unable to establish international links with one another, they have obviously had an impact on the local parties and populations. In a larger sense, visitors to Eastern Europe report a spreading of disappointment and pessimism. Even János Kádár has complained about "certain anxieties" and a "lack of confidence" on the part of the Hungarian population, and he has lamented that there "still exist nationalistic, cosmopolitan, revisionist, ultraradical and other harmful and hostile views [which] gain occasionally influence and have an effect." In youth, he has detected "negative attitudes, such as indifference, in the case of some people even cynicism, and a tendency to seek an easy life."[42]

Manifestations of nationalism have become rampant

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[41] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1977.

[42] Report to the 12th HSWP Congress, loc. cit.

Pope John Paul II, the former Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Krakow, walks among a crowd of fellow Poles after celebrating a mass in Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, 1979. To the right is Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, the Primate of Poland.

—Liaison.

in countries like Poland. Recently, for example, an official publication in Poland criticized the expression of open anti-Russian sentiments there.[43] In addition, the election of a Polish pope and the visit of John Paul II to his homeland in June 1979 have had major political and religious impact throughout much of Eastern Europe.

The economic development and social changes of the last decade have produced a substantial middle class in most East European countries, and these new social elements are trying to define and protect their vested interests. Although they have been the social group hardest hit by the recent economic adversities, no one knows how they will react to the changing conditions.

At the same time, the party leaderships are increasingly losing contact with their populations, and the rank and file of the parties are becoming more corrupt and infected with "dishonesty, nepotism, parasitism, and speculation."[44] A situation seems to have emerged in all the East European countries, as well as the Soviet Union, that is similar to what Karl Marx described at the beginning of the French revolution of 1848 as "a motley mixture of highflying phrases and real insecurity and clumsiness, of enthusiastic mania for innovation and well-grounded reign of old routine, of a fictitious harmony of the whole society and a deep alienation of all her parts."[45]

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Eastern Europe would probably be the first victim of a change in the global climate, whether through a return to the cold war or a Sino-Soviet clash. The détente of the 1970's, even though it failed to shake Soviet hegemony in the slightest degree, provided a breathing space of stability and economic improvement for the East European countries.

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[43] *Polityka*, Nov. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 5, 1979, pp. G/3ff.

[44] Edward Gierek, speech at the pre-electoral meeting in Sosnowiec, Mar. 6, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 7, 1980, p. G/6.

[45] Karl Marx, "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Works), Berlin, 1960.

But the East European leaders and peoples have no means at their disposal to influence the Soviet decision about the future of détente. If the USSR chooses to try to alter the global power balance in its favor, be it through achievement of strategic superiority or through geopolitical expansion beyond its borders, they have no recourse but to accept that choice. Control of the East European glacis is one of the most important elements of strength that Moscow boasts in the world power balance.

At the same time, it is equally plain that even if no great changes take place in the global climate, stability may not continue to prevail in Eastern Europe. The methods that the USSR has employed to forge a "socialist community" have not in fact leveled out differences of development and national traditions or produced a qualitatively new form of coherence and unity. Indeed, they have not even ensured Soviet hegemony in perpetuity in the area. At present, neither of Moscow's two options for bringing about a long-term solution of the difficulties in Eastern Europe—total subjugation of East European regimes and their incorporation into a greater Soviet Union or the granting of greater independence to them—appears realistic. Thus, the pressures for change that the ruling classes in both the USSR and the East European states have long dreaded may well arise during the 1980's.

If change does actually occur, its pattern will depend a great deal on how it comes about—i.e., from below, through social pressure, or from above, through rejuvenation of leadership, decentralization of government, establishment of a more pluralistic order, and opening of greater opportunities for private initiative and the influence of market forces. To be sure, economic difficulties, social unrest, and disappointment with rigid Communist leaders produced revolts in East Germany in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as the events in Poland in the early 1970's. Yet such conditions do not inherently lead to political upheavals. Other patterns of challenge and response are possible.

Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that in the 1980's upheavals could develop in a number or all of the East European countries more or less simultaneously. Such turmoil would pose larger problems for Moscow than any it faced in the area during the 1950's and 1960's.

Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam

By Alexandre Bennigsen

The iron curtain drawn by Yosif Stalin around the Muslim territories of the Soviet Union, hermetically sealing Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus off from the Middle East, has gradually parted since 1953 as Stalin's successors have begun cautiously to employ Soviet Islam as a means of addressing the greater Muslim world. These careful and controlled beginnings have accelerated in dramatic and less controlled fashion as a result of the revolution in Iran and then the major increase in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet Muslim lands are reestablishing contacts with the Dar ul-Islam, to which they belonged from the earliest centuries of the Hegira and in the history and culture of which they had played a major part. There appears no likelihood that this evolution will be reversed within the reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, it becomes essential to examine its probable consequences—short- and long-term—for both the Soviet Union and the Muslim world.

In what follows, we shall first examine the bases for identification between Soviet and non-Soviet Muslims. Then we shall explore the ways in which the post-Stalin leadership, particularly the post-Khrushchev leadership, of the USSR has attempted to exploit Soviet Islamic institutions to further Moscow's ends in the Muslim world. Finally, we shall trace the impact of developments in Iran and Afghanistan and the dilemmas these events pose for the Soviet Union.

A number of factors have served to link the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union with Muslims elsewhere in the world. Among them are religion and ethnolinguistic ties.

Religious and Ethnic Bonds

Religious identity. That Soviet Islam has served as such a link may, at first glance, seem somewhat paradoxical. In the Soviet Union, the religion found itself under the domination of an atheist state, whose avowed aim was—and still is—the thorough and systematic eradication of *all* religious creeds. As a result of half a century of antireligious campaigns, Islam in the USSR lost a portion of its believers. Some became indifferent, while others (more rare) turned into authentic atheists. Islam also lost, more or less completely, its hold on the economic and political life of the believers' community. In many ways, Islam became a "private affair," and its administrative structure was modified to fit in better with the realities of the Soviet system. Islam, in other words, has adjusted to new circumstances with apparent submissiveness. Moreover, its official leaders in the Soviet Union have seemed to be willing to cooperate with the authorities in certain domains, especially—as we shall see below—when the cooperation concerns relations with the Muslim world abroad.[1]

However, though forced to adapt itself to the new

Mr. Bennigsen is Visiting Professor at the Department of History, University of Chicago (Chicago, IL), and Directeur d'Études at the École des Hautes Études, University of Paris (Paris). He is coauthor of Muslim National Communism: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World, *1979, and author of* Islam in the Soviet Union, *1964.*

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[1] The meekness of Islam, though surprising at first sight, is understandable enough. As far as Soviet Muslims were concerned, there was not much difference between their "infidel" Christian-Russian masters of tsarist days and those same masters turned atheists. If anything, in the latter guise these masters may even have appeared more acceptable, inasmuch as they now declared *all* religious creeds equally obnoxious and endeavored to prove by word and deed the frailty of false beliefs that the former Orthodox government had tried for centuries to force on the Islamic faithful.

order of things, Islam has in no way been contaminated either by Marxism or by secularism. From the standpoint of Islamic law and theology, Islam in the USSR is the same unadulterated, pure religion that it had been before 1917, and its leaders, though formally submissive to the godless Soviet regime, have never been accused by anyone—friends or adversaries—of heresy *(shirq),* infidelity *(kufr),* or even innovation *(bida).* Paradoxically, nowadays, Islam in the Soviet Union appears more conservative, more traditionalist, and less modernist than the creed practiced in many Muslim countries of the Middle East or the very progressive Islam of prerevolutionary Russia. Nevertheless, a Soviet Muslim and a Muslim from abroad feel completely at home with each other in whatever country they meet. Both belong to the same Muslim "millet" (nation), to the same Dar ul-Islam, and share the same spiritual background which rules their everyday life. They observe the same religious rites and social customs. They have the same dietary traditions, wear almost the same clothes, and display the same attitude of deeply rooted mistrust toward the non-Muslim West (represented by Americans and Europeans in the Middle East and by Russians in Central Asia). In short, they are brethren facing together a hostile world.

A Soviet Muslim at prayer in Kazan.

—Jonathan Wright for Gamma/Liaison.

There are three branches of Islam represented today in the USSR, with differing levels of contact with their coreligionists abroad. The first is Sunni Islam, which is the religion of the immense majority of the Turkic, Iranian, and Caucasian Muslims of the USSR. Since World War II, Soviet Sunni Muslims have maintained continuous, though limited, contacts with the religious centers abroad, such as the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the Islamic universities of al-Azhar and Qarawyin. The "parallel" (unofficial) popular Islam is represented in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Volga region by the great Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*), the same that exist throughout the Muslim world—especially the Naqshbandiya and the Qadiriya. These Sufi orders are highly decentralized, but their spiritual doctrine and the mystical rituals and practices of the adepts (*zikr*) are rigidly the same everywhere.

A second branch of Islam in the USSR is Shi'a Islam (the Ithna Ashariya or "Twelvers"). Unlike Sunni Islam, this branch has a centralized hierarchy of clerics within an organization that can be termed a "Church," with spiritual centers in Iraq (An Najaf and Karbala') and Iran (Mashhad and Kom). However, in the Soviet Union, the Shi'a "Church," to which some 3 million Azeris belong, is cut off from these spiritual centers abroad.

Finally, there are the Ismailis of the Nizarite rite (followers of Aga Khan)—consisting of some 60,000 to 100,000 Pamirian peoples in the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakhshan. It is a highly centralized sect, which until the 1950's seems to have maintained certain illegal contacts with the Ismaili spiritual and political centers in India.

Ethnic and linguistic kinship. Soviet Muslims also identify with Muslim brethren abroad through feelings of ethnic kinship. The southern frontiers of the Soviet Union have been traced in a purely artificial way and do not reflect any natural national or geographic divisions. As a result, almost all Soviet Muslim nationalities possess more or less important correspondent "brother" groups abroad.

These national groups may be classified into four categories. The first category comprises large nationalities distributed in practically equal numbers between the USSR and one or several foreign states. These include the Azeris (with 5.5 million in the USSR as of 1979 and over 4 million in Iran); the Turkmen (2 million in the USSR and a total of about 1 million in Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq); and the Tajiks (3 million in the USSR, 3 to 4 million in Afghanistan, and small groups in China). With the Turkmens, who con-



Ethnic brethren: at left, a Turkman in northern Iran, and at right, a Soviet Turkman in Ashkhabad, the capital of Soviet Turkmenia.

—Photos by Bijan Banjahmad/Pictorial Parade and Keystone.

stitute a tribal federation rather than a modern consolidated nation, the sense of kinship among Soviets, Iranians, and Afghans is reinforced by the fact that often members of the same tribe are separated only by mere political frontiers. Such is the case with respect to the Yomuds, the Göklens, the Emrelis, and the Salyrs—who live in the USSR and Iran—as well as the Ersaris, the Saryks, and the Ali Elis—who dwell in the USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan.

In the second category are large Muslim nationalities of the USSR with corresponding minorities beyond the Soviet border. These include the Uzbeks (with 12.5 million in the USSR in 1979 and about 1.5 million in Afghanistan); the Kazakhs (6.5 million in the USSR, small groups in Afghanistan, and an important minority—about 400,000—in Xinjiang); the Kirghiz (2 million in the USSR, probably more than 100,000 in China, and a small group of less than 10,000 people—the Wakhan—who once lived in Afghanistan but have now migrated to Pakistan).

The third category consists of the immigrant nationalities in the USSR, with majorities abroad. These include the Uighurs (210,000 in the USSR in 1979 and as many as 7 million plus in China); the Dungans (50,000 in the USSR and 3.5 million in China); the Baluchis (13,000 in the USSR in 1970 [they were not counted in 1979] and an indeterminate number in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan); and the Kurds (over 150,000 in the USSR in 1979, 1 million in Iran, 4 to 6 million in Turkey, and 1 million in Iraq).

Finally, there are Soviet Muslim nationalities that have established more or less important colonies abroad. These have not lost their original national identity or their language, and they maintain in some cases official or clandestine contacts with their original homeland and their brethren in the USSR. This is the case of the so-called Circassians (Cherkess) in Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United States. The name "Circassian" is a common appellation designating the descendants of various North Caucasians.

The bonds of religion and the ethnic and sometimes tribal kinship between some 43 million Soviet Muslims and the Turco-Iranian world—more than 100 million strong—beyond the Soviet borders have made for a complicated relationship between the Soviet Muslims and the Muslim world abroad. In particular, two important questions arise. First, what and where is the real national center of these populations? Is it in the USSR, where Muslims enjoy a measure of cultural and linguistic freedom and are formally endowed with "autonomy" and distinct administrative and territorial status, but where de facto they are subjected to religious discrimination (often bordering on persecution) and where their political development is placed under the meticulous control of the "elder brother"? Or is it abroad, where they are granted full religious freedom and where, theoretically at least, they have, as individuals, access to political power, but where their communities have no national existence whatsoever?[2] Second, what is the relationship between Soviet Islam and the Muslim world abroad? What official or underground channels are used for their contacts? What strategic position does Moscow assign to Islam, and what part do Soviet Muslims play in the relations between the USSR and the outside Muslim world?

Soviet Muslims' Attitudes

Let us look at the traditional attitudes of Soviet Muslims toward Muslims abroad. It should be noted that such attitudes, or at least their expression, have been limited by official policy. Specifically, the Soviet government has never formulated any irredentist claims in connection with Azeris, Turkmen, Uzbeks, or Tajiks living in Iran or Afghanistan. Soviet propaganda ignores them. Their ethnic or religious kinship with elements of the Muslim population in the USSR is never mentioned. According to Moscow's official line, Soviet Muslims express solidarity only with those engaged in a struggle against imperialism, whatever their creed (Muslim or other). For Soviet Muslims their Russian "elder brothers" are supposed to be the "nearest and dearest," well ahead of any "bourgeois" or "feudal" Muslim brethren residing abroad. This official doctrine explains the scarcity of written sources about the relations between Soviet Muslims and the outside Muslim world. Analysis of these relations must therefore be based mainly on information derived from personal contacts.

It can be said that, as a rule, the Central Asian *masses* are ignorant of the world beyond the Soviet frontiers. Where foreign Islam is concerned, their main feeling is that of a vague religious kinship.[3]

The position of the Muslim *elites* of Communist upbringing is, on the other hand, complex and ambiguous. In general, Central Asian intellectuals are intensely interested in and hence well acquainted with the political evolution of the Muslim world abroad, while, with few exceptions, the Middle Eastern elites know little of Soviet Islam. The Soviet Muslim elites' attitude toward their foreign brethren is a complex

Muslims of the USSR and Afghanistan: at left, customers at a tearoom in Samarkand, in Soviet Uzbekistan; at right, tribesmen living north of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan.

—Photos by EUPRA and Marc Riboud/Magnum.

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[2] The Azeri language, for example, has not been officially recognized as a written literary language in Iran, and the same is true for Kurdish in Turkey and Iran and for Uzbek and Turkman in Afghanistan.

[3] This feeling seems, however, to be fairly strong. As a Soviet Muslim soldier (a Turkman) who deserted and joined the Afghan rebels recounts, Russian officers found it necessary to say that in Afghanistan, Soviet units were fighting not *Muslims*, but some kind of pagans. This was communicated to the author by Afghan émigrés the author interviewed in Paris.

blend of interest, disdain, and an ardent desire to help.

Regarding Soviet policy in the Middle East, Soviet Muslim elites have traditionally been more radical and adventurous than the Russian leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In approaching the issue of the Ghilan Republic in 1920 and the questions of Azerbaydzhan and Kurdestan in 1946, for instance, these elites endorsed the most drastic policy, the annexation of the whole of northern Iran. It is likely that the present-day elites favor Soviet annexation of, if not the whole of Afghanistan, then at least Afghan Turkestan north of the Hindu Kush. Such an annexation would considerably strengthen the Soviet Muslims' demographic and political position vis-à-vis the Russians.

Soviet Muslim political elites have also consistently championed a "transfer of revolutionary energies" from Europe to the Muslim world at large. In the 1920's, many Muslims expressed the hope that Soviet Central Asia or the Caucasus would eventually become a "revolutionary springboard" and that the Soviet Muslims—Tatars, Azeris, Turkestanis—would be the "middlemen" between Moscow and Asia, the torchbearers of the "socialist revolution" to the teeming millions of Asians and Africans. Thus, Nariman Narimanov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan, wanted that republic to serve as a "duct for [the passage of] Bolshevik-style revolution into all the states and nationalities professing Islam,"[4] and Najmuddin Efendiev (Samurskiy), the Daghestani Communist leader, considered that Daghestan "ought to serve as a bond of union between the USSR and Asia and as a channel of Communist ideas flowing toward the Near East."[5] Similarly, Mir Said Sultan Galiev, the Tatar Communist, wrote in 1923: "Tatar workers were the best conductors of revolutionary energy . . . in the entire East."[6] Elsewhere he observed, "If we want to sponsor the revolution in the East, we must create in Soviet Russia a territory close to the Muslim East which could become an experimental laboratory for the building of communism,"[7] and, "Just as Red Turkestan is playing the part of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India, Bukhara, and Khiva, Soviet Azerbaydzhan . . . will become a Red beacon for Persia, Arabia and Turkey."[8]

Suspicious of such spontaneity, Stalin banned these views as "bourgeois nationalism" and eventually liquidated Sultan Galiev and Efendiev as traitors (Narimanov died in his bed but was denounced posthumously). Now, after half a century, the position of Moscow remains unchanged: it is the Russian "elder brother" alone who bears the responsibility for carrying out a revolutionary strategy in the Third World. Muslim Communists are no more trusted in such roles today than they were 50 years ago. At best, they tend to be used as technical advisers but not as political cadres.

This low level of involvement or contact probably causes no great discomfort to Soviet Muslims in the case of the Arab countries, in which they have shown little interest.[9] However, they do feel stronger ethnic and religious kinship with Iran and, especially, Turkey. Particularly among Soviet Muslim intellectuals there are still feelings of empathy for fellow Muslims seeking revolutionary change in those countries, and, as we shall see, there is even the belief that these brethren might in some way help Soviet Muslims ease the tight control exercised over them by the Russian "elder brother."

Islam—a Policy Tool?

It is paradoxical that, despite the CPSU's deep distrust of Muslim cadres as means of promoting Communist revolution abroad, the Muslim religious establishment, represented by the four Muslim Spiritual Boards,[10] appears today to be the most effective "agent" that Moscow has for pursuing its state strategy toward the Muslim world beyond Soviet frontiers. In contrast with the indifferent, ignorant, or disdainful—and therefore largely ineffective—West, the USSR has a cautious, restricted, but systematic

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[4] See Narimanov's *Bor'ba za pobedu Sovetskoy vlasti v Azerbaydzhane 1918–1920* (The Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Power in Azerbaydzhan, 1918–1920), Baku, Azernasher, 1967, p. 20.

[5] N. Efendiev (Samurskiy), *Daghestan*, Moscow, 1924, pp. 117–18.

[6] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "The Tatar Autonomous Republic," *Zhizn natsional'nostey* (Moscow), No. 1, 1923, p. 25.

[7] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "Decree on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic," ibid., No. 4, 1920.

[8] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "Toward Declaration [of the Founding] of the Azerbaydzhan Soviet Republic," ibid., Apr. 9, 1920.

[9] The "pogroms" in Daghestan in the wake of the "Yom Kippur" war of 1973 were obviously sponsored by the authorities and cannot be considered an expression of real popular antisemitism.

[10] These are located in Tashkent, for Central Asia and Kazakhstan (because of its importance, its chairman, Ziautdin Babakhanov, has the title of "Grand Mufti"); Ufa, for European Russia and Siberia; Makhachkala, for the Northern Caucasus, including the krays of Krasnodar and Stavropol'; and Baku, for the Sh'ia Muslims throughout the USSR and for the Sunnis of Transcaucasia. The first three Boards are Sunni (Hanafi in the case of Tashkent and Baku, and Shafei in the case of Makhachkala). In the case of the Baku Board, the chairman is also the Sheikh ul-Islam of Soviet Shi'ites, and the vice-chairman is the Sunni mufti.

Islamic policy aimed at using the Islamic religion for Soviet ends. This strategy, inaugurated after Nikita Khrushchev's downfall, seeks to advertise the "freedom" of Islam in the USSR through the testimony of official Islamic representatives; to present the Soviet Union with its 43 million Muslims as a better partner than the West for the world of Islam; and, finally, to establish contacts with the conservative pro-Western Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt.

Since 1964, Soviet Muslim territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus have opened their frontiers to foreign Muslims, welcoming delegations for "friendly visits" and for participation in the numerous lavish international conferences organized by the Tashkent Spiritual Board. The pattern of such visits is predictable. An invitation is issued by the Grand Mufti of Tashkent, Ziautdin Babakhanov. The visit begins in Tashkent, with a reception by the officials of the Board and often, though not always, by those of the Uzbekistan government. Then there is a trip to the two Soviet Islamic madrasahs (universities)—Mir-i Arab in Bukhara and Imam Ismail al-Bukhari in Tashkent—and to some of the "working" mosques in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand. After Central Asia, the foreign delegation is taken to Baku, where the Sheikh ul-Islam greets it at the Taze Pir mosque. Finally, the delegation goes to Leningrad and Moscow where the delegates are received by the local *imam-khatibs* (clerical heads of mosques). In Moscow, they are also received on behalf of the Soviet government by Abdullah Nurullayev, an Uzbek who is deputy chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. Sometimes they also visit Ufa.[11]

Such tours are intended to produce the general impression that in Sovietland, Islam is free and opulent and that the government treats its Islamic leaders as "partners" and not as "tools." Abd al-Bari Isaiev, the Mufti of European Russia (Ufa), put it this way in an Arabic-language broadcast on Radio Moscow:

> *We often welcome in our country our brothers in religion in the guise* [sic] *of various delegations. They visit our mosques and say prayers with us. They can personally verify the truth of what we say concerning the freedom of Islam in our country . . . . Our Muslim guests publish frequently their impressions in the Islamic magazine published monthly in our country* [Muslims of the Soviet East]. *They note with complete satisfaction that the Soviet Union zealously safeguards Islamic monuments . . . and that the Soviet state does not interfere with religious affairs . . . .*[12]

Grand Mufti Ziautdin Babakhanov, Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, addresses a world religious conference in Moscow in June 1977 on the theme "For Lasting Peace, Disarmament, and Just Relations Among Nations."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Various international congresses organized by the Spiritual Board of Tashkent provide even better opportunities to demonstrate the "prosperity" of Soviet Islam and its unconditional support of Soviet policy. A brief sampling follows:[13]

- In 1970, a conference was organized in Tashkent on the general theme of "unity and cooperation of Muslim peoples in the struggle for peace." It was chaired by Ziautdin Babakhanov and attended by a hundred Soviet ulemas and by representatives of 24 Muslim countries. Violent attacks were launched against US, Israeli, and South African "imperialism."

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[11] The following are just a sampling of the Muslim delegations that have visited the USSR in recent years: in the winter of 1974, Jama at-i Ulema-i Islam of Pakistan, Young Muslim Society of Egypt, and a delegation of Muslims from Singapore; in the winter-spring of 1975, Abdul Razzak Mohammed, Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, and a delegation of Somali ulemas; in the spring of 1976, an Afghan ulemas delegation headed by Afghanistan's Minister of Religious Affairs; in 1978, a delegation of Turkish ulemas, a Pakistan delegation headed by the Secretary General of the World Islamic Conference, and a Jordanian delegation.

[12] Radio Moscow in Arabic to the Arab world, June 25, 1979.

[13] The best source on the activity of Soviet Muslim religious leaders is the journal *Muslims of the Soviet East*, a monthly published in English, French, Arabic, and Uzbek by the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in Tashkent. Specific citations to this journal are given for several of the activities listed below in the text.

- In 1973, the same Board convened another conference in Tashkent, on the theme "Soviet Muslims support the just struggle of the Arab people against Israeli imperialist aggression."
- In August 1974, an important international congress was held in Samarkand to commemorate the 1,200th anniversary of Imam Ismail al-Bukhari. High-ranking representatives from 25 Muslim countries were present (including ones from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Jordan). On this occasion, the congress, in an unusual departure from the norm, abstained from attacking the US or Israel.
- In October 1976, a congress was convened in Tashkent by Babakhanov, to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Central Asian Board. It was attended by distinguished representatives from Syria, North Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, India, and Pakistan.
- On July 3, 1979, an international conference was held in Tashkent to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the journal *Muslims of the Soviet East*. The conference was chaired by Grand Mufti Babakhanov and attended by high-ranking delegates from Jordan, Iraq, India, Turkey, Tunisia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Japan, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia. Its final declaration—signed by all the delegates, including those from "pro-Western" countries—contained vicious attacks against "Israeli, USA, South African, and Chinese imperialism."[14]
- In September 1979, a symposium was convened by the Central Asian Board at Dushanbe, the capital of Tadzhikistan. Its theme was "the contribution of the Muslims of Central Asia, of the Volga, and of the Caucasus to the development of Islamic thought, to the cause of peace and social progress." Delegates from 30 Muslim nations were present, and Grand Mufti Babakhanov took the opportunity once more to denounce "Israeli and South African imperialism."
- In September 1980, a large international congress is scheduled for Tashkent. It will be devoted to the following subject: "the 15th century of the Hegira must become the century of peace and international friendship." A permanent exposition bearing on "Islam in the USSR" is to be organized, and a book on the life of the Muslims in the Soviet Union is to be published.[15]

All of these visits and conferences in the USSR are carefully staged and controlled so as to strictly limit how much of Soviet Muslim realities the visitors see. Nevertheless, a fair number of foreign Muslims have seen behind the pious screen erected by the Spiritual Boards to perceive the genuine misery of Islam in the Soviet Union (there are probably less than 200 "working" mosques in all of Soviet Central Asia) and the classic type of colonial relations existing between the ruling Russians and the Muslim natives.[16]

Aside from receiving foreign Muslim delegations in the USSR, Soviet Muslim religious leaders are constantly touring Muslim countries—especially those with conservative and pro-Western governments, such as Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia. The Soviet delegations are in general headed by Ziautdin Babakhanov or one of his two deputies: vice-muftis Abdulgani Abdullayev and Yusufkhan Shakirov. Members of these delegations speak perfect Arabic and have a thorough knowledge of all aspects of religion. Thus equipped, they are certainly the best possible Soviet itinerant ambassadors to the Muslim world.[17]

The enumeration of services by Muslim spiritual leaders to the Soviet government would be incomplete if we omitted the propaganda broadcasts (such as the one cited above) by Soviet muftis and other represen-

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[14] For the text of the declaration, see *Muslims of the Soviet East*, No. 3, 1979, p. 18.

[15] Radio Moscow in English, May 11, 1979.

[16] *Muslims of the Soviet East* regularly publishes important articles signed by the Grand Mufti of the Tashkent Spiritual Board or his deputies denouncing foreign Muslims who, after visiting the USSR, have published unpleasant reports. See, for instance, No. 2, 1974, pp. 25–29 (criticizing a Moroccan visitor); No. 1, 1975, pp. 8–13, and No. 3, 1977, pp. 18–20 (attacking Pakistani visitors).

[17] Some of the recent trips abroad by Soviet Muslim delegations include:

- 1972, delegation led by Babakhanov, to Morocco.
- 1974, delegation headed by the same mufti, to North Yemen.
- Summer of 1975, an important delegation with Babakhanov among its members, to Iraq, Jordan (reception by King Hussein), and Egypt (reception at the University of al-Azhar).
- September 1975, Soviet delegation to a conference in Mecca on the "mission of the mosques"—Babakhanov received by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.
- October 1975, Soviet delegation to the International Symposium on Islamic Education, in Lucknow, India.
- October–November 1975, delegation headed by Yusufkhan Shakirov, to Somalia and Mauritius.
- 1976, delegation led by Abdullayev, to a Muslim-Christian dialogue in Tripoli.
- Winter of 1977, delegation under the direction of Abdullayev, to the International Conference on "Islamic Thought" in Ouargla, Algeria.
- March 1977, Soviet delegation headed by Abu Turab Yunus, *imam-khatib* of the "Tilla Sheikh" Mosque of Tashkent, to an international symposium in Bangladesh on the Muslim predication (sermon).
- July 1978, delegation headed by Babakhanov, to an international conference in Karachi on the propagation of Islam.
- Summer of 1978, delegation headed by Abdullayev, to Niger, Mali, and Senegal.
- September 1978, delegation led by Babakhanov, to an international conference in Istanbul on the Hegira calendar.
- Winter of 1978, delegation headed by Abdullayev, to the 12th International Conference on "Islamic Thought" in Batna, Algeria.

The interior of an Islamic madrasah, converted by Soviet officials into a Communist museum in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.

—Hussein Rofe/Keystone.

tatives of the Soviet Islamic hierarchy. These broadcasts in Arabic, Persian, Pashto, Urdu, and Turkish have increased in frequency during the last two years. Their themes do not vary much from standard Soviet emanations, but voiced by the highest religious authorities, they may be assumed to have somewhat greater weight among foreign Muslim audiences. They condemn Israeli, Chinese, American, and South African "imperialism"; call for political harmony between Islam and the Soviet government; trumpet "freedom of religion" in the USSR; denounce numerous "enemies," including Soviet Muslim émigrés (especially those working for Radio Liberty); and (in recent months) exhort the Afghan people to resist "wicked fanatics." The following excerpt from a broadcast by Ziautdin Babakhanov is typical:

The Muslims of Afghanistan for centuries have suffered the oppression of the foul order of feudalism, and now they have chosen the independent path of growth and progress. All peace-loving forces, first and foremost the friendly people of the Soviet Union support them . . . . But the counterrevolutionary elements in Afghanistan who were deprived of their privileges as a result of the April revolution are trying to restore the regime of injustice condemned by Islam itself. The glorious Koran says: "God orders justice and decency." US imperialism has embarked on activities against Afghanistan and tries to distort the ideas of the revolution and to cast aspersions on friendship and mutual assistance between Afghanistan and the USSR. American imperialism is arming the rebels, interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and causing bloodshed which is condemned by God . . . . We Muslims of the eastern Soviet republics, in accordance with our religious duty and our conscience, cannot remain unconcerned about the events in our neighboring Islamic country; we completely support

> *the people of Afghanistan in its struggle for freedom and against imperialism. We decisively demand that the interference by US imperialism and Chinese militarism in the internal affairs of Afghanistan be stopped. We ask all our coreligionists in the countries neighboring Afghanistan not to believe the lies of the imperialists and to make efforts so that bloodshed should not take place among Muslim peoples.*[18]

It is obvious that cooperation between the Soviet government and the USSR's Muslim leaders is fruitful and beneficial for the former. For some years now, respected religious leaders in the USSR have praised the Soviet government at every Islamic conference in every Muslim country—including some held in the holy cities of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, not a word has been said at these conferences in defense of the US or of the West in general.

On the other hand, the Soviet regime must pay in "cash" for any action by the Muslim leaders in its favor—by immediate and important concessions such as the slowing down of antireligious propaganda, the opening of new mosques, or the publication of religious literature. It is clear that Soviet authorities are not happy to promote the process of religious revival within Muslim territories, a process which, in conjunction with the demographic explosion of the Muslim populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus[19] and the intense activity of the xenophobic fundamentalist Sufi brotherhoods,[20] is bound to become a major threat to the future stability of the Soviet regime.

Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan

Beyond participating in exchanges of Islamic delegations, Soviet Muslims had, until recently, generally not been assigned to diplomatic, economic, technical, or military missions abroad. Only two or three of them

An armored personnel carrier and troops of the Soviet force occupying Kabul in February 1980.

—Katherine Young.

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[18] Radio Moscow in Pashto, Jan. 29, 1980 (Ziautdin Babakhanov's talk at the Tashkent Central Mosque on the occasion of Mawlud—the Prophet's birthday). See also Radio Moscow in Arabic to the Arabic world, Jan. 14, 1980.

[19] See, for example, Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1979.

[20] The best sources on this phenomenon, admittedly from Soviet eyes, are two antireligious periodicals: *Vestnik nauchnogo ateizma*, a quarterly, and *Nauka i religiya*, a monthly, both published in Moscow. For fuller detail, see the author's article, "Muslim Religious Conservatism and Dissent in the USSR," *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston), Autumn 1978.

had attained ambassadorial rank (N.A. Mukhitdinov, the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, was Soviet ambassador in Damascus in the 1950's). In foreign Muslim countries, USSR Muslims were employed in subordinate capacities—as technicians, interpreters, or auxiliary staff (cooks, chauffeurs), and even then only in small numbers.

This pattern has been disrupted by events in Afghanistan, starting with the April 1978 coup against President Mohammad Daoud and continuing through the Soviet invasion of December 1979, which overthrew the regime of Hafizullah Amin. At first intent on helping a friendly Marxist regime, and then moved by the need to prevent a total collapse of state administration in an Afghanistan wracked by successive purges within the ruling *Khalq* (People's) party, the Soviet Union undertook to send in large numbers of administrative and technical cadres. Inasmuch as there existed few Russians with sufficient knowledge of local conditions and languages, Soviet authorities were forced to employ Central Asians (mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, but also some Turkmen) in these missions. By late 1979, there were several hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of Soviet Muslims in positions at all levels of Afghanistan's administration, from the lowest posts up to deputy minister jobs. The invasion only increased their numbers. Moreover, the rank and file of the invading USSR forces included a fair percentage of Central Asians, even though the officers in command were Slavs.[21]

The Soviet Muslims sent as administrative cadres to Afghanistan after the 1978 coup in Kabul enjoyed direct contact with the native Muslim population under conditions of practically no Russian control—a thoroughly new experience in the history of the Soviet Union. In effect, they found themselves realizing the dream of the Muslim "national Communists" of the 1920's (Sultan Galiev, Turar Ryskulov, Najmuddin Efendiev, etc.), i.e., the building of communism in a neighboring Muslim country, a large part of whose population shares a common ethnic, religious, and linguistic background with the Soviet Muslim advisers.

Before the invasion, certain Western observers had argued that the existence of some 30 million Muslims in Soviet Central Asia might constitute a deterrent to a Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.[22] However, far from opposing the occupation of a brother Muslim land, the Central Asian Muslim elites seemed to welcome the adventure.[23] Conceivably, they sincerely believed that they were helping liberate their brothers, Uzbek and Tajik, from the "imperialists" and from "feudal domination." But their involvement in the Afghan operation also has given them a better bargaining position with regard to the Russians and might eventually oblige the latter to pay for the cooperation with important concessions, such as deciding to increase industrial investment in Central Asia rather than attempt to siphon Muslim manpower off to projects in the purely Russian areas of Western Siberia and northern Russia.

In all likelihood, the Central Asians were very useful in the course of the military operations involved in the invasion. For instance, they probably served as interpreters for the Soviet armed forces. They likewise made it possible for the Afghan administration to function under the occupation. Furthermore, their presence tended to give to the Soviet occupation of the country the character of an intra-Islamic affair. Certainly, this seemed to be the intention of the Soviet leadership in the beginning, when Central Asian Muslims were spectacularly exhibited in Kabul.

But the operation did not prove a success. In February 1980, the USSR began to systematically pull out units with Central Asian soldiers and replace them with purely Slav units. At the same time, the Soviet Muslims manning the Afghan administration began to be superseded by Russians or even by East Germans.

One can discern several possible reasons for this withdrawal of Soviet Muslim cadres. First, there is the violent opposition of the Pushtuns—a self-styled *Herrenvolk* who have traditionally viewed the Uzbeks and other Turks residing north of the Hindu Kush as *Untermenschen*. The Pushtuns would rather be occupied by the Russians than by despised and hated neighbors from Central Asia. As a consequence, Central Asian Muslims were attacked and in some cases killed,[24] and any hope of securing the support of the

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[21] The fact that many Central Asian Muslim soldiers were serving in the Soviet units which invaded Afghanistan in December 1979–January 1980 suggests that the Soviets did not expect these units to fight the rebels. It is a rule in the USSR that only purely Slav units should be used in quelling uprisings in Muslim territories. Such was the case in the repression of the May 1979 riots in Dushanbe and disturbances in Tashkent in the 1960's.

[22] For example, Louis Dupree argued: "The Muslim population of the Soviet Central Asian republics themselves might object to being involved in the occupation of a brother Muslim land." See his article, "Afghanistan Under the *Khalq*," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979, p. 49.

[23] The author's discussion of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is based on personal contacts with Afghan émigrés in Europe and information provided to him by journalists and diplomats in Moscow.

[24] Information circulating in Moscow in March 1980 told of a riot of Kazakhs in Alma Ata over plans to bury in a non-Muslim cemetery Muslim kinsmen returned from Afghanistan in coffins.

Members of the Jamiat Islami Afghan rebel forces opposing the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul, photographed in the Nuristan-Kunar area of northeastern Afghanistan in January 1980.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

Pushtuns through them was doomed. This card had to be abandoned.

Second, the *non-Pushtun* population—Tajiks, Turks, and Hazaras—greeted the Soviet Muslims only too well. Friendly contacts were established without the Russians' being able to intervene, and Soviet Muslims were submitted to systematic religious and political "intoxication" by the Afghans. In some places, including Kabul, an active "black market" in Korans was organized. Eventually, in January 1980, some Soviet Muslim soliders deserted and went over to the rebels, in spite of the extreme difficulties of doing so.[25]

Finally, even those Central Asians willing to assist their Russian "elder brothers" in the mission of "liberation" cooled off when ideology had to be translated into action, which had a rather gruesome side. "Liberating" Tajik and Uzbek brethren in Afghanistan seemed to entail shooting these same Uzbek and Tajik brethren, or—even worse—helping Russians shoot them. Although the immense majority of Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan remained obedient to Soviet orders, Moscow perhaps came to question the degree of their reliability as the need for military operations grew more pressing.

Moscow's Options in Afghanistan

These recent actions suggest some awareness on the part of the Soviet leadership of the potentially destabilizing impact of the Afghanistan venture on Soviet Central Asia. One way of assessing this potential is to examine Moscow's options and their possible consequences.

If the Soviets prove unable to crush the rebels' resistance in Afghanistan rapidly and decisively, they will have to face a lengthy guerrilla war. This would be a grim prospect, for sooner or later such a conflict would be bound to antagonize the Muslim world and could also awaken the never quite forgotten attitudes that motivated the great Basmachi movement in Central Asia.[26]

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[25] Soviet Turkmen defectors have reached Pakistan and have been interviewed there.

In addition, a New Delhi dispatch by the Associated press dated Mar. 27, 1980, quotes "a reliable Western source" to the effect that he met with three Soviet army reservists from Uzbekistan who had deserted to a rebel-controlled area in Afghanistan. A UPI dispatch of the same day reported that one of the three defectors had said that they had been told they would be fighting American, Chinese, and Pakistani enemies of Afghan Muslims. Instead, they found they were "fighting our Muslim brothers. We were lied to."

Were the Soviets to succeed in liquidating or neutralizing the rebellion (which for the time being seems quite unlikely), they would then have the choice of several solutions: (1) They could annex Afghanistan, which would thus become the 16th "Soviet Socialist Republic" of the Union. This outcome would be welcomed by the Soviet Muslim elites, religious and Communist alike, since it would add 15 million deeply religious and nationalist brethren to the existing 43 million Soviet Muslims and thus strengthen their not unreasonable hope of outnumbering the Russians. (2) The Soviets could annex the northern, Turkic part of Afghanistan to the Uzbek and Tadzhik republics of the USSR and permit the country south of the Hindu Kush to become a purely Pushtun state. This solution might be even more favorable in the eyes of Central Asian Muslims. (3) Soviet armed forces might withdraw from Afghanistan in favor of establishment of an "independent" but highly submissive Afghanistan ruled by pro-Soviet but non-Communist leaders receptive to Soviet civilian advisers. Such a modified "finlandization" of that country may already be under consideration by the Soviet authorities.

Further issues arise, however, with regard to the last option. Would Moscow favor a Pushtun-dominated regime, with the Pushtuns won over by a promise of eastward expansion toward the Pathan territory of Pakistan? In such a case, Soviet Central Asians would be excluded from Afghanistan in deference to Pushtun sentiments. Or would the USSR seek a regime dominated by the non-Pushtuns (Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks). Central Asians would then presumably participate in the political and economic life of Afghanistan. This would be a very favorable solution for the Central Asians but one with dangerous, far-ranging implications for the Russians.

Within the framework of most of these possible alternatives, Central Asian Muslims would certainly have much to give the Afghans in the way of technology and practical know-how, but also could receive much in return. As suggested above, the iron curtain between Muslim brethren on opposite sides of the Soviet-Afghan border has already crumbled, with active circulation and uncensored exchange of information and ideas now taking place. One of the key sets of ideas which could strike responsive chords in Central Asia is a fundamentalist, conservative religious revivalism, for such a revivalism would fortify already existing currents in the Central Asian republics. For instance, the Sufi brotherhoods hidden away within the Soviet republics would probably welcome even a temporary success of the religion-inspired resistance in Afghanistan, with its strong flavor of Holy War. If armed resistance continues in Afghanistan, it might well become a model of heroism for contemporary Muslim nationalists such as that which Shamil and his Naqshbandi murids provided all the nationalist anti-Russian movements in the tsarist Empire.[27]

The Soviets' room for maneuver in Afghanistan is therefore very narrow. Their victory must be rapid, complete, and spectacular. A failure, or even a doubtful success, might be a dramatic signal to the Central Asian Muslims, not unlike that of the defeat of the tsarist armies in Manchuria in 1905, which spurred the birth of a Muslim national movement.[28]

Iran's Influence

While developments in Afghanistan seem to have the greatest potential for immediate and profound impact on Soviet Muslims, events in Iran may also have a direct, deep, and far-reaching effect. Iran is undergoing an Islamic fundamentalist and anti-imperialist revolution not very different in character from that of the "theocratic state" of Uzun Haji and his followers in 1918–21, which has left long-lasting memories among the Caucasian Muslims.[29] (Curiously, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini even bears a physical resemblance to Uzun Haji.) Since the downfall of the Shah, Caucasian and Central Asian Muslims have displayed a passionate interest in news reaching them from Tehran and Tabriz. Iran has always enjoyed, and still enjoys, an immense prestige in the Turco-Iranian

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[26] A guerrilla movement, centered mainly in the Fergana Valley and in southeastern Uzbekistan, which started in 1918 and lasted until 1928 (in some isolated areas until 1936).

[27] The impact of the Caucasian wars on the development of the Ukrainian, Polish, and Tartar national movements is well known.

[28] Almost all the Muslim political parties appeared immediately after Russia's defeat in the Japanese war. Among them were Ittifak al-Muslimin, Tangchylar, and Uralchylar in the Tartar country, and Hummet and Musawat in Transcaucasia.

[29] In 1918–19, Uzun Haji, a Daghestan Sufi Sheikh (Naqshbandi), founded the "Emirate of Daghestan-Chechniya," a theocracy based on the shari'a. Subsequently, even though he was in his 90's, he led the great rebellion of North Caucasian mountaineers against the Soviets. Uzun Haji died in 1921, during the fighting, and his tomb in the village of Vedeno in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is one of the most popular "holy places" of pilgrimage in the Caucasus. See V.N. Basilov, *Kul't svyatykh v Islame* (The Cult of the Saints in Islam), Moscow, 1970.



Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari, an Azeri Shi'a Muslim from Iran who has called for greater religious freedom for his brethren in the Soviet Union.

—Alain Keler/SYGMA.

world, not only because of the country's unique and advanced culture but also because of its long tradition of statemanship. This is especially true among the Caucasian Muslims, for whom Iran remains—in spite of the uncertainty of its present position—an inspiring model.

Several aspects of the Iranian revolution evoke especially resounding echoes in the Caucasus—among the younger generation of Muslim intellectuals and among the quite numerous "religious fanatics" in this region (i.e., members of the Sufi orders). First, there is the "anti-imperialist" aspect of the Iranian revolution. It is easy to draw a parallel between the "foreign imperialism" of the Americans in Iran and the "imperialism" of the Russians in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. As the Iranian Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari (an Azeri Turk from Tabriz) put it:

> *The Iranian Muslim people's triumphant struggles consitute a turning point in the history of world struggles, and the best model to follow by the oppressed Muslim peoples of the world, who are meticulously studying Iran's great Islamic movement. These peoples should be benefiting from the Iranian struggles' special characteristics for the liberation of Muslims from the yoke of satanical powers, blasphemy and impiety. . . .*[30]

Second, there is the "populist" character of "Khomeini-ism," with its promise to bring to power a new category of younger political leaders of more popular origin. Third, there is the exaltation of the cultural, moral, and political values of Islam. This flatters the innate sense of superiority that the Caucasian Muslims feel with regard to their non-Muslim (Russian or Armenian) neighbors. The fact that "Khomeini-ism" is a Shi'a phenomenon and has "reactivated" Shi'a minorities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen probably would not be a great obstacle to a religious union of Muslims in the Caucasus, where differences of dogma between the Sunnis and Shi'ites have been weakened during the 60 years of the Soviet regime.

However, religious fundamentalism is not the only ideology which Iran can export to its northern neighbors. Radicalism of various sorts—always spiced with the time-honored religious flavor—is another possible Iranian influence on Soviet Islam. Among its various forms is the wild romantic philosophy of Ali Shariyati, which attempts to reconcile Marxism with Shi'a Islam. Such creeds do not always conform to the laws of logic, but "Islamic Marxism" (or "Marxist Islam"), with its tremendous pathos, its constant references to the glories of the past, and its promise of a happy and mighty future, constitutes a powerful and dynamic revolutionary ideal, more inspiring than the emasculated, bureaucratic Russian model of socialism.

All of these factors help to explain a dramatic reversal in the flow of influence between the Soviet Union and Iran since the fall of the Pahlevi monarchy in January 1979. Where once Iranians listened to propaganda broadcasts from Radio Baku, today it is the Soviet Azeris and Turkmen who follow with interest the broadcasts from Tabriz and Tehran. In June 1979, Allahshukur Pachayev, *akhund* (head) of the Baku Jami mosque and Shi'a deputy chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board for Transcaucasia, told a group of foreign journalists in Baku that "events in Iran do not

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[30] Tehran broadcast in Persian, Feb. 22, 1979. That Shari'at-Madari included Soviet Muslims among those suffering oppression was soon evident. In an Apr. 19, 1979, Tehran broadcast of an interview the Ayatollah had granted to Soviet newsmen, he was quoted as saying: "We expect the USSR to show greater respect for the religion of the 45 million Muslims of that country and allow them greater freedom."

A meeting of the Muslim Spiritual Board for the Northern Caucasus, presided over by its chairman, the Mufti Hapiz Omarov (center) in Makhachkala, Daghestan, in August 1979.

—TASS From Sovfoto.

mean that Islam will also make new inroads in the Soviet Union,"[31] but one wonders how realistic this official assessment was. Once more, as in 1908, Iran presents the picture of a "revolutionary" country where "something is on the move." Even if the Muslims of the USSR prudently express the view that developments in Iran cannot affect their life and ideology, something of their inner joy still shines through: if their Shi'a brethren in Tehran have succeeded in humiliating what they see as one mighty "imperialism" —the US—then its counterpart, Soviet "imperialism," may too be defeated one day in the Caucasus.

Prospects

There is thus considerable potential for events in such unlikely places as Afghanistan or Iran to have a profound impact on Soviet domestic politics, although one would be foolhardy to predict its precise nature. Should this actually happen, the situation would contrast sharply with those obtaining at the birth of the Soviet Union and in its Stalinist period. In the 1920's, when Soviet Russia was struggling against countless economic and political difficulties and its Muslim territories were only slowly emerging from the chaos of the Civil War, Soviet Islam was a breeding ground of revolutionaries and an exporter of ideas. Muslims who had joined the Bolsheviks tried to elaborate theories adapting Marxism to the specific conditions of a Muslim society, and these formulations—for example, Sultan Galiev's "national communism," Turar Ryskulov's "Pan-Turkic Marxism," and Najmuddin Efendiev's "Revolutionary Pan-Islamism"—made their way to the outside Muslim world. Indeed, their enduring echoes may still be heard in the radicalism of Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi and in the programs of Algerian or Syrian socialists. Then, with the advent of Stalinism, this communication of ideas ceased.

In the post-Stalin period, Moscow authorities cautiously opened some communication channels between Soviet and foreign Muslims, apparently on the assumption that the technical and intellectual achievements of Soviet Muslims and the facade of official Soviet Islamic institutions would impress the greater Muslim world. However, after decades of enforced conformity to stale Russian Marxism, Soviet Muslims had nothing to export in the political domain. To the contrary, it is they who are likely to be influenced by ideas, programs, and ideologies—perhaps even by models of political warfare and guerrilla activity—moving northward from a "destabilized" and radicalized Middle East. These ideas—ranging from the most conservative religious fundamentalism to the wildest revolutionary radicalism—share one common characteristic: the potential for destabilizing Soviet Islam, and thereby for undermining the unity of the USSR.

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[31] A full text of Pachayev's statement can be found in Steffan Teste, "Soviet Muslims Rejoice Over Iran," *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), June 11, 1979.

Books

Whither the Soviet System?

By Robert F. Miller

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR. *Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life.* New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1978.

DANIEL TARSCHYS. *The Soviet Political Agenda: Problems and Priorities, 1950–1970.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

GEORGE W. BRESLAUER. *Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

ALEXANDER DALLIN, Ed. *The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

ALEXANDER YANOV. *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD. *Am Vorabend einer neuen Revolution? Die Zukunft des Sowjetkommunismus* (On the Eve of a New Revolution? The Future of Soviet Communism). München, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1975.

AS THE BREZHNEV era draws to a close in the Soviet Union, the question of the future shape of the political system over which Leonid I. Brezhnev has presided becomes steadily less a matter of purely academic speculation and more a matter of direct political significance for policymakers and concerned citizens throughout the world. In the Brezhnev years, the Soviet Union has manifestly enhanced its capacity to influence the context of international relations and even to a certain extent the domestic considerations of statesmen and private individuals in many countries outside as well as inside the Soviet orbit.

Unfortunately, our ability to predict the nature of Soviet political processes and relationships in the post-Brezhnev period does not match our need to do so. Any such prediction requires a variety of things. We need, first of all, a solid understanding of the existing structural, procedural, socioeconomic, demographic, ethnic, and attitudinal correlates of the system and how they have operated under specific conditions of stress in the past. In addition, we must assess the role of personal factors such as leadership style and the evident policy preference of dominant individuals — factors that up to now have been decisive for understanding how the Soviet system works.

Personal factors are notoriously difficult to accommodate in any predictive exercise (in this case, we do not even know who Brezhnev's ultimate successor will be). However, as most of the authors reviewed here seem to agree, there has occurred a degree of institutionalization of power relations under Brezhnev's leadership which may make idiosyncratic personal factors somewhat less crucial for future analyses. Our knowledge about the formal and informal structures and processes of the Soviet system, while considerable, is still a far from perfect base upon which to predict. Predictions founded on social, economic, or demographic indicators and tendencies are not that solid either. Not only are reliable data less likely to be available for the USSR than for most other advanced industrial societies (in no case, of course, are the data ever totally satisfactory), but the extrapolation of future trends and behavioral patterns from such material is fraught with reductionist or deterministic assumptions which most Western analysts would be reluctant to see applied to forecasts of their own societies. We know perhaps even less about the attitudes and values of the various Soviet elite groups and of the populace at large. Therefore, we cannot with confidence say very much about the crucial question of the legitimacy of the system for its citizens and how the society is likely to react under internal or external stress.

Despite these methodological and substantive problems, we must nevertheless recognize the need for informed forecasts and welcome the efforts of those bold enough to undertake them. Four of the six books reviewed here directly address, either wholly or in part, the task of prediction. The other two (the volume on Brezhnev and Daniel Tarschys's study of Soviet politics in the 1950's and 1960's) present information and insights useful in setting the framework for prediction.

THE BREZHNEV volume, commissioned by Simon and Schuster and produced by a team of authors from the USSR Academy of Sciences, is a collage of biographical information, laudatory commentary on Brezhnev's style of leadership, and appeals for peace and businesslike cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The facts and opinions assembled by the authors offer little that is new to the reasonably well informed general reader. But what is of interest is the carefully nurtured image they present of the relations between Brezhnev, as party and state leader, and the various institutions of Soviet power and administration. The style and structure of decision-making portrayed are obviously those considered optimal for contemporary conditions of the "scientific and technological revolution" (NTR) and East-West détente. Accordingly, while paying tribute to Brezhnev's sterling qualities of maturity and judgment as a leader, the authors are careful to present him as a team player, whose chief function as general secretary is to coordinate the implementation of policies generated by the requirements of "objective necessity," as perceived by a corps of technical experts and institutional leaders. In short, what we see is the image of a successful corporation executive, rather than that of a *vozhd'* (a supreme leader or commander) or a Khrushchevian "mover and shaker." One cannot be assured that this portrayal is, in fact, valid, but it does seem to square quite well with the perception of Soviet elite politics and decision-making as a system of tacit interinstitutional and interregional "contracts," which is used as a basis for prediction by George Breslauer in *Five Images*, and by Breslauer, Gail Lapidus, and Gregory Grossman in their contributions to the volume edited by Alexander Dallin.

If such a picture is correct, the Soviet Union has changed considerably under Brezhnev—perhaps not so much in terms of *what* is decided, but *how* it is decided. Daniel Tarschys's analysis tends to support this proposition, even if one must have serious reservations about his method of arriving at his findings (he bases his formal investigation exclusively on an information-retrieval type of content analysis of the lead editorials in *Pravda* for the years 1950, 1960, and 1970). Of particular note is his description of the process by which issues are placed on the "political agenda," which suggests some interesting hypotheses about the functioning of the system as a whole.

Like Gail Lapidus and, by implication, Paul Cocks (both in the Dallin volume), Tarschys discerns a tendency under Brezhnev toward the "depoliticization" of issues. In the Soviet context, this tendency might be interpreted as a manifest,

Reviewers in This Issue

ROBERT F. MILLER—Senior Fellow in Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (Canberra); author of an ANU Occasional Paper in Political Science entitled "Tito as Political Leader and External Factors in Yugoslav Political Development," 1977, and of articles on Soviet and Yugoslav politics in *Osteuropa*, *Soviet Studies*, and *Worldview*.

T. H. RIGBY—Professorial Fellow in Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (Canberra); author of many works on the Soviet state and Communist party, including, most recently, *Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom 1917-1922*, 1979; coauthor of *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR*, 1980.

DENNIS J. DUNN—Associate Professor of History, Southwest Texas State University (San Marcos, TX); author of *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939-1949*, 1977, and *Detente and Papal-Communist Relations, 1962-1978*, 1979; editor of *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, 1977.

WILLIAM POTTER—Assistant Director, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles (Los Angeles, CA); coauthor of *SALT and Beyond: A Handbook on Strategic Weapons and Means for Their Control*, 1977; contributor of articles to *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Western Political Quarterly*, and *Papers of the Peace Science Society (International)*; currently preparing a study on Soviet perceptions of US arms control policy.

JOHN M. STARRELS—Director of International Trade, National Association of Manufacturers (Washington, DC); coauthor of *Politics in the German Democratic Republic*, 1975; author of articles and papers on East German politics and policy.

MAURICE D. SIMON—Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Greensboro (Greensboro, NC); coeditor of *Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, forthcoming; contributor of articles on Polish politics to journals such as *Legislative Studies Quarterly* and to various symposia.

or at least a latent, function of the long-term program to automate or computerize routine decision-making in various social and economic spheres, to replace politics by a form of social engineering. But one can observe a similar tendency toward depoliticization in Yugoslavia (see, for example, Edvard Kardelj's last work on "democratic pluralism of self-managing interests"[1]) and in the strategies of political coalition and the programmatic statements of the Eurocommunist parties in Western Europe. In neither of these cases is the scientific and technological aspect, which so markedly informs Soviet policy, very prominent. This suggests a more general hypothesis: Communist politicians, nurtured in the traditions of democratic centralism, naturally abhor ordinary political competition. Such a possibility should be kept in mind in the search for clues about the future course of Communist systems.

In this connection, Tarschys makes the interesting observation that politics in the USSR is an "arena of the semi-strong and the semi-weak," that is, of persons and groups not strong enough to fend for themselves in the struggle for a share of the material and cultural values which Soviet society has to offer, but with access to members of the elite who can provide the necessary support for particular aspirations. It is in this indirect way, according to Tarschys, that the "semi's" place issues on the agenda.

Of course, patron-client relationships exist to some extent in all political systems, but the nature of these relationships and the modes of access in Soviet-type systems bear some specific features of their own. In the USSR, Tarschys argues, distributive issues are ordinarily settled by custom according to an established pecking order or by agreement among the top-level elites in a kind of bargaining process. Those groups and interests which find themselves left out of the resultant bargains are forced to petition elite patrons for a share of the available resources, hoping to find individuals willing to carry the ball for them or, if necessary, to raise the particular issues or claims to the level of state policy. As an example, he cites the 1971 campaign for consumer goods production. The 1965 economic reform could also be mentioned.

However, as several of the authors reviewed here point out, every attempt at reform or redistribution in the USSR calls forth opposition from entrenched forces who fear a loss of privilege or status from the proposed changes. There is general agreement that these forces include ideologically or politically conservative elements in the central and regional apparats who are well represented in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), although Wolfgang Leonhard and Breslauer correctly caution that not all of the party apparatchiks necessarily take conservative positions. Nevertheless, as Khrushchev learned to his dismay, the conservative elements as a group constitute an extremely powerful political force, capable of sabotaging reform programs and ultimately even of causing the downfall of top leaders.

A basic feature of Brezhnev's mode of leadership has been a determination not to alienate these forces. Rather than simply *imposing* new policies upon them, he has tried to win them over, or, if need be, to buy their acquiescence by modifying the tempo or even the substantive details of his reform measures.

Herein lies the essence of the "contractual" arrangements mentioned earlier. This approach has led to remarkable stability and continuity of the political elites at various levels, but it has also led to a rather rigid and dilatory system of decision-making and administration, one that is unresponsive to new policy and organizational initiatives. By its age structure and its monopoly of executive and administrative power, moreover, the stratum of middle-level apparatchiks has effectively blocked the accession of younger, presumably more flexible and dynamic, and certainly better-educated, individuals to decision-making roles. Thus, an element of personal frustration has been added to the pressures for innovation and rationalization that virtually all of the authors reviewed see as the main problem of the post-Brezhnev succession.

THIS DIAGNOSIS is, in effect, the agreed starting point and the major premise of the debate over the future of the Soviet system represented by the works of Leonhard, Alexander Yanov, and Breslauer, and by several of the contributors to the Dallin book. The basic questions addressed by the forecasters include the following: (1) How serious is the immobilism of the system in light of the probable challenges it faces? (2) What are the composition and relative strengths of the social and political forces ranged on the opposing sides of change and stability (or, indeed, retrogression)? (3) What are the most salient weapons—ideological and/or spiritual, material, and coercive—in the arsenals of the contending forces? The variety of predictions offered reflects the differing answers to these questions.

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[1] Edvard Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism*, translated by Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic, Belgrade, Yugoslav Review, 1978.

Perhaps the most extreme prognosis is that presented by former Soviet writer and journalist Alexander Yanov, who sees as highly probable a drastic shift in the post-Brezhnev period toward an authoritarian, right-wing Russian nationalist regime. In contrast to the native Western analysts under review, Yanov attributes a continuing vital significance to ideological and spiritual factors in the Russian (not necessarily Soviet) political culture. While agreeing with most of the other authors that Marxism-Leninism is a spent force in the USSR and its satellites, Yanov maintains that Russian culture requires, and has always required, a spiritual impetus to legitimize popular political obligation. The present ideological vacuum is about to be filled, he argues, by a marriage of the doctrines espoused by the currently dissident "New Right" Orthodox Christian revivalists and by conservative Russian chauvinist elements in the political, ideological, and police leaderships. And he warns that a hard-line policy by the West on economic and political relations with the USSR will increase the probability of this outcome by justifying the repressive, xenophobic tendencies of the political reactionaries and their "exclusivist" New Right ideological partners.

Wolfgang Leonhard's book is a *tour d'horizon* of predictions regarding the future of Soviet communism. In the course of a painstaking examination of alternative interpretations and prognoses by Western authorities and Soviet dissidents of all political hues, he rejects the Yanov scenario, among many others, and does so on several grounds. For one thing, he considers Marxism-Leninism, although no longer a vital motive force in internal Soviet life, as too useful a legitimizing factor in intrabloc relations and other areas of foreign policy (for example, in dealing with so-called national liberation movements) to be given up by an essentially rational Soviet leadership for so narrow and irrational a doctrine. (Yanov, incidentally, rejects this kind of argument as a manifestation of a Western cultural bias, one which cannot conceive of spiritual factors in other than an instrumental light.) For another thing, Leonhard argues that the accumulated problems of the Soviet social and economic system and the ambitions and responsibilities of the USSR as a superpower militate against the self-indulgent, narcissistic Russian purism demanded by the New Right dissidents and those who tacitly or overtly support them within the apparat. Moscow's problems with the Soviet Union's non-Russian nationalities, noted by Leonhard and several other authors, would also inevitably be aggravated by such a tendency, which would violate many elements of the existing "contract" with these groups.

Leonhard devotes more attention to the possibility of a revolution or radical change from the other direction — that is, a liberal and/or technocratic reaction against the inability of the existing order to cope with the technical and administrative contradictions which have doomed the USSR to a mediocre living standard and a manifestly inefficient use of available resources. However, he sees as more likely a continuing effort at controlled modernization without the sacrifice of the leadership's monopoly of power. Up to now, the regime has succeeded in co-opting members of the technical intelligentsia and repressing active dissidents, without substantially diluting its own power. Leonhard's view that this limited accommodation will probably be inadequate to cope with the accumulated distortions of the system is the main basis for his contention that the possibility of a revolution "cannot be excluded." This is as far as he is willing to go. Indeed, despite his exhaustive consideration of various alternative scenarios, Leonhard provides the reader with remarkably little in the way of solid prediction; some possibilities are simply a bit less remote than others.

Of the authors who focus on one or another dimension of the managerial, technological, or scientific aspects of the existing order, Paul Cocks (writing in the Dallin volume) is probably the most optimistic concerning current Soviet programs. He regards Brezhnev as fully committed to the wholesale rationalization of the economy and social organization and of their accommodation to the perceived imperatives of the NTR. Brezhnev's modernizing strategy, Cocks suggests, is to restructure the administrative system so that it is compatible with modern information processing and control techniques, to introduce an integrated systems approach into the processes of goal formation and policy planning, and to foster the development of executive and managerial personnel who are supportive of and conversant with the new methods of decision-making and policy implementation. Cocks credits Brezhnev with exercising a great deal of tactical circumspection in the pursuit of this strategy so as to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing the conservative bureaucratic forces which have resisted the projected changes. By way of illustration, Cocks cites the regime's resort to careful experiments on a sectoral or regional basis before it has recommended programs for nationwide implementation.

The widely publicized commitment to organizing for the NTR is undoubtedly an important feature of current Soviet politics, but it is probably not as important in practical terms as Cocks assumes (the reviewer must plead guilty to a similar fascination with the theoretical implications of the new projects for the system as a whole). Gregory Grossman's account (in the Dallin volume) of the shortfalls in the Ninth and early Tenth Five-Year Plan periods and Brezhnev's own complaints at the 25th CPSU Congress about the pace of substantive and organizational change (noted repeatedly by contributors to the Dallin book) offer a useful reminder of the frequent contradictions between programmatic commitment and actual performance in the USSR. There is ample evidence that entrenched forces have succeeded in stemming, or at least slowing down, the process of restructuring the economic and administrative systems for the NTR. Whether Brezhnev's successors will be able, or indeed willing, to revive the initial enthusiasm for "scientific management" is doubtful—at least in the short run, while the process of jockeying for leadership position works itself out. And experience in even the most advanced Western societies suggests that the longer-run prospects for truly scientific decision-making and administration are not outstanding either.

WHERE does this negative assessment of the various predictions of radical change leave us in our quest for convincing prognoses of the future of Soviet communism? George Breslauer's concept of "welfare-authoritarianism" as a description of the present and likely short-term future system in the USSR is a useful starting point. It is based on the proposition that the existing authoritarian system enjoys a substantial degree of legitimacy among the majority of at least the Great Russian masses of the Soviet population. This legitimacy stems from a popular perception that Soviet policymakers continue to hold as fundamental the ideologically prescribed goal of relative equality of rewards and access to publicly supplied health, educational, cultural, and other consumption facilities (however great the stratification of benefits in actual practice). Indeed, the ruling ideology—however eroded as an inspirational factor—does continue to perform an important residual function in guiding official social policy, especially in the welfare and employment areas.

A major question is whether the manifest inefficiencies of the economic and administrative systems will permit the regime to maintain a rate of growth that will meet to a tolerable, if not entirely satisfactory, degree the rising expectations of the masses, at the same time as it permits diversion of huge quantities of resources to the traditional power and prestige areas of heavy industry and military preparedness. Those who predict instability after Brezhnev contend that the system will not be able to do this. But there is little hard evidence that failure is inevitable, or that the requisite adjustments cannot be made. Breslauer argues rather convincingly that there is ample room for maneuver between liberal and conservative adjustments within the framework of the welfare-authoritarian system—that is, without the need for a revolutionary change in the basic political structure.

Nevertheless, Yanov's insistence upon the unique spiritual dimension in Russian political culture cannot be dismissed out of hand. It may turn out that those leaders who come to power after Brezhnev will simply not be satisfied with incremental, pragmatic adjustments uninformed by consistent principle and will attempt a return to more traditional Russian patterns of authoritarian discipline and sacrifice. Such an attempt would undoubtedly evoke bitter resistance from more rationally inclined forces within the party and society at large. Much will depend, as Yanov suggests, on the state of international relations, but perhaps not in quite the way he imagines. Policies of détente and accommodation with the USSR will not have the effect—predicted by Yanov—of encouraging rationally or liberally minded Soviet opponents of neo-Stalinism to resist the resurgence of aggressive, narrow Russian chauvinism if these policies are pursued by a West that is militarily weakened and socially and spiritually fragmented. And while it is conceivable that a strong, united, and determined West might evoke a New Right-inspired Soviet regime, such a regime—ironically—would probably be easier to deal with, even if the cost of its existence to the Soviet people would be considerable.

On balance, though, one would expect the future Soviet system to reflect the present pattern of institutionalized power relationships and to maintain the basic social policies and relationships of welfare-authoritarianism. While the current leadership style has its problems, acknowledged by Brezhnev himself, it is difficult to conceive of the emergence of a radically different alternative, given the present complexity of Soviet social and economic life and the probable balance of political forces in the post-Brezhnev era. This judgment assumes, of course, that no foreign or domestic catastrophe impels a defensive reversion to Stalinist modes of totalitarian rule.

Whether the response to the inevitable, if less catastrophic, pressures for modernizing change falls at the liberal or conservative end of the welfare-authoritarian range—or, indeed, somewhere outside that range—will depend very much on external factors and the resulting perceptions of threat or opportunity on the part of the leaders who emerge in the post-Brezhnev succession.

How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered

By T.H. Rigby

N.S. PATOLICHEV. *Ispytaniye na zrelost'* (Test of Maturity). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1977.

A.I. MIKOYAN. *V nachale dvadtsatykh* (In the Early Twenties). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975.

LEONID IL'ICH BREZHNEV. *Vozrozhdeniye* (Rebirth). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978.

FOR WESTERN analysts, unobscured glimpses into the closed world of the Soviet political elite have been all too few. Now, with the publication of these three volumes of reminiscences (Brezhnev's could more accurately be described as a brochure), the door to an important but little-known group within this elite—the provincial party bosses, that is, the first secretaries of the oblast party committees (obkoms)—has swung open a bit more widely. The analyst of Soviet affairs, by looking carefully and perceptively at the position and role of the obkom secretary as they emerge from such books as these, can gain a better understanding of the informal power relationships, prevalent attitudes, and standard behavior patterns at the oblast level and the ways in which these are linked to those of the central party apparatus.[1]

In the USSR, the obkom secretary is the top party official in the oblast, the principal administrative-territorial unit below the republic level. He wields extensive powers over both party and government, much in the manner of a regional satrap. Several (but not most) republics contain obkoms, but special interest attaches to the 72 obkom and kraykom (kray committee) first secretaries of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to the 26 such secretaries in the Ukrainian SSR, since from their ranks can be expected to come many of the top party officials of the 1980's.

In the case of the three men whose reminiscences are reviewed here, the experience as obkom secretary was a crucial career step, for each made the jump to the central party apparatus immediately or soon after his work at the oblast level. N.S. Patolichev (1908–), obkom secretary in Yaroslavl' Oblast from 1941 to 1945, was brought to Moscow in 1946 and placed in the first of a series of high party offices he was to hold; he is now the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade. A.I. Mikoyan (1905–78), gubkom secretary (secretary of the party's guberniya committee; the guberniya was the administrative-territorial unit that preceded the oblast) in Nizhniy Novgorod Guberniya (now Gor'kiy Oblast) from 1920 to 1922 and secretary of the Southeast Bureau in Rostov-on-Don from 1922 to 1926, subsequently served a record term as Politburo member and deputy premier under both Yosif Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. L.I. Brezhnev (1906-), obkom secretary in Zaporozh'ye Oblast from 1946 to 1947 and in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast from 1947 to 1950, has become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and President of the USSR.

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[1] Apart from the books reviewed here, several other memoirs have issued from the pens of officials who have served as regional party leaders. The most interesting are A.S. Chuyanov, *Na stremnine veka: zapiski sekretarya obkoma* (On the Rapids of the Century: Notes of an Obkom Secretary), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1977; F.T. Morgun, *Khleb i lyudi* (Bread and People), 2nd ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975; and N.N. Smelyakov, *S chego nachinayetsya Rodina: vospominaniya i razdum'ya* (Where the Homeland Begins: Reminiscences and Meditations), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975.

Each memoir reflects some of the difficulties of the genre. With few exceptions, elder statesmen everywhere tend to show themselves in the best possible light, reinterpreting events and highlighting, distorting, or suppressing the facts so as to enhance their own reputation. In the case of Soviet memoirs, there are no dissenting firsthand accounts available either from independent scholars and journalists or from the materials contained in the official archives. Furthermore, Soviet memoirists, no matter how eminent, do not escape the monopoly of the party propaganda authorities over the molding of public opinion. Thus, the unavoidable subjectivity of the memoirist himself is joined to a second layer of distortion, the distortion that stems from the Propaganda Department's current line on what people should know and believe, and it is rarely easy for the reader to sort out the one from the other.

Such difficulties, however, do not destroy the utility of Soviet memoirs as sources of information. Recent studies of the reminiscences of Soviet military commanders have proved this point.[2] Even the relatively meager and politically sensitive (as well as distortion-prone) memoirs of Soviet party and government officials can yield much of interest.

LIKE MOST current Soviet leaders, Nikolay Semёnovich Patolichev owed the opportunity to demonstrate his "maturity" to the purges of the 1930's and to World War II. Early in 1938, during the final stage of the *Yezhovshchina* (the height of the Great Purge), Patolichev, a 30-year-old graduate of the Military Academy of Defense Against Chemical Warfare, was taken onto the staff of the Central Committee's Department of Leading Party Organs—either by lucky coincidence, as Patolichev represents it, or by shrewd calculation. Within a year, he had advanced to first secretary of the Yaroslavl' Obkom. His performance there in reorganizing the oblast for war—or was it the "pull" of his patron—earned him a transfer to Chelyabinsk Obkom, in a vitally important industrial region.

Some two thirds of Patolichev's memoirs covers his service in these two regional satrapies. The book breaks off with Patolichev's star at its zenith—in 1946, when after Patolichev has served a brief tenure as head of a Central Committee department, Stalin has made him a Central Committee secretary (replacing G.M. Malenkov) and a member of the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo). The failure of Patolichev to go on to even greater things was probably due in large part to the declining power of his patron, Politburo member A.A. Andreyev.

The second volume of Anastas Mikoyan's memoirs, *In the Early Twenties*, provides an instructive comparison with Patolichev's *Test of Maturity*, for it too covers a period, though some 20 years earlier, when its writer held successively two regional party secretaryships. Curiously, both Mikoyan and Patolichev turned up on foot to assume their first regional office, but the different circumstances provide a good measure of the changes over the intervening period. In 1920, Mikoyan gave no prior warning of his arrival and simply walked to his office from the station, an act that commanded no special attention (Mikoyan, p. 26). In 1939, Patolichev walked because his official chauffeur-driven car had broken down, and the ludicrousness of his arriving on foot to take up such an elevated post has since never ceased to amuse him (Patolichev, p. 82). Furthermore, Mikoyan quickly found that the Central Committee's "recommendation" did not guarantee election: indeed, it took him several months of intense struggle with the local party leadership to gain for himself the post for which Moscow had intended him. By Patolichev's time, "recommendation" and "election" had long since become practically synonymous.

The dominant preoccupations of the party regional secretaries underwent no less a change. In his first regional appointment, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Gubkom, Mikoyan was primarily engaged in political struggles within the party organization, that is, in breaking the power of the entrenched local clique (which had proved too much for his predecessor V.M. Molotov) and in battling with the supporters of Leon Trotsky and especially the Workers' Opposition. In his second appointment, as secretary of the Southeast Bureau, a regional office that covered the Rostov region, the Kuban', and the North Caucasus, all recently "liberated" from the White armies, he had to build up a core of reliable cadres in a predominantly hostile environment, breaking down localism and welding together a disciplined party machine. In both cases he had to build a following dependent on and responsive to the party command in Moscow. One aspect of building such a following was extension of the party committees' control over the local organs of economic administration—clearly a touchy issue, whose resolution at the local level carried large implications for power relationships at the center. In 1922, when the People's Commissar for Food Supplies reprimanded his chief administrator in the Southeast Region for taking his cue from the regional party bureau rather than from the commissariat, Mikoyan countered by invoking the authority of the Central Committee (Mikoyan, p. 179).

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[2] See especially Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II*, New York, NY, Pegasus, 1969.

By this time, the party machine was already greatly concerned with meeting grain delivery targets, but not until much later did it closely and directly involve itself in management of the economy generally. Direct involvement began with the First Five-Year Plan in the period 1928-32 and reached its height during World War II. This fact is strikingly illustrated by Patolichev's account, which mentions internal party matters only incidentally or as an afterthought and devotes scores of pages to the problems of industrial plants, raw material and fuel supplies, and rail transport.

IN BOTH Patolichev's and Mikoyan's volumes, the portraits of Yosif Stalin reflect the current emphasis on the positive. Stalin is thoughtful, farsighted, sensible, thoroughly master of the problems at hand, firm and clear in decision, and, in short, a rock of Leninism. How far this expresses the authors' true attitudes we can only guess, perhaps with more confidence in Patolichev's case than in Mikoyan's. It is what comes through *incidentally* that is interesting. For instance, Stalin summoned Mikoyan to Moscow in January 1922, before Stalin became General Secretary but when he, as the only Orgburo member with a seat on the Politburo, was already master of the central party machine (p. 140). Stalin's purpose was, first, to warn Mikoyan of the need to combat Trotsky's supporters in the regional party elections leading up to the forthcoming 11th Party Congress and, second, to dispatch Mikoyan to Siberia to convey instructions to the party leadership there to this end. Mikoyan was to pretend that his visit was for family reasons and to confide its real purpose only to M.M. Lashevich, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee. Notwithstanding Mikoyan's (or is it his editor's?) singularly unconvincing effort to represent Stalin as acting with Lenin's blessing in this matter, the story gives an intriguing glimpse of the conspiratorial dimension of Stalin's relationships with his "Mafia" in this crucial phase of his rise to power.

Mikoyan's frequent references to his contacts with Stalin (pp. 193-94, 292, 349, 375, 378) are suggestive of a growing personal bond. Whether Stalin had a hand in Mikoyan's appointment to Nizhniy Novgorod in 1920—the decision was said to have been made by the Orgburo, of which Stalin was already a member, but the Secretariat was at that time dominated by Trotsky's supporters—it is clear that by early 1922 Mikoyan was in Stalin's confidence. To judge by Mikoyan's own account, the struggle of "platforms" in the elections of delegates to the 10th Party Congress in March 1921, elections in which support for Stalin meant support for Lenin and support for Lenin meant support for Stalin, was a crucial political experience for many Communist officials in the provinces, one that disposed them to place themselves under Stalin's mantle. This experience may indeed have influenced Mikoyan, whatever his previous view of his fellow Caucasian. By 1923, the political bond, at least, was clearly a close one, and Mikoyan was closeted with Stalin on January 21, 1924, when Bukharin rushed in to report that Lenin had died.

Patolichev's account of the post-purge years leaves no doubt as to Stalin's dictatorial power and the fear this power inspired in subordinates. This comes through clearly in Patolichev's recounting of a meeting in 1941 when Stalin gave him a dressing-down for failures in the Yaroslavl' Rubber Combine and declared he must be punished. Stalin was evidently playing with Patolichev, for he then "unexpectedly smiled and said, 'Patolichev must be put on a commission for working out a decision on the People's Commissariat for the Chemical Industry.'" Everyone, adds Patolichev, "breathed a sigh of relief" (pp. 84-85). Or did the representatives of the commissariat breathe a sigh of something other than relief?

Trepidation also comes through in Patolichev's account of a night in May 1946, when Stalin's personal secretary A.N. Poskrëbyshev called up to order him to appear at Stalin's Kremlin apartment immediately. When Patolichev was admitted to the Presence, he also found party secretaries A.A. Zhdanov and A.A. Kuznetsov there. "From the expression on Zhdanov's and Kuznetsov's faces I could see that the situation was calm, and my agitation gradually subsided" (p. 280). Stalin grilled Patolichev at length on how to improve the Central Committee's control over the regional party machine and then suddenly said: "and what if we make you a secretary of the Central Committee?" Stalin was pacing up and down as usual, and, when Stalin momentarily turned his back, Patolichev took the chance to glance to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov for guidance:

> *Zhdanov, smiling, threw his arms wide, as if to say, "you do the deciding yourself, you do the answering." Drawing level with me, Stalin said, "Well, say something." "Comrade Stalin, you decide whatever you think necessary," was my reply. After that, Stalin went to the telephone, and, dialing a number, presumably Poskrëbyshev's, he said: "Write down a second point in that Central Committee decision—to approve Comrade Patolichev as Secretary of the Central Committee." What the first point was I did not know. It became known only later. It stated that G.M. Malenkov was relieved of responsibilities as Secretary of the Central Committee.* (p. 284)

Stalin's capacity well before this incident to decide even the highest-level appointments by fiat is something we may well take for granted, but there is precious little direct evidence of it. Consequently, accounts such as Patolichev's acquire no little historical value, since in the present climate in the Soviet Union it is reasonable to assume that Stalin would not be represented as more powerful than he really was.

One might cite other instances, both from Patolichev's book and from other personal accounts. In December 1941, for example, when Patolichev was transferred from the Yaroslavl' Obkom to the Chelyabinsk Obkom, he was not consulted in advance but simply instructed by telephone to appear in the Kremlin the next day. When he got there, Central Committee secretaries A.A. Andreyev and Zhdanov gave him his instructions but in so doing "cited Stalin's authority" (p. 165).

PATOLICHEV also provides abundant illustration of the importance of *svyazi* (connections) and patronage. If Mikoyan's "godfather" was Stalin, Patolichev's was apparently Andreyev, apart from Stalin the most important figure in the central party apparatus in the years after the Great Purge. It was Andreyev who took Patolichev up in 1938 and made him a Central Committee instructor, and it was Andreyev who evidently engineered Patolichev's appointment a year later as First Secretary of the Yaroslavl' Obkom. Several of Patolichev's references to Andreyev testify to the warmth of the bond that such relationships may forge. Thus on an occasion when Patolichev was summoned to the Kremlin:

> *In the morning I was informed in the Central Committee that Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev would talk with me in his office. My mood improved. We loved Andrey Andreyevich. . . . We young party workers of those years not infrequently copied Andrey Andreyevich in one way or another. In our opinion, he possessed the best qualities of the party official. We tried to develop them in ourselves. We also called him by his first name and patronymic. Our memory of Andrey Andreyevich preserves this warmth to the present day.* (p. 98)

Patolichev writes of no other party leader in comparable terms.

Another instance of *svyazi* is worth citing. During the war, regional party leaders not only were given exceptionally heavy responsibilities for industry but also were expected to exercise an unprecedented autonomy of decision in this area. As a result, a premium was placed on horizontal collaborative relationships between regional party bosses, especially between the first secretaries of the several Urals and Siberian oblasts that produced most of the country's armaments. Referring to the party secretaries of these oblasts, Patolichev writes: "We discovered and employed every possibility for mutual assistance—telephone calls, telegrams, meetings, chats. This drew us together" (p. 171). It was no accident, then, that when Stalin asked Patolichev, in the abovementioned conversation in 1946 in the Kremlin, who he would like working under him as deputies in the newly formed Central Committee Directorate for Checking Party Organs, Patolichev named precisely three of these secretaries (p. 282). He also appointed V.A. Gogosov, who had worked under him in Yaroslavl' in the capacity of chairman of the soviet executive committee, as one of the powerful group of inspectors in the directorate (pp. 161-63).

The most pervasive impression built up by Patolichev is the oblast party secretary's enormous, if ill-defined power, on the one hand, and his utter dependence on the supreme power in Moscow, on the other. Patolichev takes personal responsibility for all sorts of major industrial decisions, often without clearing them with the relevant ministers, but when his personal fate is involved, he is completely in Stalin's hands and can only hope that his protectors in Stalin's entourage will dispose the dictator in his favor. In accord with current ideological guidelines, of course, he generally plays down the terror and repression, and he also cites incidents that show him as saving officials unjustly accused (pp. 67-68, 87-88). Presumably, he introduces these incidents both for the sake of his own reputation and to "demonstrate" that Stalin's terror machine was really not so bad, since its "excesses" could be curbed by courageous and honest men. What actually comes through in these stories, though, is the personal helplessness of the victims of unjust charges and the extreme risks taken by even the most powerful officials who dared to intervene on their behalf.

One anecdote is particularly worthy of note, since it illustrates both these points and the vital importance of protection and patronage. It concerns L.P. Malkevich, Chief of the South Urals Railway, with whom Patolichev developed a close working and personal relationship out of the enormous wartime difficulties of rail transport and the critical importance of keeping industrial materials and war supplies moving. In 1942, Malkevich was awarded the Order of Lenin, but a few months later Patolichev was stunned by an order from Moscow to sack Malkevich and put him on trial. Patolichev, convinced that the charge was groundless, could nevertheless think of no formal action he could take, since the order was personally signed by Stalin. Moreover, he adds, "even today I do not know who could have introduced such an unjust proposal." He did get in touch with his protector Andreyev and also with General A.V. Khrulëv, who was both Commander in Chief of the Home Front and People's Commissar for Railways, who had been a comrade-in-arms of Patolichev's father during the Civil War, and who had had an emotional meeting with Patolichev junior at a Central Committee gathering in 1940 (pp. 3–4). Neither Andreyev nor Khrulëv could promise anything, yet a few days later Andreyev telephoned to rebuke Patolichev for being "soft-hearted" but at the same time to report that Malkevich's "punishment" had been mitigated—he was merely to be transferred to a lesser post in another oblast—and to warn Patolichev to offer no further objections. "There was nothing left for us but to express our thanks, which of course we did." Later, Patolichev contrived to have Malkevich restored to his former command of the South Urals Railway, and as a prima facie indication of their mutual loyalty it is worth recording that some three decades later, with Patolichev now Minister of Foreign Trade, Malkevich is Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (pp. 218–25).

WHERE the memoirist happens to be L.I. Brezhnev, the problems of dealing with memoirs as a historical source are compounded, since the country's top leader will be concerned both to project the aura of his exemplary personality and to spare the mass audience any disturbing facts or thoughts.[3] The result is doubtlessly further pressure for distortion, concealment, and the smoothing of sharp edges.

Thus far, Brezhnev's efforts at autobiography have comprised three slim booklets. *The Little Land (Malaya Zemlya)* treats his experiences as a senior political officer in World War II; *Rebirth (Vozrozhdeniye)*, his experiences as an obkom first secretary in the postwar Ukraine; and *Virgin Land (Tselina)*, his experiences as party leader in Kazakhstan under Khrushchev. These publications will undoubtedly receive the extensive attention their author's position demands,[4] and here I wish simply to look at parts of the second booklet, namely, those parts that amplify points that emerge from Patolichev's and Mikoyan's accounts of their experiences as regional party bosses.

Despite the problems mentioned, even the memoirs of a General Secretary–President can yield revealing glimpses of the texture and mores of Soviet life. For example, when Brezhnev (or his ghostwriter) relates how he responded to a personal approach for help by a worker whose wife had lost the family ration cards (p. 20), his intention is no doubt to display his fatherly concern and humanity. What he conveys incidentally, however, is the ordinary person's utter dependence on the "humanity" of officials, and that a family of four had gone for almost a month without legal food supplies because no official below the oblast's top man had been able or willing to exercise such "humanity." In such cases, it is not the iconographic flourish but the background on which it is drawn that is informative, precisely because this background must be sufficiently familiar to Soviet readers if the iconography is to have any chance of impressing them.

Like Patolichev, Brezhev found his path to high office opened up by the *Yezhovshchina*, but his first taste of top leadership came with his appointment as first secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom in August 1946. It was an appointment that would make or break his career. For more than two years after the expulsion of the Germans, Zaporozh'ye Oblast, whose industrial potential was vital to Moscow, had remained in an appalling condition of destruction, confusion, misery, and lawlessness, the essentials of which Brezhnev conveys fairly enough in a few laconic sentences (pp. 22, 46–47). Brezhnev's predecessor had been removed in disgrace, and Brezhnev himself was to be threatened with a similar fate when the oblast's performance came under fire and Stalin had a "serious" talk with him on the telephone (p. 24). Brezhnev survived his "test of maturity," however, and in October 1947 he was promoted to first secretary of the neighboring, but even more important, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where he again stepped into the shoes of a purged predecessor. There he remained until 1950.

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[3] The first edition of *Vozrozhdeniye* ran to 2 million copies.

[4] See Viktor Nekrasov, "Brezhnev the Writer, I," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1977–78, pp. 94–96; and Efim Etkind, "Brezhnev the Writer, II," ibid., pp. 97–108. For a brief independent account of Brezhnev's period in Zaporozh'ye, see John Dornberg, *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1974, pp. 94–98.

In comparing Patolichev's and Brezhnev's experiences as obkom first secretary, it is apparent that prewar and wartime patterns essentially carried over to the postwar period and that the smooth processes of "inner-party democracy" changed but little. Brezhnev learned he was to be first secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom in a telephone call from Moscow, whence a Central Committee department head was dispatched to preside over his "election" (p. 6). The obkom first secretary continued to be answerable for and entitled to intervene in anything and everything that happened in the oblast (pp. 20, 24, 61). Nevertheless, his central concern remained economic performance, in Zaporozh'ye the reconstruction of the great Zaporozh'ye hydroelectric station and the Zaporozh'ye steelworks. Although the Central Committee was then making efforts to have local party officials unburden themselves of the petty details of industrial production, most of the incidents and conversations recounted in *Rebirth* relate to industrial problems, and for a time Brezhnev even shifted his office onto the premises of the Zaporozh'ye Construction Trust (p. 23). Hence the continued importance of the nexus with government ministers responsible for locally prominent branches of the economy and the premium placed on the first secretary's establishing good personal and working relations with such ministers (p. 36).

Brezhnev likewise provides further glimpses of the importance of informal relationships of mutual assistance and protection between officials and the frequent durability of patron-client bonds so forged at the oblast level. Brezhnev's no. 2 in the secretariat of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom was A.P. Kirilenko, the man who more than 30 years later serves as his no. 2 in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The administrator of the Zaporozh'ye Construction Trust (where Brezhnev had his office for a time) was V.E. Dymshits, destined to hold key government office under Brezhnev. N.A. Tikhonov, like Brezhnev a graduate of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute and the man brought in to head the important Southern Pipe Plant in Nikopol' in Zaporozh'ye Oblast after his fellow alumnus took over the obkom, has recently been elevated to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and since November 1979 has been a full member of the Politburo.

Tikhonov was also the central figure in an incident related by Brezhnev no doubt with the purpose of demonstrating his exemplary loyalty to his protégés—a quality highly valued by the middle and lower-level officials for whom his reminiscences probably are largely intended. On an inspection of Tikhonov's Nikopol' pipe plant, I.F. Tevosyan, the powerful Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, who was accompanied by Brezhnev, berated the plant director for improperly diverting funds allocated to the improvement of the workers' facilities and for building a new road into the plant. It was a touchy moment. In those days industrial executives could lose their jobs and their liberty for lesser offenses, and Tevosyan had the power to bring ruin down upon the plant director. Brezhnev, instead of abandoning his subordinate to a "just" fate, sought first to ease the situation by quipping "yes, what a nice little dacha he's built for his personal use" (pp. 50–51). When Tevosyan remained unmollified, Brezhnev pointed out that without the road it would have been impossible to run a night shift. However embroidered this version of the incident may be, it reflects the larger truth that such acts of protection are the necessary ingredients of a durable bond of mutual support between patron and protégé in the Soviet system, no less so than in other political and bureaucratic structures.

THE REMINISCENCES reviewed here provide useful material on many other facets of the operation of the Soviet system apart from the role and position of the provincial party secretary, on which I have focused—a role and position that had their origins in the earliest years of the Soviet regime, that reached their full development under Stalin, and that remain essentially unchanged to the present day. Despite pitfalls, which I may not have entirely escaped, such memoirs can aid our understanding of how the Soviet system operates, and they are not simply to be dismissed with scorn as self-serving mendacity or disinformation by the Propaganda Department.

Reading the recollections of elder statesmen about their experiences as obkom secretaries reminds us, too, that tomorrow's top leaders will probably be drawn in large part from today's obkom secretaries. Are they likely to prove leaders of a different cast from their predecessors? Not very different, in my view. Their style and attitudes will certainly have been affected by the fact that they will have spent more of their careers under the calmer rule of Brezhnev than under the murderous rule of Stalin and the turbulent rule of Khrushchev. Many will have enjoyed a better formal education. But the political and administrative skills through which they are now demonstrating their "maturity" and suitability for top office are essentially those developed by the Patolichevs and Brezhnevs of the 1940's and 1950's.

That this is so, in turn, is because the *role* of the obkom first secretary remains essentially the same. It is at his desk that the "buck" still stops, especially, as before, in economic matters but also if the problem is one of education, housing, personnel, security, or anything else. And the obkom first secretary still operates within *both* a formal network of political and administrative structures that is today even more like the formal network established under Stalin than the network of 15 or 20 years ago, *and* an informal network whose norms of protection, mutual cover-up, and mutual support against rival informal networks remain those in which today's Politburo members were nurtured.[5] In the Soviet Union, too—and perhaps more than in many other countries—the past continues to illuminate the future.

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[5] For a different view on some of the issues raised here, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1979, pp. 1–16. See also T.H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), March 1978, pp. 1–24.

Religion and Nationalism in the USSR and China

By Dennis J. Dunn

RICHARD C. BUSH, JR. *Religion in Communist China*. Nashville, TN, and New York, NY, Abingdon Press, 1970.

V. STANLEY VARDYS. *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1978.

HARRY G. SHAFFER. *The Soviet Treatment of Jews*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

OTTO LUCHTERHANDT. *Der Sowjetstaat und die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche* (The Soviet State and the Russian Orthodox Church). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976.

CHRISTEL LANE. *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union: A Sociological Study*. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1978.

RELIGION PLAYS a role of singular importance in the Soviet Union and in parts, at least, of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Yet, the West has failed to give it its due. There are few Western works on the subject, and few knowledgeable specialists, no more than a few dozen. It is hardly surprising, then, that many scholars conclude, as Walter Laqueur did for the Soviet Union, that religion has not been a major factor in these Communist states.[1]

One reason for such inattention is not hard to discern: reliable information about the role of religion is difficult to come by. In Communist systems, where the church is routinely persecuted and churchgoers are subjected to discrimination or worse, there is almost no direct evidence on the issue. It hardly needs saying that the findings of Soviet "opinion polls" on this question are dubious, that there are no reliable figures on church membership or church attendance, and that the Communist press treats religion tendentiously.

In most cases, therefore, those who study religion in the Communist states must resort to a variety of more subtle approaches. The *samizdat* literature has given some indication of the part religion plays in the mounting dissident movement, and well-publicized stories about religious dissidents appear from time to time. But it is hard to tell how representative this literature and these figures are of broader religious currents. One gauge, perhaps as revealing as any other, is the time and effort—in the form of antireligious propaganda, museums of atheism, surveillance, and outright persecution—that the various Communist regimes spend in an attempt to undercut the appeals of religion. All too often, though, the researcher must rely on his own impressions, on chance conversations, and on secondhand accounts, any of which may or may not be accurate.

In a matter so private and so difficult to measure as religion, then, it is extremely hard to gain some appreciation of the depth to which religion is rooted in the societies of the Communist states and some appreciation of the ways in which religion might manifest itself in any given set of circumstances. Even in the West—one is compelled to add—where there are no institutional impediments to research on the church and religion, scholars can still disagree on the meaning of, say, declining church attendance and thus on the status of religion in general.

In any case, the most objectionable approach to the question is to argue by analogy—that is, to argue that since modernization in the West has led to the decline of religion (itself a debatable point) and since the USSR and PRC are "modern" states, religion has been on the decline in the USSR and

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[1] *The New York Times Review of Books*, Feb. 26, 1971. To take another example, Paul Hollander maintains that "religious values do not govern or significantly affect the life of the majority in either" the Soviet Union or the United States because both are "modern, urban, industrial societies." Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 186–87.

PRC. The analogy simply does not hold. If "modernization" means industrialization, urbanization, reliance on advanced technology and science, and the emergence of political, philosophical, and other values and ideas (often in a form altered by the indigenous culture) conducive to these processes—including the concept of separation of church and state—then the USSR and PRC are not "modern" in the full sense of the word.[2] And even if they are "modern" in at least some senses, it does not necessarily follow that religion in the two countries has declined. To conclude that religion has so declined is to accept an unproved assumption based on an unproved premise.

IF RELIGION is a powerful force in both the USSR and PRC, one of the principal reasons is that it is a primary source of nationalism throughout the Eurasian region. In Western Europe, nationalism for the most part was and is secular and anticlerical. In Eastern Europe and Asia, it was and is inextricably linked with religion. In the case of the Russians, as Nicolas Berdyaev aptly put it, the "profession of the true, the Orthodox Faith, was the test of belonging to the Russian kingdom."[3] By the same token, Lithuanian, Jewish, or Kazakh nationalism is inseparable from Catholicism, Judaism, or Islam, respectively. This crucial difference between West and East is often overlooked.

True to the traditions of the East, the USSR and PRC are multinational empires with a fundamental interest in forging homogeneous societies and eliminating national differences among their subject peoples. Because religion underlies many of the fissiparous minority nationalisms in both empires, Moscow and Beijing have adopted antireligious policies, promoting Marxism-Leninism as a kind of secular religion in an attempt to overcome the divisive religions of the peoples scattered on and around the Eurasian plain and in the hope, by so doing, of eroding these minority nationalisms. The Communist regime in the USSR does not officially promote russification, and the Communist regime in China does not officially promote sinicization. If either one did so, it would be clearly marked as a reactionary imperialist and colonialist. Instead, under the guise of Marxism-Leninism, both governments attack the religious base of minority nationalism. This policy allows them to diminish minority nationalism and still maintain the important propaganda argument that they are "modernizing" regimes.

In the Soviet Union, this approach has not been without paradox. Reliance upon Marxism-Leninism has led to attacks on Russian Orthodoxy and has thus hurt Russian nationalism. The paradox has yet to be resolved, but in recent years, since the removal of Nikita Khrushchev, the Kremlin has seemed to favor clearing up the paradox by opposing all religion in theory and by attacking primarily the minority religions in practice. The problem is made all the more pressing because the minorities in the Soviet Union are growing and now constitute more than 50 percent of the country's total population.

It is clear, then, that in both countries religion has implications for majority nationalism far different from the implications it has for minority nationalism. This fact is abundantly illustrated in the various books under review here.

THE PRC's problem with minority religions and minority nationalisms is less acute than that of the USSR. In fact, China is ethnically an almost homogeneous society, in which the minorities account for only 6 percent of the total population. The minorities are important, though, because they are located in China's strategic borderlands, particularly in the sensitive region of Xinjiang. Richard C. Bush, in *Religion in Communist China*, attempts to provide a general survey of what happened to the major religions of China between 1949 and 1969. Because of the lack of primary sources, his work is inevitably incomplete, but it is clear that Islam is still a force among the country's Turkic peoples, that Lamaism remains strong in Tibet, and that Buddhism and Confucianism persist among the Chinese. Christianity, to be sure, always identified as a foreign religion, seems to have suffered grievously, but even Christianity might revive as the Chinese begin once again to open themselves to Western influence. Since the Chinese are such a majority and since they have had some success in sinicizing certain minorities, such as the Chuang, they may in the future feel a decreasing need for Marxism-Leninism as an ideological cement. The Muslim proples of Xinjiang, however, will remain a significant problem.

In a pioneering work on the crucial relationship between religion and minority nationalism in the Soviet Union, V. Stanley Vardys, in *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania*, presents a fascinating case study of Soviet nationality policy and the symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism in Lithuania.[*] Moscow's ultimate goal in Lithuania is surely dissolution of the Lithuanian nationality as such, and to this end it has mounted a relentless attack on the Catholic Church, which lies at the heart of Lithuanian nationalism. The means of attack are many and varied. The Soviets continue to close churches, keep the number of places in the only remaining theological seminary in Kaunas below replacement needs, refuse to fill episcopal vacancies, control church communications, interfere in personnel assignments, cultivate a collaborationist clergy, isolate the church from the Vatican, and arrest priests, "illegal" nuns, and active laymen.

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[2] For a good definition of the concept of modernization, see Cyril E. Black et al., *The Modernization of Japan and Russia*, New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975.

[3] Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960, p. 10.

For their part, the Lithuanians know that their church is crucial to their identity and cohesiveness as a nation, and they are determined to protect their church and their nation against all Soviet forays. Of course, the struggle is uneven, for the Soviets have all the coercive powers on their side. All the same, the Lithuanians have thus far managed to defend themselves, by means as numerous and varied as Moscow uses against them. Since 1972 they have persisted in publishing *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, an underground journal that serves as an inspiration to Lithuanian nationalists and dutifully reports Soviet attacks against the church to the outside world. They have also mounted significant campaigns petitioning the Soviet government to abide by its own legislation, to halt arbitrary interpretations of religious laws, and to curtail all forms of religious persecution. Small underground convents also persevere in Lithuania, in which "illegal" nuns do most of the work in providing the young with a religious education. As in other areas of the Soviet Union, the socialization of the young has continued as the central arena of confrontation between the church and the atheist government.

The Lithuanians have been quite disturbed by a recent Soviet tactic, that of appealing to the Vatican to lessen its support for the besieged Lithuanian Catholics. This tactic seemed to enjoy some success when Pope Paul VI was still alive, but it is doubtful that the present Pope, Karol Wojtyla, the former Archbishop of Krakow, will be persuaded to neglect the Lithuanians. After years of successful resistance to Stalinism in Poland, Pope John Paul II seems to believe that it would be a fundamental mistake to appease Moscow on any issue regarding Lithuania without obtaining in return a concrete guarantee for the security and well-being of the Lithuanian church and nation.

In *The Soviet Treatment of Jews*, Harry G. Shaffer takes up the issues of antisemitism and Zionism. His book is not an analytical, definitive study of these issues, but is simply an attempt to put into perspective the wide diversity of views regarding the policy of the Soviet government toward the Soviet Jews. His conclusion is that although there is "no rampant anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union today," the Soviet government is a steadfast opponent of Zionism and expects Soviet Jews to dissociate themselves from Zionism. It opposes Zionism for a number of reasons, but primarily, as in the case of Lithuanian nationalism, because it considers Zionism centrifugal and divisive in terms of the cohesiveness of the USSR.

In its campaign against Jewish nationalism, Moscow attacks Zionism, just as in its drive against Lithuanian nationalism, it strikes out at the Catholic Church. It thereby once more underscores the degree to which religion and nationalism in the USSR sustain each other. Indeed, it may be argued that if Soviet policies toward Soviet Jews are not rampantly antisemitic, at least to the degree to which Soviet policies in Lithuania are opposed to Lithuanian nationalism, it is because the Jewish religion in the USSR is weaker than the Catholic Church is in Lithuania and, thus, less of a barrier to the assimilation of Jews into Soviet society.

Otto Luchterhandt's *Der Sowjetstaat und die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche* is the first reliable book on Soviet legislation on religion and the effects of that legislation. It treats the entire corpus of such legislation since 1917, analyzing the origins, meaning, and intentions of the legislation as well as the lacunae in the legislation. The author, trained in jurisprudence, is aware that legislation on religion is always subservient to state policy in the Soviet Union and that the state disregards and violates its own laws when it has no interest in following the law. At the same time, he correctly emphasizes the importance of the legislation itself. To be sure, the Soviet Union's progressive legislation, including a rather liberal constitution, which allows freedom of conscience, is but a facade. On various occasions, however, the published laws have proved to be important. For example, the dissidents have been able to use the law as a means of judging just how far they can go and as a means of pressuring the Kremlin to curb its arbitrariness whenever the Kremlin has wanted to court Western public opinion.

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[*] Apart from the present work by Vardys, the only significant books on the question of religion and minority nationalism in the Soviet Union are several works by the late Walter Kolarz. See, for example, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, London, Macmillan, 1961. Essays on various aspects of the subject by such scholars as Bohdan Bociurkiw and Alexandre Bennigsen are important. See Dennis J. Dunn, Ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

Luchterhandt concludes that Soviet legislation and policy on religion have much in common with the Josephinism of the 18th century, although he stresses that the Soviets make supremist claims well beyond those ever made by Joseph II of Austria. In effect, the Soviets have separated the church from the state but have not freed the church of the state. The book makes a strong case for those who would maintain that the Soviet Union, with its persecution of religion and repression of minority nationalism, is in many ways a continuation of autocratic, tsarist Russia.

Christel Lane's *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* deals directly, from a sociological point of view, with the impact of Soviet rule on all the major Christian religious groups in the USSR—namely, Russian Orthodoxy, the Orthodox sects, Catholicism, Lutheranism, the Baptist church, and the small Protestant sects, with the exception of Georgian Orthodoxy, Armenian Orthodoxy, and the illegal Uniate Catholic Church in the Ukraine. Relying primarily upon Soviet sources, she concludes that religion has declined dramatically in the USSR, although she refrains from saying, because of the lack of reliable evidence, whether this is the result primarily of the socialist nature of Soviet society or the inevitable consequence of a society caught up in modernization. She maintains, furthermore, that religion in the USSR has changed in ways similar to the ways in which it has changed in the contemporary West, although she also admits that the USSR's rate of development, its atheistic policies, its socialist institutions, and its politics, especially during the Stalin era, have produced differences as well.

In light of her reliance on Soviet sources, it is not surprising that Lane concludes that Christianity has declined in the Soviet Union. Despite her pessimism, though, she has written a work of some merit. Apart from the works of Stephen and Ethel Dunn, her book is the first serious sociological study of the Christian religion in the USSR. Lane clearly recognizes the affinity between religion and nationalism, and, quite importantly, she frequently draws attention to characteristics of Soviet society that she concludes resemble traits of late medieval society. Indeed, with its collectivized farms, its one-party government, and its official policy of atheism, the USSR is more than fleetingly reminiscent of the Russia of, say, Catherine II—with its peasant communes, its authoritarian government, and its support for Orthodoxy—more so than it is of modern developed societies.[5]

THE AUTHORS of all these books on the Soviet Union write from different perspectives—Vardys from the standpoint of the political scientist, Shaffer from that of the scholar of Soviet Jewish affairs, Luchterhandt from that of the legal scholar, and Lane from that of the sociologist. In the end, though, they come, explicitly or implicitly, to a common conclusion. That is, they draw a picture of the USSR as a feudal, patriarchal society. The Bolsheviks, after all, were not the purveyors of "modernization." In some sense, they turned the clock back, particularly with regard to the emergence of pluralism and religious tolerance in Russia. The PRC is likewise hardly a bastion of free inquiry. At the moment, both states resemble premodern regimes, a fact they themselves cannot fail to grasp as they scramble to gain access to Western science and technology.

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[5] Franz Cardinal Koenig made precisely this point in a widely cited article, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), Aug. 16, 1975

Perception and Misperception in US-Soviet Relations

By William Potter

MORTON SCHWARTZ. *Soviet Perceptions of the United States.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

NIKOLAI V. SIVACHEV and NIKOLAI N. YAKOVLEV. *Russia and the United States: U.S.-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of View.* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1979.

EUGENE ANSCHEL, Ed. *American Appraisals of Soviet Russia, 1917–1977.* Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1978.

FRED WARNER NEAL, Ed. *Detente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations.* New York, NY, W.W. Norton, 1979.

US SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS interested in misperception have long been fascinated by Soviet and American images of each other. Faulty perceptions by the political elite of the two countries have been cited by various scholars as responsible for the deterioration of US-Soviet relations after World War II, the escalation of the nuclear arms race, and the persistence of most outstanding international political issues. It has even been alleged that the Soviet Union's distorted picture of the United States is curiously similar to the American image of the Soviet Union and that this bleak "mirror image" may be self-perpetuating.[1]

The books reviewed here do not dispel the impression that misperceptions continue to bedevil US-Soviet relations. However, they do indicate that Western Sovietologists now have sophisticated counterparts in the Soviet Union who can, and occasionally do, portray the United States in realistic terms. The volumes under review also point up a number of major methodological and substantive shortcomings in existing research on the perceptions of the Soviet elite.

A FREQUENT CAUSE of misperception is the lack of adequate information and of opportunity to check perceptions against reality. This constraint can make it very difficult even for sensitive observers to comprehend phenomena which they themselves have never experienced. Such was the case, for example, in the United States between the two world wars, when university, governmental, and foundation support for the study of the Soviet Union was absent. Although certain gifted journalists such as William Henry Chamberlin and Louis Fischer "sporadically discovered Russia for Americans,"[2] the state of American perspectives on the Soviet Union in the pre–World War II period is probably not inaccurately characterized by a story about an elderly New England lady. She asked a Russian émigré whether it were true that Russians still rode bears—and received the reply that those who used to ride bears probably still did so.

Constraints on access to information and restrictions on foreign travel have been an even greater problem for Soviet American watchers. Morton Schwartz's study of *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* shows, however, that this situation has improved markedly since the establishment of the USA Institute in November 1967. According to the first issue of the Institute publication, *SShA*, a central task for Soviet *amerikanisty* was the "comprehensive, profound, and concrete study of the economics and politics of the United

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[1] See, for example, Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," *Journal of Social Issues* (Ann Arbor, MI), 1961, pp. 45–57.

[2] The expression is Philip E. Mosely's. See his essay "The Growth of Russian Studies," in Harold H. Fisher, Ed., *American Research on Russia*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1959, p. 1.

States of America." Schwartz's careful study suggests that although the results of contemporary Soviet research on America are uneven and these writings still employ Marxist-Leninist ideology and imagery, they present an increasingly sophisticated and realistic picture of the United States.

Schwartz discerns a number of fundamental changes in Soviet scholarly perceptions. Perhaps the most far-reaching is the view that "the United States is a declining threat to the basic security interests of the USSR" (p. 157). To the extent that this view is acknowledged in other treatments of Soviet perceptions, it is usually considered to reflect not a change in Soviet thinking about the political outlook of American decisionmakers, but only a conviction that a change in the "correlation of forces" has compelled the US to adopt the less threatening policy of détente.[3] Such an interpretation is consistent with the phenomenon noted by students of misperception for actors to exaggerate the degree of their own influence in shaping the behavior of others when the behavior corresponds to their own desires.[4] But Schwartz argues persuasively that a more profound revision has taken place in traditional Soviet perspectives on the predatory nature of capitalist society. No longer are the majority of American corporations regarded as having a vested interest in continued international tension and a prolonged arms race (pp. 19–23). Moreover, Schwartz points out, no longer are common "class interests" assumed to explain policy positions among an increasingly heterogeneous "'ruling class'" (p. 38). "The underlying 'motive forces' of American foreign policy are recognized to be more differentiated than originally assumed" (p. 156). Schwartz also maintains that Soviet Americanists view the US traumas of the 1960's, especially the calamitous war in Vietnam, as in large part accounting for the weakening of the ideological base of US foreign policy and the Nixon administration's decision to move from an "era of confrontation to an era of negotiations" with the Soviet Union (p. 28).

More surprising, given the legacy of Soviet disavowals of any responsibility for international tension, is Schwartz's finding that some Soviet scholars now even acknowledge the role of *mutual* misperceptions as an obstacle to better US-Soviet relations. Schwartz cites, for example, one analyst's recognition that "decades of enmity and confrontation created in the West *as well as in the East* tenacious stereotyped views of the other side" (p. 155, Schwartz's emphasis). In addition, he notes Georgiy Arbatov's view that anti-Communist sentiments in the West were, in part, a reaction to Soviet intellectual dogmatism (p. 156). More generally, he discerns an awareness on the part of Soviet Americanists "that the image of the USSR held in the United States . . . is directly affected by Soviet behavior" (p. 144).

The contributors to *SShA*, to be sure, vary considerably in their objectivity and political sophistication. Furthermore, there appear to remain certain aspects of American politics and society which confuse even the most astute Soviet Americanists. Schwartz observes, for instance, that Soviet analysts seem unable to comprehend the principles of limited government and the rule of law or the concern Americans express regarding the morality of public leaders (pp. 46–47). This difficulty may help explain Soviet interpretations of the Watergate affair and President Richard M. Nixon's resignation as the outcome of a conspiracy by the "enemies of détente." The disdain or disregard of the constitutional issues involved in such interpretations may likewise reflect the more general tendency of Soviet analysts to project characteristics of the Soviet political environment upon the American scene.[5]

The overall impression conveyed by Schwartz of a cadre of better informed and less dogmatic Soviet Americanists unfortunately is not reinforced by *Russia and the United States*, the work of two senior Soviet scholars, Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai Yakovlev. Their account of Russian-American relations since 1776, written for an American audience, indicates that the relatively subtle Soviet perceptions of the United States noted by Schwartz may not be widely shared. One reads, for example, that the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression pact was a brilliant anti-fascist stratagem which "wrecked both the immediate plans of Axis powers and the anti-Soviet calculations of the Munichites" (p. 123); that the US made a minimal contribution to the Allied effort in World War II, including the war with Japan, where "the use of the atomic bomb was of no significance" (p. 209); and that the exemplary "efforts of the USSR in the matter of ensuring international peace were crowned with success" in the Cuban missile crisis (p. 244). These are a sample of the kind of historical interpretations that encourage some analysts in the West to contend that Soviet research on American history is of value primarily to psychologists interested in the phenomena of selective inattention and paranoia.[6] Most conspicuous by its absence in this Soviet volume is the slightest recognition of Soviet (or Russian) responsibility for any problem in the course of American relations with Russia and the Soviet Union since 1776. The two authors even attempt to debunk an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as an American response to Russian expansionism and claim that "it must be admitted that the Monroe Doctrine resulted above all from the expansionist activity of the American bourgeoisie and plantation owners clashing with the English bourgeoisie. . ." (p. 8).

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[3] See Stephen Gibert, *Soviet Images of America*, New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1977, p. 142; and R. Judson Mitchell, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1978, pp. 366–90.

[4] See, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 343.

[5] This notion of projection is developed in Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 26–29. See also Schwartz, p. 88.

As previously noted, prior to World War II the caliber of American scholarship on and the accuracy of American perceptions of the Soviet Union also left much to be desired. A good selection of the writings of some of the more perceptive early interpreters of the Soviet Union is included in Eugene Anschel's anthology of *American Appraisals of Soviet Russia, 1917–1977*. The volume is organized around the theme of continuity and change, with a special emphasis on the antecedents of the Soviet system and the effects of the industrializing process on the Soviet regime. Although the brevity of most of the entries and an excessive number of topics detract from the focus of the volume, the format that Anschel adopts succeeds in illustrating both the evolution of American thinking about Soviet Russia and the continuity and change in many dimensions of Soviet society.

The contributors to *Detente or Debacle*, edited by Fred Warner Neal for the Committee on East-West Accord, are more inclined to emphasize the changes rather than the continuity in Soviet society since Yosif Stalin's death. They are particularly critical of the failure of American perceptions to keep pace with these changes and worry lest cold war attitudes and misperceptions stand in the way of improved US-Soviet relations. The articles, for the most part, are of high quality, although their journalistic style and emphasis on policy advocacy may diminish their interest to scholars. Particularly noteworthy are Sidney Drell's excellent discussion of criteria for assessing US and Soviet arms control policy and Stephen Cohen's useful summary of the nature of Soviet politics and its implications for US-Soviet relations.

A much more diverse collection of recent Western perceptions of the Soviet Union is provided in *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. This study, commissioned by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, consists of 79 brief essays on 15 topics designed to reveal important Soviet attitudes, objectives, and capabilities, as well as US policy responses. The essays respond to specific questions posed by the Committee and generally do not present much in the way of new research findings. However, the structure of the volume facilitates a useful scholarly dialogue on a large number of narrowly defined topics.

THE CONTRASTING images of Soviet scholarship suggested in the two studies by Schwartz and Sivachev-Yakovlev and the very different appraisals of Soviet attitudes and intentions discussed by contributors to the three other books under review highlight the difficulty of accurately assessing Soviet perspectives. They also indicate a number of more general problems with research in the area of Soviet perceptions.

Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming is the absence of any systematic study of Soviet perceptions which is not severely restricted in terms of the issues examined or the sources surveyed. For example, there exists no published study for the post-Khrushchev period that is comparable in breadth to William Zimmerman's penetrating but dated analysis of *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*.[7]

More recent studies of Soviet perspectives also tend to be negligent about specifying the procedures used to collect and sort out Soviet views or the extent to which the views have changed over time. Neither Stephen Gibert's recent study of *Soviet Images of America* nor Schwartz's superior analysis provides a conceptual framework or even explicit criteria for sorting out Soviet pronouncements and assessing their relative importance. Because no data on frequency of expression of various viewpoints are provided, an opportunity to assess the representativeness of the views cited is lost. The failure to pay careful attention to the time periods under analysis likewise contributes to a form of selective inattention reflected in the stance of the American Soviet expert who, when questioned about the possibility of significant change taking place in the Soviet Union, responded: "It won't happen—but if it does, I'll be sure to miss it."[8]

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[6] A rationale for this perspective is given by Robert Allen in the introduction to Leo Okinshevich's bibliography on *U.S. History and Historiography in Post-War Soviet Writings, 1945–1970*, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC Clio Press, 1976, p. xiv. The precedents for historical misrepresentation apparent in the Sivachev-Yakovlev volume are discussed at length in John Keep and Liliana Brisby, Eds., *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1964.

[7] William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969.

An additonal problem is the lack of attention generally given to the function(s) that particular Soviet statements are intended to perform and the audience to which they are addressed. Some Soviet political analysts themselves acknowledge, for example, that public pronouncements can play a dual role. According to Alexander Bovin, "The verbal expression of policy . . . either reflects real political interests and intentions, or, conversely, is called upon to conceal these interests and intentions."[9] There is reason to believe that Soviet public statements also perform a variety of more specific mobilization, socialization, and legitimation functions.[10] Statements may thus be made which bear little correspondence to actual Soviet perceptions.

Although there is no simple means to avoid this problem, difficulties can be minimized if account is taken of the context within which statements are made, the constancy over time of views expressed, and the consistency of perceptions among various actors and across different publishing outlets.[11] A highly useful study, for example, would be the systematic comparison of Soviet views on strategic doctrine and arms control policy expressed in *International Affairs*, *SShA*, and *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*—sources sometimes discounted as propaganda mills for Western audiences—with perceptions discerned in recently declassified volumes of *Voennaya mysl'*. In fact, one of the more astute students of Soviet military policy, who has examined both classified and public Soviet writings, suggests that there may not be much discrepancy between the two in terms of the views expressed.[12] Significantly different perspectives, on the other hand, may well exist among representatives of research institutes and party-government organizations having different functional roles. For example, Philip Stewart and Elizabeth Kirk report a sharp contrast in positive orientation toward international security and arms control issues for the 1969–76 period between former Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.[13]

Finally, there is a compelling need in research on Soviet perceptions to address the issue of the correspondence or lack of correspondence between Soviet perceptions and actual Soviet behavior. As one astute observer notes, this approach would theoretically be the optimal test of inferences drawn from public statements.[14] Too often in practice, however, the "test" takes the form of selectively quoting Soviet sources to bolster an interpretation based upon prior conceptions of Soviet behavior.[15] What is needed instead is a comparison of independent indicators of perceptions and behavior.

THERE IS little evidence in the books reviewed here or in the larger body of research on US and Soviet perceptions with which this reviewer is familiar that either Soviet or American analysts are yet willing or able to remove their perceptual blinders or to agree on what constitutes "the facts." Nevertheless, the apparent growth in the number of relatively astute observers of the American scene in the Soviet Union is an encouraging sign that even long-held misperceptions are subject to change and correction. It is to be hoped that as Soviet (and American) specialists become more sensitive to alternative explanations and images, the amount of information and time necessary for such learning to occur will diminish.

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[8] Cited by Alexander Dallin, "Biases and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, OH), September 1973, p. 561.

[9] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 30, 1973, p. 4, cited by Schwartz, p. 6.

[10] These purposes are discussed in Paul Marantz, "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological Considerations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Mar. 22, 1979, pp. 2-3.

[11] This is the approach adopted by Philip Stewart and Elizabeth Kirk in probably the most ambitious and promising study of Soviet perceptions now under way. For a preliminary report on their project, see "Understanding Soviet Elite Perceptions of East-West Relations: A New Approach and Preliminary Findings," paper presented at the Conference on Kremlinology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, May 11-12, 1979.

[12] See Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1978, pp. 112-47.

[13] Stewart and Kirk, pp. 22-23.

[14] Marantz, p. 12.

[15] Alexander Dallin (loc. cit., p. 566) suggests that quotation mongering is an addiction American Soviet specialists have acquired from their Soviet counterparts.

GDR Foreign Policy

By John M. Starrels

JONATHAN STEELE. *Inside East Germany*. New York, NY, Urizen Books, 1977.

JÜRGEN RADDE. *Die aussenpolitische Führungselite der DDR* (The Foreign Policy Leadership Elite of the GDR). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976.

ANITA DASBACH-MALLINCKRODT. *Wer macht die Aussenpolitik der DDR?* (Who Makes the Foreign Policy of the GDR?). Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1972.

MELVIN CROAN. *East Germany: The Soviet Connection*. Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1976.

N. EDWINA MORETON. *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

PETER C. LUDZ. *Die DDR zwischen Ost und West* (The GDR Between East and West). München, C.H. Beck, 1977.

HERMANN WEBER. *Die SED nach Ulbricht* (The SED After Ulbricht). Hannover, Fackelträger Verlag, 1974.

HANS SIEGFRIED LAMM and SIEGFRIED KUPPER. *DDR und Dritte Welt* (The GDR and the Third World). München and Wien, R. Oldenbourg, 1976.

LYMAN H. LEGTERS, Ed. *The German Democratic Republic*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

THE CONTEMPORARY situation of East Germany is a good illustration of what it means to have to conduct both a domestic and a foreign policy without the protective garb of the traditional nation-state. Dependent upon Moscow's good graces in a constant search to legitimize its existence, maintain its political status quo and economic stability domestically, and secure the integrity of its territory, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is confronted with the difficult task of satisfying the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization while simultaneously contending with the nationalism of the Federal Republic of Germany and seeking to establish and further its own "national" goals. In trying to cope with this problem, the GDR may finally decide that the best approach lies beyond Europe. A more active role in the Third World can be justified solely on ideological grounds, but East Germany is also well aware of the potential political and economic benefits to be derived from pursuing such a course.

ACCORDING TO a growing number of analysts of foreign policy, the primacy of the nation-state is under severe, perhaps even fatal, challenge. If one compares present conditions with those of a century ago, sovereignty has indeed eroded. National security and economic policies are increasingly subject to the demands and expectations of other countries, and the ability of national elites to determine the course of their governments' domestic and foreign policies is called into serious question in a world which pays more than mere lip service to the realities of global interdependence. However, the German Democratic Republic is one of several countries in the world today which, for all practical purposes, have never experienced either the advantages or the disadvantages of national sovereignty.

During the first 20 years of its political existence, East Germany scoured the world for diplomatic legitimacy. To be sure, as Jonathan Steele's *Inside East Germany* more than adequately chronicles (indeed, tends to overstress), the GDR has been able to relate its social and political order to durable socialist traditions within the framework of German revolutionary history from the mid-19th century to the beginning of World War II. Yet, the common theme that emerges from the other books under review is the unending quest of East German leaders for international recognition. And even today, while the GDR enjoys full diplomatic relations with every country in the world save Israel, Chile, and an assortment of others branded as untouchables in the Soviet lexicon, the regime of Erich Honecker remains uncertain about its national and international roles.

What explains East Germany's persistent search for international acceptance? After three decades of "official" political development (1949-80), a large part of the answer involves the foreign policy cadre who guide the short- and long-term fortunes of the German Democratic Republic. Jürgen Radde's study of the foreign policy elite in the GDR underlines the growing professionalization of that stratum, while emphasizing the continuing importance of social relationships within the apparatus of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) as a whole. Although Radde totally ignores the linkage between these personal relationships and GDR foreign policy—especially the pursuit of international legitimacy—Anita Dasbach-Mallinckrodt's impressive examination of the GDR foreign policy elite easily fills that vacuum. Mallinckrodt's study, which has been unaccountably ignored in the United States, may be the most significant work available on the making of foreign policy in the GDR, or in Communist states more generally. Perhaps the chief value of the book is her unstinting effort to search for connections between the impersonal workings of the East Germany foreign policy apparatus and the career profiles and the foreign policy orientations of the leading figures of the SED. While the East German regime did not give her permission to interview the major foreign policy figures of the GDR, she has shown imagination in constructing some highly plausible opinion profiles of these key figures.

Mallinckrodt also touches upon another reason for the GDR's dogged quest for international recognition. She demonstrates that East Germany's evolution into a functioning nation-state has been closely tied to broad Soviet foreign policy goals. Indeed, although Mallinckrodt does not press this line of argument consistently, it is clear that international acceptance of the GDR has been directly related to Moscow's willingness to advance the fortunes of its junior partner.

WHILE THE GDR has pursued international legitimacy on a global scale, the focal point of its foreign activity has remained in Europe. Therefore, any analysis of East German foreign policy must pay particular heed to the GDR's association with the Soviet bloc in Europe and the GDR's continuing struggle with the neighboring Federal Republic of Germany.

Both Melvin Croan and N. Edwina Moreton underline the importance of relations with the USSR for the East Germans. Croan rightly emphasizes that in the economic arena, East Germany's ability to supply the USSR with high-precision instruments otherwise unavailable in Eastern Europe in return for Soviet raw materials compensates in large measure for the GDR's poverty of natural resources. Moreover, he notes that if the GDR is dependent on the Soviet Union for defense of East German "socialist achievements," the GDR has some leverage over Soviet policy toward Berlin. Unfortunately, however, he merely flirts with, rather than develops, provocative ideas on the range of choices open to the GDR.

Moreton's *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance* seriously attempts to answer an imposing set of questions about contemporary East German foreign policy in Eastern Europe. Does the GDR have a "national" interest? If it does, what means does it employ to try to achieve its interests and goals? How does the Honecker regime reconcile its participation in the Warsaw Pact with the continual political demands placed upon it by a dynamic and nationalistic West German neighbor? Moreton stresses that growing East German–Soviet rapprochement within the Warsaw Pact now enables General Secretary Erich Honecker and his SED colleagues to pursue East German national interests—principally the "defense" of East Berlin and the maintenance of political authority in the GDR—with a fair amount of freedom. If East Germany's privileged trading relations with the Federal Republic irritate other members of the alliance, the GDR is not being prohibited from expanding its economic relations with Bonn. Thus, rather than being captive of Soviet big-power chauvinism—a frequent Chinese claim—the East Germans may in fact have been able to employ their relative weakness and strategic vulnerability to some advantage in dealing with the USSR.

BUT IF the German Democratic Republic has concentrated on carving out a role for itself in the heart of Europe, will it necessarily do so in the future? Both Peter C. Ludz and Hermann Weber correctly emphasize that the shift of power from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker in 1971 has brought a greater "realism" to East German foreign policy. The GDR no longer champions its special brand of communism in Eastern Europe as it did under Ulbricht, and it can be argued that East Berlin has all but forsaken any hope of "German unity"—a change most obviously reflected in the revised GDR Constitution of 1974, which refers to the GDR as a separate nation-state. But such issues may increasingly be less important in the kind of global political and economic order which now confronts advanced industrial societies as a whole and East Germany in particular.

Indeed, the chances are quite high that East Germany will become a more active, if not assertive, presence in what is loosely labeled the Third World. Actually, as Lamm and Kupper point out in their valuable work on East German activity in the Third World (*DDR und Dritte Welt*), the GDR has always been involved in the affairs of this vast and diverse area. The authors provide some fascinating, if pathetic, anecdotes of how East Germany's immediate postwar generation of leaders wooed Third World rulers in the hope of securing diplomatic recognition. For example, when some GDR pilots obtained landing rights in an Asian country for their malfunctioning aircraft and put the plane down safely, East German diplomats immediately cabled home that a delegation from the GDR had been greeted officially by representatives of the government!

In a more serious vein, however, Lamm and Kupper document East German efforts during the prerecognition era of the 1950's and 1960's to make the GDR's existence felt in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Even though the East Germans essentially followed Soviet policy in the Third World, they nonetheless succeeded in making common cause with many of the emerging revolutionary groups in the countries there, especially in the Middle East (Algeria, for example) and Southern Africa.

Lamm and Kupper also offer insight into the precise rationale for East German policy toward the Third World during the period. This has several aspects. First and foremost, the GDR sought political recognition in the Third World to counter West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, which effectively prevented Western governments, on pain of reprisal by the Federal Republic, from recognizing the GDR. Second, the East German leadership knew that the GDR's lack of natural resources might eventually force it to go outside Eastern Europe for raw materials. Through association with Third World revolutionaries, the leadership hoped that the GDR, over the long term, might secure direct access to many commodities, such as oil, copper, and fruit, which were currently being supplied by its neighbors. Finally, alignment with the Third World might help East Germany differentiate itself from its larger and more powerful German competitor to the west, and thereby assist in establishing a distinctive national identity. Interestingly, while East German propagandists have stressed the traditional elements of "their" German political culture when addressing a West German audience ("this is the home of Bach, Mozart, Einstein, etc."), they have accented the world revolutionary mission of East Germany within the broader anti-imperialist movement in talking to the Third World.

Michael W. Olszewski suggests that in recent years East German activism in the Third World has taken on an added motivational dimension. Writing in Lyman H. Legter's collection of essays on *The German Democratic Republic*, Olszewski argues that Third World policy implicitly promises GDR policymakers a partial release "from an otherwise tightly harnessed policy framework."

There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence available that indicates that the East German leaders do indeed see their Third World policy as affording them such a release. According to Anita Mallinckrodt, also writing in the Legters volume, the GDR by the early 1970's already possessed an imposing technological capacity to broadcast its view of the world scene to others. Radio Berlin International (RBI), she says,

> *has been broadcasting from East Berlin to the world for the past fifteen years. . . . Transmitting fifty-two hours of programming a day in twelve languages, RBI claims it is heard by coal miners in Sweden, students in India, and trade unionists in Australia. Beginning with a ten-minute broadcast in French in 1955, RBI next added Swedish, Danish, Arabic, and German, then Italian, Swahili, Spanish, and Portuguese.* (Legters, p. 229)

Moreover, even though the GDR, in tandem with the Soviet Union, has suffered important setbacks in the Third World—particularly in Indonesia, Egypt, and Somalia—it has nevertheless been persistent in its pursuit of allies.

Perhaps the most obvious and impressive instances of GDR activism in the Third World have been in the Middle East and Africa. In contrast with the pan-German policy of Berlin toward both these regions prior to World War II, however, the GDR's policy toward these areas has not been an independent, much less a singular, one. Rather, the GDR has worked in close association with the Soviet Union and Cuba in attempting to stimulate radical political change in various countries. Still, East German military and administrative tutelage has been conspicuous in South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. And the strident anti-Israeli (and anti-Zionist) posture of the East German leadership has served as a justification for GDR support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Such activism may in fact prove quite useful to East Berlin as a means of gaining increased leverage with respect to Moscow. To be sure, the GDR operates under many constraints here. The East German role in the Third World remains supplementary rather than decisive. Furthermore, even though the GDR's new forays in Africa and Asia may have produced a positive resonance in East German public opinion,[1] the Honecker regime still has of late been experiencing major economic and social problems at home.

Nevertheless, there is little question that the USSR increasingly requires the kind of support for its foreign policy projects throughout the world that the GDR can provide. In the arena of Eastern Europe, it is true, this requirement has not yet become very significant, for the Brezhnev doctrine underlines the continuing reality of Soviet readiness and ability to move unilaterally in handling recalcitrant allies. But in the larger global environment, the USSR finds itself under compulsion to act more circumspectly. Thus, in areas like the Third World, multilateral support assumes real significance.

In addition, there are a few signs that East Berlin has already benefited positively from its services to Soviet causes in the Third World. For example, despite the sharp increase in the cost of Soviet oil and natural gas sent to the GDR, the East Germans, unlike some other East Europeans, have yet to experience serious financial difficulties in their dealings with the USSR. More than one economic analyst has suggested that Moscow's acquiescence to the galloping East German indebtedness to the Soviet Union has been compensation for the services that the GDR has rendered.[2]

If this analysis is correct, then we can look forward to mounting involvement of the GDR in the Third World. Despite its lack of national sovereignty, the GDR, as a highly organized technological society, possesses all the attributes to carry a major share of the "socialist burden" there.

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[1] Marlies Menge, "Beat and Borscht: Development Aid of the GDR," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Feb. 29, 1980.

[2] See, for example, Michael Keren, "The Return of the Ancien Regime: The GDR in the 1970s," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 722.

A Window on Poland's Social Transformation

By Maurice D. Simon

THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. *Polish Sociology 1975–1976: Studies in Methodology, Bibliography of Sociological Works*. Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1977.

ERIK ALLARDT and WLODZIMIERZ WESOLOWSKI, Eds. *Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland, Comparative Perspective*. Warsaw, Polish Scientific Publishers, 1978.

M.N. RUTKEVITCH et al., Eds. *Transformations of Social Structure in the USSR and Poland*. Moscow and Warsaw, Institute for Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1974.

THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. *Polish Sociology 1977: Social Structure*. Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1978.

KAZIMIERZ SLOMCZYNSKI and TADEUSZ KRAUZE, Eds. *Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland*. White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978.

WLODZIMIERZ WESOLOWSKI and KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI. *Investigations on Class Structure and Social Stratification in Poland 1945–1975*. Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1977.

N.S. MANSUROV et al., Eds. *Personal Activity in the Socialist Society*. Moscow and Warsaw, Institute for Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1974.

POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE RESEARCH AND PROGNOSTICS COMMITTEE "POLAND 2000." *Polska 2000: Social Development of Poland in Prognostics Works* (Special Number). Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1974.

WESTERN ANALYSIS of socioeconomic and political changes in East European countries has tended to suffer from a lack of access to data. The political sensitivity of much of the salient information has often created insurmountable obstacles to its acquisition by Westerners. Still, the past decade has witnessed considerable progress toward the opening up of Eastern Europe to Western social science research. Poland constitutes a good case in point.

Since 1956, Polish sociologists have engaged in wide-scale empirical investigations, pursued serious international collaboration, and maintained a flexibility in both analysis and interpretation of research findings that produces challenging and provocative studies;[1] and in recent years there has been an outpouring of translations of their work. The books under review illustrate how scholarship can be advanced by such an open and genuinely collaborative spirit, and they provide a good sample of the richness and diversity of Polish sociology. At the same time, they demonstrate certain failings and limitations of which Westerners should be aware.

THESE VOLUMES aptly point up three key characteristics of Polish sociology. First, it has been oriented toward social problems, with research focusing largely on the dilemmas and issues generated by the processes of industrialization and modernization. As Jan Szczepanski, one of Poland's most eminent sociologists, puts things, a main thrust of research has been "the identification of deficiencies and backward areas" in social life rooted in the past and/or emerging with socialist development (*Polish Sociology 1975–1976*, p. 14). Second, Polish sociology has shown a keen sensitivity to theoretical and methodological questions of universal importance. While giving central attention to Polish national problems, it has not been unduly parochial in its concerns. Third, Polish sociology displays a distinctive Marxist theoretical emphasis in its preoccupation with class structure, social mobility, and class consciousness. These features bear more detailed examination in the context of the particular books at hand.

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[1] For a Western assessment of Polish sociology, see C.G.A. Bryant, "Sociology and Socialism in Poland—A View from the West," *Social Research*, (New York, NY), Spring 1972, pp. 102–33. For Polish discussions, see Wladyslaw Markiewicz, "Sociology in People's Poland," in Jerzy J. Wiatr, Ed., *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today*, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1971, pp. 97–137; and J.J. Wiatr, "Sociology-Marxism-Reality," in Peter L. Berger, Ed., *Marxism and Sociology: Views from Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 18–36.

The major process that these volumes analyze is the "transformation" of Poland into a socialist society ("socialist construction"). This process, it is emphasized, involves a developmental strategy of planned and guided societal change according to the long-term political goals associated with Marxism. Politics and ideology are said to determine the main economic and social patterns of change. As Witold Morawski asserts,

> *In Poland, as in any other socialist country, the role of official doctrine has been of decisive importance. In this doctrine industrialization is treated as a means of achieving a future socialist society and is, more or less deliberately, shaped by a series of political decisions.* (Allardt and Wesolowski, p. 50)

A wide array of statistical data is presented to describe and measure the magnitude and rate of economic growth and consequent changes in social structure in post-World War II Poland (see especially Allardt and Wesolowski, and Rutkevitch et al. for the broad panorama of change).

In terms of the goals of socialist transformation, the positive accomplishments are, in fact, impressive. These volumes document the formation and growth of the industrial working class and its mobilization for basic industrialization, the emergence of a distinctive socialist intelligentsia and its pivotal role in scientific-technological advancement and economic management, the declining size of the agrarian population because of migration to the cities, the improved (if still unsatisfactory) conditions of rural life, and the progress in agricultural production (which nevertheless continues to fall below current needs and demands). Upward social mobility, the upgrading of the quality of education and the broadening of educational opportunities, the provision of more social welfare benefits and public services, and the widening of access to culture are correctly attributed to "socialist construction" and are depicted in statistical fashion.

Although such descriptions of comprehensive social changes stemming from "socialist construction" are quite informative, they do not break much new ground. Even Western scholars unfamiliar with the specific dimensions of change in socialist Poland would tend to expect or acknowledge that the overall achievements have been considerable—whether or not they expressed strong normative reservations about the degree to which the benefits of development have justified the costs.

Yet it must be stressed that there are significant, challenging, and novel analytical perspectives and findings presented in these studies as well. The sophisticated and systematic treatment of the formation of new socio-occupational divisions and groups, of new patterns of social stratification, and of inter- and intragenerational social mobility deserves special attention. (This is particularly true of *Polish Sociology 1977*, Slomczynski and Krauze, and the empirical investigations reported in Wesolowski and Slomczynski.) Here, we see in sharpest focus some of the key consequences of socialist development — increased social differentiation; disparities in income, education, prestige, and working conditions; and distinctly contrasting opportunities for advancement for members of particular social groups. These problems are at the heart of the social and political tensions contemporary Poland has been experiencing. Industrialization and "socialist construction" have produced a high degree of organized social complexity and an intensification of group identities and claims that place heavy strains upon the political system.[2]

There is a keen awareness of and sensitivity to social inequality in most of the analyses. The thought-provoking contributions of Slomczynski and Wesolowski provide an important illustration of this concern. These writers hypothesize that research increasingly will point to "the division of labor and its imperatives as the reigning force" in "determining the distribution of numerous attributes of social position within a socialist society." In other words, there will be a diminished role for the "classical" Marxist criterion of class position, "namely [property] relations to the means of production," and an enhanced role for socio-occupational factors (such as vocational qualifications and work productivity) in determining the distribution of material and psychic rewards (*Polish Sociology 1977*, pp. 26–28). This judgment implies that as socialist construction proceeds, meritocratic principles will take precedence over egalitarian principles in shaping the allocation of social rewards. Conceivably, such a change could promote cumulative advantages for members of certain socio-occupational groups who are highly qualified and/or engaged in the most valued productive activities, thus undermining some of the egalitarian objectives of socialism. At present, however, the empirical findings of Slomczynski and Wesolowski indicate that attempts to limit social inequalities have produced a marked "decomposition of social position attributes" or "status inconsistency (incongruence between such attributes of social position as education, income, prestige, and authority). Theoretically, this could produce social discontent among those who consider their efforts to be undervalued (e.g., highly qualified professionals who receive relatively modest incomes as a result of egalitarian wage scales). For reasons that are unconvincing but too complex to summarize here, Slomczynski and Wesolowski (pp. 109–21) do not find this to be the case. In a theoretical and practical sense, however, they present important new insights into the crucial role socio-occupational differentiation may play in the crystallization of inequalities. Their contention that policymakers may be able to reduce tensions stemming from inequalities "by promoting status inconsistencies, at least among some attributes of social position" (pp. 31, 117–19) is intriguing and merits careful examination by Western social scientists.

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[2] For a useful recent examination of this theme, see Sten Tellenback, "The Logic of Development in Socialist Poland," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, NC), December 1978, pp. 436-56. See also Roger E. Kanet, "Political Groupings and Their Role in the Process of Change in Eastern Europe," in Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman, Eds., *Innovation in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, pp. 41-58.

In addition, the studies by Jan Danecki on income distribution policies, Irena Reszke on the effects of status incongruence, Tadeusz Remer on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and feelings of relative deprivation, Boguslaw Blachnicki on the consciousness of economic equality on the part of industrial employees, Jan Malanowski on interclass relations and perceptions of distance between social classes, Krzysztof Szafnicki on evaluations of individual earnings and family income, Lidia Beskid on income and consumption, and Krzysztof Ostrowski on regional development reflect the serious and extensive research efforts to determine the causes of social inequality and to probe the Polish public's view of its effects (Danecki, Reszke, Remer, and Blachnicki in *Polish Sociology 1977;* Malanowski and Szafnicki in Slomczynski and Krauze; Beskid and Ostrowski in Allardt and Wesolowski). All these articles provide important conceptual and methodological insights, as well as a variety of interesting data on Poland's social and economic development.

Equally significant and useful are the analyses of patterns of social mobility, best exemplified by the work of Krzysztof Zagorski (Allardt and Wesolowski, pp. 147–82; Rutkevitch et al., pp. 317–44; Slomczynski and Krauze, pp. 61–80; *Polish Sociology 1977*, pp. 139–58). Zagorski presents abundant data, including findings from a 1972 Central Statistical Office survey of economically active males and females aged 15–69 (involving more than 70,000 respondents), that help to clarify the influence of economic development, urban-rural residence, education, sex, and family background upon social mobility. His data suggest that social mobility has been an important tool in creating public support for socialism, especially during the period of rapid industrialization in the 1950's. Economic development plus the extension of educational opportunities, along with overtly egalitarian policies of promotion, led to notable collective mobility. More recent trends in the 1960's and 1970's indicate that a stabilization (and even a downturn) in the entry of young workers and peasants into the intelligentsia has taken place (Wesolowski and Slomczynski, pp. 91–92). Furthermore, tendencies toward downward mobility from the intelligentsia into the working class probably mean that there has been a decrease in mobility opportunities.

In combination with real or perceived perceptions of social inequality, this is likely to foster social tensions.[3] Wladyslaw Adamski's analysis of the Polish educational system vividly illustrates how. Especially during the 1950's, the educational system promoted collective social mobility through the preferential selection of working-class and peasant youth for places in postsecondary institutions. Recently, however, the "attempt to introduce a new scale of values, favouring far more the professional mastery that education gives the individual rather than the 'high post' it secures the employee in the social division of labour . . . means that the function of the school as a channel for social mobility might be tapering off in Poland" (Allardt and Wesolowski, p. 244). The result has been the emergence of strong public criticism from some groups that meritocratic selection practices actually *reduce* educational and occupational opportunities for young people from peasant and working-class backgrounds. Thus, Poland, seeking to create a system that both operates on meritocratic principles and serves to promote equality of opportunity, adopted a comprehensive reform of its educational system in 1973. It is far too early to evaluate the impact of the reform, but it is very clear that the decline in the rate of collective social mobility has politicized decision-making on education.

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[3] For a solid discussion of these issues, see Walter D. Connor, "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1977, pp. 16–32.

So far we have looked essentially at macrostructural changes in Poland, and it is at this level of analysis that Polish sociology has displayed the greatest strength. But Szczepanski has argued that analysis of changes in the microstructure (defined as "small groups, types of families, neighborhoods and labor communities, social circles, types of human relations, informal institutions, patterns of mutual interrelations, etc.") is also essential for measuring the depth of social transformation under socialism.[4] Several of the studies in these volumes have sought to rectify the existing deficiencies at this level of analysis. Most of the contributions to the volume on *Personal Activity in the Socialist Society* are too general to enable one to assess the degree of progress in the fostering of a new socialist personality; however, the discussions of objectives for educational, work, social, cultural, and leisure activities do point up the ends of political socialization. More recent studies by Magdalena Sokolowska on the social position of women, Jerzy Piotrowski on marriage and the family, Waclaw Makarczyk on social networks, and Antonina Kloskowska on cultural participation (Allardt and Wesolowski) contain valuable information and insights which heighten our understanding of the daily lives of citizens of socialist societies. Aldona Jawlowska and Edmund Mokrzycki's attempt to show how elements of presocialist life-styles have persisted in a transformed Polish social structure (*Polish Sociology 1977,* pp. 93–107) deserves special mention.

CORRECTION

On page 15 of the article, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" *(Problems of Communism,* January-February 1980), the sentence beginning at the end of column one and continuing to column two should read:

The Hungarians György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, now émigrés, push their analysis a step further to argue that the intelligentsia—far from serving as a mediator between workers and the political elite—is on the road to becoming the dominant group within the ruling class, the intellectuals' possession of "teleological knowledge" giving them a claim to preeminence in a system of "rational (i.e., non-market) redistribution."

THE PRECEDING commentary on the books under review tends to convey a very positive picture of contemporary Polish sociology, and it would be misleading to leave such an overall impression. Polish sociology does have its faults. The major one is its failure to explore systematically the relationship between changes in social structure on the one hand and politics on the other.

In a stimulating and candid essay written in 1973, "Past and Present in Polish Sociology," Jerzy J. Wiatr admitted that before 1971 empirical sociological research in Poland had been highly vulnerable to political pressure.[5] During the Gomulka period, the critical independence of many sociologists was compromised by party-government control of financing, employment assignments, access to data, and publication opportunities.

Although conditions for controversial research have greatly improved since 1970, it would appear that the threat and practice of external restrictions continue. Many salient problem areas in Polish social life are still not being fully investigated by the able researchers whom Poland boasts. Sociologists do offer some advice and expertise to political decision-makers and enjoy well-earned public status and prestige, but their talents have not been fully harnessed for exploring current policy dilemmas and social tensions. Wiatr expresses a worthy ideal: "Accepting and approving the *status quo* in so far as it constitutes the negation of the capitalist *status quo ante,* critical sociology should also be able to criticize it from the perspective of the future."[6] It is unfortunate, indeed, that Polish sociologists are obliged to be cautious in their choice of research topics and to weigh their words carefully.

As long as such conditions persist, Polish sociology can have only limited value for social science analysis in the West. The neglect of political institutions and processes is a crucial weakness. Szczepanski has been in the forefront of Polish efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of socialist society and has delineated the elements needed for working out a "synthetic forecast" of its future (*Polska 2000*, pp. 7–21). But impediments to the realization of this aim have undermined the value of the work presented in the volume on social prognostics. As Szczepanski points out, in a socialist society "the state of the system of central control decides the state of the entire society." The key components of this system are "the Party and its directing organs, the Government, the Parliament, the Council of State, the Planning Commission, the National Councils, the political parties." Yet he admits that "research on the system of central control and the forecasts regarding its composition, functioning principles, and acting efficiency have not been done in any socialist country" (ibid., p. 14). This is an overstatement, for some institutional research has been carried out (primarily on the local level). Nevertheless, most of these analyses appear to be on peripheral topics and/or do not probe deeply enough. As was pointed out earlier, Polish sociologists claim that Marxist doctrine has had a significant influence on developmental decisions, but their work offers few systematic analyses of how and why specific policy choices have been made, although there are some weak indications that more publications on political institutions and their role in processes of social change will appear in the future.

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[4] Jan Szczepanski, "Some Characteristics of Contemporary Polish Society," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1964, p. 12. For a discussion of the microstructure of Polish society, see also Szczepanski, *Polish Society,* New York, NY, Random House, pp. 173–92.

[5] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Past and Present in Polish Sociology," a publication of *Accademia Polacca Delle Scienze* (Rome), Fasc. 64, 1974, pp. 1–23.

[6] Ibid., p. 22.

Similarly, there is great need for more extensive and accurate analyses of intergroup competition and representation of diverse interests within Polish society. The increasing social differentiation examined in these volumes must affect political life. For example, Slomczynski and Wesolowski refer to "structural collisions of interests" that lead to "articulated conflicts." More specifically, they state:

> *Since there is a scarcity of many goods, the system of distribution is bound to produce conflict of interests between various socio-occupational groups to which goods are unevenly distributed.* (Polish Sociology 1977, p. 30)

Polish sociologists have entered into some discussion of "nonantagonistic contradictions" and have begun very preliminary and tentative exploration of the relationship between pluralism and politics, but much more work is required. Andrzej Tyszka, in a thoughtful critique of the Polish literature on social prognostics, argues for "following and defining the types of conflicts and questioned economic and social interests; . . . bringing to light the causes of these conflicts; . . . defining those groups that are entangled in conflicts; . . . analyzing methods and outcomes of arbitration of conflicts and tensions" (ibid., p. 48). Presumably, the political context within which Polish sociology operates has inhibited such research. These recent volumes, however, display new candor about such tensions, and it is to be hoped that forthcoming research will focus more directly on such phenomena.

The paucity of sociological publications dealing with public perceptions and evaluations of the socialist political system is also regrettable.[7] This type of research has apparently been conducted by such agencies as the Public Opinion Research Center of Polish Radio and Television and the Institute for Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism of the Polish United Workers' Party, but if so, exceedingly little is known in the West about the specific findings or even the topics.

In sum, then, the marked qualitative improvement of recent Polish sociological investigations of the transformation of the social structure during socialist construction has given Western observers new insight into the nature of contemporary Poland. Until Polish sociological research delves more deeply into the relationship between politics and changes in social structure, however, its usefulness to Western analysts will remain rather limited.

---

[7] In a recent chapter in Walter D. Connor and Zvi Gitelman, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems*, New York, NY, Praeger Special Studies, 1977, pp. 41–82, Adaline Huszczo mentions only a few studies directly bearing upon public opinion about the polity. In the same volume, Connor, referring to the more recent period, states that in European socialist states, including Poland, there has been a "tightening of control over the institutions and personnel involved in the research, and in the reservation of results of that research to governmental and party bodies that make use of them." In other words, there has been a "politicization" of public opinion research. Ibid., p. 181.

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SOVIET GLOBAL POWER AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES

Vernon V. Aspaturian



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Cover: Afghan soldiers on a Soviet tank on the Gardez road in Afghanistan's Paktia province on January 22, 1980. Photo by Alain Mingam/Gamma via Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces
Vernon V. Aspaturian

During recent years, the USSR has pursued a global policy that is something less than a "grand design" but something more than a response to targets of opportunity. As part of this policy, it has demanded treatment as an equal of the United States, but it has recognized that in fact—if not in propaganda claims—it has not yet achieved equality. Moscow now fears that its assertiveness since the mid-1970's, and especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, will cause Washington to take advantage of America's superior productive potential to counter the military capabilities that underlie the Soviet claim to equality.

The Politics of Stringency in the USSR
Seweryn Bialer

The complex economic problems that will face the Soviet leadership in the 1980's—a slowdown in growth and shortages of energy and manpower—in combination with a likely political succession will exert unusual pressures for a reform of the Soviet system of economic management. Yet, it is not certain whether the regime will respond with broad change or instead settle for a period of muddling "down" not "through."

Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda
George W. Breslauer

As the Brezhnev succession draws near, the two previous political successions in the USSR assume an immediate relevance. Each was marked by an underlying reformist impulse within the Soviet political elite; each was characterized initially by rival policy programs, policy zigzags, and polarization of positions; and in each the party leader ultimately gained the ascendancy and forged a comprehensive program in domestic and foreign policy. Indications are that the reformist impulse will persist, although several new factors at home and abroad might alter the pattern.

Soviet Letters Under Brezhnev
Maurice Friedberg

Soviet literature under Brezhnev, while not imprisoned in the sort of ideological straitjacket that marked the Stalinist years, has tended to retreat from the political engagement that surfaced briefly during the Khrushchev "thaw" to a greater concern with private issues. In keeping with this trend, there has been increased use of poetry and short prose forms, with a corresponding decline in the publication of novels.

Essay-reviews

Eurocommunist Views of Soviet History

Michael J. Sodaro

Since the early 1970's, a variety of critical studies of Soviet history by members of the Italian and French Communist parties have appeared. These writings reflect an effort to assert that Eurocommunism is distinctive from the Soviet model in origins and methods. At the same time, they betray the disinclination of the Eurocommunists to break completely with the Soviet heritage.

Perspectives on the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Harold C. Hinton

The Sino-Soviet conflict continues unresolved, and the literature regarding it in both East and West often leaves much to be desired. Western studies tend to treat the subject from narrow, specialized perspectives; in the Soviet Union, published works fail to reflect the objective studies that Soviet scholars are capable of producing.

The Party and the Gun in China

Paul H.B. Godwin

Long-standing Western concepts of the political role of the Chinese military were significantly altered by the events of the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Biao affair of 1971, which showed the weakness of the party's control apparatus within the military and the porousness of the boundary between the civil and military hierarchies. This relationship remains largely unchanged today, and the Chinese military will likely continue to play a major political role, especially in times of severe intraparty factional dispute.

Nasser's Legacy

Amos Perlmutter

Gamal Abdel Nasser's efforts to carry out agrarian reform, to nurture Egypt's industrialization, and to free Egypt from great power machinations earned him the status of one of the most exalted leaders of the Third World during his lifetime, but retrospective judgments of his record now tend to find it an unimpressive one. His internal accomplishments were meager, for he hooked his economy to Soviet bureaucratic socialism and recreated a bureaucratic feudalism. In foreign affairs, he wound up beholden to Moscow, which did not reward his loyalty.

Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces

By Vernon V. Aspaturian

For some time now, the USSR's behavior in the international arena, and particularly in the Third World, has been debated within the context of whether Moscow is executing a "grand design" or "global strategy" or merely responding to "targets of opportunity." Actually, Soviet policy amounts to something less than a master plan (grand design) or a five- or ten-year plan (global strategy), yet it is something much more than a sequence of responses to targets of opportunity. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 was clearly in part an initiatory act and not exclusively a reactive one. Even more important, the USSR's recent insistence, in advance of any definition or occasion, that as an equal to the United States it must be consulted in principle on all major issues everywhere, hardly seems like a passive, reactive policy that a targets-of-opportunity hypothesis would convey. The Soviet Union responds to targets of opportunity, it often creates its own opportunities, and it behaves in the absence of opportunities.

In short, the Soviet Union has developed a *global policy* to correspond with its as yet modest global capabilities. This article will explore that policy and its complexities and ramifications from Moscow's standpoint.

Assertion of Global-Power Status

"Today," declared Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in April 1971, "there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it."[1] This public, if somewhat premature, self-anointment by Moscow as a global power represented more pretension and anticipation than reality. Although for most of the postwar era, the international system had functioned along bipolar lines, with two powers dominating the international landscape, the United States at that juncture still constituted the only authentic global power.[2]

To be sure, Nikita Khrushchev had made a bid for global status in the late 1950's and early 1960's, when he thought that Soviet space achievements had set in motion a psychological momentum that could be converted into Soviet power. But this early and highly premature bid had failed, just as had Khrushchev's boast that the Soviet Union would soon overtake the

Mr. Aspaturian is Evan Pugh Professor of Political Science and Director of the Slavic and Soviet Language and Area Center, Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA). He is the author of The Soviet Union in the World Communist System, *1966;* Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, *1971; and numerous other works on Soviet foreign policy and Soviet politics.*

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 4, 1971.

[2] Both the USSR and the United States, it is true, had by 1960 achieved recognition as "superpowers." As such, they shared a number of salient common characteristics which set them apart from the other states in the international community. Each had a large, diversified, and highly skilled population; boasted a powerful industrial-technological capacity; occupied a large, strategically located territory; was the leader of an ideological-military alliance; and gathered around itself a retinue of client states from various parts of the world. Most important, each had or was soon to develop a capability sufficient to unilaterally and almost instantaneously incinerate the globe. Perhaps it is this last characteristic, gruesome as it may be, that constitutes the ineffaceable stigmata of a global power—more, perhaps, by adumbration than designation, since the crude capacity to destroy the entire planet does not by itself enable a country to function as a global power.

Although the distinction between the concepts "superpower" and "global power" has not always been recognized and the two concepts have often been used interchangeably, the difference is fundamental, if subtle. The term "superpower" has primary reference to the magnitude of power which a state possesses. While the unilateral capacity to

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Soviet missilery on display in Red Square during the Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1979.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA

United States in science, technology, and certain sectors of the economy.[3]

Within a year after Gromyko revealed Moscow's self-image as a global power, however, the Soviet Union was formally, if inadvertently, enshrined as a global power when, at the SALT I ceremonies in Moscow, the United States voluntarily recognized the Soviet Union as an equal *strategic power,* as reflected in the principle of strategic parity. One prerequisite "for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations" between the USSR and the United States, reads the "Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," is "the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality."[4] Although the Soviet Union in 1972 was not yet a global power, Moscow considered that the SALT I agreements and the principle of strategic parity invested the USSR with the mantle of global status and all of the entitlements and deference such a status presumed and implied.

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destroy the entire planet constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for global power status, however, it is by no means sufficient for a state to qualify as a global power, for the concept of a "global power" involves not only the magnitude of power that a state possesses but also the range and reach of that power. Thus, countries such as China, France, West Germany, and Japan have superpower potential because of their material and human resources, but it is doubtful that any country aside from the US and the USSR, with the possible exception of China, can assemble the complicated and intricate complex of intersecting and reinforcing economic, scientific, technological, military, demographic, and geographical capabilities necessary to function as a global power.

[3] See Khrushchev's report to the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the CPSU in *Pravda,* Jan. 28, 1959.

[4] The full text of this document, signed on May 29, 1972, appears in *The Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), June 26, 1972, pp. 898–99. It is not entirely clear that President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, anticipated, much less intended, that the principle of strategic parity and equal security should or would invest the Soviet Union with global power status. Certainly, the United States strongly contested such an interpretation once the USSR began to behave like a global power.

About 1974, the Soviet Union's global character finally took shape, when the USSR developed a modest but growing global capability to match its global pretensions. Taking advantage of the temporary paralysis induced in the United States by the post-Vietnam malaise and Watergate, the USSR cautiously embarked upon its first global excursion by orchestrating from Moscow an ingeniously conceived and effective military intervention by its Caribbean client state, Cuba, in the remote reaches of Southern Africa. The fact that Moscow could logistically conceive and execute such a military operation was a tangible confirmation of its global reach. To be sure, the USSR still does not possess the resources and capabilities to intervene in all parts of the globe with equal effectiveness, and its capabilities fall short of America's global capabilities. But it does possess sufficient reach to carefully select its targets around the globe, depending upon opportunities, risks, and chances of success.

As befits a global power, the Soviet Union included in the new constitution adopted on October 7, 1977, an entire chapter on foreign policy which elaborated the foreign policy aims and functions of the Soviet state in comprehensive global terms. Article 28 reads:

> *The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.*[5]

After the USSR had functioned as a global power for about five years, the Soviet leadership apparently calculated that the combination of the United States' acceptance of the USSR as a military equal—indeed, the general perception that the Soviet Union might even be militarily superior—and the USSR's new global capabilities entitled it to be recognized as an overall equal to the United States. In fact, it often acted as if it were ready to supersede the United States as the paramount power in the interstate system, with its behavior assuming increasingly interventionist and expansionist dimensions. Such behavior culminated in the massive invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979.

US President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid I. Brezhnev after the signing of SALT I in Moscow on May 29, 1972.

—Liaison.

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[5] A full text of the new Soviet constitution can be found in *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Constitution [Basic Law] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Moscow, 1978. Article 28 is on p. 21.

In contrast to the 1977 document, the 1936 constitution contained no special section on foreign policy, and it did not even include any extravagant statements on the aims of Soviet foreign policy. The sweeping ideological tone of the foreign policy section of the 1977 constitution harkens back to the 1924 constitution. The latter's Preamble began with a grandiose description of a "world . . . divided into two camps . . . the camp of capitalism: national hate and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and massacres, brutalities and imperialist wars . . . [and] the camp of socialism: reciprocal confidence and peace, national liberty and equality, the peaceful coexistence and fraternal collaboration of peoples." Its final words were that "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . will serve as a bulwark against world capitalism and mark a new decisive step toward the union of the workers of all countries in one World Socialist Soviet Republic." *Istoriya Sovetskoy Konstitutsii, 1917–1956* (History of the Soviet Constitution, 1917–1956), Moscow, 1957, pp. 458–60.

Whereas the words of the 1924 constitution reflect revolutionary bravado, ideological candor, and naiveté, the passages in the 1977 constitution reflect the power and self-confidence of Leonid Brezhnev's Russia. The absence of sweeping ideological verbiage concerning foreign policy in the 1936 constitution mirrored Moscow's prudence when it was developing the capabilities enabling it subsequently to openly reassert its ideological foreign policy goals in a constitutional document.

Although Soviet leaders and Soviet writers often suggest that the USSR is entitled to both global *status* and *equality* with the United States as some sort of divine right ordained by history, they clearly realize that the situation is more complicated than they imply. From an objective analytic standpoint, no state, not even the United States, is *entitled* to be a global power. The position of the United States in the international system was not granted to it by divine right, history, or the consent of the international community. It was self-asserted and must be self-sustained. Similarly, the Soviet Union does not possess any "right" to global status; it must be self-achieved, self-asserted, and self-sustained.

In recognition of this reality, Moscow has developed the independent capabilities to function on a global level. Thus, there is little question that the Soviet Union is a global power, whether the United States recognizes it as such or not.

Likewise, no state is *entitled* to be equal with any other state. Just as there are superpowers and superpowers, there may also be distinctions between global powers, even if the exclusive club is restricted to two members. Moreover, equality—unlike global status, which is independently determined—is a relative term and is measured against others. Of perhaps greatest significance, equality, as even Soviet observers implicitly concede, is *ascriptive* in character and depends upon the recognition and policies of others.

Yet when the United States in 1972 accepted the Soviet Union as a strategic equal—that is, as an equal military power—this did not mean that the United States recognized the USSR as an equal *global* power. To the contrary, Washington perceived the SALT I agreements as instruments designed to domesticate and contain Soviet power, not unleash it. Of this fact, Moscow is exceedingly conscious. To American criticisms of Soviet behavior in Africa and the Third World more generally as incompatible with détente, for instance, Moscow has complained defensively that the United States is refusing to treat the USSR as an equal, is attempting to deny its global credentials in practice while recognizing them symbolically.

Thus, as we shall see in detail later, Soviet leaders are painfully aware that the favorable military equation which they have achieved largely by default, because of the continuing state of the internal situation in the United States in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, is the critical factor in what they perceive as a favorable "correlation of forces" and may prove temporary, should Washington decide upon new objectives and priorities. What they have to calculate is the degree to which they can take advantage of what observers often call a "window of opportunity" during the next few years, without running the risk of prematurely provoking a renewed arms race with the United States, which, in light of the unrealized military potential of the American economy, they would surely lose.

In addition, Soviet leaders recognize the enormous resources of Washington's allies, most of whose productive energies and outputs have been devoted to the civilian sector of the economy. And, finally, there is China and the notorious "China card," which the United States could seriously exploit as part of its global policies. For example, the Soviet achievement of equality by ascription has posed the question of why only the USSR is entitled to equality with the United States. Moscow itself never raises this issue, and when others raise it, Soviet spokesmen are very evasive. Thus, at a press conference in Bonn on November 23, 1979, Foreign Minister Gromyko responded to a query about equality for other powers within the context of a possible SALT III negotiation in the following fashion:

> *But one asks . . . After all, other countries also have strategic arms. What types of weapons and what countries should have equality? Why should the Soviet Union always proceed from the premise that the subject under discussion should be equality only between the US and the Soviet Union? . . . None of these matters have been settled.*[6]

It is this enormous material and human potential, whose military convertibility has only barely been tapped—while the USSR has strained and stretched its resources to maintain the current balance—that the Soviet leadership must worry about as it contemplates its future actions. But potential is potential, and possibilities are only possibilities. Hence, Soviet leaders must also crank into their calculations the intangible factors of leadership, public support, internal stability, and various other factors operating in these countries and arrive at a judgment as to whether the undoubted potential that the United States could mobilize can indeed be transformed into a "correlation of forces" favorable to Washington.[7]

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[6] *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1979.

[7] That the unrealized military potential of the United States and its allies might become a force for the disruption of the evolving "correlation of forces" that Moscow has deemed favorable to it, is cause for grave concern in the Soviet Union. Even theory is distorted to discount the possibility. One Soviet writer, for example, maintains that "the military potential of the Western powers can no longer serve as the main criterion of their role in the world arena" and goes on to elaborate: "Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the fact that the

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Soviet Apprehensions

Obviously, the Soviet Union cherishes its equality with the United States and is reluctant to share it with third powers—most notably, China. But much of the Soviet literature reflects an apprehensiveness on this matter from two directions. The first is that the United States may seek to bestow equality upon other states, e.g., China. Soviet writers *conspicuously avoid* this theme. The second is that the United States may attempt to withdraw its conferral of equality. Three major themes concerning the legitimacy and durability of Moscow's equal and global status can be discerned in Soviet writings, and while they are inconsistent, these inconsistencies mirror anxiety about the permanence and "objective" quality of the Soviet Union's equal and global status. These three themes can be summarized as follows: (1) The United States, by lecturing the USSR on the unacceptability of its internal and external behavior, is not treating the USSR as an equal. (2) The United States is threatening to seek "military superiority," which is incompatible with the principle of equality. (3) The Soviet Union's equality has been established by the "correlation of forces" and the objective processes of history, and the Soviet Union is fully capable of preventing the United States from attaining military superiority.

US lectures on the acceptability and appropriateness of Soviet internal and external behavior have evoked great Soviet resentment, since they have recently been coupled with threats of rewards and punishment by the United States if Moscow continues to misbehave—hardly the way that one equal would treat another equal. The Carter administration's condemnation of Moscow's violations of "human rights" and restrictions on the emigration of Soviet citizens and contraventions of Basket III of the Helsinki agreement have been viewed as particularly arrogant attempts by the United States to sermonize and impose its own values and norms upon the Soviet Union. These acts, according to Moscow, are incompatible with the elementary norms of international law and sovereignty and would represent bad form even when directed against smaller and vulnerable powers, to say nothing of the fact that they are directed against a power equal to the United States. Thus, on March 21, 1977, no less a personage than Leonid Brezhnev charged:

> *Washington's assertions that it is entitled to teach others how to live cannot, I believe, be accepted by any sovereign state. . . . Let me repeat: we shall not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone, under any pretext. The normal development of relations on such a basis is, of course, unthinkable.*[8]

Moreover, when President Carter, after the invasion of Afghanistan, shifted from lecturing Moscow on proper behavior to "punishing" the Soviet Union for improper deportment and further threatening to withdraw "rewards," Brezhnev's response, while clearly a rebuff, nevertheless betrayed an apprehension that the United States was indeed still capable of "punishing" and "rewarding" its putative equal:

> *. . . the sum total of steps taken by the American administration in connection with the events in Afghanistan—the freezing of the Salt II treaty, the refusal to deliver to the USSR a whole series of commodities, the suspension of talks with the Soviet Union on a number of questions . . . indicates that Washington is again, as it did decades ago, attempting to talk to us in the language of the cold war . . . . Of course, we will get along without these ties with the United States—in fact, we never begged for them, believing that they were mutually advantageous . . . . However, Washington's arbitrary arrogation to itself of some kind of "right" to "reward" or "punish" independent sovereign states poses a question of principle. In fact, these actions of the US government strike a major blow at the system of relations among states regulated by international law.*[9]

Although from Moscow's standpoint US lecturing and sermonizing are insulting and humiliating to the Soviet Union and debase the image of equality it seeks with the United States, they are not by themselves threatening. But Soviet spokesmen also contend that the United States is threatening to attain military and strategic superiority once again. Such an undertaking would not only automatically strip the Soviet Union of its equal status but require a large-scale, fundamental, and even destabilizing reexamination and restructuring of Soviet internal and external policies and a

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category of correlation of forces in the world cannot and should not be reduced to the correlation of states' military potentials and that in the ultimate end this correlation is nothing but the correlation of class forces in the worldwide system of international politics." A. Sergiyev, "Leninism as a Factor of International Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1975, p. 101. For an excellent assessment of Soviet military potential, see Andrew Marshall, *Sources of Soviet Power: The Military Potential in the 1980's*, Adelphi Papers, No. 152, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1979, pp. 11–18.

[8] *Pravda*, Mar. 22, 1977.

[9] Ibid., Jan. 13, 1980.

reordering of priorities. It could undermine the credibility of the economic and military commitments of the USSR to its allies and client states, especially those remote from the Soviet Union, And finally, should the United States attain military superiority at a time when the Soviet Union is confronted with a leadership succession crisis, the Soviet regime could be seriously crippled.

Growing out of this second theme have been uncharacteristically modest disclaimers that the USSR has either attained or is striving for military superiority. These appear to be essentially a prudent gesture designed to undercut those in the United States who charge that the Soviet Union either has or soon will attain military superiority.

No less authoritative a figure than Leonid Brezhnev was the first to enunciate such a disclaimer. In a speech at the Soviet city of Tula in January 1977, he asserted:

> *Of course, comrades, we are improving our defenses. It cannot be otherwise. We have never neglected the security of our country and the security of our allies, and we shall never neglect it. But the allegations that the Soviet Union is going beyond what is sufficient for defense, that it is striving for superiority in armaments in the aim of delivering a "first strike," are absurd and utterly unfounded.*[10]

To further indicate to Washington and the West that the disavowal of military superiority was more than a unilateral assurance, and simultaneously to ensure that the United States would be bound by formal commitments not to seek military superiority, the USSR entered into a joint renunciation of the intention to seek military superiority, in the Joint Soviet-American Communiqué executed in Vienna in June 1979 as part of the SALT II arrangements. This read:

> *Each [side] stated that it is not striving and will not strive for military superiority, since that can only result in dangerous instability, generating higher levels of armaments with no benefit to the security of either side.*[11]

In Berlin in October 1979, Brezhnev reiterated his disavowal of any inclination to seek military superiority, in even stronger words than he had used in 1977:

> *As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I repeat again and again: We do not seek military superiority. We have never intended and do not now intend to threaten any state or group of states. Our strategic doctrine is a purely defensive one. Allegations that the Soviet Union is building up its military might on the European continent on a scale not called for by its defense requirements have nothing to do with reality. This is a deliberate deception of the public at large.*[12]

But this time he coupled it with a charge that the United States was seeking to regain military superiority:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, left, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium, with US President Jimmy Carter at Vienna on June 18, 1979.

—Henri Bureau/SYGMA

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[10] Ibid., Jan. 19, 1977.

[11] See *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 1979, p. 55.

[12] *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1979. In order to give this theme greater force, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov shortly afterward, in an article entitled "Military Détente Is a Command of the Times," cited this passage as evidence that the Soviets did not have and were not seeking military superiority. Ibid., Oct. 25, 1979.

> *The dangerous plan for the deployment of new American nuclear missiles on the territory of Western Europe . . . would substantially change the strategic situation on the continent. Their objective is to upset the existing balance of forces in Europe and to try to ensure military superiority for the NATO bloc.*[13]

Both the change and the disclaimer obviously were aimed at deterring the United States from what he feared it was capable of doing.

The recurring anxiety that the United States might once again make a bid for military superiority and succeed became even more pronounced after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It appeared to some Soviet commentators that although Soviet leaders had indeed correctly calculated that the risk of American military counteraction in response to such an invasion would be low, they may nevertheless have overplayed their hand to gain a local, if admittedly important, advantage. That is, they had miscalculated the impact the invasion would have upon the fears and attitudes of the US public, particularly during a presidential election in which the principal Republican contender was an undoubted advocate of regaining American military superiority.

Despite the enigma and paradox that the Carter administration constituted for the Kremlin leaders, and despite its annoying messianic sermonizing about human rights, the administration had exhibited a deep aversion to the use of force or had been easily deterred from employing it because of its perception of Soviet power and Moscow's willingness to use it. As Moscow saw things, the Carter administration had refused to react to the continuing Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola; shunned an opportunity to confront Moscow and Havana on the Horn of Africa by supporting Somalia; huffed, puffed, and retreated on the issue of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba; and allowed itself to be paralyzed by the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran.[14] Furthermore, in the Soviet view, this administration had shown itself to be particularly susceptible to Soviet pressures and persuasion. In the face of Soviet complaints and mild threats, Jimmy Carter had canceled the B-1 bomber, vetoed construction of another attack carrier, decided not to build the neutron bomb (after pressuring European leaders to publicly accept it even at some cost in terms of their internal political support), and retreated on a whole host of issues connected with the SALT II agreements, including matters connected with the cruise missile, the Backfire bomber, ICBM ceilings, and verification capabilities.

But now, the assessment went, the Kremlin by its move into Afghanistan may have created a real possibility that the "hard-liners" in the American ruling class would succeed in replacing the Carter administration and launch the United States on a course to achieve military supremacy. Some Soviet leaders, as the Soviet literature indicated, were already convinced that the "hard-liners," in the person of the President's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had already taken over from the "moderates," as represented by Paul Warnke, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Cyrus Vance, (soon to be former) Secretary of State, and that this shift had clearly been in process before the invasion of Afghanistan. Yet, as the initial Soviet comments on presidential candidate Ronald Reagan reveal, the rejoinder to that judgment by some Soviet circles might well be a Russian version of "if you think Brzezinski is a 'hard-liner,' you ain't seen nothin' yet."

The apprehension in much of the Soviet literature and the speeches of Soviet leaders that the United States is still fully capable of reversing the direction in which the "correlation of forces," particularly in the military sphere, had been moving, is quite evident, even though coupled with these fears are the familiar assertions that the existing alignment of power is irreversible and such that US efforts would be futile. Not only do Soviet spokesmen recognize that a renewed US effort to regain strategic superiority would stretch Soviet resources to their limits, but they also acknowledge that in spite of the maximum Soviet effort, American potential remains great enough that the United States could reverse the existing "correlation of forces" simply by enhancing its military power—not to speak of doing other things, to be discussed below.

Thus, the Kremlin's leading Americanologist, Georgiy Arbatov, warned the Soviet leaders obliquely of such a possibility:

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[13] Ibid., Oct. 7, 1979. Soviet writers and the Soviet press have devoted an extraordinary amount of space to the theme of the necessity of "military détente," while simultaneously castigating the idea of "ideological détente." The stress on the desirability of military détente betrays the Soviet fear of a resurgence in US military strength. See, for example, the following: A. Voronov, "The Chimera of Military Superiority," *International Affairs*, February 1980, pp. 18–27; A. Svetlov, "The Soviet Union's Struggle for Military Détente," ibid., February 1976, pp. 93–101; D. Proektor, "Military Détente: Primary Task," ibid., June 1976, pp. 35–43; editorial on "European Security and Détente," ibid., February 1980, pp. 3–7; and Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," ibid., January 1976, pp. 85–95.

[14] See Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Afghan Gamble," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Jan. 28, 1980, pp. 7–13, for the author's elaboration of this point. Also see Jiri Valenta, "Afghanistan—The Soviet Invasion," a four-part article in *The Baltimore Sun*, Feb. 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1980; idem, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where to Stop," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1980.

> *Despite a sustained period of détente, the US ruling class has still not completely put behind it its past global pretentions . . . to break with the guidelines, notions, and traditions of a whole period—a period right after World War II, in which America found itself in an exceptional position by virtue of an aggregation of unique and transient historical circumstances (although the Americans, understandably, wanted to see these circumstances as the natural and eternal order of things).*

Furthermore, he even singled out closer relations with China as a conceivable means whereby the United States could temporarily remedy the existing unfavorable balance confronting it until it could rectify the situation through its own resources. The Americans, he said, are gripped with "illusions to the effect that a rapprochement with the chauvinistic Chinese leadership . . . can change the balance of forces, strengthen America's position, and enable it to . . . again lord it over the planet to its heart's content." Simultaneously, Arbatov issued a caveat to Washington that the Soviet Union could still muster sufficient resources to maintain parity, at least in the military field: ". . . the Soviet Union today has greater possibilities than ever before to frustrate such plans [the achievement of military superiority] and to maintain parity in the military field."[15]

Widely prevalent in Soviet commentary is the view that the United States is not merely interested in reclaiming military superiority but yearns to restore itself to the apex of the international system as the principal arbiter of the planet's destiny, to renounce its agreement to accept the Soviet Union as an equal partner and behave once again as if it were the world's only authentic global power, with the self-asserted right to set the international agenda, resolve disputes, and in general regulate and manage the international system. These fears masquerading as accusations simultaneously afford retrospective insight into the real image which Moscow had earlier of America's position in the international system and disclose the Soviet nightmare that while the United States may not develop sufficient power to roll back the wheels of history, it may once again be able to seize its helm. In spite of all their bravado about the favorable alterations in the "correlation of forces" during the past decade, Soviet leaders continue to have a deep and even awesome respect for the enormous economic, scientific, and technological resources of the United States and the realizable military potential inherent in them—potential which the favorable shift in the "correlation of forces" has obviously left intact. The anxiety that results is implicitly but clearly spelled out in *Pravda*'s editorial denouncing President Carter's State of the Union message of January 23, 1980:

> *The message and the speech . . . openly state the US claim to a "leading role" in the world. What "leading role" means is Washington's intention to dictate its system in any region and to any state, and, when the US administration deems it expedient, to use any means, including weapons, to oppose national liberation, revolutionary and all progressive movements. Thus, what we see here is a new American claim to world supremacy.*[16]

Accompanying the Soviet accusation and fear that the United States refuses to accept the USSR as an equal and is striving for military superiority is the not wholly confident reiteration that Soviet equality has been determined by recent irreversible changes in the "correlation of forces" and that the Soviet Union is capable of thwarting US ambitions to attain military superiority and regain world supremacy. In a book written before the advent of the Carter administration, two Soviet writers had already heralded a historic shift in the "correlation of forces" in favor of socialism:

> *In the mid-1960's, far-sighted leaders in the imperialist camp were compelled to recognize that the historical initiative in world affairs was steadily passing into the hands of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. A change in the balance of power was steadily developing . . . . Experience has demonstrated that the process of change in the relationship of forces between the two systems is an objective process which arises out of the advantages of the new social system. This process can rightly be called irreversible because it has been dictated by the objective laws determining the contest between the two systems.*[17]

With specific reference to the actions and responses of the Carter administration to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned that a US effort to free itself from parity and seek superiority would fail:

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[15] "On the Threshold of a New Decade," *Pravda*, Mar. 3, 1980.

[16] *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1980.

[17] Sh.P. Sanakoyev and N.I. Kapchenko, *Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 126–63.

> *The common objective of all these actions is clear: to break the rough parity that now exists between the military power of East and West, of the Soviet Union and the US, and to try to achieve superiority over the socialist commonwealth . . . . We have stated several times—and at the most authoritative level—that we will not allow this. L.I. Brezhnev talked to the American President about this in Vienna.*[18]

Unlike the "far-sighted leaders of the mid-1960's," President Carter, according to the *Pravda* commentary on his 1980 State of the Union message, refuses to recognize or accept realities and therefore adjust accordingly:

> *On the whole, it follows from the President's message that the country's ruling circles, having run up against the realities of today's world and the objective growth of the forces of peace, progress, and socialism, clearly are reluctant to construct their policy in accordance with the United States' actual weight in today's world. Apparently, they cannot rid themselves of imperial, hegemonistic thinking, do not want to reckon with the existing alignment of forces in the international arena.*[19]

In sum, then, Soviet writers implicitly recognize that the equality which they so passionately cherish remains essentially an ascriptive one. Although they express confidence that the impersonal but objective forces of history will render it permanent, and thus free Soviet equality from its dependence upon American recognition, they are aware that for the time being, it is not. Moreover, it is clear that a successful US decertification of the Soviet Union as an equal could have a traumatic impact upon the Soviet leadership. In response to the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, Leonid Zamyatin moaned:

> *The difficulties arise . . . from the American leaders' unwillingness or inability to understand that equality in international affairs means just that—equality; that parity in the alignment of international forces means parity; and that equal security means equal security.*[20]

Soviet concerns on this matter seem to have had an effect on Soviet discussions of the "correlation of forces." This has been fairly complex. Soviet spokesmen have affirmed that while, as Brezhnev stated to the West Germans in May 1978, "the Soviet Union believes that rough equality and parity are sufficient for defense needs" and does not set itself "the aim of achieving military superiority,"[21] it explicitly welcomes and seeks a favorable shift in the "correlation of forces." These two propositions would, on the face of things, appear to be mutually incompatible. The discrepancy thus requires some extended explanation. In response, Soviet spokesmen have offered a more elaborate exegesis of the concept of the "correlation of forces" and have attempted to distinguish it carefully from the concept of the "balance of power," particularly the *military* balance of power.

Cognitive Deception

Although the resulting Soviet position does not represent outright falsehood, it amounts to a kind of "cognitive deception." Since a critical, if not always decisive, component of the "correlation of forces" is the state of the military balance, the two are obviously interrelated, and whereas it is possible to achieve superiority in the "correlation of forces" without at the same time enjoying military superiority, it is nevertheless true that the military component of the "correlation of forces" is the most precise, measurable, and visible component in the calculation. Furthermore, changes in the military balance affect changes in the overall "correlation of forces" more immediately and reliably than changes in any other component, many of which are intangible and amorphous, thus making their calculation and exact weight elusive and subject to differing intuitive estimates and judgments rather than precise and unambiguous measurement. As even a Soviet commentator has conceded, "the military strength of a state is by all means a decisive element of its position in the world."[22]

To appreciate the character of the new exegesis, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the traditional Soviet approach to the "correlation of forces." Because the Soviet Union has survived and developed its capabilities for decades when it was militarily weak and had to rely upon factors other than the conventional elements of national power to make up for its military deficiencies, the Soviet leadership is experienced and well versed in the manipulation and mobilization of various "exotic" nonmilitary elements that can be factored into the "correlation of forces." One writer recently capsulized these in the following fashion:

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[18] *Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1980.

[19] Ibid., Jan. 29, 1980.

[20] "Restore a Climate of Détente and Trust," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 27, 1980, p. 14.

[21] *Pravda*, May 4, 1978.

[22] A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of International Relations," *International Affairs*, May 1975, p. 101.

> *The foreign policy potential of a state depends not only upon its own forces and internal resources but, to a considerable extent, on such external factors as the existence of reliable, socio-political allies among other states, national contingents of congenial classes, mass international movements and other political forces active in the world scene.*[23]

As the well-known Soviet Americanologist Genrikh Trofimenko has pointed out, such elements even embrace the internal social and political alignments and forces within the United States:

> *. . . political reality also includes the domestic political situation in the US itself, where the popular masses are demanding increasingly, decisively, and loudly the renunciation of military adventures abroad and the administration's turning to face the internal socio-economic problems . . . . Moments arise when the split between the sentiments and feelings of broad public circles and official policy proves so deep that a bourgeois government, wishing to remain in power, either has to correct official policy or resign from power . . . . The . . . administration must take into account the opinion of the overwhelming majority of voters who support . . . the reduction of US military commitments abroad.*[24]

Soviet leaders, in short, have long recognized that social conflicts, tensions, frustrations, and resentments, particularly between classes, conceal tremendous reserves of pent-up social power, which can be detected by dialectical analysis and then tapped, mobilized, and transmuted into concrete political power subject to the manipulation of Soviet policy. These stored-up social energies of a world in ferment and convulsion are released with tremendous force during periods which Lenin described as "revolutionary situations." In calculating the international "correlation of forces," or "the relation of forces in the world arena," these internal social factors, and the direction of their movement—for or against the status quo—constitute important elements in the power equation.

However, Soviet leaders also know that the most direct and quickest way to affect the "correlation of forces" is to increase one's military strength. After all, Nazi Germany's rise to power in the 1930's eloquently demonstrated how the "correlation of forces" could be radically reversed within a short period of time. Instead of "realistically" adjusting to the "realities" and "correlation of forces" as they existed in 1933, Adolph Hitler set out to willfully and successfully revise both reality and the "correlation of forces." His principal means was to transform Germany's human and material resources into military power.

Similarly, the USSR has actually been devoting an inordinate share of its own resources to military development. But given the imbalance in the productive capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States, between socialism and capitalism, Moscow has also sought to downgrade the salience and possible decisiveness of the military contribution to the "correlation of forces." It stresses the decisive character of the nonmilitary factors, particularly those intangible and elusive (but nevertheless real) social, revolutionary, and progressive "forces" in the overall equation, which are fortuitously inevitable, irreversible, and favorable to the Soviet side.

Hence, the concept "correlation of forces," while useful as a mode of analysis for Soviet leaders in assessing and building strength, is far less useful and relevant for the US and Western leaders. The West is not as versed as the Soviet side in manipulating or adjusting to the manifold social, political, and revolutionary processes which contribute to the "correlation of forces" equation, and for this reason Western analysis and policymakers are likely to put greater stress upon the "elements of national power" and the "balance of power" in the traditional sense as their basic calculus. Attempts to develop a formula which goes beyond the economic and military factors in the balance equation and incorporates assessments of processes in various parts of the globe, while hypothetically possible for Western decision-makers, usually turn out to be dysfunctional and counterproductive, paradoxically because of both the amorphous character of Western ideologies as a guide to Western policies and the rigidity and inflexibility of whatever ideological baggage is employed.

At any rate, the Soviet concept "correlation of forces" differs fundamentally from the concept "balance of power." While the balance of power can be the product of deliberate policy, the "correlation of forces" represents "balance" determined by social and historical processes in which the policy of states is only a component. As developed by Soviet writers, the "correlation of forces" constitutes the basic substructure upon which the interstate system rests. The latter, like any superstructure, is governed by man-made rules and is the product of deliberate policy processes of various states, whereas the "correlation of forces" derives from a myriad of cross-cutting and interacting variables which operate independently of decision-makers and state policies. Thus, the "correlation of forces" can be affected only marginally by state policy, but, in general, state policies are shaped by the changing "correlation of forces." Whatever changes take place in the substructure are inevitably reflected in the superstructure of the interstate system.

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[23] Ibid., p. 103.

[24] G. Trofimenko, "Political Realism and the 'Realistic Deterrence' Strategy," *SShA* (Moscow), No. 12, 1971.

Soviet writers have been focusing on the changing "correlation of forces" for decades, but only recently have they been discussing the transformational processes at work in the international system. "The Marxist-Leninist approach to the relationship of forces between classes, groups of states, and individual states," contend two Soviet commentators, "differs fundamentally from the approach to these matters taken by bourgeois politicians and ideologists." For Marxists-Leninists,

> *International politics is above all an area of struggle and the interaction of diversified class, political, national, and other factors, with class factors always playing the decisive role. These have ultimately shaped the picture of international relations as a whole and in any given period of time.*
>
> *The changing relationship of forces between the two systems has provided the basis on which new, positive processes in world affairs can now develop. This change means a definite and irresistible tendency towards the increased influence of socialism on the course of world developments.* ***It is quite obvious that the alteration in the balance of power between socialism and capitalism is mainly a change in the relationship of class forces.***[25]

On the other hand, "some spokesmen for modern bourgeois political sciences, basing themselves on conceptions first formulated in the last century,"

> *. . . have made the preservation of peace and all the important processes of international relations contingent on the maintenance of an equilibrium of strength. This equilibrium (or balance of power) is presented as the main and crucial factor in the preservation of peace and the stable development of relations between states and groups of states. From this premise, the maintenance of a definite equilibrium or balance of power between states or groups of states is declared to be the basic factor in the further development of international relations and the key instrument for preserving stability.*[26]

Thus, according to this line of analysis, any attempt to function outside the "correlation of forces" ordained by the historical process is bound to fail. Increasingly, the military power of individual states can have only restricted and temporary effects, slowing down the process, speeding it up, or modifying and diverting it in marginal dimensions. Since the changes are in directions unpalatable to the old order, it justifies efforts to arrest or reverse the process by ascribing the movement to the intrigues and machinations of the Soviet Union, as if the processes were the simple product of a contest between states. But while interstate behavior is governed by and dependent upon the underlying "correlation of forces," it does not determine them, and the two spheres are not interchangeable or continuous:

> *The socialist countries draw a clear line between the spheres of class struggle and interstate relations, and oppose any attempts to erase this line. As for the imperialists, their persistent attempts to interfere in the socialist countries' internal affairs reflect their intention to transfer the class struggle to the sphere of interstate relations, to substitute one for the other.*[27]

Consequently, while it is both possible and desirable for countries in their interstate relations to make agreements not to seek military superiority, Soviet observers maintain, "no one can 'put a freeze' on the world socio-political development on the pretext of detente," and "international agreements cannot alter the laws of class struggle."[28] Simply because the Soviet Union and socialism happen to be the principal beneficiaries of these processes, the net consequences of these processes in terms of the "correlation of forces" are incorrectly translated into a Soviet passion for military superiority.

At Vienna in 1979, Brezhnev himself responded to President Carter's complaints about Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa by saying in effect that the President should direct his grievances not at the Kremlin, but to the Muse of History:

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[25] Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, op. cit., p. 160. Emphasis added.

[26] Ibid., p. 162.

[27] V. Kortunov, "The Leninist Policy of Peaceful Co-existence and Class Struggle," *International Affairs*, May 1979, p. 91.

[28] Ibid., p. 93.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of National Defense, left, welcomes General of the Army Raúl Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, to Moscow in February 1979.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

> *The opponents of mutual understanding between the USSR and the US make active use of the legend about a so-called "Soviet military threat." . . . There are also continuing attempts to depict social processes in one country or another and the struggle of peoples for independence and social progress as "Moscow's intrigues and machinations." . . Our appraisals of political regimes in various countries sometimes differ strongly from the appraisals made by certain circles in the US . . . . We believe that every people has the right to decide its own destiny.* ***Why then pin on the Soviet Union the responsibility for the objective course of history and, moreover, use this as a pretext for worsening our relations?***[29]

As noted earlier, there is more than a little disingenuousness in Soviet attempts to draw a sharp distinction between their actions and behavior and what they call the "processes" or "forces" of history. While one can plausibly explain revolutionary movements and social ferment as the product of underlying historical forces and trends, one can hardly burden history with the decision to airlift and support thousands of Cuban soldiers in Angola and Ethiopia, or to send 85,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Even in accordance with Soviet definitions and conceptions, these are the acts and results of deliberate state policy, decisions taken within the context of the interstate system and not in the abstract arena where class struggles occur.

The uncoupling of the concepts "correlation of forces" and "military superiority," in sum, appears to be designed not so much for methodological and cognitive clarity as to send out conflicting signals to two separate audiences. To its partisans and supporters, Moscow is conveying the message that the balance of power has shifted or is about to shift in favor of the Soviet Union; to the West, it is saying that the balance has not and is not about to do so.

Policy Implications

Intellectually dubious though the Soviet distinction between not seeking or striving for military superiority and anticipating a favorable "correlation of forces" may be, it does have certain implications for Soviet policy. These are fourfold: (1) Soviet leaders will not explicitly claim military superiority or make its attainment a matter of official policy. (2) They will, however, accept military superiority and act upon it if they attain it by default, i.e., if the United States fails to maintain military parity with the Soviet Union. (3) Soviet leaders will accept military parity as sufficient for their defense and security interests, but they will conspicuously avoid saying that they will *strive* for or *seek* parity, i.e., *they will neither strive for nor seek parity or military superiority*. (4) They will, however, strive for and seek a favorable "correlation of forces," since this striving and seeking presumably takes place in the "international arena of class struggles" and not the "international arena of state relations."

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[29] *Pravda*, June 17, 1979. Emphasis added.

These distinctions are important from the USSR's standpoint, for they serve to relocate what Moscow itself mockingly calls the "Soviet threat" or "menace," out of the arena of state relations and into the arena of class struggles. Soviet leaders and writers do not refrain from conceding that "socialism" and the USSR constitute a "menace" or "threat" to capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, reaction, and other assorted evils. Indeed, they exult in the fact, and the new Brezhnev constitution establishes as two of the concrete aims of Soviet policy "consolidating the positions of world socialism [and] supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress," which are activities defined even within the Soviet context as belonging to the sphere of "class relations" rather than "state relations."

Yet ever since Leonid Brezhnev resurrected the title of General Secretary of the CPSU, the distinction between "state" and "party" has been losing its relevance insofar as Soviet foreign policy is concerned. For decades, the Soviet leaders found it advantageous and preferable to maintain a scrupulous distance between "party" and "state"—Party Secretary and Premier—in foreign policy, but the practical significance of the distinction diminished under Brezhnev, even before he assumed the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1977. Increasingly after 1966, Brezhnev played a more conspicuous and "official" role in diplomacy and even signed bilateral and multilateral treaties in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPSU, a title which appears boldly on both the SALT I Treaty and the Helsinki Final Act. It is true that he received special plenipotentiary authority to officially represent the Soviet state on these occasions; nevertheless, it was highly unusual for him to attach his party title to formal interstate documents, since the party has absolutely no standing under international law.

Moreover, with Brezhnev's assumption of formal state authority as head of the Soviet state and simultaneous retention of his post as General Secretary of the CPSU, the distinction between the two spheres has been virtually obliterated. Never before in Soviet history have the posts of head of the Soviet state and head of the Soviet party been joined in one person. Neither Vladimir Lenin nor Iosif Stalin nor Nikita Khrushchev was ever head of state; they all were head of government, a lesser position under international law.

Thus, the notion that Leonid Brezhnev, in his capacity as General Secretary, is free to threaten and menace capitalism but nevertheless constitutes no threat to states or countries, simply boggles the imagination. In a curious appropriation and imitation of devices employed in the past by those who tried disingenuously to draw a distinction between the Comintern or international communism on the one hand and the USSR on the other—which Moscow never accepted—the Soviet Union expects the world to believe that its hostility toward capitalism and imperialism as abstractions should bear no relevance to Soviet relations with "capitalist" or "imperialist" states. But now that the Soviet state freely crosses over into the sphere of class struggles, where it can openly threaten and menace capitalism and imperialism and support revolutionary and national liberation movements, one can hardly accept that when it returns to the sphere of interstate relations, its menacing and threatening baggage has somehow been conveniently left behind. There is little question that the baggage is inseparably tied to the Soviet state, no matter within what sphere it chooses to operate.

Even Soviet writers seem to be having an increasingly difficult time sustaining the distinction and justifying the Soviet threat in one realm and denying it in another. For example, they assert on the one hand that "the Soviet Union has never pledged itself to work for the maintaining of the status quo in other countries" and then insist on the other that "social changes occurring in the world . . . serve to strengthen the positions of the democratic and socialistic forces . . . . [and] create a much more favorable international setting for each of the three revolutionary streams of our day—world socialism, the international working class movement, and the national liberation movement—to achieve their goals."[30] The difficulty is compounded by the Soviet constitution's stipulation that the foreign policy of the Soviet state is pledged to support two of these revolutionary streams—world socialism and the national liberation movement—and the fact that the Soviet head of state in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPSU presides over, if does not direct, the third, i.e., the international working-class movement.

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[30] Kortunov, loc. cit., p. 94.

Leadership Divisions

The foregoing analysis is not meant to leave the impression that Soviet leaders and their various support constituencies agree about the best course of action to take at a time when opportunities appear to be running high and risks low. Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Soviet leaders have been divided—certainly confused—about how to respond and react to what they have described as the capricious, arbitrary, unreliable, and inconsistent behavior of the Carter administration. This evidence indicates uncertainty about whether such behavior represents deep cunning, traditionally associated in the Bolshevik mind with the kulak, or whether it represents naiveté, inexperience, or even ineptitude.[31] Soviet commentaries on the Carter administration have reflected the entire spectrum of perceptions mentioned—individually, selectively grouped, or, in some cases, all together.

In particular, Soviet leaders and observers found bewildering the US President's rhetoric in favor of détente, SALT II, and cooperation with the Soviet Union and his conspicuous aversion to the use of force, on the one hand, and his stern moralizing about the USSR's violations of "human rights" and its inappropriate behavior in Cuba and Africa, on the other, for this combination of positions, all often in the same speech or statement, implicitly carried a message that American attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union would be conditional on good marks for Soviet deportment and behavior. Thus, *Pravda*, in response to President Carter's speech before the US Naval Academy on June 7, 1978, registered what was by then a typical complaint:

> *Recent evidence indicates that American policy is undergoing changes. . . . The US government is also undertaking actions whose aim is difficult to understand. . . . Some administration officials . . . have [caused] . . . considerable confusion in the minds of US allies and among their fellow citizens. President J. Carter's recent speech in Annapolis . . . was supposed to dispel this confusion. However, the US President definitely failed to clarify the American policy, particularly policy toward the USSR . . . for the simple reason that the speech was an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable—to combine reassurances of devotion to the ideas of détente and improved Soviet-American relations with undisguised attacks against the Soviet Union . . . with a prejudiced and distorted description of Soviet reality of the kind that has rarely appeared since the cold war, even in the most malevolent American newspapers.*[32]

While Soviet leaders could fall back on the familiar view that the contradictions and resultant confusion almost certainly represented divisions between the moderates and hard-liners in the American ruling class, the inadequacies of this standard litany as an explanation were quite apparent to them. Moreover, the enigmatic image projected by the Carter administration resulted in disorientation and distortion of the general character of the Soviet internal debate, for the various sides in the Soviet leadership found it difficult to bring into focus a clear image of what they were responding to. Under such circumstances, Soviet observers were moved to shift to personality explanations of US behavior. Even Brezhnev himself did so soon after the invasion of Afghanistan:

> *As a result of the Carter administration's actions, the world is getting an even clearer picture of the United States as an absolutely unreliable partner in interstate ties, as a state whose leadership, prompted by some whim, caprice, or emotional outburst or by considerations of narrowly understood immediate advantage, is capable at any moment of violating its international commitments and nullifying treaties and agreements it has signed; there is no need to explain what a dangerous destabilizing influence this has on the entire international situation—all the more so because the leadership that is behaving this way is that of a major and influential power, from which the people are entitled to expect a carefully considered and responsible policy.*[33]

At the same time, it is by no means clear that the Soviet internal debate can be shaped in a preferred direction by external influences—notably, the United States. That external factors have an impact upon the debate cannot be questioned; at issue is what that im-

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[31] See Aspaturian, "Moscow's Afghan Gamble," loc. cit., and Alexander Dallin, *The United States in the Soviet Perspective*, Adelphi Papers, No. 151, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1979, pp. 13–21.

[32] *Pravda*, June 17, 1978.

[33] Ibid., Jan. 13, 1980.

A group of Soviet T-62 tanks stationed on the outskirts of Kabul on January 7, 1980, during the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces.

—Sipa Press via Black Star.

pact is likely to be.

The emergence of a limited semipluralistic decision-making process in the Soviet system, somewhat akin to an idiosyncratic combination of Graham Allison's bureaucratic and organizational process models,[34] has created the impression that such decision-making processes will almost automatically produce moderate decisions and policies. While the current Soviet decision-making process does often result in more hesitation, vacillation, and involuntary self-restraint in the formulation and execution of decisions and can seriously affect their timing, its impact on the substance or quality of the decision is likely to be much less. In fact, what the process means is that Soviet decisions are increasingly uncertain and unpredictable, and frequently even ambiguous, ambivalent, and reversible.

One of the hidden shoals of Brezhnev's generally successful consensus style of conflict resolution and decision-making—which has resulted in policies commanding the widest possible base of support and, hence, has entailed shared responsibility—has been the definition of his policies, and in particular détente, almost entirely in *utilitarian*, rather than in *normative* or *value*, terms. Détente, for example, is never described as a substantive goal or an objective value in itself; instead, it is discussed in terms of whether it promotes or hinders the achievement of traditional Soviet ideological and other objectives. And it is often referred to as the *best* means or vehicle for achieving substantive ends. Presumably, such references can only mean that if détente hinders the attainment of Soviet goals or can be shown to be less effective than another policy, then détente is likely to be replaced.

The utilitarian and pragmatic dimension to Soviet policies, thus, can lead to the replacement of a policy, no matter how valuable for its own sake or for various vested interests, with one that is more utilitarian and successful in achieving substantive Soviet goals. Precisely such a situation appears to have arisen in the case of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. The self-restraint imposed by détente was increasingly perceived as functionally deleterious to Soviet policy as opportunities increased and risks decreased, and a better utilitarian argument could be made in favor of an invasion than against it, although such a decision would run the risk of rupturing détente. Furthermore, as the course of events in Afghanistan became ominous from the Soviet standpoint, the utility of a policy of not heightening international tensions—i.e., détente—correspondingly diminished. Even though individuals and groups within the Soviet Union may, in varying degrees of intensity, take positions for or against détente because of vested interests of different kinds, they must still debate the policy within the context of the utility of détente for the achievement of the Soviet equivalent of national goals.

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[34] See his *Essence of Decision*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

Moreover, the appearance of hard- or soft-liners in Washington does not automatically produce counterparts or opposites in Moscow. The symbiotic relationship that exists between various kinds of "-liners" in the two capitals is extremely complicated and depends upon many unknown and unknowable variables. In addition, the state of the military balance—strategic and conventional, global and regional—critically affects the impact that one set of decisionmakers and decisions has upon the other set. For instance, the flourishing of moderate forces within the Soviet leadership is not encouraged if the United States allows its end of the strategic balance to tip adversely and refuses to sustain and maintain strategic parity, for excessive weakness and lack of resolve on the US part, whether real or perceived, arouse appetites in the USSR which otherwise can be successfully depicted as unattainable as long as the United States continues to be powerful and its willingness to use that power remains credible. Although power corrupts (mainly the holder) and maims (both the holder and the adversary), impotence excites and invites those whom power corrupts. Thus, moderation is more likely to prevail in the Soviet Union if the United States is strong but not threatening, is prudent and generous from "positions of strength."

One important caveat ought to be registered here, however. While it is true that the Soviet internal debate has an indirect and opaque quality for external audiences, the same is probably the case for internal audiences. Soviet advocates of détente or a relaxation of international tensions, whether as a value in its own right or as a means of serving the interests of particular individuals and groups, must still make their arguments and justifications in utilitarian terms. Therefore, it is essential not to take the often extravagant Soviet claims about how successful détente will be in altering the "correlation of forces" or promoting socialism, revolution, and national liberation, as evidence that détente must be a bad policy for the West since it is simultaneously expected to perform miracles for Moscow. Such Soviet claims may simply be attempts to win arguments against internal opponents of détente.

Conclusions and Prospects

As noted at the outset, one does not have to assume that Soviet intervention abroad in the 1970's reflects a Soviet grand design or global strategy to recognize that the Soviet Union has developed a global policy, representing an intersection of Soviet global capabilities and residual universalist ideological goals. The Soviet move in Afghanistan must be linked with earlier and continuing Soviet/Cuban moves in Africa. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, has pointed out, there is indeed an "arc of crisis" stretching along the western edge of the Indian Ocean from Mozambique to Pakistan.

To be sure, Soviet initiative in virtually all parts of the arc has been distinguished by its absence. The apparent unwillingness of the United States to support its local clients probably had more to do with the development of the crises there than did the Kremlin's political/diplomatic engineerings. Of equal importance, the revolutions in Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan were the result of indigenous activity to which the Soviet Union responded, usually following an invitation either from a new regime or one of the factions in an internal civil struggle. And although the USSR did attempt to inflame passions in the final stages of the upheaval in Iran, there is no evidence that Moscow fomented the revolution or had much impact on its ultimate course.

Nevertheless, the overall consequences of Soviet behavior within a global context may eventually be indistinguishable from the execution of a grand design. What is more, the opportunities that have inadvertently and fortuitously been created may induce the Soviet Union to operate as if it is pursuing a grand design or stimulate it to formulate one to take systematic advantage of the situation. In this context, the threat and danger of Soviet envelopment of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region from the south are real. Since the Middle East is adjacent to Soviet borders, the natural resources of the region are close to the centers of Soviet power and lines of communication. Furthermore, no large bodies of water separate the USSR from these natural resources, and the countries lying between the USSR and the resources are small, internally unstable, and subject to both domestic turmoil and external penetration. That Soviet influence and penetration are more likely to result from internal upheavals and invitations for support extended to Moscow rather than from Soviet military initiatives does not significantly reduce the importance of these considerations.

In the recent past, Moscow has placed its ideological goals in cold storage, largely because it deemed too vocal an expression of them counterproductive and because the USSR did not have the capabilities to implement them in any case. But if Soviet global capabilities continue to grow while the capabilities of the United States wane, there could be a resurgence of

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and Chief of State of the USSR, at the May 1980 meeting in Warsaw of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the pact.

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ideology as a shaper of Soviet foreign policy. The apparent Soviet decision to give global and universalist application to the so-called Brezhnev doctrine affords an ominous reminder of this possibility.

Since the enunciation of this doctrine in the late 1960's, the Soviet interpretation of it and its application had remained something of a mystery. While it surely applied to the Warsaw Pact states and perhaps the "socialist commonwealth," Moscow never defined the latter unambiguously, thus leaving open to question whether it intended the doctrine to cover China, Yugoslavia, Albania, and other Communist states.[35] However, in a speech in April 1980, the Soviet ambassador to France, S.V. Chervonenko (the same Chervonenko who staged and orchestrated the massive intervention in Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact states in 1968 from his vantage point as Soviet ambassador to Prague), went a long way toward clearing up this matter and explaining the precise mechanics whereby the doctrine is applied. Chervonenko asserted in connection with the Afghanistan invasion that the Soviet Union "would not permit another Chile"—a rather imperious and arrogant pronouncement in itself—and made the extraordinary statement that now any country, in any region, anywhere on the globe, "has the full right to choose its friends and allies, and if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat of counter-revolution or a foreign intervention."[36] This expanded Brezhnev doctrine serves not only to justify the invasion of Afghanistan but also retroactively to justify the Cuban/Soviet military interventions in Angola and on the Horn of Africa, and it poses an immediate threat to Iran or any other country where internal chaotic conditions can generate "invitations" to Moscow for support to quell internal counterrevolutions or external intervention. Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979 provide sufficient cause for concern that Soviet leaders are not overly fastidious in examining their invitations and are fully capable of inviting themselves, should no invitation be forthcoming.

To give a further global dimension to his remarks, Ambassador Chervonenko gratuitously warned that the Soviet Union would not recognize any assertion by the United States that the Persian Gulf or any other region was a special area of vital interest to the United States. Indeed, he indicated that the USSR would contest any such claim. In this connection, the Soviet ambassador emphasized the USSR's claim to equality with the United States not only as a military power but also as a global power, and he contended that the Soviet Union had a right equal to that of the United States to be consulted and involved everywhere in the world on all major issues. This contention contained an implicit threat of intervention to sustain such a right.

Even without such an ideological resurgence, however, there appears to be a Soviet global policy—if not yet a grand design woven out of targets of opportunity—that only transparently conceals a powerful Soviet ambition to supplant the United States as the paramount international power—to become the world's principal manager and regulator. The kind of management and regulation that the USSR promises to deliver can already be faintly discerned in the Soviet scholarly and journalistic literature. In the mid-1970's, it emerged vaguely in discussions of the role of Leninist ideas and the "correlation of forces" in achieving an extensive restructuring of the international system which would be "designed to completely exclude from international relations *imperialist* violence and threats," i.e., a system in which American and Western power is neutralized or nullified. One Soviet author wrote:

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[35] For various definitions and views of the "socialist commonwealth" within the Communist world, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Metamorphosis of the Socialist Commonwealth," in H. Horn et al., Eds. *Sozialismus in Theorie und Praxis* (Socialism in Theory and Practice), Berlin, 1978, pp. 249–320.

[36] As quoted in *The New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1980.

> *The change in the balance of forces of the two social systems constitutes a decisive factor in restructuring the system of international relations, because this balance is a key issue determining its very nature. The weight of the socialist community in the economic, moral, political, and military balance of forces in the world today has been constantly growing, just as, on the whole, the role it plays in world politics has also increased. The foreign policies of socialist countries have become far more effective, and the coordination of their joint action in solving major issues of our day has become more close and purposeful. As soon as the balance of forces in the world began to change in favor of socialism, possibilities for establishing international relations on truly just and democratic principles were extended.*[37]

Several years later, the same author offered a much more revealing observation:

> *The new style international relations that have taken shape and are developing among the socialist countries provide a convincing model of relations among nations and represent a major factor influencing the development of the present-day world.*[38]

This notion of an international system restructured in accordance with Leninist norms should not be confused with the crude Soviet ideological approach of earlier years that sought to stimulate world revolution to achieve world communism. Revolution and communism will continue to be supported and promoted, but only in areas where they are supportable and promotable. As the paramount global power, the USSR would make appropriate adjustments to both the developed capitalist world and the underdeveloped Third World—and although the Kremlin would coordinate and manage all three worlds, it would pursue separate policies with respect to each.

A Soviet warship in the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, in November 1979.

—SYGMA.

When overall Soviet behavior in the international arena is viewed within this context, one can begin to understand why Moscow has been eager to expand and diversify its strategic arsenals far beyond its defense and security needs. One can understand, too, why it pursues a flexible ideological policy—with the Eurocommunists in Western Europe, the do-it-yourself Marxist-Leninists in Africa, the various nationalist and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World, and a motley assembly of traditional and conservative regimes sprinkled around the globe.

Whether or not the USSR will realize its ambition will depend in large measure on how resolutely the challenge of Soviet power is met. The Soviet Union is probably in Afghanistan to stay, but it is by no means inevitable that the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region will pass under Moscow's control and influence.

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[37] N. Kapchenko, "Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 5.

[38] N. Kapchenko, "Leninist Foreign Policy: A Transformative Force," *International Affairs*, October 1978, p. 7. See also Philip Windsor, *The Soviet Union in the International System of the 1980's*, Adelphi Papers, No. 152, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Summer 1979, pp. 2–10; and Curt Gasteyger, "Soviet Global Strategy," *Survival* (London), July–August 1978, pp. 159–62.

The Politics of Stringency in the USSR

By Seweryn Bialer

As the Soviet Union enters the 1980's, it faces compelling pressures for change such as it has not experienced in a Brezhnev period generally characterized by stability, continuity, and gradualism. One could mention the coming leadership succession and the possible replacement of the entire core of top leaders, or the potentially explosive nationality problem, which appears insoluble within the present political framework. Yet the Soviet regime has been able to contain similar problems in the past and may well be able to do so for some time to come. In the current decade, however, there looms one set of problems which challenge the Soviet leadership's ability to deal with its various problems in sequential, gradual fashion. This is a complex combination of economic issues which have qualitatively new dimensions and which have important political ramifications.

In brief, the era of extensive Soviet economic development, when high rates of growth were assured through increasing inputs of labor and capital, is ending. An already poor situation is aggravated tremendously by an impending energy crisis and a manpower shortage. As a consequence, the USSR faces a period of decelerating growth or even stagnation, and an environment in which diverse claimants must compete for shrinking marginal increments of resources.

These developments will sharply increase the pressures on the Soviet leadership to change, at the very least, the system of economic planning and management in the USSR. Whether or not they will occasion or combine with crises in other areas—such as leadership politics and nationality relations—and thereby trigger a profoundly destabilizing chain reaction within the political system is more problematic.

Below, we shall outline the dimensions of the economic problems that will face the post-Brezhnev leadership of the Soviet Union. Then we shall summarize the potentially serious political ramifications that these problems will have for the Soviet regime. Finally, we shall explore the question of whether the mounting domestic economic problems will be of sufficient severity to convince the Soviet leadership of the need to abandon its traditional approach of attempting to "muddle through" and to undertake a thoroughgoing reform of the system of economic planning and management.

Signs of a Slowdown

There seems to be considerable agreement among American analysts—government and private—that the Soviet economy will experience a radical deceleration of growth in the 1980's. While there are differences about what the precise degree of the slowdown will be, it is generally believed that the recent decline in the rate of growth will inevitably continue through much of the present decade.[1]

Mr. Bialer is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (New York, NY) and Director of its Research Institute on International Change. The questions discussed in this article are treated more extensively in Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union, *scheduled to appear this autumn.*

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[1] **The following discussion of Soviet economic prospects in the 1980's is based on a number of Western sources, both government and private. Some of the most important government reports are: *DCI [Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency] Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-Sixth Congress, 26 June 1979* (hereafter, *DCI Testimony*), mimeographed; US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), *Simulations of Soviet Growth Options to 1985*, ER 79-10131, Washington, DC, March 1979; CIA, *SOVSIM: A Model of The Soviet Economy*, ER 79-10001,**

(continued on p. 20)

The most optimistic US government estimates now foresee that Soviet gross national product (GNP) will grow at somewhat less than 3 percent annually over the next few years (down from an earlier estimate of 4 percent), and then continue to decelerate gradually thereafter. Projections for this subsequent slowdown are contingent upon assumptions concerning Soviet oil production. Should oil output decline to 10 million barrels a day by 1985, GNP growth might fall to a 2 percent annual rate; a production rate of 8 million barrels a day could further depress GNP growth to less than 1 percent annually in the mid-1980's.[2]

The Soviet leadership itself has given some signs of awareness of the problem,[3] although we shall not have a clear view of their perceptions in this regard until publication of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan, probably late this year or early in 1981. Moreover, there are even hints in the current (1976-80) plan of anticipation of a decline in Soviet economic growth. The planned annual rate of growth of capital inputs was set at 6.5 percent, lower than in any other plan since Stalin's death. The planned annual growth of man-hours of labor was put at 1.5 percent (compared with actual growth of 1.8 percent in 1961-70 and 1.9 percent in 1971-75). To be sure, the output targets of the 1976-80 plan implied an annual growth of 1.5 percent in overall factor productivity, but this seems an improbable target judging from the 0.8 percent yearly growth in 1961-70 and the 0.6 percent annual *decline* in 1971-75.[4]

Concrete evidence of a slowdown has already begun to accumulate. Clearly, the 1976-80 plan is in trouble, and far from all the difficulties can be attributed to the weather-plagued results of 1979,[5] which were probably the worst for the Soviet economy in all the years of L.I. Brezhnev's leadership. This dismal performance only served to aggravate and highlight the longer-term problems facing the Soviet regime.

Of special consequence was the drop in grain production, to 179 million metric tons (some 20 percent below the 1978 record of 237.2 million tons and also below the 1976-78 average of 218.9 million tons).[6] Because of this shortfall in domestic production, the Soviet Union had to import large quantities of Western grain and continues to have severe shortages of meat and quality foods.[7]

It is true that Soviet farm production has climbed well above the level of a decade ago, and that 1979 witnessed particularly adverse weather conditions.[8] Nevertheless, fluctuations in agriculture may become more pronounced in the 1980's if weather conditions become more "normal," i.e., harsher than they have been for a number of years. And against a slowing in the overall growth of the economy, year-to-year swings in farm output will have a greater impact on annual economic performance.

The severe winter of 1978-79 conspired to bring economic growth to a virtual standstill. Energy demand increased, even as it became more difficult to produce and distribute energy (more on this below) and other raw materials. On the heels of the poor performance of October-December 1978, industrial production in January-March 1979 increased by less than 1 percent over the comparable 1978 period. Output of steel, cement, nonferrous metals, mineral fertilizer, and pesticides for the first five months of 1979 dropped *below* the figures for the comparable 1978 period. Average daily oil production for the

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Washington, DC, February 1979; CIA, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects*, ER 77-10436U, Washington, DC, July 1977; CIA, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production*, ER 77-10270, Washington, DC, April 1977; CIA, *USSR: Long-Term Outlook for Grain Imports*, ER 79-10057, Washington, DC, January 1979. A representative nongovernment study is Holland Hunter, Ed., *The Future of the Soviet Economy, 1978-1985*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

[2] *DCI Testimony*, p.1. Soviet oil production in 1979 was running at an estimated 11.5 million barrels a day. See Joseph Licari and F. Douglas Whitehouse, "Soviet Resource Allocation in the 1980's: Some Speculations," paper presented at the US Air Force Academy-Rand Corporation Conference on the Economics of National Security, Colorado Springs, CO, Aug. 15-18, 1979, Fig. 1.

[3] Concern about the difficulties that the USSR faces in the next five-year plan and indication of the Soviet Union's lowered expectations come through in two articles published by Premier A.N. Kosygin in 1979. Writing in *Planovuye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 7, 1979, Kosygin spoke of impending manpower shortages and of the need to conserve on the resources consumed in capital investment. In *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1979, the Soviet premier stated: "In the five-year plan henceforth there will be confirmed a limit of state capital investments and of construction-installation jobs."

[4] *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects*, p. 10.

[5] In a speech to the Nov. 27, 1979, plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Soviet party and state chief L.I. Brezhnev openly expressed dissatisfaction with progress as of the fourth year of the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan. While laying some of the blame on the year 1979, with its adverse "objective factors" (i.e., weather), Brezhnev acknowledged, "If we are to speak of the main reason why bottlenecks and shortcomings still remain in the economy, then it is because of the fact that in the sphere of further raising the efficiency of production and quality of work we have not been able to move forward to the extent envisaged by the plan." *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1979.

[6] Ibid.

[7] In recent years, the Soviet regime has attempted to adopt a conservative trade and financial strategy. Such an approach has helped to cushion the impact of hard-currency grain purchases on the USSR's balance of payments. *DCI Testimony*.

[8] Wet weather in the autumn of 1978 reduced the area sown to winter grains by 5 million hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres), as compared to the previous year. The late arrival of spring in 1979 and widespread flooding in parts of the European USSR delayed spring grain planting. Finally, periods of hot, dry winds damaged both winter and spring grain crops in major producing regions.

period was below the output for the previous five months, the first time this had occurred in Soviet history.[9] For 1979 as a whole, Soviet GNP grew only 0.7 percent. Agriculture declined 5.7 percent, and industry grew only 2.2 percent. For the years 1978–79, the average annual rate of change in overall factor productivity was negative, -1.4 percent. Oil production appeared to have reached a plateau of 11.7 million barrels a day.[10]

A number of factors—some old and some of more recent vintage—appear to underlie the slowdown in Soviet economic growth. For one, the rate of increase of major production inputs—namely, labor and capital—has continued to decline. Second, productivity of capital stock has been diminishing. There are basically two schools of thought concerning this latter problem. The first, shared by most Western economists—for example, Abram Bergson[11]—seeks to



Grain arriving at the elevators of the I. Pavlov State Farm in Kustanay Rayon in the Soviet Virgin Lands during harsh winter weather in March 1979.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[9] *DCI Testimony.*

[10] CIA, *The Soviet Economy in 1978–79—and Prospects for the 1980's*, forthcoming.

[11] Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Perspectives: Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1973.

Oil workers battle the elements in Tyumen' Oblast of West Siberia in the ongoing struggle to meet Soviet energy needs from the rich deposits of the region.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

explain the slowdown by postulating a gradual decline in the rate of technological progress. A second and minority view, best represented by M.L. Weitzman,[12] holds that technological progress remains constant and that the decline in the rate of growth is due to the fact that inputs of capital goods are growing faster than inputs of labor, thereby continuously increasing the capital-labor ratio and reducing returns to production factors overall.[13]

By contrast to the above factors, the impending Soviet energy shortage is something qualitatively new. Without adequate energy, the Soviets will not be able to operate all their plant and equipment at full capacity—which in turn will accelerate the downward trend projected for the 1980's.

According to some estimates, the Soviet oil industry may already have entered a no-growth stage in 1979 and may face production declines as early as 1980.[14] Especially significant is the possibility that production in the giant Samotlor field of West Siberia may peak in 1980 or 1981 after many years of operating above the maximum efficient recovery rate. This field accounts for more than half of West Siberian and one fourth of total Soviet oil output. Exploitation of smaller fields in West Siberia is lagging behind plan because of transportation bottlenecks, soaring drilling requirements, and the failure of authorities to provide the necessary equipment and infrastructure (roads, pipelines, electric power, housing).[15] In 1980, there was increased evidence of problems in Soviet oil production.[16]

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[12] See his article, "Soviet Postwar Economic Growth and Capital-Labor Substitution," in *American Economic Review* (Menasha, WI), September 1970, pp. 676–92.

[13] While both of these views entail an expectation that the decline in growth will persist, it should be noted that there is a third view which offers a contrasting assessment. S. Gomulka predicted in 1974 that Soviet growth would remain at a level of 6 to 7 percent a year. See his paper, "Soviet Post-War Industrial Growth, Capital-Labor Substitution and Technical Changes: A Re-Examination," presented at the International Slavic Conference, Banff, Canada, September 1974.

[14] See *DCI Testimony* and *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production.* American scholar Marshall I. Goldman took strong exception to the CIA forecasts in *The Washington Post* of Aug. 20, 1979. However, even in refuting the dire CIA estimates, Goldman did seem to acknowledge that Soviet oil production was in serious trouble.

[15] *DCI Testimony.*

The possibilities for fuel substitution do not look promising either. In the 1980's, shortfalls in the coal and nuclear power industries are likely.[17] Natural gas production might provide some relief, but as yet the Soviet investment program reveals no major effort to shift the structure of fuel consumption to greater reliance on gas. (Furthermore, higher natural gas consumption could be limited by the reduction of gas exports from Iran to the USSR. In the autumn of 1978, construction stopped on a second trunk line that was to have carried increased quantities of Iranian gas to the USSR.[18]) Aware of the difficulties ahead and presumably anxious to avoid a repeat of the dislocations of the winter of 1978–79, the Soviet government issued a decree in June 1979 that included a number of measures aimed at effecting energy conservation and expanding energy production.[19]

The Soviet manpower situation will also be uniquely tight in the 1980's. As already reflected in the 1976–80 plan, the Soviet Union is in a period of declining increments to its labor force. It is estimated that the natural increase in the working-age population of the USSR will drop from 2.3 million in 1978 to about 300,000 a year in the mid-1980's. The regional aspects of the manpower problem will be particularly critical. During the present decade, net increments to the labor force will come almost exclusively from the less skilled and less mobile Muslim populations of Central Asia and the Transcaucasian republics.[20]

This manpower situation will present serious dilemmas for Soviet investment planners, with important ramifications for growth. While all areas of the USSR will require investment, the leadership will have to decide whether to stress investment in Central Asia, where most of the growth in the labor force will occur and away from which it will be difficult to move the new manpower; in the European portions of the Soviet Union, which are short of labor and raw materials but where investment can be carried out more cheaply by modernizing and expanding existing facilities; or in Siberia, where exploitation of energy and other raw material resources awaits the necessary infrastructure and industrial facilities and where operating costs are nearly double those in the western part of the country.[21] On balance, one would predict that Central Asia and Siberia will preempt an increasing share of an investment pie that is, as we have seen, likely to be growing at a decreasing rate. In the case of Central Asia, moving the available manpower would be sufficiently hard to make such a course unattractive; as for Siberia, its energy resources are essential if the USSR is to offset depletion of oil, coal, and gas deposits elsewhere.

Dividing a Smaller Pie

As growth of the Soviet economy slows in the 1980's, the leadership of the country will have smaller increments of GNP to allocate to investment, consumption, and military expenditures, and hence will face increasingly difficult allocation choices. To reduce growth in investment below the already low current rate of 3 percent a year[22] would seem inadvisable in view of vast needs for new, more energy-efficient production facilities. To reduce growth in consumption would—at the very least—have a negative impact on workers' morale and productivity just when a boost in both is needed most. To reduce growth in defense spending at a time of leadership transition would be equally difficult, since those vying for power will probably be reluctant to press for actions that might alienate the military.

Moreover, no reordering of priorities, however difficult, can be expected to have a major effect on the decline in the overall growth rate. As one Western study concludes: "Resource reallocations on the scale of the recent past are not likely solutions to the basic problems underlying future Soviet growth."[23]

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[16] For example, B. Filanovskiy, a department chief in the USSR State Planning Committee, stated that to meet production goals of the 11th (1981–85) Five-Year Plan there will have to be *2.5 times* the amount of production drilling *(eksplyuatatsionnoye bureniye)* as in 1976–80. Yet, in 1979, he reports, the plan for such drilling was only 82 percent fulfilled. *Planovoye khozyaystvo,* No. 3, 1980.

A.P. Krylov, Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Scientific Council on Problems of Exploitation of Oil Deposits, predicts that if the Soviet oil industry continues to exploit its oil deposits with current methods, resulting problems of water flooding will lead to an absolute decline in production. *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1980.

[17] *DCI Testimony.*

[18] Ibid.

[19] For the text, see *Pravda,* June 16, 1979.

[20] See *DCI Testimony.* The continuing expansion of the Muslim peoples is clear from the following comparison of statistics for natural reproduction (per 1,000 inhabitants) in 1978 in the republics heavily populated by Muslim citizens and in the other republics of the Soviet Union. *Muslim republics:* Azerbaydzhan, 18.2; Kazakhstan, 17.0; Kirgiziya, 22.3; Tadzhikistan, 29.2; Turkmeniya, 26.4; Uzbekistan, 27.0. *Other republics:* Armenia, 16.7; Belorussia, 6.8; Estonia, 2.7; Georgia, 9.7; Latvia, 1.2; Lithuania, 5.3; Moldavia, 10.3; RSFSR, 5.6; Ukraine, 4.0. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1978), Moscow, Statistika, 1979, p. 27.

[21] *DCI Testimony.* Extraction and processing of Siberian resources, as well as the transportation of them to urban-industrial regions in the European USSR, are costly. In some instances—for example, the long-distance transmission of coal-generated electric power—reliance on Siberia is still not technically feasible.

[22] Ibid.

Yet, something will have to give. Since the growth of investment is already at historically low levels and further reduction would only slow the rate of increase of GNP more, increased stringency in this sector is not that palatable an alternative. If investment is not sacrificed, the issue would boil down to one of guns *vs.* butter, i.e., the Soviet leadership would see an end to the comfortable situation, which existed during the 1960's and 1970's, of being able to afford both guns *and* butter.

If the Soviets move in the direction that tradition dictates—that is, reduction of consumption and of development of the sectors producing consumer goods, including agriculture — such reallocation may have a more far-reaching and unwelcome effect than a mere decline in worker productivity. This prediction rests on the proposition that during the Brezhnev era, the Soviet regime's success in raising the living standard of the population has constituted one of the cornerstones of the USSR's stability and that a prolonged and significant decline in the rate of growth of consumption or, even worse, a virtual stagnation or drop in living standards could lead to sociopolitical instability. Certainly the Brezhnev leadership has acted as if it believed such an assessment of the situation. From 1964 through 1978, for example, total consumption grew at an annual rate of 4.6 percent, which translated into a per capita increase of some 3.4 percent a year.[24]

In this connection, it should be underscored that a Western projection for 1981-85 based on the assumption of only a moderate decline in overall growth envisages an annual rate of increase of only 2.1 percent in total, and 1.2 percent in per capita, consumption—that is, roughly half and one third of the respective rates for the preceding 15 years.[25] Were further inroads to be made into these very modest projected rates by reallocation away from consumption, then there would for all practical purposes be a freezing or even a decline in the standard of living of the Soviet population. If the leadership does subscribe to the view linking consumer satisfaction with stability, it is likely to view such a prospect with considerable misgivings.[26] Fear of the possible sociopolitical consequences could lead Soviet leaders to establish a more restrictive general political climate or, alternatively, to place consumption still higher on their list of priorities and this time at a clearer and higher cost to the other resource claimants, especially the military.

The burden of military spending on the Soviet economy has been significant. The US Central Intelligence Agency has estimated that in 1975, military requirements—both direct and indirect—claimed the following shares of the output of major branches of Soviet heavy industry: energy, one sixth; chemicals, one sixth; metallurgy, one fifth; and machinery and metalworking, one third.[27] In the 1970's, according to another study, military spending claimed 11 to 12 percent of Soviet GNP. Military outlays increased at 3–4 percent a year over that period.[28]

The level of economic development achieved in the last decade does provide the USSR a sufficient base—economic slowdown or no—to maintain a strong strategic and conventional military posture in the 1980's, one that is highly competitive with that of the West (on the assumption the military expenditures of the latter stay at current levels). Nevertheless, the rate of Soviet economic growth will have some bearing on the Soviet posture and on Moscow's attitudes toward competition in armaments.

If the annual rate of growth of Soviet GNP in the 1980's is in the neighborhood of 3 percent a year, i.e., at the upper end of the range of projections, then for the foreseeable future the Soviet Union can continue to raise the level of its military expenditures at a rate similar to that of the last decade without significantly increasing the existing burden on civilian economic programs. In this case, Soviet military strength would remain competitive with the West in the 1980's even if the Western allies upped their military expenditures. If, however, Soviet economic growth is lower, the leadership would face a more difficult set of choices. It could sustain the rate of increase in military spending observed in the 1970's, but only at the cost of disrupting the existing balance in the economy. Alternatively, it could allow the rate of increase in military spending to slow, at the risk of possible deterioration in the USSR's military posture vis-à-vis the West. Consequently, there would appear to be significant economic disincentives for the Soviet side to get involved in an unrestricted arms race, above and beyond the fact that such a race could enhance the risk of war between the superpowers.

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[23] *Simulations of Soviet Growth Options to 1985*, p. 22.

[24] Derived from M. Elizabeth Denton, "Soviet Consumer Policy: Trends and Prospects," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Oct. 10, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 766, Table 2.

[25] *Simulations of Soviet Growth Options to 1985*, p. 3.

[26] Further intensifying the potential impact of this stagnation are perceptible signs of decline in social mobility—for example, educational mobility. Thus, from 1960 to 1978, the percentage of day-course middle-school graduates admitted to full-time day studies in higher education establishments declined from 36.4 percent to 20.7 percent. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 g.*, pp., 468, 478; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1968 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1968), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 687.

[27] CIA, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970–1975*, SR 76–101210, Washington, DC, May 1976.

[28] CIA, *Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1970–79: A Dollar Cost Comparison*, SR 80–10005, Washington, DC, January 1980. According to this report, the 3 percent rate of increase was based upon dollar calculations; calculated in rubles and Soviet prices, the rate would have been 4–5 percent.

One caveat is necessary here. If the Soviet leadership concludes that the USSR's basic security is endangered, whether by a more rapid military buildup in the West or by a modernizing China, Moscow will doubtless take appropriate measures to increase military procurements regardless of costs. Nevertheless, two simple points should be made: (a) The cost of any step-up in military expenditures will be much higher, the burden much more painful, than at any time in the post-Stalin era. (b) Under these circumstances, the Soviet leaders' once almost automatic satisfaction of the demands and requirements of their military establishment may become much more tempered, and proposed expansions of military programs may be subjected to a much closer, more critical scrutiny.

Political Repercussions

The economic dilemmas facing the Soviet Union in the 1980's have a number of important potential political repercussions. To be sure, major emergencies in the economic, social, or political arenas are nothing new to the USSR; it has solved or coexisted with a number of them in its history. Yet, neither the post-Stalin leadership nor the Soviet system itself as it exists today is conditioned to deal with the kinds of emergencies looming in the 1980's. In the past, problems tended to be concentrated in one area at a time and/or were responsive to a mass mobilization effort—what one might call the strategy of a hammerblow. The approaching problems are spread across the board to many vital areas and require sophisticated manipulation simultaneously on many levels—what might be called the strategy of a scalpel.

On one front, the problem of declining growth calls for a fundamental reform of the entire system of planning and management, with obvious political ramifications. The Soviet leadership simply cannot reverse the reduction in the rates of growth merely by exercising the traditional policy levers under its control. While a strong, imaginative, highly interventionist leadership redirecting resources at the macroeconomic level may bring, and is in fact a sine qua non of, *partial* success, the Achilles' heel of the Soviet political economy remains its microeconomic structures, which are highly inefficient, lacking in autonomy, and discouraging to innovation.

The pressures on resources discussed above likewise will create new tensions within the Soviet decision-making apparatus, testing its ability (developed under Brezhnev) to arrive at collective decisions through a process of bargaining and compromise. The relatively low level of conflict among Soviet party and state administrative elites in the 1970's reflected changes made in the structure of the Soviet party-state over the last decade, as well as the policies pursued by the post-Khrushchev leadership in organizational, political, economic, and ideological matters. In the first years, the result was improvement in the power position and satisfaction of the group interests of almost all institutional segments of the Soviet political elite. This situation was reinforced by the healthy rate of growth of the Soviet economy, which made possible the partial satisfaction of the expectations of all elite groups. The declining growth rates of the 1980's and resulting budgetary constraints will create conditions for a much sharper competition for allocations among interest groups, i.e., for a much less benign political climate.

No easy choices are available to any set of Soviet leaders in the 1980's. The resource allocation dilemmas that loom are likely to prove increasingly intractable from a political as well as an economic standpoint. There will be strongly conflicting pressures from different elements within the Soviet bureaucracy to increase investment, to maintain consumption levels and keep up allocations to agriculture, and to avoid cutbacks in military spending. Whether the post-Brezhnev leadership will be strong enough to impose a coherent and effective strategy for dealing with these demands is uncertain. What is clear is that in the mid-1980's, marginal shifts in resource allocations will become more and more contested as energy and labor shortages take their toll.

The unavoidable major shortages in manpower that are coming and the increased economic importance of those labor increments that do emerge may exacerbate the ethnic-national problems of the Soviet Union, especially with regard to the areas inhabited by Muslim peoples. (This is in addition to the general increase in interrepublic competition for resources that one would expect to result from any economic slowdown.) It is almost exclusively from the Muslim population living in Central Asia and Transcaucasia that the new Soviet labor force in the mid-1980's will stem. As noted above, this situation presents the Soviet leadership with two choices—to try to "persuade" the new

Kadyr Sapargeldyev, a veteran schoolteacher of 35 years in the town of Iolotan' in the Turkmen Republic of the USSR, and himself father of 10.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

labor force to move to European Russia or Siberia or to try to move a major part of the investment activity to the labor supply in Central Asia.[29]

A large-scale out-migration of the Muslim population to labor-short areas of the European Soviet Union is not likely, and Soviet authorities have not acted as if they believe that encouraging such an out-migration would prove a successful policy. Beyond the considerable cultural barriers inhibiting emigration, there are economic factors—such as the relatively high rural living standards in Central Asia—that strengthen the ties of the Central Asians to their native areas.

Adoption of the second alternative could have several adverse consequences. First, it could foster a great deal of dissatisfaction among the European republics of the USSR by diverting contested capital resources to areas of non-European nationality (such dissatisfaction would, of course, be intensified by a simultaneous diversion of capital to Siberia as well). Second, it could create among the Central Asians social and cultural stresses of the kind inherent in rapid industrialization. Finally, it could increase the hostility of native political-administrative elites to encroachment on their autonomy, particularly personified in the additional Russian bureaucrats who would certainly come to Central Asia in connection with any massive influx of Russian capital.

In allocating resources and contemplating the possibility of economic slowdown and energy shortages in the USSR, Soviet leaders must also weigh the possible impact of these developments on economic and political relations with its East European client states. The latter rely heavily on the Soviet Union for energy and raw materials, and their needs in these areas are likely to increase in the 1980's. Yet, drastic reductions in Soviet oil exports to Eastern Europe may be the only way for Moscow to contain the damages to the Soviet economy of the energy shortage likely to emerge in the USSR by 1985.

Moscow's ability to deliver energy and raw materials has long been one positive means of enticing, rather than having to compel, East European ruling elites to maintain their allegiance to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, economic difficulties in these countries have a tendency to translate quickly and directly into dangerous sociopolitical instability. As things stand, however, economic prospects for the East European Communist countries in the 1980's are, if anything, less promising than those for the Soviet Union, particularly in the cases of Poland and East Germany, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia. The countries of Eastern Europe have a heavy and growing indebtedness to the West, and any Soviet decision that would force them to find their needed energy resources outside the Soviet Union—in hard-currency markets—would be a major blow, one that might not only endanger political stability in individual countries but also undermine allegiance to Moscow.[30]

The USSR has experienced troubles with its East European empire in the past, but these have tended to crop up in different countries at different times. As a consequence, Moscow has managed to deal with them individually. But the economic squeeze of the 1980's would seem to diminish the chances that this good fortune will last.

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[29] For further discussion of this problem, see Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1979, pp. 1–13.

[30] On these matters, see Ernst Kux, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," ibid., March-April 1980, pp. 21–37.

The continuing economic slowdown, and especially the oil situation, will likewise create pressures for adjustment of Soviet trade policy with other areas in the 1980's. Moscow will need imports from the West more than ever before, and the leadership may have to abandon its current conservative financial stance regarding trade with the West. The Soviets will continue to require substantial imports of grain, steel products (especially large-diameter pipe for oil and gas pipelines), and a wide range of other oil and gas technology. But, as domestic oil production trails off and Moscow attempts to satisfy competing East European and domestic Soviet energy needs, oil exports for hard currency are likely to fall. This state of affairs will limit Moscow's capacity to import grain, steel, and Western machinery and equipment. Maintenance and expansion of Soviet trade with the developed capitalist states will thus depend increasingly upon Moscow's willingness and ability to increase markedly the USSR's medium- and long-term debt to those states, as well as upon its success in negotiating compensation agreements with Western firms so as to ensure an expansion of exports.

That such an adjustment in Soviet policy will actually occur is not altogether certain, but it is a real possibility. After all, the Soviet leadership in the 1970's made a basic decision to turn from an autarkic economic policy toward greater dependence on exchange with the West. This decision provided the background to, and served as a concomitant of, the USSR's switch to détente in foreign policy. Subsequently, to be sure, the policy of détente did not bring the USSR all the economic benefits that Soviet leaders had originally envisioned it would, and Moscow itself cast doubt on the viability of the policy by interpreting détente as giving it freedom to undertake military and military-oriented activities in the non-European areas of political competition between the USSR and the United States. However, it is conceivable that if the United States succeeds in convincing Soviet leaders of, on the one hand, its resolve and ability to resist Moscow's interpretation of what détente permits the USSR to do militarily in the Third World and, on the other, its willingness to engage in real economic cooperation with the USSR, Soviet leaders will feel greater pressure for restraint about trying to exploit marginal targets of opportunity and will focus upon the economic considerations that inclined them toward the détente policy in the first place. Certainly, the objective aspects of the situation would seem to impel them in that direction.

Decision Framework

Today, as the Soviet economic plan for 1981–85 is being formulated and measures directed toward the 1990's are being approved, the pressures and dilemmas discussed above are already objective facts of Soviet socioeconomic and political life. Moreover, they are likely to intensify in the coming years. The Soviet leadership must clearly make some hard decisions in the near future and then be willing and able to adjust them subsequently to evolving reality over the coming decade. These decisions will determine not so much the degree of the Soviet economic slowdown in the

The Soviet freighter Zarechensk unloading wide-diameter steel pipes for gas transmission at Murmansk. The pipes, manufactured by the West German Mannesmann firm, are to be used to exploit Soviet gas deposits and are to be paid for by exports of natural gas to West Germany.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

next five-year plan—this is almost preordained—but who in the main will lose because of it and, as important, what steps can still be taken to reverse the trend and salvage as much as possible by the end of the 1980's.

Just how Soviet leaders react to the domestic economic problems that are going to accumulate during the 1980's will depend on four major variables: (1) the degree of the actual slowdown in the next decade, (2) their perceptions of the long-range economic prospects, (3) the degree of maneuverability that they have available to them in dealing with economic problems, and (4) the influence of the political succession to Brezhnev on their economic policies. Let us examine each of these in order.

With regard to the first, Soviet and Western economists, while agreeing that the 1980's will see a slowdown in Soviet economic growth, differ significantly in their evaluations of the likely extent of that slowdown. As noted above, the projections range from a prediction of stagnation of Soviet GNP at the pessimistic extreme, through annual growth at a slow 1.0 to 1.5 percent rate, to annual growth of 2.5 to 3.0 percent in the most optimistic projections. (Soviet economists with whom I have discussed the matter in Moscow incline toward the latter estimates, with some dissent on the downward side.) Differences in the prognosis stem in part from evaluations of the Soviet leadership's ability to counter the trend with intelligent and reformist policies. A more significant source, however, is varying opinions about the likely magnitude of the Soviet energy shortage and the options available to minimize its impact.

For an economist to forecast the annual growth rate of an enormous economy over long periods of time is of course a risky and inexact enterprise. In the Soviet case, the only certainty among economists is the prediction that rates will decline. For the political analyst, however, the *degree* of decline is the most crucial element in estimating sociopolitical consequences. In the case of the Soviet Union, realization of the most pessimistic alternative—stagnation—or even a growth rate of 1.0 to 1.5 percent would precipitate a sociopolitical crisis of major proportions. By contrast, the most optimistic alternative—a 3 percent growth rate—would, while creating serious problems for the system, maintain conditions permitting Soviet leaders to "muddle through," especially in the first years of the decade. Although the extreme points of the continuum cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the sociopolitical implications of slowdown, a mean position is the more likely outcome in the next decade. Both the most and the least pessimistic alternatives would require for their fulfillment a rare confluence of either the most favorable or the least favorable passive and active factors, and a random distribution of those factors would appear a more realistic expectation.

When we come to the question of how Soviet leaders view the long-range prospects for the Soviet economy, i.e., of what they see beyond the difficulties of the 1980's, a fundamental point needs to be made. The Soviet leadership acknowledges that the trend toward a slowdown of economic growth is a secular one brought about by the limits of Soviet extensive growth, and they have spoken of the need to stimulate the intensive factors of production, particularly productivity and technological progress, in order to counteract the trend.[31] Moreover, they appear to recognize that the impact of the next decade's decline in growth will be seriously aggravated by the projected situations with regard to energy supply and the distribution of the population.[32] However, things farther down the road, beyond the 1980's, may look different to them.

In the case of the demographic situation, for example, all signs point to a considerable improvement in the 1990's. If the supply of new labor is not likely to return to the peak of the early 1970's, it will rise sharply as compared to the mid-1980's.[33]

The energy situation is more complicated and unpredictable. As we well know, the Soviet Union possesses the largest known reserves of oil of any country in the world. But the bulk of these are located in regions of Siberia and the Far East that are most difficult to reach, explore, and exploit. Without sizable investments of capital, Western technology, and time, these areas cannot be developed. Thus, a major policy decision is required. Unless a decision for an all-out attack on the energy problem from the supply side is made soon, the present trend will not be reversed by the late 1980's or early 1990's. If it is made soon, then the specific difficulties of the 1980's might well be alleviated by the start of the next decade.

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[31] Kosygin in his *Planovoye khozyaystvo* article cited above spoke emphatically of the need for "intensification of production, relentless growth of its efficiency." Referring to capital construction, the Soviet premier stated, "For many years we rapidly increased the volume of capital investments, the rate of growth of which markedly exceeded the rate of growth of national income. From the results of three years of the current five-year period, the rate of growth of produced national income was higher than the growth of capital investments. This is a positive tendency, bearing witness to increase in the efficiency of social production."

[32] For example, Kosygin has declared: "We must learn to manage efficiently and successfully develop the economy under conditions of an unchanged and in the long term even an absolutely decreasing number of persons employed in material production." Ibid.

[33] From 1990 to 1991, the natural increase of the Soviet working-age population should be some 500,000; from 1995 to 1996, some 800,000. Unpublished estimates prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of the Census.

In light of this general picture, the Soviet leaders of the 1980's might well make decisions that are the least difficult politically. They may choose to "tough it through" the next decade and await better times in the 1990's. This would, of course, again postpone confronting the basic long-range problem of Soviet development—the need to adjust the managerial-planning instruments of the economy to the requirement of intensive growth. Such a policy could be seen as "muddling through" at a lower level of achievement.

However, this brings us to the third set of considerations. The policy of "muddling through" or "business as usual" depends heavily on the margin of maneuverability available in the 1980's for allocating resources. In the long run, it seems that the simultaneous pursuit of increased military spending, rising consumption, and growing overall investment—that is, the policy of the Brezhnev era—cannot be sustained. In the short run, the Soviet leadership can hope to preserve military and consumer priorities by cutting overall investment sharply. According to a recent estimate, a reduction by one half in the growth of investment (which would fall most heavily on availability of funds for the capital goods industries and on long-range agricultural investment) would permit continuation of the rise in military spending at present levels and a rate of increase in consumption of approximately 1.5 percent a year.[34] Such a strategy of drastic cuts in investment growth in the coming five-year plan would permit, for a time at least, production of both guns and butter.

The crucial term here is "for a time." In the longer run, such a policy cannot provide a solution. First of all, a decision to cut both investment growth and the proportion of investment in the GNP would presumably be predicated to a large extent on the assumption that the energy shortages of the early and mid-1980's would leave underutilized larger industrial capacities than is normal under Soviet conditions and that therefore an effort to utilize them more fully would produce industrial growth without additional investments. However, this kind of procedure could only be a one-time operation. By the mid-1980's—if we assume the correctness of the possible Soviet calculation—the reserve of underutilized capacities would have been largely exploited once and for all. The investment starvation of the Soviet economy would then begin to be felt very deeply, and this time there would be no possibility of avoiding difficult allocation decisions on the macroeconomic level.

Soviet General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev on the reviewing stand at the 1979 May Day parade in Moscow's Red Square.

—Sipa Press from Black Star.

Second, and more important, if there has ever been a time in the development of the USSR since Stalin that large investments have been needed, it is now. For example, the energy situation itself cannot be ameliorated without gigantic inputs into the development of Siberia and the Far East. One has to assume that this is clear to any configuration of Soviet leaders and that therefore the investment cuts would be made primarily in other economic sectors. But draconian cuts in other economic sectors would frustrate the immediate needs of technological progress and the essential renovation of the outmoded Soviet industrial plant. Their effect would only be to deepen the decline in Soviet economic growth and to produce yet another delay, costly in the long haul, in maximization of the intensive factors of Soviet growth. Thus, such a course might postpone hard choices and avoid far-reaching reforms, but it would solve nothing, as would become painfully evident by the mid-1980's.

Yet the situation is rendered even more complex and unpredictable by the fact that these economic decisions will be made in an environment of succession politics. The process of succession—combining the ultimate replacement of the top leader with an inevitable turnover of major proportions in the top central elite and entrance into high political roles of the representatives of the post-Stalin generation of elites—has for all practical purposes already begun.[35]

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[34] See Licari and Whitehouse, loc. cit.

Departure of the Great Purge generation of leaders is in itself an important turning point in Soviet *political* history, and its coincidence with a major turning point in Soviet *economic* history marks a time of unusual opportunities and openings for change. However, the Soviet Union will be able to capitalize on these opportunities only if its new leadership is imaginative and (what is crucial) strong. How soon is such a strong leadership likely to emerge from the succession process?

The most probable course of development after Brezhnev's departure is the selection of an interim leader, who during a short term of two to four years in office will fail to achieve a strong position within the oligarchy and will yield to a younger leader, who will in turn require several years to consolidate his power. In this event, the earliest that one *may* have a strong leader is the second half of the 1980's.

There are, of course, other possibilities. For example, an interim leader chosen from the Brezhnev generation could remain in office longer than suggested above. He might hold strong opinions different from those of his colleagues on the desirable direction of Soviet policies, and he might succeed in allying himself with a younger generation of officials whom he would introduce in large numbers into the central hierarchy. It is not to be excluded, either, that Brezhnev might be followed directly by a younger leader and that the entire pattern of interim succession might thereby be avoided. While these last two scenarios might surface a strong and established leadership team before the mid-1980's, they appear less likely than the one suggested above.

Prospects for Change

In the 1970's, the Soviet system displayed a high level of stability and of continuity, and a marginality of change. But the pressures for change that will emerge in the current decade may seriously shake this stability. To be sure, any changes that might ensue from such pressures during the 1980's in all probability would *not* constitute a systemic crisis and would *not* lead to a transformation of the Soviet system of government; nevertheless, they might make the Soviet Union significantly different from the Soviet Union of the 1970's.

In 1979, according to information from Moscow, a new major reform of Soviet economic planning and management was already under active discussion in central institutions. An official resolution seeming to suggest that one is forthcoming was published in the summer of the year.[36] Speaking with Soviet economists and political scientists, one is struck by the extent to which the need for major reform is recognized and the introduction of one is expected. What the focal point of such a reform should be is obviously a matter of dispute and major differences of opinion.

As far as it is possible to judge, the reform that is being actively discussed or prepared will attempt to reconcile two basic but clashing tendencies with respect to reform. One of these tendencies is to respond to the new difficulties and demands primarily with greater centralization and more discipline, accompanied by a better flow and processing of information between the micro- and macroeconomic levels. The other tendency is to switch the center of gravity of everyday economic decision-making to the direct producer and to intermediate links between the producer and the macroeconomic level. This would require a radical shift in the weight of quantitative and qualitative planning indices, in the system of incentives and rewards, and in the type of association between planning, supplying, and production units. Of these, incentives are crucial. It is, after all, not a lack of proficient cadres that restrains the effectiveness of Soviet enterprises. Soviet industry today employs three times as many engineers as does US industry, but the USSR's industrial output is only two thirds that of the US. Soviet agriculture employs five times as many agronomists, but its productivity is less than one third that of US agriculture. The existing system of planning, incentives, and rewards discourages innovation, encourages waste, and punishes initiative.

Unfortunately, a reform—such as appears to be in the works—aimed at partially satisfying both these

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[35] See Seweryn Bialer, "Succession and Turnover of Soviet Elites," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall/Winter 1978, pp. 181–200.

[36] In July, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted an extensive and important resolution, "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism's Influence in Enhancing Production Efficiency and Work Quality." The text was printed in *Pravda*, July 29, 1979, and a translation is available in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Aug. 22, 1979, pp. 1–8, 14.

The most noteworthy departure in this resolution was the decision to *increase the role of the five-year plans as against the annual plans.* If implemented, this decision could lead to a decline in day-to-day supervision by planning authorities and increase the flexibility of management.

A fisheye photo of the main machine room at the Main Computer Center of the USSR State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN).

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

tendencies would seem to ensure the worst possible results. It would probably produce no more improvements in the qualitative indices of economic performance — which are now decisive—than the other reforms which have preceded it.

The Soviet Union has many very talented economists and planners, and has major research institutions well suited to the job of remodeling the system of planning and management. Moreover, virtually everyone, not only among experts but among party and government leaders as well, admits that the present system is able to manage economic growth well only when that growth is based on increased *amounts* of the basic factors of production. It is generally accepted that some change of the economic system is required in order to generate growth based on increased *efficiency* per factor unit.

Yet while this truth is basically accepted by all, there enters a crucial set of subquestions which provoke acrimonious disagreement or simply vacillation and paralysis. For example, How far-reaching do changes have to be to activate "intensive" factors of growth? What changes should there be? How should the transition from the existing to a new economic mechanism be effected? What will convince the system directors that the gains from the reforms will be a fair trade-off for undesirable political side-effects and interim high costs?

On the surface, questions of the extent and nature of the reforms seem the most hotly debated between the centralizers and the supporters of a flexible approach.[37] A large group of Soviet economists and virtually all Western specialists would agree that small-scale tinkering can no longer suffice and that "What is to be done" is to change from a system of guidance based on *administrative orders* to one based on *economic parameters*.[38] Such a change would constitute a major watershed, the ramifications of which for a socialist economy were described by the late Polish émigré economist Janusz Zielinski thus:

> *It seems that such a watershed does exist in terms of the abolition (or retention) of direct planning at plan executants level. It is extremely important to notice that abolition of direct planning at plan executants level means also the abolition of the ratchet principle—planning (and rewarding) from the achieved level—with all its far-reaching negative economic consequences both in the sphere of plan construction (bargaining for low/high input/output plans, falsifying information in the planning process) and in its implementation (keeping "reserves" for use in the*

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[37] Even Brezhnev, in his Nov. 27, 1979, Central Committee speech cited in fn. 5, has borne witness to the conflict: "It is important that higher bodies do not infringe on the rights given to enterprises, associations, and labor collectives."

[38] The contrast between the two approaches has been capsulized by a Hungarian economist in the following fashion: "The difference between the socialist market model according to plan and the model relying on plan directives can be summed up by saying that [in the former case] the planning of the national economy is kept up but obligatory plan indices are omitted." B. Csikos-Nagy, *Socialist Economic Policy*, London, Longman, 1973, p. 44.

Line management of Soviet industry: a session of the technical council of the BELAVTOMAZ production association in Minsk, Belorussia. BELAVTOMAZ manufactures heavy-duty trucks.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

planning period, which means keeping actual enterprise productivity permanently below what its managers ***know*** *to be possible).*[39]

However, the crux of the difficulties concerning the reform may well have to do with the other two questions —the mechanism of its introduction and the probable political-economic trade-offs.[40]

There exist three clear, interconnected sets of contradictions with regard to the last two questions which tend to constitute a vicious circle, impeding any serious effort to introduce reforms in the Soviet system. First, the initial period of reform is immensely costly, not unlike investment in a plant before it starts to produce. Disorganization is inevitable; temporary decline in productivity, most likely. Reserves are required to carry the economy through this difficult initial stage. However, the poor shape of the economy and the tautness of present planning—factors which would induce the leadership to introduce the reform in the first place—leave few such reserves. Second, only a far-reaching reform has a chance to be effective in the long run and is worth trying. Yet a far-reaching reform is the most difficult. It requires the change of deeply ingrained habits, of ways of doing business which have been inculcated through generations. If the need for thorough reform is not generally recognized, it must be forced through by a strong, consistent leadership. Third, the effective introduction of a far-reaching reform has to be carried out without hesitation across the board, not in a piecemeal way. But until the effects of such a reform are tested and recognized as effective, the necessary determination and consistency are likely to be lacking.

As we know from past Soviet experience (particularly the flirtation with Libermanism[41]), the response to these contradictions tends to be largely self-defeating. Of all the variants of reform, the leadership selects the one that would cause the least disturbance and would require the least cost and effort—that is to say, a compromise solution. Instead of introducing it across the board and with determination, they want to try it on an experimental basis and limited scale. Consequently, the results of the reform are far from conclusive and even disappointing, an outcome that in turn fuels the arguments of opponents, who prevent its further implementation. The leadership reverts to traditional ways of doing business and further half-hearted tinkering with the system. Piecemeal and well-intentioned partial reforms, instead of transforming the traditional economic system, are absorbed and changed by this system. *This political mechanism explains the inherent stability of the traditional economic system and the inherent instability of reform efforts in the Soviet Union.*

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[39] Janusz G. Zielinski, "On System Remodeling in Poland: A Pragmatic Approach," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1976, p. 6. Emphasis in original.

[40] Zielinski, loc. cit., discusses these problems. His essay launched a general discussion of economic reforms in Communist societies, published in subsequent issues of *Soviet Studies*.

[41] The theories of Yevsey Liberman figured strongly in reforms discussed and partially introduced at the outset of the Brezhnev era. The reforms were supposedly designed to increase the role of material incentives and profit-based performance indicators in decision-making by enterprise managers.

One should not make the mistake of picturing the Soviet reform debate as one between reluctant central leaders, on the one hand, and eager plant managers, on the other hand. The divisions are much more blurred and twisted, running vertically and zigzag throughout the political-managerial establishment. If anything, the inertia might even be stronger at the bottom and middle levels than at the top. As one Western analyst recently observed, "After sixty years of experience with a socialist economy run by government agencies . . . , nearly everyone seems to have found ways to turn its shortcomings to individual advantage."[42] In this situation, the top central leadership has not merely to agree to a reform to make it a reality, it has to push hard to overcome the resistance of habit and interest at lower levels if it wants to succeed.

For all these reasons, it is easy to understand why one analysis has concluded:

> *. . . a major economic reform would disturb established balances in both political and economic power. It would be strongly opposed by the state bureaucracy where jobs, careers, and political influence would be at stake, as well as by the party bureaucracy, whose control over economic decision-making and resource allocation would be threatened. Faced with uncertain long-run benefits, probably high short-run costs, and certain strong opposition, a Soviet leadership of any foreseeable composition would probably opt against taking such risks.*[43]

Yet such a judgment may be premature.

At no point in the past have the pressures for change been so great. This is not to argue that time is running out on the system, for it still possesses enormous reserves of stability. But the economic emergencies facing the Soviet Union in the 1980's, when combined with the opening afforded by the approaching succession of leadership and elites, seem uniquely conducive to serious efforts to reform the traditional economic system. Should actual Soviet growth and energy problems in the 1980's fall within the range of the most pessimistic of the projections noted above, the USSR will need a reform—and a successful one at that—to avoid being condemned to a process not simply of "muddling through," but of "muddling down."

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[42] Gertrude E. Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of Reforms," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, p. 313.

[43] CIA, *Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: The Search for Panaceas*, ER 77-10769, Washington, DC, December 1977, p. 21.

Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda

By George W. Breslauer

With the Brezhnev succession almost upon us, discussion of the future of the Soviet Union has acquired an unusual measure of topical interest and importance. Aside from questions of systemic stability, observers typically are interested in such questions as who is likely to occupy the leading positions in the Soviet government and Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), what challenges (socioeconomic, political, and international) are likely to face the new Soviet leaders, and how the new Soviet leaders are likely to respond to those challenges. This article will focus on the last of these questions—specifically, on the prospects for significant change in Soviet foreign and domestic policy during the 1980's.

In approaching the subject, it is important to recognize that this will be the third major political succession since the death of Yosif Stalin, and we would be unwise to ignore the courses of past successions in constructing our images of the future.[1] This article, then, will begin by exploring the successions after the death of Stalin and the fall of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, with particular reference to two questions. What has been the impact of political succession on the Soviet policy agenda, and how has the political process involved in changing administrations affected the timing and types of policies considered and adopted? In this undertaking, it should be noted, the emphasis will be on *similarities* in policy and process during the rise of Khrushchev and Leonid I. Brezhnev, similarities that existed despite manifold differences between the two men in personality, concrete policy preferences, degree of utopianism, amount of power, and the domestic and international context of their policy initiatives. Such emphasis will tend to control, if only in a limited way, for the impact of personality on policy choices.

Mr. Breslauer is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley). He is the author of Five Images of the Soviet Future, *1978, the coauthor of two other works on Soviet politics, and a contributor of articles and papers to various journals and symposia. An earlier version of this article was presented at the April 17, 1980, meeting of the Study Group on Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY.*

One cannot, however, uncritically assume that past patterns will recur, and mechanistically project the past into the future. Indeed, there are new factors in Soviet politics and policy and in the international context in the 1980's that could alter those patterns. Some could affect the timing of change, and others, the content of change. Obviously, the future holds many possibilities. Thus, the article will assess the new factors at work and then the implications for the post-Brezhnev period. On balance, I will argue, factors related to internal Soviet politics are not likely to eliminate an intra-elite reformist impulse that has persisted through a quarter century of the post-Stalin era. If that impulse does not survive, the cause will probably lie in significant new factors in international politics.

Patterns of Political Succession

In turning first to previous successions, it is essential to keep in mind at the outset several general aspects of political succession in the USSR.

First, political succession in the Soviet Union has been a prolonged process. After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the political succession lasted through

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[1] George W. Breslauer, "Images of the Future and Lessons of the Past," in Robert Wesson, Ed., *The Soviet Union: Looking to the 1980's*, Millwood, NY, Kraus International Publications, 1980.

December 1959, when the Central Committee approved Khrushchev's demand for a one-third cut in Soviet ground forces, an act that in turn capped Khrushchev's efforts to flesh out the foreign policy implications of the comprehensive program he had presented at the 21st Party Congress earlier that year. Similarly, after the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, the political succession lasted through November 1971, when a Central Committee Plenum endorsed Brezhnev's foreign policy measures of that year, an endorsement that in turn capped Brezhnev's efforts to flesh out the foreign policy implications of the comprehensive program he had presented at the 24th Party Congress earlier that year. In both cases, the process of political succession lasted approximately seven years.

Second, although precise turning points within these long periods are difficult to pin down, it is nonetheless possible to discern two stages in each succession. The first stage lasted roughly four years—from March 1953 to early 1957 for Khrushchev and from October 1964 to late 1968 for Brezhnev. In each instance, it was characterized by rival programs for significant change in policy and structure, by zigzags in policy, and by the polarization of positions as policy disputes fed into the power struggle and as the major protagonists seized on opportunities to portray their rivals in an unfavorable light. During this stage, the party leader maneuvered against his rivals in the leadership and began his gradual rise—but did not yet achieve complete ascendancy. The second stage lasted nearly three years—from early or mid-1957 to December 1959 for Khrushchev and from late 1968 or early 1969 to November 1971 for Brezhnev. In each instance, it was characterized by the ascendancy of the party leader,[2] by the forging and presentation of a comprehensive program for structural reform and budgetary redistribution at home, and by Soviet initiatives to improve the prospects for US-Soviet collaboration abroad.

Leaders in Stage 1 of the Stalin succession: at left, G.M. Malenkov, and at right, N.S. Khrushchev.

—Ede Koenig/Black Star.

Finally, the patterns of succession attest to the continuing importance of what might be termed the "post-Stalin consensus." Both within and between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev administrations, there has been a relatively broad agreement among the Soviet political elite that "post-Stalinism" requires continuing attention to consumer satisfaction and welfare, relaxation of international tensions through US-Soviet collaboration to avoid nuclear confrontation, and the simultaneous expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union as a competitive global power. Some members of the political elite have embraced these goals as ends in themselves, and others have viewed them as little more than regrettable necessities. Nevertheless, since the death of Stalin, most members of the Soviet leadership have not disagreed over *whether* to pursue these ends. Rather, both within and between administrations, they have differed over the strategies for attaining these goals and over the costs to be incurred in seeking them (potentially including budgetary restrictions on the military/heavy-industry complex, sacrifice of the values of autarky and foreign policy militance as the guarantors of national security, and inroads on the primacy of bureaucratic centralism and party interventionism as means of stimulating initiative in a planned economy).[3] In such a general context, "significant change" in policies would involve the advancement of programs that explicitly challenge traditional priorities and values for the sake of improving economic efficiency, raising consumer satisfaction, building the global influence of the Soviet Union, and achieving détente with the United States.[4]

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[2] To be sure, Khrushchev rose to a position of greater primacy than Brezhnev, but the trend within each administration was in the same direction. Moreover, some argue that Khrushchev had more power in 1955 than in 1957–58. This contention, which flows from the "conflict model" first elaborated by Carl Linden (*Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), is based upon a misreading of Khrushchev's policy preferences during the period 1957–59 and therefore upon the erroneous conclusion that he lost on many issues during that period. For a reexamination of the evidence, see George W. Breslauer, "Patterns of Leadership in the Soviet Union Since Stalin," unpublished book manuscript.

Such, in general outline, are the patterns of both the Stalin and Khrushchev successions. The particular character of each stage will now be set forth in greater detail.

Stage 1

A common feature of Stage 1 of both political successions was the rapid emergence of rival policy programs. Both the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (Khrushchev and G.M. Malenkov in the first succession, and Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin in the second) sponsored programs based upon competing approaches to problem-solving. While all four leaders offered programs that fell within the post-Stalin consensus, they differed most significantly over the costs to traditional values they were willing to bear for the sake of their programs.

Thus, in the domestic realm, Malenkov advocated a program for expanded investment in light industry, conversion of selected heavy-industry and defense plants to the production of consumer goods, long-term and heavy investment in the intensive development of agriculture, deep cuts in the defense budget to help pay for these programs, and restraints on party activism in order to improve administrative efficiency. In the sphere of foreign policy, he emphasized collaboration with the United States to reduce international tensions and thereby to make cuts in the defense budget more feasible. Khrushchev, in contrast, developed a program that was far less redistributive of budgetary priorities than Malenkov's, less challenging to traditional military and heavy-industry interests and values, and less accommodating to US sensibilities. Accordingly, in the domestic realm, he proposed a low-cost, short-term approach to solving the agricultural problem (the Virgin Lands Program), an expensive program for modernization and expansion of the defense forces (with particular emphasis on nuclear missiles), and increased party activism and interventionism as a means of stimulating administrative initiative. In the sphere of foreign policy he sought to expand competitive activism vis-à-vis Western interests in the Third World and (to prove that such activisim was not incompatible with the simultaneous search for collaborative arrangements with the West) to reduce the threat of confrontation, war, and an unlimited arms race with the United States.[5]

The differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin after Khrushchev's ouster were neither as large nor as stark as those between Khrushchev and Malenkov, but in certain respects they were analogous. Like Malenkov, Kosygin championed the cause of light industry in the battle for investments and advanced a program for administrative reform that, for the sake of economic efficiency, challenged the principle of party interventionism. In the realm of foreign policy, he endorsed the post-1965 rise in the defense budget, but his inclination was more to define the rise as a regrettable necessity and to insist on greater production of consumer goods in defense and heavy-industry enterprises.[6] In contrast, Brezhnev, like Khrushchev in the mid-1950's, identified himself with the agricultural sector (at the expense of light industry) and with a costly program for expansion and modernization of the armed forces. Brezhnev's lyric endorsement of patriotic themes and his strong and frequent repetition of the need for increases in the defense budget suggest that he was considerably less ambivalent than Kosygin on the issue and was determined (as Khrushchev had been) to "ride" the issue for personal political gain.[7] Moreover, Brezhnev placed much greater emphasis than Kosygin on party activism and interventionism in his approach to public administration. Thus, Kosygin paralleled Malenkov in his greater willingness to challenge traditional values for the sake of administrative efficiency and consumer satisfaction, and Brezhnev paralleled Khrushchev in his more assertive defense of traditional values.

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[3] Breslauer, "Patterns of Leadership," Chaps. 2–4, 7–9. V.M. Molotov, however, was not a party to this consensus.

[4] Throughout this article, I will refer to such programs as "reformism" or "moderate reformism." My use of the term "reformism," it should be noted, differs from the usage in Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), June 1979, where "reformism" refers to transformations in the political authority relationship between party officials and the masses.

[5] On Khrushchev's and Malenkov's foreign policy differences, see Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1959; and C. Grant Pendill, Jr., " 'Bipartisanship' in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., Eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy.* London, Butterworth, 1971.

[6] On Kosygin's insistence in this respect, see Robert Ehlers, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies V: The Documentary Record of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Columbus, OH, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1973, p. 100; contrast Brezhnev's more tepid formulation in ibid., p. 21.

[7] See, for example, Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (On a Leninist Course), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970–79, Vol. 1, pp. 152–53, 156–57, 160, 161, 165, 224–25, 249; see also *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1965.

During the first years of Stage 1, however, the direct confrontation between the top leaders was to some extent kept in bounds by the restraints of collective leadership, by a division of labor among members of the Politburo (from 1952 to 1966, the Presidium), and by restriction of the policy-defining role of the party leader to a limited number of issue-areas. In the period 1953–55, for instance, Khrushchev's speeches dealt almost exclusively with issues of agriculture, party organization, defense, and foreign policy. Matters of culture, light industry, and industrial administration were primarily left to other members of the leadership. Similarly, during the first years of his administration, Brezhnev focused his attention largely on issues of agriculture, party organization, and defense as well as on symbolic-patriotic issues. Only as Stage 1 progressed did both Khrushchev and Brezhnev begin to speak more frequently on questions of culture and industrial administration. But even then, neither one set forth his own comprehensive, integrated program for progress in all realms.[8]

A second common feature of Stage 1 in both successions was the occurrence of policy zigzags and inconsistencies, which stemmed primarily from the division of labor within the leadership, rival policy approaches, unavoidable interdependences among sectors, and the struggle for power. Thus, in 1953–54, Malenkov's emphasis on light industry and consumer goods held sway, the defense budget was cut significantly, and Soviet policy toward the United States and Third World was restrained and noncompellent.[9] Increased activism toward neutral countries and collaborative emphases vis-à-vis the United States were on the policy agenda, but neither such activism nor such emphases were especially bold, far-reaching, or reflective of major Soviet concessions. In 1955, however, Khrushchev saw to the reexpansion of the defense budget, the cutting of funds for light industry, and a more compellent foreign policy that intensified *both* competitive activism and collaboration with the United States—for example, the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal, expanded Soviet political and economic ties with neutral Asian states, rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the Geneva summit, the Austrian State Treaty, and substantive Soviet concessions on arms control.

Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin, delivered at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, represented an effort to seize the initiative from his political rivals, to expand his policy-defining role still further,[10] and to break through traditional constraints on what he saw as domestic and foreign policy progress. But the results of the speech were not what Khrushchev had anticipated, and by the end of 1956, his rivals made a short-lived effort to revise the Sixth Five-Year Plan and to institute a technocratic reform of industrial administration that would restrain party interventionism. Within a few months, Khrushchev launched a counteroffensive, one that entailed scrapping the current five-year plan, abolishing most central ministries, establishing regional economic councils *(sovnarkhozy)*, and expanding party interventionism throughout the economy. With this counteroffensive began Stage 2 of the political succession.

Policy zigzags during Stage 1 of the post-Khrushchev succession were neither as frequent nor as far-reaching as those of the period 1953–57, perhaps because the Soviet political elite were less polarized after Khrushchev than they had been after Stalin. Nonetheless, the zigzags were real. The defense budget was initially cut in December 1964 but was raised again, sharply, in December 1965. Agricultural investment increased strikingly in the period 1965–67, but at the September 1967 Central Committee Plenum, decisions were reached to reduce agricultural investment by 25 percent and to raise welfare benefits, the defense budget, and investment in light industry. However, the decisions were soon overturned, for in 1968, Brezhnev won a struggle over in-

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[8] Khrushchev's dramatic initiatives at the 20th Party Congress, in February 1956, do not contradict this generalization. The thrust of "destalinization" at the time was negative (though far-reaching), in that it emphasized destroying what was wrong with the previous political order rather than uniting the nation for the attainment of positive new goals in all realms. Similarly, Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Party Congress, in 1966, reiterated the premises of the agricultural and industrial reforms introduced in 1965; however, beyond this, it was largely negative in emphasizing the rejection of Khrushchev's leadership style. A comprehensive, positive program that defined the character of new relationships in all realms would have to await the 24th Party Congress, in 1971.

[9] The concept of "compellence" has been suggested by Steven Walt, a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley. A compellent approach forces solutions to critical issues but does not necessarily specify any particular means of doing so. Thus, it may be based on significant concessions or on militant confrontation.

[10] The concept of "role expansion" was introduced into the literature on Soviet elite politics by Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975.

Добро пожаловать!

N.S. Khrushchev, former Soviet Communist Party First Secretary, addresses collective farmers in the village of Shishinskoye in the Kustanay Oblast of Kazakhstan, part of the Virgin Lands.

—Sovfoto.

vestment priorities and saw to the reexpansion of investment in agriculture at the expense of investment in light industry. Similarly, in the realm of administrative reform, the early policy of the Brezhnev regime (1964–66) pointed in the direction of meaningful restraints on party interventionism and a tentative commitment to move toward marketization. But the forces that favored party intervention were simultaneously regrouping, and, in 1967–68, they found the climate favorable for more frequent and more decisive interventions.

Shifts in foreign policy were fewer than in domestic policy, and fewer than they had been during Stage 1 of the post-Stalin succession. These were "years of consolidation,"[11] during which the emphasis was on building up conventional and strategic military capability and on expanding Soviet economic and military ties and presence in the Third World as opportunities presented themselves. The Soviet posture toward both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States was neither confrontational nor collaborative—in US-Soviet relations, the exceptions involved secondary issues, such as cultural exchanges or the demilitarization of outer space, or urgent issues on which Soviet action was consistent with the Soviet image of world order and did not constrain the Soviet Union's arms buildup (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation). Although ongoing debates were taking place within the Soviet leadership over the desired shape and extent of the military buildup, over tactics in the Third World, and over the extent to which risk-taking should be curbed to avoid confrontations with the United States,[12] there was relatively little evidence of major differences over basic foreign policy orientation. A rather broad consensus had emerged within the Soviet political elite that the Soviet Union should have the will and the capability to be a competitive global power.[13] By mid-1966, a rather broad consensus had also developed on the threatening nature of the international situation, a perception that grew out of the Americanization of the Vietnam war, US intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, and a right-wing reaction throughout the Third World. And a broad range of figures within the political elite agreed that such circumstances rendered undesirable either highly competitive activism in the Third World or détente with the United States.

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[11] Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1973; The Paradox of Superpower*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, Part 2.

[12] On these debates, see Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945–1970*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970; Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behavior Toward the United States," unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

Nonetheless, there were important similarities in the trend of foreign policy in Stage 1 of both successions. First, from 1965 to early 1968, Soviet policy toward the United States was noncompellent, much as it had been from March 1953 through the spring of 1955. Second, during the spring of 1968, clear signs appeared that Soviet leaders were ready to emerge from their consolidative reaction and to make substantive concessions that would facilitate arms control talks—which is precisely the kind of shift in Soviet policy that occurred in the spring and summer of 1955.[14] (Whether the common shift took place because of common changes in the Soviet perception of the international situation or because of changes in internal politics resulting from the course of the political succession is a separate question to be discussed below.)

A third common feature of Stage 1 of both successions was the polarization of positions among the principal rivals for power. The power struggle not only fostered policy inconsistencies, as noted above, but also fed into policy debates, leading the party leader to engage in polemics with his main rivals, during which he sought deliberately to exaggerate the level of polarization over the issues.

During Stage 1 of the post-Stalin succession, Khrushchev and Malenkov polemicized over a wide range of issues in March and April 1954.[15] A running debate ensued during the remaining months of 1954 and culminated in Malenkov's demotion after the January 1955 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, at which Khrushchev accused "certain economists" (read Malenkov) of a "right-wing deviation" and presented himself as the leader best able to feed the people without undermining the nation's defense.[16] Thereafter, Khrushchev shifted his foreign policy position to support expanded collaboration with the United States and rapprochement with Yugoslavia, a shift that resulted in polemics with Molotov. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev reiterated his critiques of the Malenkov and Molotov "deviations" and tried to project himself as the leader best able to implement the post-Stalin consensus without submitting to the forces of extremism of either the right or the left.[17]

Early in the Khrushchev succession, leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union pay last respects to their colleague, F.R. Kozlov: in the front center, L.I. Brezhnev; at the far right, A.N. Kosygin; between them, N.V. Podgornyy; and to Brezhnev's right, A.I. Mikoyan.

—Sovfoto.

Although the differences between the positions advocated by Brezhnev and Kosygin were neither as deep nor as broad as those that had divided Soviet leaders after Stalin, they were analogous (especially with regard to domestic policy). They were in evidence in speeches delivered during the period 1965–67, and they too resulted in a multi-issue polemic toward the end of Stage 1. Thus, from November 1967 to March 1968, the differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin came to a head, as they were deliberately exaggerated.[18] Kosygin defended his distinctive approaches to investment priorities, economic reform, and foreign trade. Brezhnev adopted a more conservative and combative posture than he had struck in earlier years, accusing Kosygin of neglecting the people's need for agricultural products, of threatening the leading role of the party in public administration, and of underestimating the Soviet system's capacity to overtake the United States technologically through party-mobilizational instruments. In other words, Brezhnev attempted to pin the extremist label on his rival and to project himself as the leader best suited to protect traditional political values during a period of policy innovation geared toward implementing the post-Stalin consensus on behalf of peace, prosperity, and expanded Soviet global influence.

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[13] The existence of such a broad consensus after Khrushchev is suggested by the early reversal after October 1964 of both Khrushchev's reduction of the Soviet commitment to North Vietnam and his readiness to make major concessions to solve the German problem in spite of objections by the German Democratic Republic. It is further indicated by Brezhnev's downgrading, in his November 1964 speech on the anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution, of the status of the concept of peaceful coexistence. On the latter point, see Griffiths, op. cit., p. 430. All this predated the US bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965 and the Americanization of the Vietnam War.

[14] On Soviet foreign policy shifts during Stage 1 of each succession, see the relevant sections of Dinerstein, op, cit.; Wolfe, op. cit.; Griffiths, op. cit.; and Edmonds, op. cit.

[15] See *Pravda*, Mar. 7, Mar. 13, and Apr. 27, 1954. For an analysis of the polemic, see Breslauer, "Patterns of Leadership," Chap. 2.

[16] See *Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1955.

[17] See Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party Congress, as translated in Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1957, pp. 60–61.

With the end of Stage 1 of both successions, however, the features that had marked it faded from view. This development reflected the party leader's ascendancy, the predominant feature of Stage 2 of the political succession.

Stage 2

During Stage 2, the party leader seized the initiative from his rival or rivals, decisively expanded his policy-defining role into all realms, allowed or encouraged a sharp expansion of his personality cult, and altered the composition of the Politburo to increase his own political leverage. Under Khrushchev, the struggle to consolidate ascendancy was a prominent feature of the years 1957–58. During these years, Khrushchev purged the "anti-party group" from the leadership, "packed" the Presidium with representatives of the party apparatus, purged Marshals G.K. Zhukov and N.A. Bulganin from the leadership, combined in his own person the positions of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and initiated the practice of expanded (i.e., packed) plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Brezhnev never went this far, but in 1969 and 1970 (the corresponding years of Stage 2), he too sought to consolidate a position of primacy. He took the lead in defining policy in realms (industrial administration, in particular) to which his earlier speeches had devoted less attention. He took a personal initiative in furthering rapprochement with West Germany. He seized the initiative on economic reform with a blistering attack on the ministries at the December 1969 Plenum of the Central Committee. In 1969–70, he sharply expanded his visibility as leader of the Politburo. For example, in June 1970, he, rather than Kosygin, delivered the main speech to the USSR Council of Ministers, and later in the year, he alone signed the "Directives" of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. In 1970, too, Brezhnev for the first time invoked the threat of the mass mood against opposing currents within the political elite in order to advance his agricultural program—a threat that Khrushchev had employed frequently in the 1950's but that Brezhnev had dropped during his first years in power because of its populist overtones.[19]

With respect to policy changes during Stage 2, the opportunistic positions adopted by the party leader in polemics with his rivals toward the end of Stage 1 are a poor guide to the positions he adopted when forging a comprehensive program to be presented at the next party congress. In some issue-areas, the programs advanced by the party leader at the 21st and 24th party congresses reflected his earlier priorities. In others, however, they were compromise, unity platforms, based on a commitment to reformism in domestic and foreign policy.[20]

In domestic policy, there was clearly an element of continuity between each party leader's positions in Stages 1 and 2. Khrushchev's program for the "full-scale construction of communism" bore his distinctive stamp. It proposed social, administrative, and political transformations to release popular initiative and thereby achieve consumer abundance without a diversion of funds from defense and without preventing a sharp increase in the funding of heavy industry and Siberian development. Brezhnev's domestic program of 1971 likewise reflected positions he had defended during Stage 1. It placed heavy emphasis on sharply

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[18] See *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1967, and Mar. 30, 1968; and *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Feb. 15, 1968. For an analysis of the polemic, see Breslauer, "Patterns of Leadership," Chaps. 7–9.

[19] For Brezhnev's resurrection of allusions to the mass mood, see *Pravda*, Apr. 23 and June 13, 1970.

[20] Convenient translations of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's programs of 1959 and 1971 may be found in Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1960; and in Robert Ehlers, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies VI: The Documentary Record of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Columbus, OH, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1973.



American machinery is used to pave the bed for a lateral canal on the Kakhovka irrigation canal near Novotroitsk in Kherson Oblast in December 1976.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

expanded investment in the rural sector and in industries that service agriculture. Similarly, Brezhnev's position on administrative reform amounted to a rejection of the hopes of those who had earlier looked forward to marketization of the economy.

But both comprehensive programs for domestic progress held major surprises as well. They toned down or retreated from the opportunistic, traditionalist positions adopted by the party leader during earlier polemics with rivals. Indeed, they selectively reincorporated elements of programs advanced by the party leader's outflanked or defeated rivals. Thus, Khrushchev's program called for expanded investment in light industry and in a chemicals industry that would, among other things, produce synthetic fiber for textiles. It postponed Soviet investment in full-scale production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) until a second generation of such missiles had been developed. It promised to increase administrative efficiency without a continuing purge of the regional elite. Similarly, Brezhnev's program was a surprise for those who had observed his traditionalist positions of Stage 1. At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev proposed to simultaneously hold down expenditures on defense and Siberian development, struggle against ministerial and regional party resistance to production associations established according to criteria of economic efficiency (even if such associations cut across traditional political-jurisdictional lines), expand sharply the production of consumer goods in heavy-industry and defense enterprises, increase investment in light industry, and de-emphasize welfare-oriented values for the sake of increasing labor productivity through increased differentiation of material reward and through the release of redundant labor. Thus, both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's comprehensive programs for domestic progress were reformist, Khrushchev's much more so than Brezhnev's.[21]

In foreign policy, both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's programs and behavior during 1959 and 1971 converged in the direction of collaborative competition.[22] At the 21st Party Congress, Khrushchev lauded the imminent transformation of the international order to the advantage of socialism and escalated his use of strategic bluff in an attempt to deter a confrontational US response to Soviet activism.[23] In the same speech, however, he offered a "grand design" for increased US-Soviet collaboration that would, he hoped, result in arms control agreements, the denuclearization of West Germany and the PRC, and measures to prevent US-Soviet confrontation.[24] Moreover, after the party congress, Khrushchev took the personal initiative to make rapid progress on military, political, and economic détente with the United States. He abrogated the nuclear-sharing agreement with the PRC and journeyed to the United States, where he partook of the "spirit of Camp David," sought expanded trade with the United States, and agreed to a Big Four summit meeting the following spring. And at the December 1959 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev attempted to further the cause of "peace and prosperity" through collaborative competition by gaining approval of a plan to reduce the size of the Soviet ground forces by one third.

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[21] For an analysis that interprets Brezhnev's reformist program as even more reformist than I do, see Alexander Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977.

Brezhnev's behavior during 1971 followed much the same pattern. At the 24th Party Congress, he retreated from the militant, uncompromising rhetoric of the previous party congress but reaffirmed, in no uncertain terms, the Soviet commitment to competitive activism in the Third World. At the same time, however, he outlined a "peace program" that indicated new Soviet urgency about furthering US-Soviet collaboration on outstanding issues of arms control, European affairs, and avoidance of confrontation.[25] After the party congress, Brezhnev, like Khrushchev earlier, took the initiative to flesh out the implications of this program. He signaled US decision-makers that he was now the leading Soviet spokesman on foreign affairs. This led, in turn, to significant Soviet concessions at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during April–May 1971[26] and to a Soviet sense of urgency during the spring of 1971 about finalizing ongoing negotiations with the United States and West Germany. In August 1971, the Soviet leadership invited US President Richard Nixon to a summit meeting in Moscow the following spring. And in November 1971, Brezhnev got the Central Committee Plenum formally to endorse his "peace program" (something it had not done after the 24th Party Congress) and to affirm his now-expanded linkage between US-Soviet collaboration (on arms control and trade) and domestic economic progress.[27]

Thus, somewhat belying the exaggerated positions they had adopted in earlier years, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, at about the same points in the political succession process, returned to the post-Stalin tasks at hand: to offer a synthesis of conflicting tendencies for the sake of simultaneously increasing consumer satisfaction, promoting US-Soviet détente, and expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Moreover, both advanced programs that recognized the impossibility of achieving these ends without significant acts of reformist leadership that would, at a minimum, challenge major political interests and traditional values within the Soviet Union. Finally, both linked economic and military détente abroad to structural and budgetary reforms at home, rather than viewing one as a substitute for the other.

But both Khrushchev and Brezhnev overreached themselves. In each instance, the comprehensive, ambitious program for progress at home and abroad was undermined within 18 months of its presentation. In Khrushchev's case, dust-bowl conditions in the Virgin Lands, coupled with the U-2 affair and the collapse of the Paris summit, knocked the props out from under his economic program and "grand design." In

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[22] In a recent article, Stanley Hoffmann makes a useful contribution to the language of discourse about US-Soviet relations by suggesting that the choice is not between "cooperation" and "competition," but rather between "cooperative competition" and "confrontational competition." See "Reflections on the Present Danger," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Mar. 6, 1980. I prefer the term "collaboration" to "cooperation," but I otherwise agree completely that US-Soviet competition is a constant and that the choice is (and has long been) between one type of competition and another type. Moreover, "collaborative competition" more accurately describes the character of both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's collaborative offerings of 1959 and 1971.

[23] See Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 53 f; and William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969.

[24] On Khrushchev's "grand design," see Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1974, p. 621.

[25] On Soviet militant perspectives at the 23rd Party Congress, see Marshall Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York, NY), Vol. 22, No. 1, 1968. For an analysis of Brezhnev's foreign policy perspectives at the 24th Party Congress and a comparison of the two party congresses, see Peter M.E. Volten, *The Soviet 'Peace Program' and Its Implementation Towards the West*, Amsterdam, Foundation for the Promotion of East-West Contacts, Free University, 1977.

[26] These concessions predated the secret trip to Beijing by Henry Kissinger, national security adviser to the US president, after which more concessions were forthcoming. See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1979, pp. 817–31, 835–38.

[27] See Volten, op. cit., pp. 61–66. December 1971 was a turning point in the specialist literature on détente, as is documented in William B. Husband, "Soviet Perceptions of U.S. 'Positions-of-Strength' Diplomacy in the 1970's," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1979, p. 507.

Brezhnev's case, the worst winterkill and drought in 50 years struck Soviet grain-producing regions in 1972, destroying the viability of Brezhnev's economic program. But no such misfortune intervened in the foreign policy realm, and Brezhnev was able to link his new domestic program to the hoped-for fruits of détente.

(Khrushchev and Brezhnev also differed in their reactions to the frustration of their domestic programs—Khrushchev going on the counteroffensive against the most powerful political forces in the regime, and Brezhnev from 1973 accommodating to them. But that is another story, which no longer pertains to political succession.[28])

Explaining the Patterns

In comparing the two political successions since Stalin, then, several common features stand out. First, in both cases the political succession was a two-stage process, leading ultimately to the ascendancy of the party leader. Second, in the short run (i.e., during Stage 1), rival programs were advanced, one of which fundamentally challenged traditional values by calling for cuts in the defense budget, for structural change at home, or for both. The party leader undercut those challenges by portraying his rivals as extremists and by supporting policies that fell within the post-Stalin consensus but that did relatively little damage to the primacy of political mobilizational approaches to public administration. At the same time, he undertook a defense buildup. Third, in the long run (i.e., during Stage 2), the party leader forged a comprehensive program in domestic and foreign policy, in so doing striking a compromise among conflicting tendencies, advocating significant changes in economic policy and administrative structure, and proposing significant Soviet initiatives for the sake of US-Soviet collaboration in order to regularize the arms race, reduce con-

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[28] For an analysis and comparison of how Khrushchev and Brezhnev responded to the frustration of their programs, see Breslauer, "Patterns of Leadership," Chaps. 6 and 11.

Crowds at a Moscow food store.

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

frontations, outflank the PRC in international affairs, and increase access to Western trade and credits.[29]

Are the patterns of past successions relevant to the coming Brezhnev succession? If the causes that gave rise to these patterns are still operative, the same pattern may well be repeated. If the causes are no longer operative, new patterns will probably emerge. What causal factors, then, explain these patterns?

The *fact* of a two-stage succession process leading to the ascendancy of the party leader and his presentation of a comprehensive program (of any kind) soon thereafter can probably be explained by several mutually reinforcing factors: (1) the party leader's strategic placement with respect to the allocation of patronage and his identification with the institution that provides the guiding political mythology of the system; (2) the time required to manipulate issues, discredit rivals, and accumulate patronage; (3) the flexible yet constraining cycles and deadlines associated with the five-year plans and party congresses; (4) pressures on the party leader from within the broad political elite to "deliver" once he discredits rival programs and pushes to the fore.[30] But the interaction of these factors does not account for the *content* of the programs offered by the party leader during Stages 1 and 2. And how are we to explain the apparent paradox that the party leader first rides to victory in part by discrediting programs that raise too direct a challenge to traditional values, and then proposes to challenge those values himself?

The *short-term* victory of political mobilizational approaches at home and "hard-line" approaches to foreign and defense policy can partially be accounted for by opportunistic mobilization of dominant interests in the military/heavy-industry complex, the central and regional party apparatus, and the ministerial bureaucracy, buttressed by an ideological tradition (in both the military and civilian sectors) that sees military power as security against what is perceived to be a hostile international environment, that equates global activism with progress, and that extols central planning and party activism as ends in themselves. Yet such opportunism explains neither the short-term appearance of programs for far-reaching reform nor the reincorporation of parts of those programs in the behavior of the party leader during Stage 2. To explain these patterns, the reformist impulse itself must be scrutinized.

Alexander Yanov argues that the persistence of a reformist impulse in Soviet politics results from two sets of political interests: a managerial "lobby" and an "aristocratizing elite."[31] The former, Yanov claims, consists of the "new Soviet managers," who seek access to scarce supplies now hoarded by military interests and who yearn for restraints on ministerial and party intervention and for the creation of a form of market socialism. The "aristocratizing elite," according to Yanov, consists of those central officials from all sectors whose overriding concern is to perpetuate their privileges through consumerism and peace.

These political interests may well exist, but it seems unlikely that they alone have been large enough or strong enough to perpetuate the reformist impulse. The realm of political interests supporting reformism, it appears to me, is somewhat broader, and the realm of political ideology extends the net of support still further.[32] I would therefore hypothesize that several additional factors help explain Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's (as well as Malenkov's and Kosygin's) behavior. First, there has been a far-reaching consensus[33] among the Soviet political elite that neither a return to Stalinism (in domestic and foreign policy) nor a breakthrough toward Yugoslav levels of market socialism, international openness, and dependence on the outside world is necessary, desirable, or feasible.[34] Second, there has been a far-reaching consensus among the Soviet political elite that an unrestrained arms race is a threat to domestic economic goals (and potentially to domestic stability), that US technological prowess is potentially awesome and needs to be checked, that the threat of nuclear war requires collaborative restraints on US-Soviet competition, and that the rise of the PRC as a rival power makes the need for US-Soviet collaboration all the more urgent. Third, the ideological tradition of the USSR calls for unabating progress toward a more affluent society. Fourth, there has been a diffuse fear among the Soviet political elite that shocks to the standard of living may have adverse effects on political stability, notably among Russian workers and ethnic minorities and in Eastern Europe. Fifth, many regional party officials of both the Stalinist and post-Stalin generations have been infused with a "win orientation" that calls for continuous improvement in the structure and functioning of Soviet public administration and public mobilization.[30] Sixth, many Soviet officials who work in the military/heavy-industry complex have increasingly come to realize that improvements in the standard of living are a prerequisite for making labor incentives effective spurs to productivity. Finally, perennial budgetary strain has made Soviet leaders susceptible to appeals for administrative reforms that would substitute for budgetary redistribution.

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[29] These patterns support the argument advanced 15 years ago by John Armstrong in "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs*, January 1965, p. 57: "*In the short run* contestants for leadership in the Soviet Union will manipulate policy issues to strengthen their domestic power positions. This manipulation (which sometimes involves at least marginal sacrifice of Soviet interests) will, however, last only as long as the power struggle is in doubt . . . . In the *longer run*, any victorious contestant tends to take the position which is consonant with a rational calculation of Soviet interests." (Emphasis in original.) Armstrong was writing only of foreign policy, but his statement, with due qualification, could apply as well to domestic policy. If by "rational calculation of Soviet interests" we mean a serious effort to challenge traditional values and interests in order to make significant progress toward meeting the commitments of the post-Stalin era both at home and abroad, the statement is an accurate characterization of the common features of Khrushchev's behavior in 1959 and Brezhnev's behavior in 1971.

[30] By the Soviet "political elite," I mean candidate and full members of the Central Committee, and those with regular access to, or influence on, these members. Matters of timing could also be studied in broader comparative perspective, even within Soviet history. Thus, six and a half to seven and a half years passed between Lenin's incapacitation and Stalin's pushing to the fore with a comprehensive program of his own.

[31] Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, passim.

[32] On the distinction between the realm of interests and the realm of ideology, see Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power*, New York, NY, Pantheon Books, 1974.

[33] By "far-reaching consensus," I mean a degree of agreement that is substantially less than unanimously held, but substantially more than a narrow majority.

[34] For the argument that the emergence of a "revolutionary consciousness" requires that one perceive revolutionary change to be necessary, desirable, and feasible, see H. Wolpe, "Some Problems Concerning Revolutionary Consciousness," in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, Eds., *The Socialist Register 1970*, London, The Merlin Press, 1970.

All of these factors have been in evidence throughout most of the post-Stalin era, though in different forms, to different degrees, and with different concrete consequences. They created a structure of political interests and expectations supportive of both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's reformist efforts, although those who had such interests and held such expectations were not willing at the time to go as far as Malenkov and Kosygin were portrayed as wanting to go, or as far as Khrushchev went after 1960.

Considerations for the Future

Will the causal factors just outlined continue to have the major impact on Soviet power and policy that they have had in the past? Or are new factors more important for Soviet politics today? To answer these questions, it is necessary to identify potentially relevant new factors and to specify their possible effect. Such factors would include:

1. A transitional leadership. It is not improbable that Brezhnev will be succeeded by a transitional leader or leaders from his own generation, who will be committed to maintaining the conservative policies Brezhnev has followed since 1973. This eventuality might turn the Brezhnev succession into a three-stage process. Moreover, to the extent that hard choices are postponed and pent-up demands for reform are not released, a transitional leadership could lead to the crystallization of a reformist program even in the first stage subsequent to the retirement or death of the transitional leader or leaders. Other things being equal, however, a transitional leadership per se is not likely to prevent the subsequent reappearance of the reformist impulse from within the Soviet political elite.

2. The exhaustion of alternatives. It is sometimes argued that both the economic and the political situations in the Soviet Union today are now different from what they were at the beginning of the previous successions. The dearth of slack in the Soviet economy will make it difficult to repeat the positive performances of 1953–57 and 1964–68, it is held, and the experience of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev administrations has alerted members of the Soviet political elite to the high political costs associated with structural reform of the economy.

One variant of this argument is that a broad consensus has been forged in favor of an indefinite perpetuation of the conservative approach of recent years. That is, the relatively inefficient, overcentralized system would be maintained, collaborative arrangements in foreign policy would be sought to gain Western assistance in developing Siberian resources, and Siberian mineral resources would be traded for Western consumer goods, agricultural products, and technologies to alleviate the impact of systemic inefficiencies on the Soviet consumer.

A second variant is that the frustration of both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's reformist programs has increased elite polarization and mass discontent, creating constituencies within the political elite who argue that the only alternative to economic decline is marketization, or who view the only alternative as a return to some form of Stalinism.

There is no denying that there is currently not much slack in the Soviet economy. But I would quarrel with the above views of current perspectives within the Soviet political elite. Neither the central leadership itself nor the broader political elite is as united or as satisfied as the first variant of the "exhaustion of alternatives" argument would suggest. And neither the central leadership nor the broader political elite is as polarized, or as disenchanted with the prospects for *moderate* reformism, as the second variant would indicate.[36] Other things being equal, budgetary redistributions, structural-administrative (not political) reforms, and collaborative offerings are likely to take place in the 1980's. (The question of the "longer run" is, to be sure, an open one, but it is also a moot one. So is the question of whether the policy initiatives of the 1980's will work as intended.)

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[30] On the "win-orientation" infused in contemporary Soviet officials, see Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics*, October 1975.

3. *Generational change*. In efforts to foresee the opinions of the Soviet political elite during the coming succession, the generational factor must be taken into account. As the Brezhnev administration is replaced by another, there will be a widespread turnover throughout the Soviet political and administrative elite, from the Politburo down through the central party and government apparatus to regional positions in the party and government. Many of those who will move into these posts will be significantly younger than current officeholders — indeed, of an entirely different generation.

What impact will this massive generational turnover have on the prospect for moderate reformism in Soviet policy? Relatively little work has been done to try to tap the political orientations of this new and younger generation, and no work exists that taps intergenerational differences over foreign policy. But work in progress, and results already reported, indicate considerable potential support for moderate reformism at home, though not for radical social or political transformation.[37] If there is anything distinctive about the orientations of the younger generation of party officials, it would appear that this generation possesses a higher incidence of self-confidence, a still more activist win-orientation, a greater impatience to get on with improving the functioning of the economy, and a fuller appreciation and greater tolerance of complexity. As they reflect on current rates of economic progress, many members of this political generation are likely to exclaim: "we can do better than that!" And as they reflect on the prospect of maintaining current levels of inefficiency while trading Siberian minerals for Western consumer goods, many, I suspect, would experience ideological dissonance: "after more than 60 years of Soviet power, we can do no better than to place ourselves on the short end of a semicolonial relationship with our capitalist competitors!" With respect to concrete policy preferences, one is likely to find among these officials significant support for a new type of *sovnarkhoz* movement (which would sharply increase regional authority for the sake of administrative efficiency); for reform of the foreign trade sector; for budgetary redistributions that cut into, or reduce the rate of growth of, the defense budget; for legalization of certain private consumer services, such as catering or repair services; for more widespread introduction of rationalizing but inegalitarian measures such as the Shchekino experiment in industry or the link *(zven'yevaya)* system in agriculture; and perhaps (if domestic policy reformism also reflects a foreign policy reformist orientation, as was the case in 1959 and 1971) for new strategies for combining global competition with the United States and economic, military, and political détente with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. To be sure, programs consistent with such attitudes may not produce results — with unpredictable consequences for elite frustration with reformism. But the orientations ascendant among many future Soviet leaders point to the conclusion that another round of moderate reformism is more likely than a perpetuation of the status quo, a breakthrough into market socialism, or a return to Stalinism.

The massiveness of the coming turnover among Soviet decision-makers, coupled with the extent of the current economic slowdown and the lack of a clear successor to Brezhnev, will certainly complicate Soviet policymaking. This combination of factors may well reinforce the propensity for policy zigzags and opportunistic denunciation of rival programs during Stage 1 of the political succession. It may also contribute to a somewhat more freewheeling power struggle — more like that of the 1950's than that of the 1960's. But policy zigzags, mutual denunciation, and freewheeling power struggles would by no means be new in Soviet politics, and the volatility caused by this combination of factors would probably be kept in bounds by the leadership's collective interest in avoiding an open power struggle, by the fact that potential leaders are not advocates of radical political or social transformation, and by the fact that the level of elite polarization is not nearly as high today as it was in the 1950's.

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[36] See George W. Breslauer, "The Twenty-Fifth Party Congress: Domestic Issues," in Alexander Dallin, Ed., *The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977; Seweryn Bialer, *The Politics of Change in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, Part 2; Albert L. Salter, "Portrait of an Emerging Soviet Elite Generation," in Dimitri K. Simes and associates, *Soviet Succession: Leadership in Transition*, The Washington Papers, No. 59, Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1978. See also articles in the Soviet press by Krasnoyarsk Kraykom First Secretary P.S. Fedirko — for example, in *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 14, 1977, pp. 43–48; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 23, 1976, p. 5; *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1976; and *Sovetskaya kul'tura* (Moscow), Aug. 30, 1977.

[37] See Bialer, op. cit., Part 2; M. Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, "Searching for Policy Preferences Among the Soviet Elite: The Case of Ya. P. Ryabov," paper delivered at the 41st Military Operations Research Society Conference, National Defense University, Washington, DC, July 11–13, 1978; and Jerry Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979. Peter Hauslohner and I are also engaged in an analysis of the domestic policy orientations of a sample of 23 obkom and kraykom first secretaries in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The following discussion in the text is based on a synthesis of the above works.

4. A new international context. Another factor that could make the coming political succession different from previous ones is the altered international context. It has been argued that the Soviet attainment of strategic parity, the Soviet acquisition of a global conventional military "reach," and the unprecedented Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when coupled with the US reaction to that invasion and the probable initiation of a new round of US-Soviet confrontations in the Third World, bode ill for the future of US-Soviet collaboration and for Soviet reformism at home. This argument has power. And, as noted below, there are other critical new factors in the international context. More so than the domestic factors noted above, therefore, the new international context could fundamentally alter the pattern of succession. But in what ways, and to what extent?

In order to specify the possible impact, we need a base line. Closer inspection of previous successions reveals that in certain respects, the coming succession will take place in an international context not unsimilar in important ways to that of the earlier successions.

During Stage 1 of both the Stalin and Khrushchev successions, the Soviet Union was on the defensive in international affairs. A new presidential administration in Washington had adopted what Moscow saw as a militant posture and a globalist perspective (John Foster Dulles and the rhetoric of "rollback"; Lyndon B. Johnson and the Americanization of the Vietnam War). This perception undermined arguments within the Soviet political elite for substantive concessions geared toward collaboration with the United States on issues of core importance in East-West relations. Soviet caution, absorption in domestic problems and politics, and recognition of the USSR's relative military weakness contributed to avoidance of dangerous US-Soviet confrontations. However, the US counteroffensives simultaneously strengthened resolve within the Soviet political elite not to be "contained" and facilitated the victory of those who argued for the development of Soviet military capacity to play a truly competitive global role.[38]

During the first years of Stage 1, many Soviet leaders were genuinely apprehensive (if not fearful) that the US counteroffensive could become a direct threat to Soviet national security—either through rollback or "bridge-building" in Eastern Europe (viewed in 1954, as in 1966, as an effort to destabilize Soviet control over that region) or through escalation of the war in Vietnam to levels that required a Soviet response-in-kind (the same fears existed both in 1954 and 1966). But during the subsequent years of Stage 1, Soviet leaders arrived at a more sober assessment, becoming satisfied that the operative goal of US policy was containment, not rollback. During the Stalin succession, the United States did not attempt to save the French in Indochina, the Geneva summit satisfied Khrushchev that the United States feared the Soviet Union, and the Western failure to aid the Hungarian freedom-fighters in 1956 convinced Khrushchev that all talk of rollback was mere rhetoric.[39] Similarly, during the Khrushchev succession, the United States neither invaded North Vietnam nor used nuclear weapons; the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in West Germany convinced Soviet leaders that the West German government was now interested in normalization of relations, not destabilization; and the Western failure to aid Czechoslovakia in 1968 reaffirmed tacit Western recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

During Stage 2, on the eve of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's presentations of their grand designs for collaborative competition, there were also striking similarities in the international context. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had come to the conclusion that rollback was no longer the operative goal of US policy. Both had confronted the United States on an issue close to their vital commitments—Khrushchev over Berlin in November 1958, and Brezhnev over Jordan and Cienfuegos in the fall of 1970—and the United States had stood firm. Both perceived the United States to be *in need* of détente—Khrushchev because of the US recession of 1957, because of the Soviet surge forward in strategic rocketry, and because of the accelerating process of decolonization in the Third World; Brezhnev because the United States was frustrated in Vietnam, torn by domestic dissent resulting from antiwar dissent and racial divisions, and burdened by the high economic costs of trying to have both guns and butter at the same time. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev presented their collaborative designs at a time when they perceived themselves to be in a position of "effective strategic parity"[40] with the United States but when they greatly feared that unless the parity relationship were codified and regularized, the United States would make a technological burst forward and leave the Soviet Union behind once again. Then, too, both presented their collaborative designs at a time when they viewed the PRC as a rival or threat; indeed, both intended their designs in part to contain the expansion of Chinese power and influence. Both advanced their collaborative offerings at a time when Soviet expectations about trends in the Third World were either high or rising (relative to what they had been two or three years earlier). Finally, Khrushchev and Brezhnev advanced their collaborative offerings the year before a US presidential election, and at a time when Soviet leaders perceived trends among US leaders to be advantageous to the cause of collaboration. Dulles had been hospitalized toward the end of 1958, with all public indications pointing to terminal cancer, and Christian Herter, his successor as US Secretary of State, was perceived by Soviet leaders as favoring the cause of collaboration. In like manner, the Kissinger-Nixon team had proven, during 1969-70, to be congenial to Soviet negotiators as "businesslike" and "realistic."[41]

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[38] Military expansion after Stalin and Khrushchev is sometimes explained as a side payment to the military to curry support during the power struggle. This interpretation strikes me as narrow and misleading. In both cases, it exaggerates the power of the military and understates the military implications of the geopolitical perspectives embraced by civilian politicians.

[39] Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 248–53. Further support for this interpretation appears in Khrushchev's memoirs. See *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1970, pp. 398–400.

In both Stage 1 and Stage 2, then, there were manifold similarities in the international context. Such similarities make it especially difficult to weigh the independent causal impact of the succession process on policy, for it is by no means clear whether internal or external factors were decisive.

During Stage 1 of both successions, a relatively "hard-line," or traditionalist, position emerged victorious in both domestic and defense policy, outflanking more reformist and collaborative programs. Was this a reflection of the strength of traditionalist forces (both civilian and military) within the Soviet political elite? Or was it a result of a perception (credible, though exaggerated) that a threatening international environment required leaning on, and building up, the traditional strengths of the system? And if it was a little of both, how do we determine which was decisive, in light of the fact that there are only two cases with which to work and no variance in outcomes between them?

Similarities in the international context during Stage 2 of the political successions do not solve the problem. On the one hand, one could argue that Soviet elite reevaluation of US ambitions and needs made possible the advancement of a collaborative design. On the other hand, one could argue that, once the power struggle had largely been decided, the need for opportunistic exaggeration of external threats had receded, so that the Soviet leader could return to the task of implementing the post-Stalin consensus through moderate reformism at home and collaborative competition abroad. Thus, the matter remains a subject for future research.[42]

What makes these questions especially compelling is their immediate relevance to the coming Brezhnev succession. As in the past, the immediate succession to Brezhnev's position may well coincide with the

Party General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev receives then US Treasury Secretary William Simon in the Kremlin on November 30, 1976, before a meeting of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.

—TASS from Sovfoto

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[40] "Effective strategic parity" means the ability to make one's adversary act as if one actually possessed strategic parity. Thus, Khrushchev did not actually possess such parity in 1959, but he tried to play on the psychological impact of Sputnik and the Soviet ICBM to bluff the West into believing that the USSR had achieved parity.

[41] In "Patterns of Leadership," I note the remarkable correlation between fundamental changes in Soviet domestic policy and the first year of US presidential terms from 1953 through 1973, with the exception of the Lyndon Johnson interregnum of 1963-64. Similar correlations appear to exist in foreign policy. I am now engaged in research to determine how Soviet leaders defined the nature of US intentions at crucial turning points in policy. Franklyn Griffiths, op. cit., discovered a "bunching" of Soviet arms control concessions in the year before US presidential elections.

[42] Alternative methodologies that might be used to address the issue can be found in Dinerstein, op. cit.; Griffiths, op. cit.; and Dina Rome Spechler, *Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC, University Press of America, 1978.

onset of a new presidential term (or administration) in the United States. As in the past, that new term will probably be marked by an upsurge (already under way) of US militancy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, by rhetoric and actions geared toward a military buildup close to Soviet borders, and by a new doctrine of containment. As in the past, there may be considerable ambiguity among the Soviet political elite as to how far the US counteroffensive is intended or likely to go in threatening Soviet security. Will the United States, for example, seek a tacit military alliance with the PRC? Will it strive for or attain technological breakthroughs geared toward reestablishing strategic superiority? Will the arms buildup in Western Europe go beyond Pershing and cruise missiles to include the neutron bomb and other advances? Will US frustration in the Third World lead to the resurrection of some doctrinal variant of "massive retaliation"? These are open questions, but in light of the tendency to "oversell" one's case in American political debate,[43] it is probable that Soviet leaders will be led to misperceive actual US intentions. And the temptations built into the Soviet power struggle will provide an incentive to publicly exaggerate the US threat, even in the case of those who are not given to exaggeration in their private thoughts.

Nonetheless, there are three critical differences between the international context of the coming political succession and that of the previous ones. First, each of the past successions began at a time of distinct Soviet strategic and conventional inferiority relative to the United States. As noted above, that will no longer be the case, for the Brezhnev succession will commence with the Soviet Union in a position of rough strategic parity and selective conventional superiority (in the Persian Gulf region, among others). Second, the Brezhnev succession will take place in the shadow of the frustration of détente in recent years; therefore, it will proceed in the atmosphere of whatever disillusionment has set in in Moscow regarding the détente process. Third, both the Stalin and Khrushchev successions began on the heels of a short period of *diminished* Soviet activism in foreign policy (in the early 1950's, vis-à-vis the Third World, the Korean war, and Western Europe; in 1964, with respect to the Soviet commitment to North Vietnam, Laos, and East Germany). In contrast, the coming succession will get under way on the heels of a period of increased Soviet global activism.

What difference will these new factors make? It would be reckless to predict with confidence, for we do not know how far the US counteroffensive will go and cannot possibly know what conclusions Soviet leaders will reach in their current dialogue over the changing nature of the international situation. But three scenarios are possible, each embodying a distinctive mix of the past and present causal factors by which the relationship between political succession and foreign policy has been shaped.

The first scenario would play down the importance of new factors and would posit a benign Soviet response to a US counteroffensive, much in line with previous patterns. In this scenario, the next generation of Soviet leaders—absorbed in the solution of domestic problems and aware that the solution of those problems requires both moderate reformism and "economic détente" with the West; eager to codify the arms race at current levels of parity to avoid another spiral of defense expenditures; hoping to avoid overextending themselves in the Third World and to consolidate recent gains there; and confident that time favors the Soviet Union, that the US counteroffensive is bound to be short-lived, and that, for both sides, there is no alternative to détente—may turn inward during Stage 1 of the political succession. Or, alternatively, they may forge a consensus on a collaborative offering of modest proportions: arms control, an effort to defuse the most immediate tensions, and selective détente with governments in Western Europe.

The second scenario would posit a hostile, competitive Soviet response, emphasizing the difference that new factors are likely to make. New Soviet capabilities, perspectives, and commitments, combined with the exaggeration of threats during the succession process and the emergence of a more self-confident generation of Soviet leaders, could reinforce a determination to "show the Americans."[44] During the previous two successions, US counteroffensives fostered or reinforced an inward orientation in Soviet foreign behavior but simultaneously reinforced the Soviet determination to attain parity and to aim for a truly competitive role in world affairs. However, an *analogous* response in the current circumstances would be more far-reaching. It would manifest itself in the Soviet Union's determination to use its *existing* capacity in defense of its worldwide commitments and to expand those commitments in order to demonstrate that global activism, not the acceptance of containment, is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. This response would not necessarily be reckless or confrontational on a broad scale—though it could come to that if events got out of hand. Yet it would be decidedly competitive, involving seizure of opportunities to expand influence and alliances and testing of the distinction between primary and secondary US interests, but at the same time entailing exercise of a good measure of respect for US national security concerns.

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[43] On "oversell" in American politics, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, New York, NY, W.W. Norton, 1969, pp. 174 f.

[44] In recent interviews in Moscow, Jerry Hough heard much of a desire to "show the Americans." See his "Why the Russians Invaded," *The Nation* (New York, NY), Mar. 1, 1980, p. 233.

Such a highly competitive posture abroad might well be incompatible with moderate reformism at home. Since there is little slack in the Soviet economy, major budgetary redistributions to benefit the consumer would have to come out of the defense budget, an unlikely eventuality in the international context posited by this scenario.[45] Institutional reforms might be feasible in such an atmosphere, as they were in 1957–58 and 1965–66. But the more hostile the international context, the less the likelihood that such reforms could be initiated without a highly unified and purposeful leadership. In sum, the second scenario would diminish the prospects for moderate reformism at home, even if it would not wipe them out.

The third scenario is the least likely yet could become more probable if, in Soviet eyes, the US counteroffensive goes too far. Should the United States strive for maximal goals, including a tacit military alliance with the PRC and military confrontation with the Soviet Union at various points on the globe, the Soviet leadership might return to the mentality of 1948. If so, the post-Stalin consensus would break down, a Russite-fundamentalist reaction against all reformist tendencies would arise, and the Soviet Union would engage the United States and China in a militant confrontation on its own borders.[46] Such confrontation at home and abroad would undoubtedly be a despera-

The expansion of Soviet military power during the Brezhnev years has included production of equipment for military airlift, such as the AN-22 craft shown here.

—EUPRA.

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[45] For a highly innovative empirical demonstration that political successions since Stalin in Soviet-type regimes have resulted in substantial gains for the consumer through budgetary redistributions, see Valerie Bunce, "Elite Succession, Petrification and Policy Innovation in Communist States: An Empirical Assessment," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, CA), April 1976; and idem, "The Succession Connection: Policy Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), forthcoming.

[46] For this scenario, see Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev;* and idem, *The Russian New Right,* Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978.

tion measure, for the costs would be immense. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out as a possible response to what the Soviets would very likely see as an international context of "encirclement."[47]

Which scenario characterizes Stage 1 of the coming succession will obviously have an impact on the course of Stage 2. But if the post-Stalin consensus does not break down and if by the time a new party leader consolidates his position the Soviet elite still has "a lot to hope for and a lot to fear"[48] from the United States, it seems likely that the party leader will forge a program based on moderate reformism at home and collaborative competition abroad. Soviet domestic needs and political pressures will not have changed radically, and the "objective" US-Soviet need to regulate the arms race, avoid unwanted confrontation, and develop a more balanced conception of rapprochement within the strategic triangle will remain (again, assuming that neither the second nor the third scenario has broken down the post-Stalin consensus). Moreover, the Soviet succession will have reached the stage when the seizure of such opportunities will be politically more feasible.

Of course, it is impossible to predict whether the specific program so forged can satisfy both the Soviet political elite and political forces in Washington. That may hinge on the extent to which conditions that preceded the previous grand designs have been recreated—conditions that indeed gave Soviet leaders a lot to hope for and a lot to fear (but not *too much* to fear) from the United States. And even then it is impossible to predict whether international conditions and events will support or undermine the continuation of a new US-Soviet détente.

5. *The role of accidents, irrationality, and unprecedented acts of leadership.* Nothing written here is meant to ignore the limits of prediction or to deny the role of accidents, irrationality, or unprecedented acts of leadership in historical evolution. Of necessity, I have not touched on the "shocks" that could create new trends in Soviet politics. For example, a Sino-Soviet war (however short) could set in motion such trends. So could a dramatic Soviet move in search of a quick win abroad to bolster factional fortunes—though it is almost impossible to identify confrontational behavior of this sort during Stage 1 of the past two successions. Or a creative leadership might consciously seek to alter established trends. Although the equivalent of a Pope John XXIII may not be on the Soviet horizon, creativity of a less far-reaching sort cannot be ruled out. For example, a party leader could himself be the first to propose a program for technocratic reforms of the economy, thereby heading off unnecessary polarization from the sort of opportunistic antireform polemics that both Malenkov and Kosygin provoked.

An exchange of papers during the first session of another round of Sino-Soviet negotiations, on October 17, 1979, in Moscow. At the left is Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister L.F. Il'ichëv; at the right, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yuping. The talks were suspended by the Chinese in January 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

To sum up, similarities between the Stalin and Khrushchev successions would lead us to anticipate a two-stage process of political succession, characterized by the advancement of rival programs for significant policy change, by policy zigzags, by the polarization of positions among the major antagonists, and by the eventual emergence of a leader who sponsors a program for moderate reformism at home and US-Soviet collaboration abroad. But several new factors in Soviet domestic politics (deteriorating economic conditions, a dearth of slack in the economy, and massive generational turnover) could make the power struggle of the 1980's far less smooth than that of the 1960's, though perhaps not quite as freewheeling as that of the 1950's. And several new factors in Soviet foreign policy (military parity with the United States, frustration with détente, and expanded Soviet activism in the Third World)—when coupled with a more freewheeling power struggle and in the context of another US counteroffensive against Soviet activism in the Third World—could break down the post-Stalin consensus and temporarily suppress the reformist impulse in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. However, the reformist impulse has deep roots, and would be repressed only under extreme conditions.

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[47] For a highly insightful structural analysis of the possible impact of "encirclement" on Soviet domestic and foreign policy, see Kenneth T. Jowitt, *Images of Detente and the Soviet Political Order*, Berkeley, CA. Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977.

[48] Seweryn Bialer, "A Risk Carefully Taken," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1980, p. A-17.

Soviet Letters Under Brezhnev

By Maurice Friedberg

Evaluation of the achievements of Soviet literature during the Brezhnev era is of both intrinsic and extraliterary interest. On the one hand, one may—in the tradition of the great 19th-century critic of Russian literature Vissarion Belinskiy—find considerable merit in chronicling the literary events of each passing year. On the other hand, developments in literature, particularly in light of the state monopoly of public publishing that exists in the USSR, also shed much light on matters of artistic and general freedom of expression there and tend to indicate many of the social and/or spiritual issues that agitate better-educated Soviet citizens.

Can we justifiably speak of a "Brezhnev era" in Soviet letters? Yes, and within limitations not much stricter than those that allow us to view the entire category of post-Stalin writings as a separate corpus, quite distinct from the one that preceded it. To be sure, as with the writings of any era, Russian literature published during the 15-odd years that L.I. Brezhnev has been leader of the Soviet Union includes works conceived or actually written earlier, even some by writers who had been active as far back as the 1920's. However, readers ordinarily do not differentiate between revivals of long-neglected works (or initial publications of works written earlier) and the first printed efforts of younger, contemporary poets, novelists, and dramatists, but tend to view them all as "new."[1]

Emphasis on Private Concerns

The central feature of Soviet Russian writing from the mid-1960's to the present has been its preoccupation with private human concerns. It is characteristic of the overall moderate conservatism of the Brezhnev years that the overtly political, reformist writing that flourished under Nikita Khrushchev is generally not tolerated. At the same time, however, there has been no major effort to reintroduce the obligatory shrill political militancy that one associates with Soviet literature of the Stalin era. Russian writing of the Brezhnev period occupies, in terms of ideological latitude, an intermediate position. It is more doctrinaire than literature of the Khrushchev era, but considerably less rigid than that of Yosif Stalin's time. This environment, together with what may be called an official attitude of benign neglect toward moderate experimentation in form (or, more precisely, the toleration of what — by rigid standards of Soviet traditionalism — might be seen as unconventional litera-

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Mr. Friedberg is Head of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign). He has published a number of works on literature in the Soviet Union, the most recent of which, A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia, *appeared in 1977.*

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[1] This phenomenon is discussed in *Sovetskiy chitatel'. Opyt konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya* (The Soviet Reader. An Experiment in Concrete Sociological Research), Moscow, Kniga, 1968; B.S. Meylakh, Ed., *Khudozhestvennoye vospriyatiye* (Artistic Perception), Leningrad, Nauka, 1971; and *Kniga i chteniye v zhizni nebol'shikh gorodov* (Book[s] and Reading in the Life of Small Cities), Moscow, Kniga, 1973.

Interestingly, public preferences for Russian translations from West European and American fiction, poetry, and drama in the post-Stalin era have generally mirrored attitudes toward Soviet writing too. However, there tends to be somewhat greater emphasis on pure entertainment or "escapism" in the choices of translations. See the author's *A Decade of Euphoria; Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia, 1954–64*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1977, and "The US in the USSR: American Literature through the Filter of Recent Soviet Publishing and Criticism," *Critical Inquiry* (Chicago, IL), Spring 1976, pp. 519–83.

ture), has encouraged the production of reasonably competent writing.[2] While generally more drab and boring than the prose, drama, and verse of the Khrushchev decade, Soviet books and literary journals of the last 15 years are at least not ludicrously contrived and indeed downright offensive, as were many of those published during Stalin's declining years.[3] By and large, recent Soviet fiction offers believable protagonists and genuine human conflicts, both indispensable attributes for any work expecting to have a degree of reader appeal.

In evaluating this trend, one may argue that private conflicts and aspirations and preoccupation with self are proper concerns of imaginative literature as we understand it and that there is no reason why literature *should* grapple with social problems. In and of itself, this thesis is uncontestable, and one may find ample evidence to support it in Russia's own 19th-century writing. Still, we discover on closer scrutiny that even these earlier works did tackle, in essence, the problem of the happiness of the individual in his oftentimes hopeless conflict with the demands of an intolerant society and an omnipotent state. In order to enlist the reader's sympathies for their heroes, prerevolutionary Russian authors felt compelled to cast at least some doubt on society's wisdom or the state's justice; this was true of Aleksandr Pushkin in *Bronze Horseman*, Nikolay Gogol in "The Overcoat," Ivan Turgenev in *Sportsman's Sketches*, and Fëdor Dostoyevsky in *Poor Folk*. However "apolitical," a writer must, we submit, *feel free* to adopt such a critical stance.

In December 1971, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn pays his last respects to Aleksandr T. Tvardovskiy, the man who published Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich *in the pages of* Novyy mir *in 1962. Solzhenitsyn now lives in exile in the United States.*

—Black Star.

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[2] Here we speak, obviously, of the "average" output of the USSR's more than 7,000 professional writers. *Kratkaya literaturnaya entsiklopediya* (Short Encyclopedia of Literature), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Vol. VII, 1972, p. 112, reported that the membership of the Union of Soviet Writers was 7,280.

[3] Vera S. Dunham's *In Stalin's Time* (New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1976) offers an excellent description and analysis of pulp fiction of that period

In this respect, Soviet writers of the 1970's feel far more constraints than did Russian authors of the past—particularly those who wrote during the Empire's last decades. And this, in turn, sometimes imposes severe limitations on the contemporary Soviet writer's choices of themes, protagonists, and situations—constraints that extend far beyond the overtly political. To find a comparable degree of political latitude (or lack of it), one might look to the neoclassical writing of the era of enlightened absolutism in 18th-century Russia. Then, as today, creators of poetry, drama, and prose felt reasonably free to depict, usually with considerable sympathy, an individual's sense of dissatisfaction or even of personal tragedy, but on condition of bypassing in silence its social roots.

Should today's Soviet literary confines appear intolerably narrow to a casual observer, a better sense of perspective is obtained if we recall that preoccupation with the private, the personal, at least allows authors to eschew the hortatory optimism that was all but obligatory during Stalin's last years. In addition, the manifestation of compassion for misfits and failures that is tolerated by the censors (even while they forbid authors to discuss what a Marxist critic would call the "objective" factors creating such types) is considerably closer to traditions of pre-Soviet "philanthropic" Russian literature than the contempt for weakness and failure that was the hallmark of Soviet writing during the Stalin era.

Soviet literature in the Brezhnev years has lacked the extremes of "thaw" and "freeze" that characterized the first post-Stalin period, under N.S. Khrushchev. In the wake of Stalin's death there was initially much demand for what may be called anti-Stalinist muckraking writing. The works then published exposed, with varying degrees of explicitness and artistic success, some of the evils of Stalinism. That type of writing reached its apex in 1962 with the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.*[4] This liberal "thaw" was followed by a "freeze," which continued until Khrushchev's downfall two years later. After Brezhnev's accession to power, the "freeze" moderated somewhat, but there was never a genuine "warm spell." Rather, the climate of public permissiveness in Soviet literature has remained at a relatively constant "chill." Most of the liberal firebrands of the first post-Stalin decade have grown tame, and a significant number have emigrated to the West. In addition to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, these include Andrey Sinyavskiy ("Abram Tertz"), Viktor Nekrasov, Vladimir Maksimov, Anatoliy Gladilin, Grigoriy Svirskiy, Yosif Brodskiy, Anatoliy Kuznetsov, and Aleksandr Galich (the last two now deceased). By mid-1980, there were indications that other Soviet authors may soon join the ranks of the émigrés.

Anna Akhmatova, whose lyric poetry—suppressed during the Stalin era—is now widely read in the Soviet Union.

TASS from Sovfoto.

While the Brezhnev regime has made it clear that politically unorthodox writing will not be tolerated (thereby driving troublesome authors from public print to the catacombs of *samizdat*), it has made no effort to stop another process that began during the Khrushchev decade, namely, the resurrection of works by authors who had suffered boycott or worse under Stalin. In an obvious reaction to the contrived "public" character of Stalinist Socialist Realism, in which human protagonists were often but a function of political slogans, the mid-1950's witnessed a surge of interest in 20th-century Russian poets who emphasized private concerns. Thus, there was a revived demand for the few extant copies (or typewritten texts) of Osip Mandel'shtam, a victim of the Great Purges, whose work might have been assumed totally forgotten after many decades of nonpublication. There was a similar rediscovery of Anna Akhmatova, the grand old lady of Russian lyric verse, then still alive, who only a few years earlier had been denounced as a half-nun and a half-whore; of Nikolay Zabolotskiy, the singer of symbiosis of man and nature, then just recently released from a labor camp; and of Marina Tsvetayeva, another lyric poet, who had returned from

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[4] The novel was originally published in 1962 in *Novyy mir* (Moscow). An English-language translation by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley appeared in 1963 (New York, NY, Praeger).

Parisian exile on the eve of World War II only to commit suicide shortly thereafter. All were rescued from oblivion and were reunited, as it were, to the body of modern Russian poetry at a time when many of the Stalinist versifiers, whose rhymed propagandistic "public" writings had earlier been extolled, were viewed with condescension.[5] In the Brezhnev era, works by the rehabilitated poets have remained "legal," if often out of print. Sometimes they have even been reprinted.

It should be noted that a number of older poets—such as Leonid Martynov, Nikolay Aseyev, Pavel Antokol'skiy, Semën Kirsanov, and Vladimir Lugovskoy—who had earlier (whether under pressure or out of sincere conviction) produced much conventional politicized verse during the Stalin era published some strong denunciations of Stalinism after the dictator's death. Indeed, Martynov and Kirsanov were among the most articulate older spokesmen for the liberal forces favoring the "thaw." Subsequently, however, these and other established poets, ranging from the carefree, joyous, and simple Viktor Bokov to the complex and philosophical Arseniy Tarkovskiy, came—under some pressure—to abandon overt politics, and reverted to poetry's traditional concerns.

Boris Pasternak, a poet who over the years had often been ahead of literary fashions (an early advocate of experimentation, he was also among the first to disavow its excesses), was, once again, a harbinger of moods that other poets would reflect a decade later. His *Doctor Zhivago,* a very poetic novel completed in 1955, eschews overt political concerns. Pasternak's work is an impassioned paean to the right of the individual to be entirely engrossed in his pursuit of private happiness even in the midst of momentous social upheavals. Submitted to *Novyy mir,* now a run-of-the-mill literary monthly but once the rallying banner of the liberal anti-Stalinist intelligentsia, the novel was turned down, admittedly for political reasons, in what must surely be the longest rejection slip ever received by any author.[6] In retrospect, it appears that Pasternak's sin was one of omission rather than commission. It was his failure to "properly" raise and then just as "properly" answer some obligatory political questions, rather than any overt political statements, that could not be tolerated in his long work.

The Brezhnev era has seen new names added to the list of victims of Stalin's purges whose works have been reprinted for the first time in many decades—most notably, Boris Pilnyak. Other purge victims, such as Nikolay Gumilëv and Yevgeniy Zamyatin, remain proscribed.

Decline of the Novel

The Pasternak episode is instructive with respect to the forces which have brought a general decline of the novel in Soviet letters of the 1960's and 1970's. It is clear that fewer novels are being published than during the preceding period, and one suspects that fewer are being written. We appear to be dealing here not merely with a normal downturn in a periodic cycle of growth and exhaustion of this particular literary form, but also with a larger shift in the fortunes of it and other forms as an indirect response to the political pressures applied to Soviet literature.

In the last decade of Stalin's rule, the novel had dominated the Russian literary scene. Most of the novels of the period were crude potboilers manufactured en masse to exacting ideological specifications and differing, by and large, only in their settings. There were industrial novels, collective farm novels, military novels, and even research institute novels. In the first two categories, protagonists were crudely divided into heroes and villains, depending on their roles in the struggle for higher productivity; in the last two, the criteria were much the same, except that here it was military victories and scientific progress that were at stake. Regardless of the locales and of the professions of their central characters, many Soviet novels of the period also featured among their casts a *raisonneur* or two (a throwback again to the neoclassical era), who—usually in the modern guise of rural district party secretary or factory Komsomol organizer—offered a running political commentary of sorts on unfolding events.[7]

In their pristine form, such literary creations by and large disappeared with Stalin's demise. However, the novel form continued to be a highly politicized literary genre. By virtue of its sheer bulk, the novel is peculiarly vulnerable to political demands for the "correct"

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[5] The backlash directed at such poets as Vladimir Mayakovskiy, who, in Boris Pasternak's words, had been implanted by force during the Stalin era like potatoes in the reign of Catherine the Great, was understandable, although sometimes misguided. In the case of Mayakovskiy, the public had seen only the propagandistic side of his work and knew little of his moving lyric poetry.

[6] See *Doctor Zhivago*, New York, NY, Pantheon 1958. The letter to Pasternak was written by the late Konstantin Simonov, then editor of *Novyy mir*, and was published in the November 1958 issue of that monthly. A moderate Stalinist during Stalin's lifetime and an equally moderate liberal after the dictator's death, Simonov appears to have inspired the character Galakhov, an opportunistic Soviet novelist, in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* (New York, NY, Bantam, 1976).

[7] Many such literary personages are described in Dunham, op. cit.

The late Soviet novelist Konstantin Simonov at his country dacha in Krasnaya Pakhra in October 1977.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

presentation of "typical" situations, or for an adequate degree of political militancy. It is, therefore, not surprising that many Soviet writers have avoided this form and turned to shorter prose genres, if only because the space limitations of the latter make it impossible to conform to *all* political demands in *every* such work, thereby affording a degree of protection from such demands. Even collections of short pieces rarely satisfy all such requirements.[8]

Thus, while novelists of the older, Stalinist generation have continued to publish in the Brezhnev years—one thinks of Konstantin Simonov's *The Last Summer* or Valentin Katayev's semi-fictionalized memoirs[9]—the whole of post-Stalin Soviet literature, now already a quarter of a century old, has produced few major new novelists.[10] There have, to be sure, been some interesting Russian novels, but these have been written by dissident novelists and have had to be published outside of official Soviet channels. These latter works tend to be didactic. Thus, Solzhenitsyn's

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[8] Moreover, if the individual parts of such collections are unoffensive, the works as a collective may go further than the censors anticipate. Over a century ago a tsarist censor was fired for failing to discern that while every short story in Turgenev's *Sportsman's Sketches* may have appeared innocent enough, their *cumulative* effect was quite different and politically objectionable as an attack on the institution of serfdom.

[9] Konstantin Simonov, *Posledneye leto*, Moscow, Sovetskiy pisatel', 1971; and Valentin Katayev, *Razbitaya zhizn' ili volshebnyy god Oberona* (Jaded Life, or Oberon's Magical Year), published in *Novyy mir*, Nos. 7 and 8, 1972.

[10] Naturally, we are judging only on the basis of works that have actually been published. There is the possibility that a major young Soviet novelist *may* currently be writing "for the drawer." The 1960's, for instance, saw the publication of several major novels by Mikhail Bulgakov, a writer who was *not* arrested by Stalin's secret police and who died a natural death before World War II. As a consequence of these discoveries, we have had not only to revise Bulgakov's posthumous reputation (he is now, in retrospect, certainly the greatest satirist so far in 20th-century Russian writing), but also to upgrade our estimate of Soviet writing as a whole.

August 1914, part of a trilogy in progress, appears intended as an anti-Communist response to such massive Soviet novelistic treatments of the subject of World War I and the Revolution of 1917 as Mikhail Sholokhov's *Silent Don* and Aleksey Tolstoy's *The Road to Calvary*.[11] Unlikely as the thought at first may appear, Vladimir Voynovich's comic novel *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin* shares the didacticism of Solzhenitsyn's somber volumes.[12] Both authors call attention to issues that had for decades remained taboo in Soviet writing—in Solzhenitsyn's case, the horrors of the vast Gulag Archipelago,[13] and in Voynovich's, the ludicrous component in two of Stalinist Russia's sacred cows, the army and a science establishment believed capable of reshaping nature itself. Indeed, in an inverted image of Solzhenitsyn's central concern, Voynovich's book attempts to provide a *comic* picture of the Soviet secret police, depicting them as cowardly and stupid.

Toward Poetry and Short Prose

As noted, the wish to eschew political matters has encouraged many Soviet authors to forsake novels for short prose and has also contributed to the rise of poetry. However, there also appears to have been a positive consideration involved in the shift. The latter forms are more attuned to the task of probing man's inner world. A shift in dominant literary genres similar to the one currently discernible in Russian writing occurred at the turn of the century, in the transition from the openly didactic later novels of Lev Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky to the social agnosticism of Anton Chekhov's short prose and plays. The period was also marked by the ascendancy of the Symbolists, who were demonstratively preoccupied with esthetic riddles, mysticism, and sexuality—all subjects their predecessors had believed unworthy of serious concern.

The roster of Soviet poets and writers of short stories who have emerged since Stalin's death is impressive. Even though most of them were products of Soviet schools, these authors, predominantly young, somehow found in themselves the inner resources to discard the shibboleths of Stalinist Socialist Realism and seek new ways. At first, in the flush of destalinization, political concerns loomed high. But with the passage of time, the degree of social involvement abated. Several factors contributed to this development. There was, to be sure, the less permissive atmosphere of the Brezhnev years, but there was also the fact that the influx into literature of younger people—with few memories of the Stalin era—could not but dilute the degree of political involvement.

In poetry, the trend was evident in the decline of some and the emergence of other luminaries. Among the first group, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko was perhaps the most striking example. This "public" poet par excellence symbolized the anti-Stalinist rebellion of the 1950's and early 1960's. But, as literary political activism declined, his star faded.[14] The poets that emerged in the new environment were all essentially "private." This group encompassed three women—Bella Akhmadulina, Novella Matveyeva, and Yunna Morits—with their highly inventive and technically polished verse, particularly in the case of Akhmadulina. (Some of this poetry further enriches that marvelous treasury of 20th-century Russian poetry in which love is viewed from a female vantage point.) It also included Andrey Voznesenskiy, a poet declamatory in his manner but predominantly lyrical in his subject matter, and probably the finest writer of verse to emerge in the USSR since the 1950's. Voznesenskiy appears to be the rightful heir of the young Pasternak and those Russian poets of the 1920's who wanted to *add* to Russia's poetic tradition by further enriching it with imagery from the urban and technological universe, rather than—as Mayakovskiy once proposed in a moment of youthful exuberance—merely throw Pushkin off the ship of modernity. By contrast, the talented Iosif Brodskiy, who now lives in the United States but was formed as a poet in the

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[11] *August 1914*, as translated by Michael Glenny, was published in 1972 (New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux). Translations of the two parts of Sholokhov's *Silent Don* have appeared in English: *And Quiet Flows the Don* (New York, NY, Knopf, 1934); and *The Don Flows to the Sea* (New York, NY, Random House, 1965). Aleksey Tolstoy's *Road to Calvary* was published in English in 1946 (New York, NY, Knopf).

Aleksey Tolstoy died some years ago. However, Sholokhov, the Soviet Union's lone politically loyal winner of the Nobel Prize, as well as the two other major novelists of the 1930's and 1940's, Konstantin Fedin and Leonid Leonov, are still alive. None has published anything very significant in decades.

[12] An English-language translation, by Richard Lourie, was published in 1977 (New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux). The original was published in Russian in 1975 by YMCA-Press in Paris.

[13] It is worth noting that the theme of Stalin's prisons and of the quest for justice looms large in the work of three other Soviet émigré novelists, all now living in France—Anatoliy Gladilin, Viktor Nekrasov, and Vladimir Maksimov.

[14] Yevtushenko is one of the dramatis personae (under the name of Raspashonka) in what is a truly monumental satirical portrait of the post-Stalin Soviet intelligentsia, Alexander Zinoviev's *Yawning Heights* (New York, NY, Random House, 1979). The author of the book, formerly professor of philosophy at Moscow University, now lives in the West.

Contemporary Soviet poets who stress personal concerns: left, Bella Akhmadulina at Moscow's House of Literature Workers in March 1978; center, Andrey Voznesenskiy at Moscow's Tchaikovsky Concert Hall in June 1978; and right, Novella Matveyeva at the House of Arts in Peredelkino (the writers' colony outside Moscow), in February 1966.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

USSR, owes more to John Donne, T.S. Eliot, and the English metaphysical poets than to any Russians—unless one goes back to the intellectual and religiously colored verse of Fëdor Tyutchev and Yevgeniy Baratynskiy in the 19th century.

As for the short story and the novella, these forms have been in the ascendancy in Russian belles lettres for more than two decades now, and so far their position continues unchallenged. The short prose genres, if only by virtue of their brevity, do permit the author to pose problems (and not necessarily even within their broader context) without the obligation to suggest solutions, let alone defend their choice. It is probably in part for that reason that short stories and novellas were favored by the Soviet angry young men during the stormy period of destalinization. It was through these forms that there erupted in Soviet publications pent-up grievances against the dead dictator's regime, against at least some of its crimes (usually still only hinted at), and against the social pathology that it had bequeathed.[15] Gradually, however, even this degree of involvement disappeared from legal Soviet publications—which is not to say that the subjects were exhausted and died a natural death. Rejected by Soviet publishers and journals, a great many works dealing with such subjects continued to circulate in *samizdat,* and not a few were subsequently published abroad.[16] Here and there, short works describing poverty, social injustice, and moral corruption may still be published in the USSR—for instance, Fëdor Abramov's *Dve zimy i tri leta* (Two Winters and Three Summers) or Yuriy Trifonov's *Dom na naberezhnoy* (House on the Embankment)—but such are usually set during the Stalin era.[17]

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[15] A good example of this writing may be found in Hugh McLean and Walter N. Vickery, Eds., *The Year of Protest, 1956,* New York, NY, Vintage Books, 1961. In addition to that anthology's useful introduction, a good study of the subject is George Gibian, *Interval of Freedom: Soviet Literature During the Thaw, 1954–1957,* Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1960.

[16] It is worth noting that many were printed in the West without the knowledge, let alone consent, of their authors, who remained in the USSR and in many cases continued to publish "acceptable" works. Indeed, some of the most damning indictments of the Soviet regime belong in the former category. Thus, in this writer's estimate, the most chilling descriptions of Soviet labor camps are not those of Solzhenitsyn, but those found in Varlam Shalamov's eyewitness accounts shaped into concise tales and in Georgiy Vladimov's novel *Faithful Ruslan: The Story of a Guard Dog* (translated by Michael Glenny, New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1979), which observes the universe of the gulags through the eyes of a police dog. Both authors are still in the Soviet Union.

In recent years, short prose has increasingly been put to other uses, uses suggested, perhaps, by its greatest Russian master, Chekhov. Not a political activist but at the same time not at all an uncritical admirer of the tsarist regime, Chekhov lived in an era of decline in the degree of ideological involvement among the Russian intelligentsia, a setting that bears intriguing resemblance to the USSR of the Brezhnev years. Both periods were ones of disenchantment in the wake of the euphoria and great expectations of years of great reforms. Chekhov demonstrated that the short story and the novella are ideally suited to portray paradoxes, inconsistencies, isolated incidents, chance encounters, and, above all, to convey the flavors and sounds of moods, feelings, premonitions, fears, and aspirations. Chekhov's prose offers unequaled models for the portrayal of loneliness behind a facade of outward sociability, of collectives whose members cannot communicate, of individuals who are emotionally crippled by a society that detests spontaneity—in short, of suffering and discontent that cannot be directly traced to *tangible* causes, economic or social. Dostoyevsky reputedly said that all of Russia's 19th century literature, with its central theme of social compassion, traces its lineage to Gogol's "The Overcoat." If similar hyperbole is permitted, then one might say that the central concerns of serious contemporary Soviet Russian writing—above all, its emphasis on "minor" private concerns as opposed to the "major" public ones of literature of the Stalin era—are clearly inspired by Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, a kindly doctor who, in his role as author, offered sympathy, hinted at a diagnosis, but never presumed to offer advice.

Echoes of Chekhov may also be discerned, not unexpectedly, in post-Stalin Russian drama, although the genre continues in its traditional position as the weakest in Russian writing. Indeed, in recent years some of the most lively and controversial events in Soviet theater have been unorthodox productions of Chekhov's own plays.[18] But Chekhov's imprint has been most important on the Russian short story and the novella.

While many "Chekhovian" attributes may be found in Soviet writing of the early post-Stalin years, they are more typically found in short works of more recent vintage, in which social concerns are kept in the background and a mundane incident in the life of unheroic people forms the modest plot of a story. This literature manifests considerable variety in both subject matter and manner of presentation. There are the touching, unassuming descriptions of love in the short stories of Yuriy Nagibin; the haunting portrayals of often embittered individuals drawn against the background of lush natural surroundings in Yuriy Kazakov; and the very, very American-like drifters and dreamers in the short prose of Vasiliy Aksënov. Each of these writers focuses in his own way not on the destinies of a nation, on military victories, or on economic battles, but on individual, often intimate concerns of men and women who are in many respects the Soviet descendants of 19th-century Russian literature's superfluous men, strong women, humiliated clerks, and frightened lovers.

(One can point to other parallels with 19th-century Russia. While overt political activity is proscribed by the authoritarian state, one can now—just as then—identify writers who are, by Soviet standards, conservatives or reactionaries [for instance, Vadim Kozhevnikov] or those who are "legal liberals" [such as Andrey Bitov or Andrey Voznesenskiy]. And the age-long Russian battle between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers continues unabated—the "internationalist" Aksënovs are regularly challenged by the "truly Russian" Vladimir Soloukhins. While the Soviet authorities are clearly more sympathetic to the latter, they refrain from officially taking sides, lest it be

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[17] Trifonov's story, published in the January 1976 issue of *Avrora* (Leningrad), describes moral squalor among the intelligentsia. Specifically, it tells of a young careerist of the Stalin era (the story is set in the late 1940's) who repays the many kindnesses of an aging professor by joining his tormentors. (As if to emphasize the contrast between Stalin's Russia and present-day Soviet society, a postscript to the novella shows the careerist as a down-and-out derelict.) Abramov's novella *Dve zimy . . .* (Leningrad, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1969) describes a Soviet village on the verge of starvation, but the impact of the story is partly neutralized by having the tale set in wartime. Thus, the privations cannot be blamed on the Soviet regime. By contrast, the same Abramov's novella *Vokrug da okolo* (Around and About), published in the Khrushchev era (in the January 1963 issue of the Leningrad monthly *Neva*), implied that its dismal account of poverty and mismanagement on a collective farm did describe contemporary conditions. Similarly, the semi-fictionalized sketches *(ocherki)* of Soviet rural life published by Yefim Dorosh and Valentin Ovechkin in the Khrushchev years had been presented as reportage of actual conditions.

[18] Naturally, there have been some plays of interest, particularly those staged by Yuriy Lyubimov at Moscow's innovative Sovremennik theater. Yet even the better works by such leading Soviet playwrights as Aleksey Arbuzov and Viktor Rozov are unimpressive in comparison with recent West European and US drama. Indeed, Chingiz Aitmatov's *The Ascent of Mount Fuji*, one of the most successful Soviet plays of the last decade, can be described as, at best, competent.

Anatoliy Efros's original interpretations of such classics as Chekhov's *The Three Sisters*, which broke with the traditional Soviet "upbeat" interpretations of the play, stirred much debate in the 1970's. For a biography of Efros, see *Teatral'naya entsiklopediya* (Encyclopedia of the Theater), Vol. V, Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1967, pp. 1029–30.



Two accomplished writers of short prose in the USSR during the last 15 years: left, Valentin Rasputin; right, the late Vasiliy Shukshin.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

suggested that *any writer* can presume to speak for the Communist Party.)

Three stories are, in many ways, representative of recent Soviet Russian short prose. The first is Valentin Rasputin's *Den'gi dlya Marii* (Money for Maria).[19] Born in 1937, Rasputin obviously has few memories of the Stalin era. His settings are contemporary, usually rural, and frequently Siberian, and he cultivates an art that is rather rare in Russian fiction—a tightly woven, gripping tale. In *Den'gi dlya Marii,* a farmer's wife in distant Siberia manages the village store. An audit of the books reveals that a sizable sum of money is missing. Everybody is certain of her innocence and wants to help, but the sum is too large. The woman's husband then decides to turn to his estranged brother, who lives far away in a big city. At the end of the story, we see the poorly dressed farmer on a train, where he is the subject of compassion and derision from more affluent passengers. We do not find out whether the rich brother agreed to help, or whether the farmer's wife will end up in jail.

The second example is *Kalina krasnaya* (The Red Guelder Rose)[20] by Vasiliy Shukshin, whose premature death in 1974 at the age of 45 was a serious loss. Not only was Shukshin a very promising author, one of the best among the so-called rural writers *(derevenshchiki)*; he was at least equally prominent as a filmmaker. *Kalina krasnaya* tackles a subject that was once used frequently enough by Soviet authors but was later banished from Soviet writing: a criminal's attempt to break with his past, "to go straight."[21] For the first time in decades, Soviet readers were titillated with descriptions of thieves' dens, of "jobs" being "pulled," and so forth. The story's central character really desires to start life afresh—to return to farming with an honest woman by his side—but, in keeping with the hallowed traditions of similar Western writing, his dream is not to come true. He is murdered by the criminals whose world he wanted to leave.[22]

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[19] Valentin Rasputin's story appeared in *Vniz i vverkh po techeniyu* (Downstream and Upstream), Moscow, Sovetskiy pisatel', 1972.

[20] Vasiliy Shukshin's novella was printed in *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 4, 1973.

[21] In the 1920's, the subject was treated by such Soviet authors as Venyamin Kaverin, in *Konets khazy* (The End of a Gang), a novel published in Moscow in 1926, and Leonid Leonov, in *Vor* (The Thief), of which an English-language translation appeared in 1960 (New York, NY, Vintage Books). These were serious enough works, even if marred occasionally by an excessive desire to magnify the exotic and sensationalist aspects of the material. However, by 1934, such writings had disappeared in the face of the Soviet state's heavy reliance on forced labor as a means of "rehabilitating" criminals. In that year, however, Nikolay Pogodin did write *Aristokraty* (The Aristocrats, translated in B. Blake, Ed., *Four Soviet Plays*, New York, NY, International Publishers, 1937), which may well be the only comedy ever written which has as its setting a penal labor camp.

The last example is *Damskiy master* (Ladies' Hairdresser),[23] by Irina Grekova (pseudonym of Yelena Ventsel). Grekova is not a professional writer; now in her 70's, she began to publish fiction less than 20 years ago. The narrator of *Damskiy master* bears much resemblance to the author, who is a professor of mathematics. It is through the eyes of this narrator—now an older woman, a widow or divorcée, who somehow had managed to combine a busy career with the demanding task of bringing up two sons—that we see the world of the young, which includes her junior research associates, secretaries, and also the central character of the story, a male hairdresser. (The choice of the hairdresser's profession is in itself indicative of the change in Soviet literature's concerns. One can hardly visualize a member of such a "frivolous" profession—and a young man at that!—as a chief protagonist in a novella published during the Stalin years.) As the wise and tolerant narrator sees them, the young—obviously as a result of years of Stalinist regimentation—no longer know how to enjoy themselves. Even a college dance is ruined by "educational" games. It is, however, the young hairdresser who shows the deepest wounds inflicted by goal-oriented education. Everything he does must have a useful purpose. He chooses his customers (including a very pretty young woman) for the professionally educational value of the texture of their hair. Similarly, he accepts an invitation to attend a dance because this might prove rewarding as a live sociological exhibit. Instead of reading bulky novels, he is intent on studying (no doubt, for reasons of greater efficiency) literary criticism, which not only describes novels but evaluates them as well. At the end of the story we learn, with relief, that the young man has decided to enter a "normal" profession—working in a factory. Such an ending offers grounds to hope that he will be restored to emotional normalcy.

However different, these three stories share some common attributes. They have genuine human interest, and they avoid annoying didacticism and contrived situations. When viewed against the background of writing of the Stalin period, these are in themselves no mean achievements.

The Future

If prognoses are to be made for the 1980's, one safe prediction would be that, barring major changes in Soviet policies in general, *politically* daring writing will probably be rare.[24] Rather, it is likely that the emphasis will continue to be on personal rather than social themes.

Belorussian novelist Vasiliy Bykov is well known for his tales of war and soldiering. He writes in both Belorussian and Russian.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

One would also expect Russian literature to become more decentralized geographically, as it was in the 1920's. Fewer writers will probably live in and write about Moscow, Leningrad, and the writers' colony of Peredelkino. This development, should it come to pass, would benefit Russian literature. It not only would result in a greater variety of settings and situations but would also enrich the Russian literary language with resources borrowed from many regional dialects.

Most certainly, there will also be an ever growing number of bilingual writers who create (for reasons of sentiment or of ethnic pride) in their native tongue and also—simultaneously—in Russian, the only language in which real literary fames are made in the USSR. Hence, in the coming decade there should be more authors like Fazil Iskander, the highly effective comic author from Abkhaziya in the Caucasus; Vasiliy Bykov, the Belorussian; or Chingiz Aitmatov, the Kirghiz and Russian author of prose and drama. With linguistic assimilation, there will also be more non-Russian authors writing in Russian alone. Thus, there may emerge in Soviet Russian literature counterparts of such subcategories of American literature as Black writing, Jewish-American writing, and the like.

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[22] For translated selections from the writings of Rasputin and Shukshin, see Valentin Rasputin, *Live and Remember*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1978; and Vasiliy Shukshin, *Snowball Berry Red and Other Stories*, Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis Publishers, 1977.

[23] Published in *Novyy mir*, No. 11, 1963.

[24] Such a rarity was Anatoliy Rybakov's novel *Tyazhëlyy pesok* (Heavy Sand), published in *Oktyabr'* (Moscow), Nos. 7–9, 1979. Rybakov provides an unorthodox, sympathetic account of the history of a Jewish family from the tsarist period, through the ordeal of heroism during the Nazi Holocaust, down to the placid present.

A prognosis for the 1980's must take into account as well the new émigré Russian literature that is currently being created in Western Europe, Israel, and the United States. This literature promises to produce a body of writing no less substantial than that bequeathed by the earlier émigrés, those who arrived in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague in the 1920's.

One looks to Soviet literary *samizdat* for some idea of the thematic concerns and perhaps even styles that would, if permitted, surface in officially sanctioned writing. Judging from the contents of *Metropol'*, a *samizdat* anthology brought out in early 1979, the aspirations are modest indeed. What are some of the taboo subjects? Well, for one, judging by Fazil Iskander's contribution, a more relaxed attitude toward human sexuality—relaxed, that is, by prudish Soviet standards. Yuz Aleshkovskiy goes further—a poem of his is entitled "A Lesbian Song," which for all we know may be the most shocking title in the annals of Soviet verse. Pëtr Kozhevnikov (not to be confused with Vadim or Aleksey Kozhevnikov) describes cynical and bored Soviet 16-year-olds seeking forgetfulness in vodka and sex; his adolescents bear much resemblance to those we remember from books by Great Britain's Angry Young Men in the 1950's. Vladimir Vysotskiy, the actor and balladeer in the tradition of the late Aleksandr Galich, contributed a parody of Pushkin's *Ruslan and Lyudmila*. (It should be recalled that disrespect for the classics is not tolerated in the USSR, and that a parody of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* was the object of particular outrage during the postwar anti-Semitic purges.[25]) And then there was Boris Vakhtin's "Dublënka" (The Fur Coat), a story about a frightened little man who is a theatrical censor by trade and parrots Marxist classics. *Metropol'* also included contributions by Aksënov, Akhmadulina, and

Among prominent Soviet literary artists who have emigrated to the West during the Brezhnev era: from left to right: Iosif Brodskiy, Vladimir Maksimov, and Viktor Nekrasov.

—Brodskiy photo from Black Star; Maksimov and Nekrasov by Katherine Young.

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[25] It is indicative that the author of the parody, Aleksandr Khazin, though a poet and playwright of some distinction, was listed in the literary encyclopedia only following his death in 1976. See *Kratkaya literaturnaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. IX, Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1978, p. 767.

Voznesenskiy. Rather innocuous in themselves, these items were significant as tokens of support for the enterprise by some of the most prominent of the younger Soviet authors. Indeed, when some of the less-known contributors to the volume were later expelled from the writers' union, their more famous colleagues rose to their defense.

If *Metropol'* does, indeed, offer some clues about themes that might appear in officially sanctioned journals should another liberal "thaw" occur, then we should expect more vodka and boredom. Perhaps even a more generous dose of sex, but only of the heterosexual variety. (Somehow, one finds it difficult to visualize lesbians frolicking in the pages of *Novyy mir.*) But Soviet censorship is not likely—as long as it continues to exist—to tolerate parodies of itself. And so far there is no evidence that the institution is about to wither away.

Indeed, the present Communist rulers of the USSR seem intent on maintaining a political control over the arts which, while less severe than during the Stalin years, remains tighter than during the Khrushchev period. As long as this is the case, one would not expect Soviet literature to venture often or far into direct assessments or criticism of the existing political system. Rather, like the society at large, Soviet writers and poets can be expected to pursue their quest for meaning and truth on an inward-looking, individual basis.

Books

Eurocommunist Views of Soviet History

By Michael J. Sodaro

GIUSEPPE BOFFA. *Storia dell'Unione Sovietica* (History of the Soviet Union). Rome, Arnold Mondadori, Vol. I, 1976; Vol. II, 1979.

GUISEPPE BOFFA and GILLES MARTINET. *Dialogo sullo Stalinismo* (Dialogue on Stalinism). Bari, Laterza, 1976.

JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.* (History of the USSR). Paris, Éditions Sociales, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1975; Vol. II, 1973; Vol. III, 1974; Vol. IV, 1975.

JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Histoire du phénomène stalinien* (History of the Stalinist Phenomenon). Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1975.

JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Staline-Trotsky. Le Pouvoir et la Révolution* (Stalin-Trotsky. Power and the Revolution). Paris, Julliard, 1979.

GIULIANO PROCACCI. *Il partito nell'Unione Sovietica, 1917–1945* (The Party in the Soviet Union, 1917–1945). Bari, Laterza, 1974.

ISTITUTO GRAMSCI. *Momenti e problemi della storia dell'URSS* (Aspects and Problems of the History of the USSR). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1978.

ALEXANDRE COHEN et al. *L'URSS et nous* (The USSR and Us). Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1978.

ALBERTO PONSI. *Partito unico e democrazia in URSS* (The Single Party and Democracy in the USSR). Bari, Laterza, 1977.

S. BERTOLISSI et al. *Studi di storia sovietica* (Studies on Soviet History). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1978.

FABBIO BETTANIN. *La collettivizzazione delle campagne nell'URSS* (The Collectivization of the Countryside in the USSR). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1978.

GUIDO ORTONA. *La questione agraria in URSS negli anni Venti* (The Agrarian Question in the USSR in the Twenties). Bari, De Donato, 1978.

RITA DI LEO. *Il modello de Stalin* (Stalin's Model). Milan, Feltrinelli Economica, 1971.

IN HIS FAMOUS interview with the journal *Nuovi Argomenti* in June 1956, Palmiro Togliatti, chief of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), created a swirl of controversy by suggesting that Nikita Khrushchev's critique of Yosif Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) several months earlier had not gone far enough. What was needed, Togliatti insisted, was a more thorough investigation into "why and how Soviet society could reach certain forms alien to the democratic way . . . ."[1]

While the Soviet leadership was scarcely disposed to take up Togliatti's challenge, scholars associated with the PCI began producing their own studies of Soviet history. Initially, most of these works appeared as articles in the party journal *Studi storici*. More recently, however, Italian Communist authors have produced a spate of book-length histories of the USSR, and nearly all of these have been written from an avowedly critical point of view. Included among these historians are Giuseppe Boffa, a former *l'Unità* correspondent in Moscow, and Giuliano Procacci, a historian at the University of Florence, as well as a host of younger PCI scholars. With the evident encouragement of the party leadership, a number of these writers expounded their views at a conference on Soviet history sponsored by the Gramsci Institute, the

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[1] *Nuovi Argomenti* (Rome), June 16, 1956, translated in Russian Institute, Columbia University, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1956, p. 120.

PCI's principal research organization, in January 1978.

Likewise, members of the French Communist Party (PCF) have begun to reassess the Soviet past. By far the most prolific among them is Jean Elleinstein, a prominent PCF historian and a frequent critic of the party leadership. Over the last few years, Elleinstein has published a four-volume history of the USSR, as well as separate volumes on Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Several other French Communist writers have also contributed to this reexamination of Soviet history, and in 1978, five of them collaborated on a volume entitled *L'URSS et nous*, a project that seeks to inspire still more research of a critical nature on the USSR by PCF members in the future.

The books examined here represent the most important contributions to this recent efflorescence of "Soviet studies" in the French and Italian Communist parties. As such, they are very much the product of the ambivalent political atmosphere in which they were written. What they reflect above all is an effort by the leading West European Communist parties to affirm the distinctiveness of Eurocommunism as a movement whose origins and methods differ in significant ways from the Soviet model. At the same time, however, these writings betray the Eurocommunists' unwillingness to break completely with the Soviet heritage. Acute criticism of the USSR is tempered by admiration for the "positive" and "liberating" elements of the Soviet experience. In short, these histories mirror both the Eurocommunists' increased readiness in recent years to criticize the Soviet Union and their manifest uncertainty about how far this criticism should go. Ultimately, what the French and Italian Communists say about the USSR tells us a great deal about themselves.

In view of the multiplicity of events and themes in Soviet history which the authors considered here explore, this analysis of their interpretations will be limited to four problem areas which are of central importance to the Eurocommunists' current political orientations. These are: (1) the relationship between Stalinism and Leninism; (2) the nature of "socialist democracy"; (3) the general character of the USSR under Stalin and Khrushchev; and (4) the question whether the USSR may be considered a socialist system. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which the authors in question differ among themselves. This is a particularly appropriate exercise inasmuch as the books under review are not "official" histories, but display a wide range of interpretations and judgments.

EVER SINCE Khrushchev launched the Soviet destalinization drive in 1956, Stalin has been a legitimate target for attack. It therefore comes as no surprise that Stalin is fair game for contemporary Eurocommunist historians. All of them roundly condemn Stalinism (meaning essentially the Stalinist terror) as a blight on Soviet history whose repetition Communists of all nations must avoid.

There is less consensus, however, on the nature of the relationship between Stalinism and the Leninist tradition. It is especially instructive to compare Boffa and Elleinstein on this question. Boffa, for his part, denies that Stalinism was an inevitable outgrowth of Leninism. He contends that there were major differences between Stalin and V.I. Lenin that went beyond the former's penchant for mass terror. Stalin's conception of the party as a militarized order and his notion of the USSR as the only valid model of socialism are cited as examples of his "originality" and of his distance from various aspects of the Bolshevik tradition. For Boffa, Stalin was a modern incarnation of Russian "Caesarism" who took the Soviet Union closer to a "national" revolution than to a "socialist" one.[2]

On the other hand, Boffa admits that some of the features of Stalinist rule "were implicit in the Leninist conception of the party" and in early Bolshevik practice.[3] These included the willingness to use violence against adversaries of the regime, the establishment of a centralized state and party bureaucracy, the institution of the Cheka (the secret police), and the formation of the Comintern, which took the first steps toward "a new orthodoxy."[4] Curiously, Boffa tends to excuse or even justify a number of these very practices. The Civil War and the Western intervention are blamed for compelling the Bolsheviks to resort to political violence and to impose one-party rule on Russia, measures that Boffa believes were not contemplated by the Bolsheviks prior to 1918.[5] For Boffa, the Bolsheviks' efforts to consolidate their power, however brutal, were fully justified by the overriding necessity of defending the revolution.[6]

Significantly, this position has

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[2] *Storia dell'Unione Sovietica*, Vol. I, *Dalla rivoluzione alla seconda guerra mondiale, Lenin e Stalin, 1917–1941* (From the Revolution to the Second World War, Lenin and Stalin, 1917–1941), pp. 615, 301–09, 445, 456.

[3] Ibid., p. 37.

[4] Ibid., pp. 156, 164–65, 167–68, 137.

[5] Boffa maintains that there does not exist "even a single Bolshevik writing from this period which augurs the existence of a single-party [regime]." Ibid., p. 155.

[6] Ibid., p. 166. Elsewhere, Boffa says that the legitimacy of the Bolsheviks' "dictatorship of the proletariat" derived from the party's status as the "general staff" of the revolution and from its construction of "a new state." Ibid., p. 161.

important implications for Boffa's attitude toward subsequent Soviet practice. In the second volume of his history, Boffa draws a distinction between Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the intervention in Hungary in 1956. While he condemns the former, he sanctions the latter as necessary to prevent "an impending catastrophe."[7] The parallel between these attitudes and Boffa's endorsement of Bolshevik terror and authoritarianism in defense of the revolution during the Civil War (measures which he insists were "limited") is striking.

Thus, despite his generally critical portrayal of the USSR under Stalin and Khrushchev, Boffa tends to be wedded to the Communist tradition when examining the Leninist era. Indeed, his explanation of this era is essentially repeated in his "dialogue on Stalinism" with the French Marxist, Gilles Martinet.

Elleinstein's approach to the problem is roughly similar to Boffa's. The first two volumes of his *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, like Boffa's account, treat the establishment of one-party rule and the institution of the Cheka as grim imperatives forced on the Bolsheviks by perfidious forces bent on their destruction. Without the White terror, he maintains, there would have been no Red terror, and had it not been for the counterrevolutionary activities of other parties, Russia would have had a multiparty system after 1918.[8] What Elleinstein calls "the Stalinist phenomenon" is viewed in his *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.* as essentially the outgrowth of these historically determined conditions, reinforced by the authoritarian traditions of Russia's tsarist past. This account ignores or plays down the existence of any inherent bias toward violence or authoritarianism in Leninist doctrine.[9]

Elleinstein's *Histoire du phénomène stalinien* comes a bit closer to acknowledging these doctrinal predispositions. Here Elleinstein admits that Lenin tended to underestimate the importance of "democracy" and to overestimate the role of violence in his revolutionary thought. As a consequence, the Leninist period of Soviet history is seen in this work as containing the "germ" and the "possibility" of the Stalinist phenomenon. Once again, however, Elleinstein points to Russia's authoritarian past and to the counterrevolutionary reaction to Bolshevik rule as determining Lenin's thinking on these matters, and he concludes that the resulting brand of socialism *à la russe* has never had anything in common with the type of socialism that might one day develop in the democratic West. The Stalinist phenomenon, he asserts, is strictly a product of Russian history, not of socialism itself.[10]

While Boffa and Elleinstein thus tend to interpret Leninism's approbation of coercive rule as a legitimate response to the *opponents* of the Bolsheviks—a position seconded by Giuliano Procacci[11]—a few Italian and French Communists take issue with this view. Vittorio Strada, the author of several works on Russian culture, traces the origins of Stalinist misconduct to Lenin's theoretical predilections for authoritarianism and violence. As a participant in the Gramsci Institute's 1978 conference on Soviet history, Strada further maintained that Lenin's vision of a "monocentric" society was not intended solely for less developed countries such as Russia but, more alarmingly, was established as a "general formula" deemed valid for all socialist societies.[12] Another scholar at the same conference described Leninist theory as "the anticipator of Stalinism" and accused the Bolsheviks of triggering the Civil War.[13] In addition, the authors of *L'URSS et nous* reject Elleinstein's term "Stalinist phenomenon," precisely because it appears to suggest that Stalin's deeds occurred outside socialist history rather than constituted an integral part of it.[14]

With these few exceptions, however, the writers surveyed here are clearly reticent about associating Lenin with the subsequent actions of Stalin. The founding father of Bolshevism thus remains sacrosanct.

THE QUESTION of what is meant by "democracy" is undoubtedly a critical one for the Eurocommunists. Elleinstein, in particular, has emerged as an outspoken proponent of more democracy inside the PCF.[15] His analysis of the status of democracy in the USSR is therefore of considerable interest.

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[7] *Storia . . .*, Vol. II, *Dalla Guerra patriottica al ruolo di seconda potenza mondiale, Stalin e Chruscëv, 1941–1964* (From the Patriotic War to the Role of Second World Power, Stalin and Khrushchev, 1941–1964), p. 647.

[8] On the lack of Bolshevik responsibility for the Civil War, see *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. I, *La conquête du pouvoir, 1917–1921* (The Conquest of Power, 1917–1921), 2nd ed., pp. 146, 166–67, 178, 189–91. On the dashed hopes for a multiparty system, see ibid., pp. 184, 217. As evidence of the Bolsheviks' willingness to share power with other parties, Elleinstein cites Trotsky's remark, "We accept all parties which approve our program." Ibid., p. 153.

[9] Ibid., p. 166.

[10] *Histoire du phénomène . . .*, pp. 32–33, 135–36, 56. Elleinstein also says that Lenin "did not sufficiently see" the implications of a single-party system, a swollen bureaucracy, or such organs as the Cheka for Russia's future—owing to his lack of "sufficient historical experience." Ibid., p. 44.

[11] Procacci's thesis is that the institutional origins of Stalinism are to be found in the militarization of the party brought about by the Civil War. See *Il partito nell'Unione Sovietica, 1917–1945*, pp. 30ff.

[12] See "Politics and Culture in the USSR," in Istituto Gramsci, *Momenti e problemi della storia dell'URSS*, p. 161. See also Strada's introduction to a series of essays by Soviet dissidents in *Dissenso e Socialismo* (Dissent and Socialism), Turin, Einaudi, 1977.

[13] Marisa De Luca, "On the Origins of Stalinism," in *Momenti . . .*, pp. 261, 265.

[14] *L'URSS et nous*, p. 64.

As it happens, Elleinstein's understanding of what constitutes democracy in the Soviet Union bears little resemblance to the meaning of the term in the Western liberal tradition. Nowhere in his history of the USSR does Elleinstein specify that a system of strict legal checks on official power, free elections, and a multiparty system are indispensable elements of any political order worthy of the name "democratic." On the contrary, he criticizes the Western concept of liberal democracy as at best "formal" (though he admits that its existence in the West is "precious" all the same).[16] Moreover, he explicitly describes a wide range of Soviet practices as laudably democratic. Thus, he maintains that the Bolshevik party had a "democratic substance" at least until 1920–22, when such events as the Civil War and the Kronstadt uprising required the Bolsheviks to curtail "democratic" tendencies both inside and outside the party.[17] Furthermore, he believes that the Bolsheviks were justified in liquidating the Constituent Assembly in 1918, not only because that body was not "representative" but also in order to prevent it from becoming a source of counterrevolution.[18] At one point in his volume on the "Stalinist phenomenon," Elleinstein criticizes Lenin for failing to realize that democracy necessitates "a structure, an organization, a practice without whose existence contemporary societies can evolve toward totalitarianism"; however, nowhere in this book does he explain what these structures and practices must be, and he certainly does not insist on the desirability of formally institutionalized restrictions on power.[19]

Indeed, a central element of both Elleinstein's and Boffa's accounts of the first decade of Soviet history is their basic disregard of the overwhelming bias in Bolshevik theory against the institutions and attitudinal underpinnings of "bourgeois democracy." Both historians tend to pass over or minimize the deeply rooted *doctrinal* bases of the Bolsheviks' antagonism to such mechanisms as a multiparty system and legal safeguards against abuses of power—an antagonism derived not simply from Russia's autocratic history but also from Marx. At most, they aver that Lenin may have "undervalued" the liberal democratic tradition; they are generally reluctant to observe that both he and Marx flatly *opposed* it. Consequently, both end up ascribing the absence of sufficient "democratic" practices in the USSR to circumstantial factors such as the tenacity of Bolshevism's adversaries.[20]

To be sure, Elleinstein's concept of democracy, at least as it applies to the Soviet Union, can be read in his evaluation of developments in the post-Stalin period. This is highly revealing. For one thing, he asserts that democracy in the USSR can and must come about within the framework of the one-party system.[21] Moreover, he affirms that elements of Soviet political, social, economic, and cultural life have been increasingly "democratized" since the Khrushchev era. Not only, he insists, was "socialist legality" reinstated after 1953,[22] but "fundamental liberties are assuredly real in the Soviet Union" today.[23] While admitting that there is a "certain lack" of "formal liberties" in the USSR, Elleinstein remains convinced that such practices as the suppression of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet dissidents are only "marginal" phenomena, at variance with "the profound tendency of the contemporary Sovet Union, which is that of the development of Soviet socialist democracy."[24]

As to the question of "democratic centralism" in the party itself, Elleinstein seems incapable of breaking out of that concept's tortuous ambiguities. While asserting that democratic centralism without democracy leads to dictatorship, he is unwilling to assail the principle as such. Ultimately, he falls back on the hackneyed maxim that true democratic centralism requires the right amounts of both democracy and centralism, while avoiding "too much" of either.[25] How the proper balance is to be achieved without institutionalized procedures remains unclear—a problem which obscures Elleinstein's position in relation not only to Soviet history but to his own role as a critic of the PCF leadership.

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[15] Elleinstein joined with other PCF members in writing letters or articles in *Le Monde* which criticized the PCF hierarchy for not reforming its internal structures and doctrines along the lines of the Italian or Spanish Communist parties. See *Le Monde* (Paris), Apr. 13, 14, and 15, 1978. Lately, he has attacked the PCF's endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Ibid., Jan. 8, 1980.

[16] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. IV. *L'U.R.S.S. contemporaine* (The Contemporary USSR), pp. 274–75.

[17] *Histoire du phénomene* . . . , pp. 218, 222.

[18] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. I, p. 163. Boffa also approves of the Assembly's dissolution. See *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, pp. 65–66.

[19] *Histoire du phénomene* . . . , p. 223. In his recent book on Trotsky, Elleinstein notes that neither Lenin nor Trotsky accepted "political democracy" or "public liberties" as permanently valid formations, but he insists that Marx did, and that the Bolsheviks' authoritarianism derived in large measure from the exigencies of maintaining power under threatening circumstances. See *Staline-Trotsky*, pp. 44–69.

[20] See *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. II, *Le socialisme dans un seul pays (1922–1939)* (Socialism in One Country [1922–1939]), pp. 24, 216. Also ibid., Vol. IV, p. 273. For Boffa's views, see *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, p. 161. Elsewhere, Boffa maintains that Lenin in his last years was moving toward "pluralistic" mechanisms in the party leadership, but admits that Lenin never made these tendencies explicit and even denied them. See Boffa and Gilles Martinet, *Dialogo sullo Stalinismo*, pp. 29–32.

[21] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. IV, p. 277; *Histoire du phénomene* . . . , p. 244.

[22] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. IV, p. 105.

[23] Ibid., p. 301.

[24] Ibid., pp. 173, 265, 302–03.

Boffa is equally aware of the dilemmas of democratic centralism, yet, like Elleinstein, he does not address the question of why the Bolsheviks never adopted more stringent guarantees for assuring "party democracy" beyond the informal tolerance of discussion and debate that normally prevailed under Lenin's aegis. As for democracy outside the confines of the party, Boffa dismisses any prospect for a coalition government even after the crises of 1921 as unrealistic, asserting that, by this time, the "only alternative to Communist power was greater disorder."[26]

The difficulties of defining democracy in the Soviet context are also apparent in the work of a younger Italian Communist scholar, Alberto Ponsi. In *Partito unico e democrazia in URSS*, Ponsi argues that the initial interpretation of Article 141 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, as advanced by Nikolay Bukharin, would have permitted multiple candidacies in Soviet elections. While Ponsi's study is an amply documented account of resistance to Stalin on the eve of the Great Purge, one wonders how much "democracy" would have been ensured by even the most liberal application of Article 141, inasmuch as Bukharin himself (as Ponsi notes) insisted that the entire election process had to be supervised by the CPSU.

A much more critical analysis of Soviet failures to guarantee political and civil rights may be found in the writings of Umberto Cerroni. At the Gramsci Institute conference on Soviet history, Cerroni squarely attributed the absence of a depoliticized system of "socialist legality" in the USSR to Marxist categories and the rejection of Western liberal theory.[27]

UP TO NOW in our discussion, the similarities between Boffa's and Elleinstein's treatments of Soviet history have been more apparent than their differences. These differences, however, are considerable. Particularly striking are their contrasting interpretations of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras.

Elleinstein's approach, especially in *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, borders on the apologetic. (Indeed, the French historian introduces his lengthy history with the terse notice: "One will not find any anti-Sovietism in this book."[28]) For Elleinstein, Stalin's biggest "crime" was the blood purge of the CPSU. By contrast, the violent collectivization program and the forced-pace industrialization drive, while containing some "mistakes" in their implementation, were essentially correct in their underlying motivations. The suppression of the kulaks was "an absolute necessity" designed to eliminate a "threatening force."[29] Elleinstein's account of the collectivization campaign grossly minimizes the extent of Soviet violence applied to peasants of all classes and refers weakly to the opposition of "an important part of the peasantry" in characterizing peasant resistance. Similarly, Elleinstein argues that the rigors of rapid industrialization were fully understandable in view of the "danger" posed by the West to the Soviet regime.[30] Incredibly, Elleinstein closes his examination of the 1930's with an approving reference to Stalin's notorious remark, "Life is easier, life is happier." "In spite of everything," Elleinstein concludes, "this was true."[31]

Against these polemical effusions, Boffa offers a much more critical and balanced presentation of Stalin's first two five-year plans. His interpretation is informed by a conviction that there existed practicable alternatives to Stalin's violence against the peasantry. Boffa strongly endorses Bukharin's vision of a continuing truce between the party and the peasants within the framework of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and nonviolent incentives to collectivize.[32] (Elleinstein, in contrast, is far less favorably inclined toward Bukharin's views and faults his tendency "to lean too far to the right."[33])

An even more forceful indictment of the collectivization campaign is Fabbio Bettanin's *La collettivizzazione delle campagne nell'URSS*. This painstakingly researched volume by a young scholar presents a stark picture of Soviet violence and peasant resistance, and it actually considers the economic *dis*advantages to the regime occasioned by the destruction of the kulaks. Borrowing terminology from Antonio Gramsci, the author concludes that the Soviets should have opted for a long-term "war of position" in the countryside, based on popular consent, instead of unleashing an all-out "war of movement."[34]

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[25] *Histoire du phénomène* . . . , pp. 218, 33.

[26] *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, p. 189.

[27] "Politics and Legality in the Soviet Experience," in *Momenti* . . . , pp. 61–78. For another critical study of "socialist legality" in the USSR, see "Revolutionary Legality in the USSR from 1932 to 1934," in S. Bertolissi et al., *Studi di storia sovietica*, pp. 252–71.

[28] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. I, pp. 8–9.

[29] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 170.

[30] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 182.

[31] Ibid., p. 273.

[32] *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, pp. 337–57.

[33] *Histoire du phénomène* . . . , pp. 78–79.

Bukharin is not the only Soviet figure to be given contrasting portraits by the two leading French and Italian Communist historians. Trotsky likewise evokes controversy. Elleinstein in his four-volume history tends to gloss over Trotsky's heroics during the October Revolution and the Civil War and accuses him of opposing "Bolshevism" from 1923 on.[35] Only in his more recent work, *Staline-Trotsky,* does Elleinstein restore Trotsky to his rightful place as the second most prominent Bolshevik until his demise under Stalin. Trotsky gains a more consistently sympathetic hearing from Boffa and from Anna Di Biagio in a study published by the PCI press.[36]

As to the Khrushchev years, Elleinstein places much more emphasis on the "democratization" of the USSR under Khrushchev than does Boffa. For Boffa, Khrushchev was more the "stabilizer of the Stalinist system" than its "authentic reformer."[37]

An additional area of contrasts between Boffa and Elleinstein is Soviet foreign policy. To cite just two examples, the historians differ in their appreciation of the role of nationalism in Stalin's policies and in their analysis of the cold war. Elleinstein explicitly de-emphasizes the importance of nationalism in Soviet wartime propaganda at home and attributes the establishment of Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe after the war primarily to "multiform revolutionary processes founded on the mass movement and the class struggle."[38] The outbreak of the cold war itself, he maintains, was the "fundamental responsibility" of the United States, which he accuses of violating the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, threatening war against a prostrate Soviet Union, and instigating the Korean war. Although Elleinstein concedes that Stalin may have committed "grave mistakes" in Eastern Europe, he suggests that "one cannot reduce the history of these countries only to these elements."[39] Boffa is considerably more sensitive to the prominence of nationalism in Stalin's policy.[40] Moreover, Boffa's assessment of the origins of the cold war, though essentially anti-Western, is a bit less one-sided than Elleinstein's. While he holds the United States basically responsible for starting the conflict, he takes Stalin to task for pursuing a spheres-of-influence policy in Europe. As a consequence of the attitudes of both sides, according to Boffa, the cold war division of the continent was "inevitable." In addition, Boffa roundly condemns Stalin for blocking the development of "national roads to socialism" in Eastern Europe, an action which Boffa argues only "aggravated" Europe's division.[41]

THE QUESTION of whether, or to what extent, the Soviet Union is a socialist country has assumed pressing actuality for the Eurocommunists ever since Santiago Carrillo, head of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), emphatically denied that the Soviet system is socialist in his book *"Eurocommunism" and the State.*[42] The authors surveyed in this essay vary in their response to this fundamental question, and their general evaluation of the relevance of the Soviet model for other societies, particularly in the area of economics, likewise reflects some interesting nuances.

Predictably, Elleinstein is the most straightforward in asserting that "socialism has become a reality" in the USSR. This view is in keeping with his overall characterization of Soviet history as an "optimistic tragedy."[43] Even the authors of *L'URSS et nous* describe the USSR as a socialist society, though they judge it a form of "authoritarian socialism" having little in common with the "democratic socialism" espoused by the PCF.[44]

Boffa is more reserved. He says that the socialist character of the USSR by the end of the 1930's was "debatable," and affirms that, while one cannot "expel" the Soviet experience from the history of socialism, Stalin's claim that the USSR is a manifestation of "real socialism" is "mortifying for anyone who nourishes socialist convictions." This is so because, in

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[34] See *La collettivizzazione* . . . , pp. 256ff. Additional works on the Stalin period worth mentioning here are Guido Ortona's *La questione agraria in URSS negli anni Venti* and Rita Di Leo's *Il modello di Stalin.* Ortona argues rather convincingly that elements of Stalin's system can be found in the implementation of NEP, as local party functionaries increasingly came to exercise more economic control functions than initially anticipated. Di Leo, whose views on a variety of subjects led to her expulsion from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), makes the argument that Stalin's preference for political goals over economic "laws" reversed Lenin's priorities and was a true manifestation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

[35] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. II, p. 39.

[36] "The Last Battle of the Opposition," in Bertolissi et al., pp. 89–223.

[37] *Storia* . . . , Vol. II, pp. 585–604, 636–40.

[38] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. III, pp. 164–67; Vol. IV, p. 16.

[39] Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 7–32.

[40] *Storia* . . . , Vol. II, pp. 188–90, 205, 291. See also Boffa's "The National Component and the Socialist Component in the Russian Revolution and in Soviet Experience," in *Momenti* . . . , pp. 15–32.

[41] *Storia* . . . , Vol. II, pp. 305–06, 25–57, 318, 434–35, 356.

[42] *"Eurocomunism" y Estado,* Barcelona, Editorial Critica, 1977.

[43] *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.*, Vol. I, pp. 8–9.

[44] *L'URSS et nous*, pp. 213, 218.

Boffa's view, socialism requires "civil liberties" and "political democracy." Indeed, he holds that such things are indispensable components of the socialist tradition.[45]

Of the writers treated here, it is Vittorio Strada who is the most unequivocal in stating that the USSR is not a socialist society. Like Boffa, Strada regards "freedom of information and discussion" as intrinsic elements of real socialism.[46] Other speakers at the Gramsci Institute's conference offered more elliptical comments regarding the "problematic" nature of Soviet socialism.[47]

If there is any unanimity among the writers just examined, it is in their insistence that the Soviet Union does not constitute a model worthy of emulation by the PCF or the PCI. This position has long been articulated by these parties in light of their commitment to the "democratic path" to socialism. However, many of the works analyzed here also criticize the Soviet economic system, with varying degrees of severity. One Italian analyst affirms that the Soviet experience indicates that a planned economy "is no less anarchic than the market,"[48] and one of the contributors to *L'URSS et nous* calls for a system of Soviet "self-management" *(autogestion)*.[49] Even Elleinstein, whose sketch of Soviet economic failures is spotty, concludes that the superiority of socialism over capitalism is at best "abstract" and is not something that can be measured in economic statistics.[50]

IN SUM, the histories of the USSR written by Italian and French Communists in recent years constitute the most thorough and studied critiques of the Soviet experience yet produced by West European Communists. Virtually every major aspect of Soviet life in the political, economic, and cultural spheres has been subjected to critical, at times trenchant, analysis. This is especially the case for the Stalin and Khrushchev periods.

It is the Leninist heritage, however, which remains the most problematic element for the Eurocommunist historians. In particular, the linkage between Leninism and Stalinism creates the knottiest ambiguities and inconsistencies in their writings and underlies the deepest divisions in their judgments. Granted that Stalin's brutality and dictatorial power vastly exceeded Lenin's, can it be said that Leninism had no connection at all with what followed? Not even the most pro-Soviet of the writers examined here seem willing to go this far, but clearly there is a deep reluctance to implicate Lenin in any way in the deeds of Stalin. Another problem is that, whereas Russia's autocratic history may help explain why Lenin's brand of socialism was authoritarian, it does not explain why *West European* Communists, including historians of the USSR conscious of their own countries' liberal traditions, continue to venerate Lenin's thought and actions.

The matter is further complicated by the question of "democracy" in the USSR. The insistence on the part of most of the Eurocommunist historians that elements of "democracy" and "socialist legality" were present in Lenin's period (and, for some, even in Khrushchev's) does little to clarify what the Eurocommunists ultimately mean by these terms as they apply to socialist systems. This issue is of more than academic interest. In fact, although the Eurocommunist parties have repeatedly sworn their commitment to liberal democracy while traversing the "path to socialism," the prospect for the survival of parliamentary democracy once "socialism" has been installed is still an open question. The writings of the majority of the historians treated here do not resolve the matter. On the contrary, the ease with which Elleinstein and Boffa rationalize Bolshevik violence "in defense of the revolution" only heightens the uncertainties in the Eurocommunists' vision of democracy in socialist society.

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[45] *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, p. 654; Vol. II, pp. 652–55.

[46] *Momenti* . . . , p. 162.

[47] See Luciano Gruppi, "The Unexpressed Potentialities of October," in ibid., p. 188; and Cerroni's remarks in ibid., p. 387.

[48] Mario Ferrero, "Notes on the Theory of Socialist Planning: Utopia and Reality," in ibid., pp. 211, 213. In the same volume, see also the essays by Carlo Buffino (pp. 139–55) and Marco Buttino (pp. 335–39).

[49] *L'URSS et nous*, pp. 122, 126.

[50] *Histoire du phénomène* . . . , p. 191.

Perspectives on the Sino-Soviet Conflict

By Harold C. Hinton

GEORGE GINSBURGS and CARL F. PINKELE. *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949–64.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

MORRIS ROTHENBERG. *Whither China: The View from the Kremlin.* Coral Gables, FL, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1977.

C. L. SULZBERGER. *The Coldest War: Russia's Game in China.* New York, NY, and London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974.

DREW MIDDLETON. *The Duel of the Giants.* New York, NY, Scribner's, 1978.

VICTOR LOUIS. *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire.* New York, NY, Times Books, 1979.

E. STUART KIRBY. *Russian Studies of China: Progress and Problems of Soviet Sinology.* Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1976.

AS THE REVIEWER pointed out in these pages nearly a decade ago,[1] Sino-Soviet relations are capable of following any of several paths, even some form of armed conflict. Since there are powerful disincentives to the exercise of this last option by either side, however, the confrontation between Moscow and Beijing has been conducted so far in a somewhat less violent and essentially political way.

In describing the pattern of relations between Moscow and Beijing in the 1970's, it is useful to evoke the example of Beijing-Hanoi relations since early 1979, for the two confrontations exhibit striking parallels. In the latter relationship, China, having assessed the highly imperfect success of the "lesson" that it tried to teach Vietnam in February-March 1979, has apparently settled down, at least for the time being, to a strategy aimed at keeping Hanoi tense and off balance, complicating its development program, and if possible distracting and deterring it from further "expansion," by means just short of further military pressure. (While a reescalation of the process to the level of violence cannot be excluded, as of the spring of 1980 there had been no signs of another Chinese military buildup along the Vietnamese frontier like the one that preceded the "lesson.") Whether by coincidence or not, this strategy closely resembles the one that China's colossus to the north, the Soviet "polar bear," has employed against China since the 1960's. There is the same reduction of trade, termination of aid, and polemical broadsides; the same exaggerated sensitivity to historic and previously latent territorial claims by the weaker party; the same military buildup in the border region, efforts to isolate the target adversary diplomatically, and promotion of dissidence and subversion (especially in ethnic minority areas) through covert means.

Moreover, in each case, one of the main results has been to drive the weaker state more or less into the arms of the stronger party's main adversary: the Soviet Union with respect to the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation, the United States with respect to the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. In each case, too, there have been political talks between the parties, but because of the bitterness on both sides, these have tended to degenerate into snarling matches. Such was true in the new round of Soviet-Chinese talks initiated in 1979. The talks came about after Beijing, on May 5, called for negotiations without preconditions.[2] Previously, the Chinese had insisted on prior "mutual" withdrawal (actually a Soviet withdrawal, since China did not occupy any significant areas claimed by the USSR) of troops from "disputed" areas (Moscow, at least in public, heatedly denies the existence of any "disputed areas").

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[1] "Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–April 1971, pp. 45–61.

[2] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), May 16, 1979.

This concession apparently reflected Beijing's alarm at Moscow's hostile reaction to such recent developments as the PRC's drive toward industrialization; Hua Guofeng's demand (on February 26, 1978, at the Fifth National People's Congress) for a drastic reduction of Soviet forces along the whole of the Sino-Soviet border; the normalization of Sino-American relations; China's attack on Vietnam; and Beijing's abrogation in April 1979 of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950. The danger signal to Beijing seems to have been the inclusion in the Soviet May Day parade in 1979, for the first time since 1968, of a large military (nuclear as well as conventional) component. In 1969, participation by the military had been canceled on short notice, partly as a means of conveying a soothing signal to Beijing at a time of great tension over the Sino-Soviet border, and reintroduction of a military component in the 1979 parade seemed to indicate an ugly and dangerous mood in Moscow.

However, there is no convincing reason to believe that negotiations are capable of resolving the serious issues and bitter antagonism between Moscow and Beijing in the near term. China, as the weaker party, resents the bullying to which the Soviet Union has subjected it since 1969 and fears, probably with good reason, that a true accommodation with Moscow would have to be on Soviet terms, which Beijing thinks involve an unacceptable semisatellite status for China. Moscow, for its part, seems to distrust Beijing so profoundly and to be so infected with "great nation chauvinism" (to use a Chinese phrase) that it would be content with nothing less than such a status for China. Without it, Moscow is virtually certain to maintain its threatening and humiliating (to the Chinese side) military presence along the Sino-Soviet border. Hence, it came as little surprise that the new round of talks achieved no observable results and was suspended by Beijing in January 1980, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the pretext.[3]

The main qualification to this bleak outlook is that Moscow claims to believe that the more or less "socialist" nature of the Chinese economy will seriously complicate China's dealings with the non-"socialist" West and Japan and will ultimately lead Beijing to cultivate closer economic ties with the Soviet Union instead.[4] Moscow seems to imply a willingness to be generous under these conditions, if China is willing to pay the political price noted above. But, while there appear to be some Chinese who would like to increase trade with and perhaps seek aid from the Soviet Union,[5] they probably would not do so at the cost of abandoning either economic relations with the non-"socialist" countries or the political struggle against Soviet "hegemonism." There may be others in the PRC (among the military leadership, it is thought by some[6]) who would like to improve relations with Moscow for the sake not only of lowering the risk of war but also of acquiring military equipment, especially if the US persists in its current reluctance to sell weapons to China. However, the existence of such a viewpoint in China is highly speculative.

BECAUSE of its obvious importance and interest, the Sino-Soviet dispute has evoked a huge journalistic and scholarly literature in other countries since bursting on the world's consciousness toward the end of the 1950's. Some of this analysis has been of very high quality, an excellent example being Donald S. Zagoria's classic, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961*.[7] For various reasons, however, many books on the Sino-Soviet dispute suffer from one or more of the following defects: they rehearse well-known facts for the "n"th time, without adding anything new; they concentrate on relative superficialities, such as propaganda polemics (which sometimes masquerade under the guise of scholarship), without going in depth into the real issues (inferable more from behavior than from statements) and the actual conduct of the dispute; they are more or less outdated by the time of publication or soon afterward (an inevitable occupational disease of much contemporary book publishing); they concentrate on a particular aspect, possibly minor, of the dispute and thus shed little light on the phenomenon as a whole, as it needs to be seen; or they are written from the viewpoint, or even in the cause, of one or the other of the adversaries and thus suffer from some degree of conscious or unconscious bias. The books under review range from the scholarly to the journalistic, even propagandistic, and among them we find samples of all these shortcomings.

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[3] New China News Agency (Beijing), Jan. 20, 1980.

[4] Statements to this effect have been made to the author and other analysts by Soviet officials.

[5] For example, Cheng Liu, "Sino-Soviet Relations Should Be Thawed," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), May 1, 1979.

[6] For example, Franz Michael, "China and the Soviet Union: Waiting for Mao to Die?" *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1975, p. 104.

[7] 3rd ed., New York, NY, Octagon Books, 1979.

For example, George Ginsburgs and Carl F. Pinkele's analysis of the 1949–64 phase of the Sino-Soviet border dispute is useful background for understanding the flare-up of this matter in 1969, which to a large extent triggered the sharp deterioration in the relations between the two countries in recent years. However, this generally competent work relies largely on Soviet sources and does not quite do analytic justice to the Chinese side. The authors perceive China as motivated by a nationalism that has turned increasingly against the Soviet Union since the early 1950's and has found the territorial dispute a moving and effective issue. This is true, but it is not the whole story. Ideology, in the form of sinicized Marxism-Leninism, or Maoism, also played an important role. The late Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao, a militant Maoist, seriously exacerbated the situation along the Sino-Soviet border from the time of his appointment in 1959 until the Chinese ambush of a Soviet patrol on the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969, mainly because he felt and wanted to demonstrate a strong contempt for the "revisionist" paper bear on the other side of the border.[8]

Soviet policy toward and propaganda about China down to the end of 1976 (shortly after the death of Mao Zedong) is the subject of Morris Rothenberg's useful analysis. He shows very well how seriously the USSR takes its China problem in both its current and possible future aspects—above all, Beijing's efforts to form an anti-Soviet combination of some sort with the United States and Japan. This Soviet apprehension has existed for a long time, but is only now widely understood. (Indeed, it was astonishing to the reviewer, in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, how slow Western sovietologists were to understand the grave concern Beijing was already then causing Moscow.)

In a more journalistic vein, an eminent correspondent of *The New York Times*, C.L. Sulzberger, surveys the history of the Chinese Communist revolution and the basic cultural, historical, and political reasons why its leaders eventually broke with their Soviet mentors. From the vantage point of late 1973, Sulzberger predicted that the Soviet Union would confine itself to pressures short, although only just short, of war in its efforts to bring China back into line. To date, of course, this line of analysis has proved to be generally correct.

Drew Middleton, another correspondent of *The New York Times*, has provided us a somewhat more recent and more solid piece of journalism on the Sino-Soviet confrontation. A military specialist who has written a series of firsthand reports on the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Middleton devotes much of his book to the military aspect of the problem. His highly sensible conclusion reminds us that although a Sino-Soviet war is not probable in the near future, it is not "unthinkable."

And then we come to the work of the well-known Soviet "journalist"—more accurately, intelligence agent and propagandist—Victor Louis. His is the most controversial and best known of the books under review.[9] Like a China-watching Andrey Amal'rik, Louis asserts that the Chinese are so hated by the ethnic minorities they have oppressed for centuries that the "breakup" of China, possibly assisted by some sort of Soviet incursion, is a definite possibility. The main purpose of this line of argument is probably to discourage Beijing from going too far against Hanoi. In reality, the Soviets are making some efforts to promote dissidence among the minorities in China,[10] but—in spite of the Dalai Lama's visit to Moscow and to Ulan Bator in June 1979—there is no evidence that they have had any significant successes along these lines.

A valuable antidote to some of the errors and exaggerations in Louis's polemic is the "dissenting introduction" to the book, written by Harrison Salisbury (yet another correspondent of *The New York Times).* Such introductions are a good idea, for they may deter authors, more or less hardened to critical reviewers, from some of their excesses.

AN IMPORTANT element in any attempt to analyze the Sino-Soviet conflict is an understanding of China. However, the art of China-watching (the contemporary equivalent of traditional sinology) is practiced with varying success in different quarters. In the West, where all is merry chaos, the cumulative results of the large investment of money and manpower in this endeavor since World War II, especially in the United States, have nevertheless been impressive, if uneven.

When we come to Soviet China-watchers, we discover more problems. As E. Stuart Kirby—a British scholar well informed on both the Far East and the Soviet Union—

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[8] The case for Lin Biao as the originator of the clash is developed in Harold C. Hinton, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future*, New York, NY, Crane, Russak, 1976, pp. 16–17.

[9] For example, it evoked a full-page, highly critical, commentary in *Time* (New York, NY), May 28, 1979.

[10] On Soviet propaganda to and about the minorities in China, see Harrison E. Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China*, New York, NY, Bantam Books, 1970, pp. 160–61.

observes in his study of Soviet sinology, the deterioration in relations between the USSR and China in recent years has compounded distortions introduced by Marxist-Leninist ideology and by ethnic prejudice to weaken the contributions of otherwise quite knowledgeable Soviet scholarship on China.

But this is not the whole story. Indeed, the Soviet party and government apparatuses and the semiofficial research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences (for example, the Institute of the Far East) have a substantial number of very able individuals who know China and its language well and in many cases have had recent experience in China. When speaking privately, these specialists can be very objective both about China and about the West's China-watching, which they respect. The problem is that they are not truly free intelligences when they write for publication or address foreign audiences at international conferences and the like. In such contexts, they must and do purvey essentially the party line, which amounts largely to bitterly anti-Chinese (and of course strongly pro-Soviet) propaganda. In recent years, the Soviets have made some energetic efforts in this direction among some Western China-watchers.[11]

But one should remember that such public behavior by Soviet China-watchers reflects political, not intellectual, factors. It remains to be determined how the more objective analysis going on out of the limelight views the Sino-Soviet conflict and how much such perceptions affect the actual course of that conflict.

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[11] A favorite Soviet ploy has been to convey to invited Western China-watchers, supposedly in confidence, a self-serving and very likely fictitious version of the Soviet relationship to the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. A reference to one such interview may be found in A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1977, p. 36n.

The Party and the Gun in China

By Paul H.B. Godwin

HARVEY W. NELSEN. *The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

LIVIO MAITAN. *Party, Army and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath*. London, New Left Books, 1976.

THE ROLE of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Chinese polity was of critical importance in the post-Cultural Revolution period and even after the death of Lin Biao in 1971, when the explicitly political content of the Chinese military ethic and the past behavior of the PLA gave rise to questions about the role the PLA might play after Mao Zedong's death.[1] Today, questions about the PLA's current and future role continue to be asked, if not with the urgency of earlier years. The PLA still has a strong tradition of political participation, a tradition dating from the PLA's origins in 1927 and nurtured by 22 years of "people's war." Moreover, the military system of the People's Republic of China (PRC) preserves no clear line between the party hierarchy and military hierarchy, so that military officers and soldiers at various levels perform ostensibly "civilian" functions in such realms as policy-making and party control of the military establishment. As a result, PLA involvement in politics has been considerable. And if severe intraparty disputes were to occur, such as occurred during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA might again play an even more significant political role.

It is precisely recognition of the current and potential political role of the PLA that has rekindled Western scholarly interest in the PLA. In the post-1954 period, it was widely believed that the PLA had but minimal influence on critical policy issues, and Western scholars showed little interest in the PLA, even to the point of neglect.[2] In the mid-1960's, works by Ellis Joffe, Alexander George, John Gittings, and Samuel Griffith provided the essential scholarly underpinnings for the subsequent growth of interest connected with the events of the Cultural Revolution.[3] In the early 1970's, when it had become evident that the PLA was indeed to play a significant role in Chinese politics and when the alleged coup plot by Lin Biao was followed in short order by a purge of the Chinese high command, a veritable flood of Western publications issued forth. Since then, one of the primary quests of Western scholars has been to determine the PLA's precise role in the Chinese polity.

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[1] Throughout the following discussion, the entire military organization of China will be referred to as the People's Liberation Army.

Renewed Western interest in the PLA has brought a plethora of conceptualizations. Most have emphasized the uniqueness of the PRC's experience with its military establishment,[4] and until recently, little interest has been shown in a more comparative approach.[5] However, in 1978, Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes organized and contributed to symposia designed to initiate the comparative analysis of civil-military relations in Communist systems.[6] Then, in the spring of 1979, Andrzej Korbonski and Roman Kolkowicz, both of the Center for International and Strategic Affairs at the University of California at Los Angeles, organized a conference on "Civil-Military Relations in Socialist and Modernizing Societies," the outcome of which will be a volume that presents both studies of particular cases and studies of the broader comparative and theoretical problems of the military in society. This recent trend indicates that, in the area of civil-military relations at least, the study of Communist systems in isolation from the general field of comparative politics is coming to an end. In the 1980's, Western scholars will thereby be better equipped to evaluate such complex phenomena as the Chinese military system.

NEITHER OF the two works reviewed here is specifically oriented toward the broader issues of comparative analysis, but each adds to our growing pool of analysis of the political role played by the PLA. Harvey W. Nelsen sought to pick up where Gittings and Griffith left off—on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. His approach differs from that of his predecessors in that he chose not to organize his research around a continuous chronological record. Rather, he elected to follow the path charted by Franz Schurmann and A. Doak Barnett, that of preparing an analysis of organizational behavior.[7] Thus, he presents a detailed description of the structure and function of the Chinese military establishment, the role it played in the Cultural Revolution, and the impact its behavior had on the Chinese military system in the post–Cultural Revolution period.

The general character of Livio Maitan's work, originally published in Italy in 1969 and revised and updated for the 1976 English edition, is made clear in the book's subtitle, *A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath.* Maitan, a member of the Fourth International, views the Cultural Revolution as an expression of the conflict between the democracy sought by the masses through the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong's attempt to limit the Cultural Revolution to a reform of the bureaucracy. For this essay, we shall restrict our observations on Maitan primarily to his analysis of the political role of the Chinese military establishment.

Central to Maitan's argument is the proposition that the Cultural Revolution was a process of "reorganization and reform" designed to restore Mao's particular conceptualization of the goals of the Chinese revolution and to oust party officials who opposed his views (p. 144). This argument does not require the support of a Marxist interpretation. Rather, Maitan's Marxist orientation is to be found in his particular normative view, which seeks to judge Chinese communism against its self-proclaimed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. However, Maitan is by no means inimical to the Chinese Communist movement; he explains the "contradictions" in Chinese society and leadership as a function of the transitional stage between capitalism and communism and the Stalinist nature of the Chinese political system. Maitan's analysis focuses on the creation of a dominant political elite modeled on Stalinist principles of leadership and organization (in classical Trotskyist form, V.I. Lenin is absolved from any contribution to Stalinism), an elite that exercises its power through layers of bureaucracy. As Maitan explains it, the Chinese variant of the Stalinist model emerged in part because in the early stages of the revolution the Maoists sought not the overthrow of capitalism but the establishment of a "New Democracy." A democratic structure controlled by the workers and peasants did not take shape, and the apparatus of the party and state grew apart from the masses. When critical factional splits occurred in the party center and Mao turned to the students and workers to expunge the apparatus of heretics, the new revolutionaries used the Cultural Revolution to express their demands for democracy. The Maoists sought to control these aspirations, permitting "power seizures" only at the lower levels of the apparatus while real political power remained in the hands of an increasingly smaller circle of the political elite. According to Maitan, the Cultural Revolution resulted in very little change, and the system quickly returned to one in which a political/bureaucratic layer dominates the masses and in which no real democratic power is delegated to the workers and peasants.

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[2] See Jonathan Pollack, "The Study of Chinese Military Politics: Toward a Framework for Analysis," in Catherine Kelleher, Ed., *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1974, pp. 239–70.

[3] Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1965; Alexander George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1967; John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1967; Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, New York, NY, McGraw–Hill, 1967.

[4] See Pollack, loc. cit.; and Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Armed Forces of the PRC: Time for a New Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Fall 1978, pp. 145–54.

[5] Pollack, loc. cit.; and Godwin, loc cit.

[6] Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978; Dale R. Herspring, Special Issue Co-Editor, "Civil-Military Relations in Communist Countries: First Steps Toward Theory," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Autumn 1978.

[7] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966; A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1967.

Non-Marxist analysts of the Chinese polity did not, and do not, anticipate the kinds of changes Maitan hoped for. Rather, they see political behavior such as the recent demise of Democracy Wall as far more characteristic of Marxist-Leninist systems. Furthermore, whereas Maitan was dismayed by Deng Xiaoping's first return to high office in 1973 and would be even more dismayed by the wholesale restoration of the bureaucrats under Deng and Hua Guofeng since Mao's death, non-Marxist analysts in the West generally applaud the reintroduction of relative pragmatists and pragmatism into the mainstream of Chinese politics.

Where non-Marxist analysts are not likely to disagree with Maitan is in his careful analysis of elite politics. Both Maitan and Nelsen explore the problems faced by the military establishment as the conflict between the goals of the Maoists and the more conservative values of the civilian and military bureaucracies enmeshed the military more and more in politics and ultimately created a triangular pattern of interaction between the Maoists, the party bureaucracy, and the PLA. Although the officer corps as a whole was more in accord with the conservative values of the party bureaucracy brought under attack by the Cultural Revolution Group, it too had its complement of Maoists. Hence, PLA involvement in the Cultural Revolution and in post-Cultural Revolution politics sometimes presents a confused picture. Here, Nelsen's discrete analysis of, first, the organization of the military establishment and, second, the kind of interaction with politics created by the structure and function of the military establishment permits him to assess the role of the PLA in these processes with great clarity.

WHAT KIND of party-military relations emerged from the party's experience with the military establishment between 1965 and 1973? Until the late 1960's, it was widely believed that party control of the military establishment was assured by a separate and highly centralized control apparatus, consisting primarily of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the party Central Committee, the PLA's own General Political Department (GPD), and the GPD's extensive and hierarchical network of political commissars, political officers, political departments, and party committees. As Nelsen observes (p. 53), however, this control system failed to prevent breaches of discipline by the Regional Forces during the Cultural Revolution and failed to prevent the organization of a military coup by Lin Biao and his supporters.[*] The analyses of both Nelsen and Maitan clearly indicate that the GPD, rather than mirroring the goals and values of the civilian party leadership, may well have reflected essentially the goals and values of the military party leadership. Thus, earlier Western models of party-military relations in the PRC, in assuming civilian party domination of the PLA, may well have been in error.

In such circumstances, analyses of party-military relations in the PRC must go back to the rather obvious proposition that the level of PLA involvement in politics is directly proportional to the intensity of intraparty disputes. The more intense such disputes are, the greater the likelihood of conditions in which the party network of controls may not work as intended.

Furthermore, regardless of Mao's 1938 dictum that "the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," the boundary between the military hierarchy and the civilian party hierarchy has been quite porous—porous because of the historical relationship between the party and the army and porous because party membership cuts across all functional hierarchies in Chinese society. During the Cultural Revolution, the repercussions of this porousness were felt at both the national and provincial levels.

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[*] Organizationally, the PRC's armed forces are divided into Main Forces (which include the navy and air force) and Regional Forces. The Main Forces are designed to operate in any area of the PRC whenever necessary, and the Regional Forces are supposed to concentrate on defending their own localities.

At the national level, the placement of career soldiers on the Politburo became "institutionalized," which in turn gave rise to a considerable blurring of roles between military party members and civilian party members in the processes of national policymaking. The result was an interlocking structure made up of civilian party leaders and senior military officials who, as party members, serve together with their colleagues from the civilian party apparatus. With such an arrangement, the political involvement of senior military officials is to be expected.

Below the level of the Politburo, the Central Military Commission functioned not as a body responsible to the Central Committee but as the Politburo's staff office for military affairs. Moreover, it was composed almost entirely of career soldiers. Formally, its chairman was Mao Zedong (and is now Hua Guofeng). Actually, its de facto chairman, normally the first vice-chairman, was Lin Biao (and is now Xu Xiangqian). At this level, then. only the rarely mentioned Control Group of the CMC, which may have a veto function, seems to have represented "civilian" interests (Nelsen, p. 47). Thus, even though the CMC was in theory a party institution that reported to the Central Committee, it appears in practice to have been a military party organization that reported to the Politburo, which itself contained a number of representatives of the military establishment, most of whom were also members of the CMC.

Below the CMC, the General Political Department was supposed to have been the heart of the party control apparatus in the PLA, but it by no means engaged in clearly defined civilian party interaction with the PLA. Its political commissars and political officers were soldiers, and its political departments (and the party committees as well) were composed of soldiers—with the single exception of political commissars appointed from the ranks of the provincial party secretaries (or from the regional party bureaus when they existed) to the military region and military district commands of the Regional Forces.

At the top, then, neither the Politburo, nor the CMC, nor the GPD preserved a clear dividing line between civilian and military. In fact, as the GPD's organizational structure, membership, and relationship to the central party apparatus indicate, the PLA was privileged to operate its own party system and its own system of political work.

Thus, when the Cultural Revolution began, the PLA had its own separate campaign, run by He Long, a vice-chairman of the CMC, with the assistance of Liu Zhijian, a deputy director of the GPD (Nelsen, p. 75). (This pattern conformed to the PLA's preferred style of political work.) Furthermore, a deputy director of the GPD, Liang Biye, attempted (Nelsen, p. 103) to protect the military preparedness of the PLA from the political impact of the Cultural Revolution (he was subsequently purged for his efforts). In fact, because the GPD initially so dragged its feet in carrying out the Cultural Revolution in the army, in August 1967 its operations were temporarily suspended, and its director, Xiao Hua, was

Reviewers in This Issue

MICHAEL J. SODARO—Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Political Science and member of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC); author of articles on the French Left, Italian communism, and the German Democratic Republic in various symposia and in journals such as *Studies in Comparative Communism*, *World Affairs*, and *Problems of Communism*.

HAROLD C. HINTON—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and member of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University; author of *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure*, 1971, and other works on Chinese politics and foreign policy and on Sino-Soviet relations.

PAUL H.B. GODWIN—Associate Professor of Asian Studies, The Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; coauthor of *The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China*, 1971; contributor to numerous journals and currently writing a book on the Chinese People's Liberation Army; the opinions expressed in Mr. Godwin's essay are his own and are not to be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or The Air University.

AMOS PERLMUTTER—Professor of Political Science and Sociology, American University (Washington, DC); editor of *The Journal of Strategic Studies;* and author of numerous works on the Middle East and the military, including *Military Rulers and Military Roles*, 1980, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, 1977, and *Egypt: The Praetorian State*, 1974.

dismissed (Nelsen, pp. 104–05).

At the provincial level, both Nelsen and Maitan conclude, the Regional Forces tended to support the more conservative Red Guard organizations. Maitan's explanation of this behavior emphasizes, first, the interaction of the Regional Forces with the provincial party and state apparatus after 1959–60, when the GPD in the provinces was reorganized so that senior provincial party secretaries were appointed first political commissars of the military region and military district commands of the Regional Forces, and, second, the essentially conservative bias of military institutions, regardless of the PLA's revolutionary background (p. 182). Nelsen's explanation parallels Maitan's, adding the interesting fact that some provincial party leaders argued that the Regional Forces were "not a part of the national defense army, and that its [provincial military district] task was mainly concerned with the localities and its principal leadership was the provincial Party committee" (p. 32). Here, the interaction of the regional PLA units with the senior provincial party secretaries, who played a dual civil-military role, led to an unwillingness to support the more radical Red Guard organizations. The deviation of the Regional Forces from the goals of the Maoists brought restrictions on the authority of local military commanders, the transfer and suspension of a number of these commanders, and the dispatch of Main Force units (which are under the direct command of the CMC and the Ministry of National Defense) to correct the political errors of the Regional Forces (Nelsen, pp. 34–35).

Of exceptional interest in Nelsen's and Maitan's books, in sum, is what the behavior of the PLA during the Cultural Revolution tells us about the Chinese military system. First, it appears that the GPD was a creature of the PLA, not a pliant tool by which the civilian party apparatus assured that the party controls the gun. Second, as is described in Nelsen's analysis of the structure and function of the Chinese force deployments in peacetime, the Regional Forces were more responsive to local political interests than to central directives in an era of intense intraparty dispute when local leaders were under siege. Their responsiveness in this respect was reinforced by the organization of the GPD in the provinces after 1959–60. (Main Force units, as far as can be determined, do not have civilian party secretaries as their senior political commissars.)

It is clear that during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA, as a political actor, was far from monolithic and that the military system devised by the Chinese contributed to the PLA's failure to respond without question to the demands of the political center. In times of severe intraparty dispute, party control of the gun was not assured, and the system presumably devised to assure such control had specific built-in weaknesses that were merely compounded by the introduction of senior military officials into the Politburo, where they could be drawn into the factional disputes that divided the party.

TO WHAT extent, then, did the Chinese military *system* contribute to the organization of the military coup d'etat? For Nelsen, the alleged coup plot contrived by Lin Biao and the Chinese high command grew basically out of "civil/military competition for political power" (p. 89). On the level of issues, Lin opposed détente with the US and supported the "self-sufficiency" approach to China's economic development (pp. 90–91). Maitan, who appears to disregard the allegations of a coup plot (but not Lin's death), prefers to stay within the context of domestic and foreign policy disputes and does not raise the question of a civil-military dispute over who shall govern. Indeed, he argues that Lin had become dispensable to Mao because Lin's support within the army had been undermined by the regional military commanders and that Lin, along with Chen Boda, "impeded the conclusion of a deal with the central administration and the strong regional forces which asserted themselves in 1968–70" (p. 300). He further argues that the removal of Lin's supporters in the provinces after 1971 permitted the restoration of party and state administrators "without alarming the local military commanders" (p. 301). Maitan does not ignore the gains made by the military establishment in representation both at the center and in the provinces; however, he views these gains as having been made by one bureaucracy at the expense of another. Thus, for Maitan, the issue is not one of civil-military relations but one of interbureaucratic conflict.

To Nelsen's and Maitan's analyses, which complement rather than contradict each other, must be added analysis of the total military system devised by the Chinese. Based upon values inherited from 22 years of "people's war," the system emphasized political participation. At the political center, the high command was essentially interlocked with the policymaking process through membership in the Politburo. At the regional level, the relationship between the regional commands and the provincial party apparatus was *interactive* rather than interlocking, but as Cultural Revolution events and the Lin Biao affair were to demonstrate, the pattern of interaction was significant.

The participatory proclivities of the Chinese military system were not controlled by the General Political Department. Rather than assuring that the civilian party apparatus would dominate the military, the GPD tended to place control of the PLA system of political work in the hands of the military establishment. It neither imparted unity to the PLA as a political actor nor assured unity between the high command and the regional commands. As a control apparatus, it failed to assure the PLA's unquestioning loyalty to the civilian party hierarchy, failed to assure the regional commands' unqualified response to directives from the central leadership, and failed to prevent an alleged coup plot originating in the high command. Clearly, the GPD was a weak tool to rely upon if the civilian party leadership intended to use it to assure that the gun remained under the control of the civilian party hierarchy. Its spotty history may partially explain why, after it was revived in 1969 after a two-year period of temporary suspension, it came under the direction of senior officials from the civilian party hierarchy.

More important, though, the military system devised by Mao tended to undermine party control of the gun. The Lin Biao affair, if the purge of the military hierarchy that followed it is any measure, is the clearest demonstration of this particular weakness in the Chinese military system. First, Lin Biao was at once China's senior military official, acting Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Minister of National Defense, and Mao's successor (having been so designated at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969). His multiple positions, held simultaneously, epitomized the absence of a clear line between the military hierarchy and the civilian party hierarchy. The issue of the party's controlling the gun had become moot, for the basic problem had become one of Mao's ability to control Lin. Because Lin's personal, political, and institutional position had been personally supported by Mao, party control of the military hierarchy in fact amounted to Mao's influence alone. Second, since no formal institution or process within the Chinese military system could restrain Lin, Mao had to resort to packing the CMC, purging the central leadership, rotating Main Forces units, and forming an anti-Lin coalition composed of civilian party leaders and regional military commanders. The Chinese military system had failed to accommodate itself to Mao's dictum, and to recover his position, Mao, with his supporters, had to resort to coalition politics.

THE CHINESE military system today remains much as it was under Lin Biao's direction. To be sure, a senior member of the civilian party apparatus (Wei Guoqing) remains director of the General Political Department. That a civilian holds this post may reduce the control problem that Mao tried to correct after the Lin Biao affair. But no structural changes have been made, and the system itself continues to be peculiarly susceptible to the reinvolvement of the PLA in intraparty factional disputes. It is evident that in spite of Mao's dictum, the boundary between the civil and military hierarchies is still quite porous. The interlocking structure of the high command and the Politburo remains, and the interaction between the Regional Forces and the provincial-level party hierarchies continues, even more so because of the 1979 pronouncements that local party first secretaries will be the first political commissars of the military departments at the same level.

The Chinese military system was a major factor in the crisis of 1970–71, and the continued acceptance of this system by the new Chinese leadership, even with a civilian party official functioning as director of the General Political Department, does not permit the symbolic brandishing of Mao's 1938 dictum to overcome the system's implications for the dynamics of Chinese politics. The system forces the military hierarchy to become involved in policy formulation outside the narrow, functional concerns of the military establishment, and the high command will probably remain a potential faction within intraparty policy disputes. "Praetorianism" is clearly too strong a word to describe China's problem with its military,[9] but the character of the Chinese military system would permit a "praetorian" syndrome to emerge if the civil leadership were to become dependent upon the military hierarchy for its continued existence.

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[9] See especially Lynn T. White III, "The Liberation Army and the Chinese People," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1975, pp. 380–82.

Nasser's Record

By Amos Perlmutter

RAYMOND W. BAKER. *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978.

JOHN WATERBURY. *Egypt: Burdens of the Past/Options for the Future*. Bloomington, IN, American University Field Staff and Indiana University Press, 1978.

MOHAMED HEIKAL. *The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East*. New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1978.

P.J. VATIKIOTIS. *Nasser and His Generation*. London, Croom Helm, 1978.

MUNIR NASSER. *Press, Politics and Power: Egypt, Heikal and Al-Ahram*. Ames, IA, The Iowa State University Press, 1979.

A.I. DAWISHA. *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*. New York, NY, John Wiley and Sons, 1976.

KAREN DAWISHA. *Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER made Egypt famous. He ousted the British from Suez. By playing East against West, he secured arms from the Soviet Union and created a challenge to Anglo-American defenses in the northern tier of the Middle East. He established the United Arab Republic (UAR), embracing Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, and proudly proclaimed Egyptian (diplomatically referred to as pan-Arab) hegemony over the Arabs. He launched several agrarian reforms, and by enhancing Egypt's reputation in the Third World, he also nurtured Egypt's incipient industrialization. He did much to rebuild the country's pride in its identity. As a result, he ranks with Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, Zhou Enlai, and possibly Sukarno as one of the most exalted leaders of the Third World.

All this seems to suggest that Nasser's record was an impressive one indeed. But was it? Almost a decade after his death, most of the books reviewed here do not judge it favorably.

In actuality, Nasser's internal accomplishments were meager, and his diplomacy never freed Egypt from great power machinations. On the domestic side, his two major agrarian reforms—in 1953 and 1961—ended in dismal failure. At his death in 1970, Egyptian peasants who had not owned land in Farouq's time still did not own even one feddan (1.038 acres). The real beneficiaries of the agrarian reforms were the prosperous peasantry of lower Egypt. Similarly, the lower classes did not profit from industrial development. The state bureaucrats and capitalists who are now Anwar al-Sadat's new bankers and pashas were its beneficiaries. There were many other problems. The rate of growth in the numbers of urban workers did not keep pace with needs. Nor was the malady of overpopulation tackled effectively. Urbanization proceeded at an uncontrolled pace. Cairo, for example, increased in size to 12 million people, even though its facilities could handle less than a third that number. Even today, the country has practically no working telephones, and roads and communications remain poor. In fact, contact between lower and upper Egypt is mainly by airplane and riverboat. Finally, as Raymond Baker points out in his study of what he terms Egypt's "uncertain revolution," Nasser hooked his economy to Soviet bureaucratic socialism and recreated a bureaucratic feudalism. The bureaucracy grew geometrically while economic development grew arithmetically. In this context, the Aswan dam constituted only a sterile symbol, a pyrrhic economic victory.

In foreign affairs, Nasser's so-called Bismarckian policy, in combination with Pan-Arabism, brought Egypt to the brink of disaster militarily as well as economically. Although Nasser did force the British out of Suez in 1954, Israel dominated the Suez Canal—Egypt's national symbol and pride—by the time he died. Even Tawfiq al-Hakim, the dean of Egyptian letters and an early admirer of Nasser (in fact, he was Nasser's most beloved author), admitted in the mid-1970's, as John Waterbury notes in *Egypt: Burdens of the Past/Options for the Future,* "that for twenty years I was duped," and Tawfiq al-Hakim suggested (as have other writers) that a statue of Nasser should be erected, not in Cairo but in Tel Aviv. He also charged Nasser with distorting the goals of the Egyptian revolution and maintained that attacks on Nasser by both the right and left for his vanity, corruption, brutality, and selfishness were justified.

Nasser's military record was, in truth, abysmal. In the end, as his chief propagandist Mohamed Heikal (Muhammed Hasanyn Haykal) writes in *The Sphinx and the Commissar,* he was completely beholden to the Soviets, who, as Heikal observes, did not reward his loyalty. Not only did he suffer decisive and humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967, but he also lost Egypt's "Vietnam war," the action in Yemen (1962–65).

Moreover, Nasser's dream of Egyptian hegemony in a united Arab world was thwarted. In 1961, Syria ousted Egypt's proconsul, Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, and left the UAR. Then in 1963 Yemen and Iraq refused to merge with Egypt.

WHY DID all this happen to Egypt's modern liberator? P.J. Vatikiotis, in *Nasser and His Generation,* provides us with the definitive answer. Instead of concentrating on creating a free and modern Egypt in political terms, Nasser opted to develop the country's security and military-bureaucratic structures. Vatikiotis writes:

> *The man . . . who, in less than a generation, became the oracle of Egypt's destiny and of Arab revolution at mid-century, was a soldier by chance, a politician by instinct and a conspirator by ability and inclination. He contributed little to soldiering or politics. But he elevated the more native art of conspiracy to new technical heights. At the end of the day, however, he was by formation, tradition, and force of circumstances an Egyptian despot.* (pp. 363–64)

As Vatikiotis correctly points out, a police state based on bureaucratic feudalism posed great impediments to economic progress.

Vatikiotis, in by far the most important book yet written on Nasser, his intellectual and political origins, his generation, and the making of Ottoman-style praetorianism, contends that Nasser was influenced mainly by the radical and fascist nationalism of Ahmad Hussein's Young Egypt *(Misr al-Fatat),* by the military academy, by the nationalist radical wing of the Wafd party, and to some extent by the Moslem Brotherhood. However, since Nasser never read anything more profound than Egyptian newspapers, his political "philosophy" was derived from the brilliant and articulate writings of a group of Egyptian journalists and nationalists that included Ihsan abul Quddus, Fathi Radwan, and the Amin brothers. Above all, he listened to Mohamed Heikal, a young journalist who wrote for *Akhbar al-Yom* (the newspaper of the Amin brothers). Heikal was a propagandist and a practiced courtier and image manipulator. Although in viewpoint he moved from nationalist leftism to Third World, pan-Arab nationalism between 1950 and 1970, he continued to serve Nasser in vital ways during this evolution. Because Nasser was inarticulate, he depended on Heikal to write and read for him. Far more than Nasser's speech writer, Heikal was Nasser's confidant, his mouthpiece, his chief propagandist and negotiator. Heikal helped create the exaggerated expectations Egyptians had of Nasser. He "explained" Nasser to Americans and Europeans, to Third World potentates and revolutionaries. The only foreigners he was ambivalent about were the Soviets.

For years, Heikal printed venomous attacks on the Americans and British in *al-Ahram,* the newspaper of which he became editor-in-chief in 1957 and which he built (with the help of Nasser) into the most widely distributed one in Egypt. Munir Nasser's study of the Egyptian press tells us that Heikal had originally opposed a regime-run newspaper, suggesting instead formation of a regime-supported political party. However, Heikal was acutely aware of the weaknesses of privately owned newspapers like *Akhbar al-Yom,* and after the Suez War, as Nasser consolidated power, Heikal took over *al-Ahram* and turned it into Nasser's international propaganda vehicle.

But *al-Ahram* was more than that. Under Heikal, it served as a foreign office, a strategic center, an intelligence unit. The paper was a tool of Nasser's police state, something that Munir Nasser, who depends exclusively on Heikal interviews, fails to grasp. In the final analysis, Munir Nasser is most concerned with the fact that "*al-Ahram's* credibility and prestige suffered after Heikal" (Heikal was replaced in 1974). He does not admit that Heikal and *al-Ahram* were instruments of Nasser and Nasserism. Sadat did not oust Heikal and appoint one of his own scribes, Yousef al-Sibai (killed by the PLO in Cyprus in 1978), to head *al-Ahram* because Heikal was a champion of freedom of the press but because he was a Nasser intimate. Mustafa Amin, Heikal's former boss at *Ahkbar al-Yom,* wrote a kind of epitaph for Heikal (quoted by Munir Nasser, p. 109): "Heikal built a pyramid and buried the press in it."

And what is the final judgment on Nasser's pan-Arabism? Unfortunately, A.I. Dawisha's book tells us nothing new, primarily because he has fallen victim to the sterile, pseudo-scientific cybernetic model of foreign policy. The model stifles his analysis. Although his research must have been monumental—in fact, the research design takes up half of the book—the information crowds in upon the reader. Brilliance and clarity are needed to tell the story, but Dawisha provides us with a catalog of information resembling an almanac, and not much more.

It is Vatikiotis who finally penetrates the myths of Nasser's foreign policy and his famous concentric circles (of which Amin, Heikal, and Quddus were the authors). Vatikiotis shows that the concept of Egyptianhood, combined with pan-Arabism, had had great currency among liberal Egyptian nationalists of the 1930's. He also clearly demonstrates the vicissitudes of Nasser's pan-Arabism, which Nasser used for his own purposes. According to Vatikiotis:

> *It is futile to establish whether or not Nasser believed in a political doctrine of Arab nationalism. . . . He believed that an Arab region free of foreign power influence would allow Egypt a leading role in its affairs and destiny—and at the expense of other Arab contenders. Where he differed from previous Egyptian rulers was that he was less circumscribed than they were in involving his country in Arab affairs.* (p. 225)

In the process of laying out his conclusions, Vatikiotis refutes the notion, trumpeted by Heikal and other Nasserite journalists, that Nasser attempted to fuse Arab and Egyptian destinies. As Vatikiotis sums up the matter, "A combination of circumstances and coincidence of events pushed Nasser towards Arabism and the adoption of Arab nationalism and unity both as a means and an end simultaneously" (p. 233). Nasser denounced French and British aggression in 1956 not only to cover his military defeat by Israel but also to cement his emergence as a Third World anticolonial leader. He should have erected a monument in Cairo to Sir Anthony Eden.

At the time, it is worth noting, only the Israelis believed in Nasser's deep commitment to the Arabs. Their misperception on this score was subsequently reinforced by regular Sunday reading of Heikal's "Speaking Frankly" column in *al-Ahram*, which came out on Friday. The Israeli cabinet saw this column as a true mirror of Nasser's policy, apparently believing he might carry it out on Monday.

Ironically, the failure to dispel Israeli misconceptions of his pan-Arab, "Egyptianhood" purposes prevented Nasser from achieving these ends. In the reviewer's opinion, Nasser could well have succeeded in accomplishing his goals if he had managed to either win a war with Israel or avoid a military engagement altogether. By choosing a course that led to both war and bitter defeat, however, he ensured that he would be thwarted in his efforts to bring about his larger objectives. Whoever finally provoked the war in 1967, that conflict marked the end of any chance for peace for more than a decade. It resulted in the death of 30,000-40,000 Egyptians in Sinai, the loss of Egyptian territory, damage to the country's honor, and the disappearance of all hope of reform because of increasing dependence on the Soviets. Only gradually, after Nasser's demise, could Sadat—whom Nasser contemptuously called "Colonel OK," according to Vatikiotis—alter the situation.

Why did Nasser make such a grievous mistake? According to Vatikiotis, Nasser in the beginning was ambivalent toward Israel, but by 1955 Israel had become his bête noire. "Nasser's attitude to Israel," Vatikiotis goes on (p. 249), "evolved with his Arab policy, or his struggle for Arab leadership, and his adoption of an anti-Western policy at home and in the Middle East region as a whole." Moreover, Vatikiotis contends, Nasser's 1967 brinkmanship brought upon him unexpected disaster because he was manipulated by events. He thought "in confronting Israel [that] the U.S. may restrain the latter"; furthermore, he felt that his army, having been trained and equipped since 1955 by the Russians, was now ready, and that the USSR could be depended upon to support him and so offset or counter American backing of Israel (p. 256).

THE USSR, of course, did not rescue Nasser. Just as it had done in 1956 and as it was to do again in 1970, it left that job up to the United States. Why, then, did Nasser maintain his pro-Soviet stance after 1967? I was hoping that Karen Dawisha, A.I. Dawisha's wife, would supply the answer in *Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt*. But her book is identical to her husband's, a mechanical compendium of data and statistics (mostly borrowed—with, of course, appropriate credit—from other works). Her "research design" does little to advance my understanding of Soviet and Egyptian motivations.

But the question still remains: why did the anti-Marxist graduate of a British military school and of Hussein's national socialism join forces with the heirs of Iosif Stalin? Could it be that Nasser's anti-Westernism moved him to ally with the Soviets? Is that a sufficient answer? I doubt it, although most of the reviewed authors, especially Karen Dawisha, believe that it is.

Only Heikal could tell us for sure. As he rightly claims in *The Sphinx and the Commissar,* no other Egyptian individual except Nasser had a better position from which to view the erratic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Heikal reveals little of substance, confining himself mostly to self-praise and journalistic tidbits. He does, however, deny contentions, such as those of Karen Dawisha, that the Soviets achieved certain objectives. In particular, he rejects claims that after Suez in 1956 the Soviets aligned Egypt's foreign policy "in such a way that it would completely coincide with Soviet interest" and that the Soviets influenced the radical transformation of the Egyptian economy. He notes that by 1971 Egypt had repudiated most of these Soviet "successes."

Perhaps Heikal's most useful contribution is his description of the asymmetry, the strangeness, the lack of camaraderie in the relationship between the Soviet patrons and their Egyptian clients. Though Egypt was the key Arab ally of the Soviets, it was never "theirs" even at the height of Nasser's power. As Heikal says, "The Soviet Union frequently showed a surprising inability to understand the realities of power in other parts of the world." Heikal himself told Nikita Khrushchev that Egyptians were "Westerners," that they did not like Soviet movies and preferred a trip to Paris to a trip to Bulgaria. Here is the essence of the bitterness between Egypt and the Soviets. Egyptians consider themselves members of a superior, non-Asiatic civilization—which means Soviets are their inferiors. Why should they watch Soviet movies even if they needed Soviet weapons? In 1978, after Sadat had clearly demonstrated an inclination to replace Soviet equipment with American arms, one of Egypt's senior generals told me something while I was in Cairo that reinforces the point. If department stores sold weapons and the American equipment were sold on the second floor, he said, he would not even look at Soviet wares on the first floor.

So Soviet-Egyptian amity was a Nasserite dream. When it turned into a nightmare for Sadat in 1971, he drove the Soviets and their movies out of Egypt. If Soviet strategy was to anchor in Egypt, Heikal concludes, then "I don't believe that the Russians ever evolved an overall strategy for the Arab world." Certainly, Egypt failed to serve the USSR as a bridgehead to the radical Arab world.

In a book of essays by a group of Israeli scholars, Yaacov Ro'i ends his balanced analysis thus:

> *Relations between Moscow and Cairo included all the major spheres which comprise ties between partners in the international arena, particularly between superpowers and medium-sized, technologically backward 'client' states. From the Soviet point of view these relations were satisfactorily defined by the May 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation which contained both general declarations and specific references to political, military, economic and other aspects of the relationship. While Cairo did not officially reject this framework until March 1976, it was clearly calling for a Soviet reevaluation some time before. Moscow's failure–or refusal–to reappraise either the conceptual or practical guidelines of its Egyptian policy brought to the fore the fundamental nature of the disagreement between the two states after October 1973.*[1]

Heikal never makes us aware of this disparity in his book. He writes as if Nasser's Egypt were the senior partner, and he is oblivious to the ironies of his description of the Soviets:

> *You must realize that for all their pragmatism, the Soviet leadership is made up of Slav peasants, easily moved to laughter and tears. They are fascinated by the attributes of power.*

What a marvelous description of Nasser's reign in Egypt! And who are Nasser and Heikal, and even Sadat, if not sons of the Nile, sons of Egyptian peasants like Rais himself, given easily to tears and laughter?

Because the Soviets treated Egypt as a client, the Egyptians ousted them unceremoniously. In the end, the net result of the Soviet efforts was merely a more inefficient Egyptian bureaucracy. By the 1980's, Egypt was de-Sovietized, de-Nasserized, and deradicalized. Anwar Sadat and his military-bureaucratic establishment chose to do away with everything Nasser stood for. They even made peace with Israel. The mirage of Nasserism, radicalism, and Soviet "influence" has faded away, but Egypt, the Nile, and the new Pharaoh remain.

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[1] Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, London, Croom Helm, 1979, p. 181.

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LEFTIST FORCES IN IRAN	Shahram Chubin
The Left in Turkey	George S. Harris
Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas	William S. Turley

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Cover: Young members of the Mojahedin learn to handle weapons and explosives in April 1979 at a training ground near Tehran taken over from the police. Photo by Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Leftist Forces In Iran

Shahram Chubin

Despite its numerical weakness and fragmentation, the Iranian Left has had an important radicalizing effect on the Iranian revolution. The major leftist groups—the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and Mojahedin—have achieved an informal cooperation among themselves and have made common cause with the religious Right on a variety of fundamental issues. The result has been an erosion of the moderate Center, a strengthening of the Left, and a "leftward drift" of the revolution. If current trends continue, the Left could be a serious contender in any future power struggle.

The Left in Turkey

George S. Harris

The Left in Turkey claims only a minute portion of the popular vote, yet leftist ideas enjoy wide acceptance among students and intellectuals and also contribute to the political violence that currently accounts for some eight deaths a day in that country.

Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas

William S. Turley

A combination of domestic factors, subsequently exacerbated by international events, has forced the leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to revise their expectations of the speed at which they can transform their formerly divided nation into a united, modern, socialist state based on adaptation of the post-1960 Soviet and East European models. As a consequence, they have now given priority to the improvement of production over socialist reorganization. But the commitment to the latter goal remains and creates dilemmas for the future—especially in light of continued social and political impediments to its realization.

• • •

Essay-reviews

Political Participation and the Soviet System

D. Richard Little

Although the Soviet population is highly involved in governmental activities in the USSR, this "participation" differs greatly from that in the West. It does not entail any role for the citizenry in selecting leaders, defining major policy objectives, or publicly opposing those objectives. The populace has inputs into the policymaking process only through private, individual actions which, in aggregate, affect decision-makers' views of the likely success or failure of a contemplated policy.

The USSR and Western Europe

Robert M. Slusser

Although not overtly directed westward, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan has serious implications for Western Europe, for this intervention has introduced a new and unpredictable element into the calculus of Soviet foreign policy behavior. Thus, while analysis of Soviet–West European relations in the 1970's can help shed light on the opportunities and dangers of the new phase now emerging, it can no longer claim to define them within reasonably precise limits.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

Hans H. Baerwald

Despite considerable similarities in modernization patterns in the pre-World War II period and complementary economic requirements, the Soviet Union and Japan continue to operate at arm's length politically. Part of the reason is the sharp postwar shift in Japan's approach to modernization, with an emphasis on consumer satisfaction and democracy.

Dissident Images of Eastern Europe

Vlad Georgescu

Most East European dissidents are not anti-Marxist, but rather are critical of today's Communist regimes for betraying "true Marxism." The dissidents' historical explanation for this betrayal provides few ideas of what socialist society should look like, however, and no dissident writer has yet succeeded in offering a realistic method of reforming "the system." Still, dissidence in the face of increasing repression deserves respect and may promote future change.

Dissent in Yugoslavia

Dennis Reinhartz

Recent events point to the emergence of a community of dissent in post-Tito Yugoslavia, a community united by a common belief in democratic socialism, pluralism, true nonalignment, and existential humanism. This development need not portend major instability, as long as the government continues to show restraint and the dissidents continue to emphasize caution and moderation.

Interpreting China's Foreign Policy

Jonathan D. Pollack

A recent study of Chinese behavior in the United Nations suggests that China has adapted to international structures in which it finds itself and disproves contentions that absence of data prevents serious research on Chinese foreign policy. It transcends the problems characteristic of much existing scholarship about the subject. All too often, writers on Chinese foreign policy display ignorance of the world beyond China, while students of world politics who attempt to include China within their purview demonstrate an inadequate sense of what can be learned from the Chinese case.

Leftist Forces in Iran

By Shahram Chubin

The enduring reality of Iran's politics in 1980 is a persistent, three-sided struggle for power. The Left and Right have allied to squeeze out the Center, which is small and shrinking rapidly. The Center and Right have joined together to push back the challenge from the Left. Only the Center and Left have failed to make common cause, although elements of the Center have made some overtures toward dialogue. The consequence of this struggle for power has been increased opportunity for the Left, which has grown rapidly, has had an important radicalizing effect on the revolution, and may be a serious contender for power in any future power struggle.

In the meanwhile, the USSR, with its long history of interest in Iran, stands by in close proximity to events in the country. Soviet policy toward the Iranian revolution has been consistent. The USSR has sought to assist in the consolidation of the revolution, lending its support for all "revolutionary" measures and insisting that the steps so far taken in Iran constitute "only a first step" on the path toward a total revolution. It has also tried to assure the participation of all "progressive forces" in the revolutionary government, its primary interest in Iran being a government that is compliant, sensitive to its interests, and deferential to its concerns. Finally, it has sought to deepen and make irreversible the rift with the United States, in so doing attempting to underscore its own role as "protector" of the revolution and to focus hostility on the West's alleged sins in the past.[1]

At the same time, the USSR has evinced a degree of skepticism about the long-range stability of the Khomeini regime. There is evidence of considerable Soviet covert activity across the porous 1,000-mile frontier. The USSR has been sending into Iran's Azerbaijan provinces radical exiles to whom it had earlier granted refuge. It is helping to revive the Azerbaijani Democratic Party, which has links with the Tudeh party (the Iranian Communist party). It has also provided arms to dissident groups within these provinces, which, along with the other northern provinces of Iran, are in practical terms now outside the control of the central government.[2] The availability to the USSR of peoples of similar ethnic origin makes it remarkably difficult for an Iran targeted for infiltration to detect "foreigners" or "agents." Moreover, the USSR has other assets in Iran, including its relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[3] The Soviet

Mr. Chubin is an Iranian national who has been at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) since 1977. He is currently supervising a project on regional security, the first phase of which deals with the Persian Gulf. Mr. Chubin studied at Columbia University (New York, NY) and has worked in the United States and in Iran. He is the author of Iran's Foreign Relations, *1975,* Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf, *1980, and numerous articles on international politics in this and other journals. The author acknowledges the assistance of Andrew Whitley, who helped provide the author with a sense of the differences among the Left, and of a number of other individuals who cannot be identified publicly.*

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[1] See the author's *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf*, Adelphi Papers, No. 157, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980.

[2] Report to the author from private sources; see also *The Economist* (London), May 24, 1980, p. 50.

[3] The Soviet relationship with the PLO is ambiguous, but that it constitutes an avenue of influence into Iran is undoubted. It is particularly revealing in this respect to note Soviet comments about the PLO's role in the Iranian revolution. In November 1978, Moscow denied any PLO activity in Iran and claimed that "events in Iran are of a purely internal nature" and that "the issues they raise should be dealt with by the Iranians themselves." See Radio Moscow in Arabic, Nov. 22, 1978, translated in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London—hereafter *SWB*), SU/5977/A4/2, Nov. 24, 1978. A year later, in contrast, Moscow commented, "Everyone knows that the PLO exerted great influence over the Iranian revolution and rendered effective and memorable assistance to the revolutionary forces in Iran . . . ." Radio Moscow in Persian, Oct. 30, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6262/A4/1, Nov. 3, 1979.

occupation of Afghanistan provides a further avenue of influence.

If a power struggle should develop after the demise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the USSR with its propinquity would be in an advantageous position to provide covert assistance and to influence the outcome of such a struggle. Were the authority of the central government (and particularly its military capability) to continue to decline and were the country to edge further toward disintegration, Soviet preclusive action in the northern provinces might be forthcoming on "defensive" grounds.[4]

But the Khomeini regime does not seem worried. It is convinced that it can, if it wishes, suppress the Left overnight. This may be the case today. But what are the trends? And how will they affect the prospects of the Left?

The Political Context

Ever since the departure of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in January 1979, it has been extraordinarily difficult to capture the dynamics of politics and change in Iran. Formally, the reins of government passed initially to Shahpour Bakhtiar and, in March 1979, to Mehdi Bazargan. But much of the government's authority was illusory. In November 1979, after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, Bazargan had to resign in protest of actions over which his government had no control. It quickly became apparent that the Ayatollah Khomeini would not relinquish the political power seemingly conferred upon him by popular consent throughout Iran. Even the Khomeini regime, though, has not been what it seems. Formally, the powers of government have rested with the moderate Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, elected president of the republic in January 1980, and with his ministers, such as Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh. Unofficially, however, they have until recently rested with the 13-member Revolutionary Council, a self-appointed body dominated by the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). Iran's parliament, the Majlis—elected in two rounds of voting in March and May 1980—has done little to resolve the ambiguities of power, so far being unable even to decide on the procedures by which it will conduct its business. Perhaps as never before, Iran's politics remains the domain of myth and charade.

Supporters of the Feda'iyin demonstrate at Tehran University in February 1980, before Islamic groups drove them from the campus.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

In this context, names and labels do not always mean what they do in the West. For example, the Right and the Left are often extremely difficult to disentangle. There are a host of cross-cutting cleavages in the country, such as age, rural-urban, literate-illiterate, domestic- or foreign-educated, as well as the more traditional divisions—and on some issues the Left and the Right have often made common cause. The Left in Iran is split into a dozen splinter groups without any one dominant force around which the others can coalesce. It includes a variety of small groups espousing loyalty to China (the Tufan, or Typhoon, group), Albania, or others, and even a Socialist Workers' Party of Trotskyist orientation. It includes underground organizations professing adherence to Marxism and demanding autonomy for the peoples of the Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi areas, where these organizations are active. It even includes secular socialist groupings, such as the National Democratic Front (an offshoot of the centrist National Front, a secular grouping that opposed the Shah in the late

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[4] The USSR might justify any such action by invoking the terms of the Iran-USSR Treaty of 1921—specifically Art. VI, which gives the USSR the right to intervene in Iran to secure its own defense. Both the Shah and Iran's revolutionary regime denounced the treaty, but the USSR still considers it valid.

1950's and early 1960's). Perhaps the most interesting groups on the left, however, are the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin-e Khalq, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Although these three are to varying degrees Marxist, attract primarily the literate sector of the populace, and have overlapping programs, they are quite different from each other in organization and appeal. On the right are the religious elements, who are not only Muslim but also anti-American and anti-Communist in outlook, headed by the mullahs and the IRP. The IRP has great popular appeal, dominates the Revolutionary Council, and is clearly moving the country toward a theocratic regime. In the center are the moderates, the liberal democrats, and the Westernized middle class. Once typified by Bazargan and former Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, the Center has now been inherited by Bani-Sadr.

The comparative strength of the Left is difficult to gauge. Early in 1979, one observer estimated that the Iranian Left could together mobilize some 50,000 people on the streets of Tehran and that the mullahs could rally 50 times that number.[5] A year later, the same source reported that the Left could (optimistically) claim 30,000–40,000 well-trained, well-armed, and dedicated fighters.[6] The difference between mere sympathizer and armed adherent is no small one, and the Left has increased its stock of both since the beginning of the revolution.

Nevertheless, the Left remains numerically inferior to the supporters of Khomeini. As Sharif Arani has noted, the Iranian industrial working class, some 700,000 strong, now accounts for only about 7 percent of the total active labor force and is unlikely to grow much more, as Iranian industry is now unlikely to match its annual growth rate of 15 percent over the period 1965–75. Furthermore, Khomeini can bid for labor support by wage increases. In contrast, Khomeini's constituency—the traditional sector of the economy—numbered some 2.5 million in 1977, or about 3.5 times the size of the industrial labor force.[7] And since the traditional sector of the economy and the bazaar have been untouched, and may in fact have benefited from the slowdown in industrial growth, Khomeini has little to fear from defection from these ranks. At least so argues Arani.

The argument is persuasive, but it assumes a static picture. The Left makes up for its numerical deficiencies by strong organization in the strategic sectors of the nation's economy. In 1979, for example, it claimed that 55 percent of the 60 members of the strike committee at the Abadan oil refinery were leftists (Tudeh, Feda'iyin and Mojahedin).[8] The Left also has a coherent doctrine for seizing power, it is armed, and it has at least the potential of active assistance from a proximate superpower. Above all, though, the Left benefits from the dynamics of current Iranian politics.

It has also been contended that the Iranian Left is divided by harsh and irreconcilable differences into many factions and that, as a result, its energies are dissipated and its opportunities lost. There is a certain merit to this position, as will be evident from a detailed examination of the three major parties of the Left—the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin.

The Tudeh

Founded in 1941, the Tudeh (Masses) party is the oldest Communist party in the Middle East.[9] During the 1950's and 1960's, it was the major opposition movement to the Shah. Through much of its existence, it has also been the most organized political force in Iranian politics, often appearing in the guise of a protest movement that brought together individuals of diverse political views.

The prerevolutionary period. In the 1940's the Tudeh could boast 25,000 members, and perhaps half a million affiliates in the Iranian trade unions. Banned in 1949, it resurfaced in the fluid politics of the early 1950's, but it failed to bury its distaste for Muhammad Mosaddeq and to support him fully. With the fall of Mosaddeq and the restoration of the Shah in 1953, the Tudeh suffered considerable repression at the hands of the regime. Its leadership went into exile in East Germany, and its rank and file grew passive or converted to more acceptable political ideas. By the 1960's, the Tudeh's core membership had dwindled to perhaps 2,000, and by 1973, to some 500.[10] The Tudeh's support now came essentially from the urban areas, largely from among the professional and intellectual classes. The party appeared to have been overtaken by history.

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[5] *The Economist*, Feb. 3, 1979.

[6] Ibid., Apr. 26, 1980, p. 33.

[7] Sharif Arani, "Iran: From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy," *Dissent* (New York), Winter 1980, p. 21.

[8] *The Economist*, Feb. 3, 1979. This figure is probably an exaggeration. Since then, active recruitment has undoubtedly increased, and the figures quoted for 1979 may actually be correct in mid-1980.

[9] For history and background, see Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966; and idem, "Communism in Iran," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1965, pp. 46–55.

[10] See US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (Washington, DC), for 1973 and earlier.

Only in the late 1970's, with the first glimmerings of active opposition within Iran, did the Tudeh bestir itself. While in Moscow in 1975, Tudeh leader Iraj Eskandari publicly acknowledged cooperation with Cuba. In the same year, the 15th Party Plenum of the Tudeh's Central Committee agreed to seek a coalition among the disparate opposition groups contesting the Shah's rule; doctrinal impurity would no longer stand in the way of cooperation. Eskandari, who was accused of failing to appreciate the surge of religious feeling and its tactical implications for Tudeh policy, was replaced as First Secretary of the party, a post he had held for eight years. His successor was Nureddin Kianuri, a sexagenarian who had been in exile in East Germany for more than two decades.

As the traditional Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh was throughout the prerevolutionary period the local agent of the USSR, with which it was joined in an unequal relationship by identical interests and mutually reinforcing policies. Almost all analysts of Iranian politics agree that the Tudeh's tie with the Soviet Union was both a liability and an asset. In the mid-1960's, for example, Moscow followed a policy of cooperation with the Shah and, accordingly, reduced its assistance to the Tudeh. The Tudeh thus found itself in the thankless position of having to defend and rationalize a policy that weakened it.

The Soviet tie was also a source of controversy within the Tudeh. In 1948, Khalil Maleki left the party in protest against its strong Soviet links and founded a "third force." In 1965, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet rift, a Maoist group, the Tufan (Typhoon), also broke away.[11] In 1969, some 200 Tudeh members dissatisfied with the party's aversion to political violence formed the Revolutionary Organization of Iranian Communists (Sazman-e Enqalab-e Kommunistha-ye Iran), a group that advocated recourse to armed measures to finance its activities. On the eve of the 1979 revolution, a variety of groups pulled out of the Tudeh in order to minimize the liabilities associated with the Tudeh. Several splinter groups formed under the writer Mahmud Behazin in the "Democratic Union of the Iranian People," which was doctrinally close to the Tudeh but suffered few of its handicaps. This organization was able to mount demonstrations of as many as 10,000 in favor of an armed uprising.

Moreover, resentment of the Tudeh's association with the USSR undoubtedly limited its appeal among older intellectuals. Dr. Feraydun Keshavarz, for example, later accused Kianuri of being a "Stalinist" and criticized the USSR for its support of the Shah.[12]

But the association with the USSR brought advantages as well. It facilitated such mundane tasks as recruitment, infiltration of agents, the provision of sanctuary, and the exercise of diplomatic pressure. Soviet funds and access to Soviet printing presses, at the very least, eased the task of the Communist opposition. The Soviet-sponsored "clandestine" radio station in Baku, the "National Voice of Iran," which began transmitting in 1959 and broadcast in both Farsi and Azeri, was also an asset—an asset of the sort that no other leftist group in Iran could claim. (From the Soviet standpoint, of course, such a station had the advantage of being a channel for Soviet views without at the same time being fettered by diplomatic niceties. Because it was "unofficial," it could be disowned when the situation warranted.) Finally, the USSR's network of ties with Communist parties was also a plus for the Tudeh.[13] With Soviet encouragement, the Tudeh had been cooperating with the Khalq faction in Afghanistan since the early 1960's—perhaps even to the extent of conducting military and political training for Iranians in Afghanistan.[14]

The revolution of 1979. Despite a modest comeback in the years immediately preceding the revolution, the Tudeh was still virtually a spectator in the revolution itself. It had not had the time to absorb the host of ideological and tactical questions raised by the rapid fall of the old regime, the collapse of the imperial army, and the broad popular base of the opposition. Having been the principal target of the Shah's repression, it was sorely depleted in numbers—by 1976, it still had fewer than a thousand members—while, by comparison, other Marxist groups in Iran numbered

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[11] The Tufan fell into the same trap as the Tudeh. By obediently following its master, China, it too was compromised—by China's rapport with the Shah's regime in the 1970's. The Tufan played a negligible role in the 1979 revolution.

Ironically, the persistence of Sino-Soviet rivalry is reflected in the daily positions of the Tudeh and the various Maoist factions within Iran. For example, Maoist groups and publications such as *Ranjbar* (Tehran) acclaim Bani-Sadr as "a champion of the struggle against the Soviet imperialism of the USSR." *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 2, 1980. The USSR in turn claims that China supported the Shah and that Tufan and *Ranjbar* are threatening the revolution by "vigorously attacking the Tudeh party of the Iranian working class as well as other progressive organizations." See Radio "Peace and Progress" (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1979, in SWB, SU/6186/A4/4, Aug. 6, 1979.

[12] See *Kayhan International* (Tehran, overseas edition), Jan. 31, 1979. Others, such as the leftist Iranian journalist Ahmad Faroughy, have observed that the Tudeh is discredited among an entire generation, who see it as a Soviet Trojan Horse in the heart of Iran. See Ahmad Faroughy and Jean Loup Reverier, *L'Iran contre le Chah* (Iran Against the Shah), Paris, Jean Claude Simeon, 1979, p. 160.

[13] The mobilization of the Communist party movements in Europe against the Shah was particularly striking in its orchestration.

[14] Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the Northern Tier," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979–80, p. 21.



A meeting of the Iranian Tudeh Party in Tehran in August 1979. The large banner to the rear reads: "In support of the Tudeh Party, which thinks only of the independence and democracy of your country." The banner to the left rear reads: "To guard the revolution of Iran, vote for the Tudeh Party." The candidate photo at the left on the front of the rostrum is of Ehsan Tabari; the photo on the right is of Tudeh Party Central Committee First Secretary Nureddin Kianuri.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

15,000–20,000 adherents.[15] In early 1979, it was accorded but third or fourth place among the "leftist groups" in Iran.[16] Its "historic mission" was in the hands of the sexagenarian Kianuri—this in the face of a demographic shift that challenged the older generation's relevance as a source of inspiration. The party's connection with the USSR was a public relations liability—the more so in a nationalist era because of Soviet proximity and the Russian-Soviet record of imperialism in Iran as well as because the Soviet Union's atheism held no attraction for the masses in Iran, who are neither secular nor eager to give up their traditional ways.

With a keen appreciation of its own narrow base of social support and hence of its potential vulnerability to political pogroms, the Tudeh had a difficult choice in early 1979: Should it throw its support to the emerging clerical elements, or should it take advantage of the disorder to push for a socialist people's republic?

Hoping to buy time to consolidate its position and gain tacit official acceptance, the Tudeh quickly embraced Khomeini. Kianuri, for example, saw "no overwhelming differences between scientific socialism . . . and the social content of Islam." Indeed, he argued that "the programme of the Ayatollah coincides with that of the Tudeh."[17] The party issued the call for an armed struggle (belatedly, since the revolution was already in its final stages). It supported the Islamic Republic in the referendum of March 1979 (it was the only leftist grouping to do so), and its publications praised Khomeini and the religious movement as "revolutionary" and as "friends" of the oppressed. The decision to seek security and hug the cloak of the Imam, it claimed, was a "historical" rather than tactical decision; to Communist audiences, it justified its choice by specific reference to the threat of counterrevolution.[18]

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[15] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1976*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 542.

[16] Marshall Shulman, as reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1979.

[17] See his interviews in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Jan. 23, 1979, and in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Jan. 28, 1979. For Iskandari's earlier views, see his "The Tudeh Party and the Muslim Movement," *Navid* (Tehran), as quoted by Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Iran," *The New Yorker* (New York, NY), Dec. 18, 1978, p. 150; and *Daily Telegraph* (London), Oct. 30, 1978. See also Robert Moss, *The Campaign to Destabilise Iran*, Conflict Studies, No. 101, London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, November 1978.

Similarly, the Tudeh sought to minimize discord with other opposition groups. It called for unity of the "progressive" forces and contended that no group should be permitted to "monopolize the revolution," which consists of a "united front of popular forces."[19]

Apart from buying time, the Tudeh has from the outset of the revolution had other objectives. First, it has sought to intensify the revolution, radicalize the masses, and discredit the moderates. The Tudeh has consistently held that the revolution was "only the completion of the first step on the people's road to a final victory" (a view that Moscow has just as consistently echoed).[20] Second, the Tudeh has sought to focus Iranian hostility against the United States (and the West in general), and thereby to widen the US-Iranian rift and make it irreversible. As a part of this effort, the Tudeh has encouraged and made common cause with elements within Iran that are hostile to the United States. Concomitantly, the Tudeh has sought to increase Iran's dependence on the USSR.

Since January 1979, the Tudeh has not fundamentally departed from its objectives. To this date, it has consistently refused to give vent in public to any misgivings about the Imam's decisions. And, with Moscow's help, it has doggedly pursued its revolutionary and anti-American course, particularly in its natural constituencies. But its declarations have reflected greater self-confidence as it has consolidated its own position.

Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi pictured on December 24, 1979, in Zahedan, capital of the province of Baluchistan, where he was attempting to mediate a clash between Baluchi and members of the Revolutionary Guards.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

There have been decided frictions, however, in the Tudeh's relations with the revolutionary government. August 1979 brought the first test of strength between the two. Khomeini had by then found that his threat to crush the Left had not worked as a weapon to control it. The government therefore moved to ban all the leftist groups (including the Tudeh) from organizing or publishing and to subject them to official harassment.

The fundamental conflict between the government's and the Tudeh's positions was all too clear. The Tudeh, as it had done consistently, was advocating the right of minorities (especially the Kurds) to self-government—at a time when the government's clashes with the Kurds were on the increase.[21] More generally, the Bazargan government was basically moderate and reformist, anxious not to exchange one dependency for another and convinced that the reestablishment of order and consensus was the prerequisite for any progress. To the Tudeh, this outlook meant that Bazargan represented the bourgeoisie, not the oppressed poorer classes. Moreover, it implied the need for a "balanced" relationship between the two superpowers, not a complete severance with the United States. When Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi in August 1979 appeared to be reviving links with the United States in order to obtain spare parts and lubricating fuels, the Tudeh (and the other leftist parties) unleashed a barrage of criticism. It argued that practical issues were irrelevant, that the arms relationship would be antirevolutionary, and that the nation demanded a free, not a dependent, army.[22] In a related move, it exerted pressure to annul all existing treaties with the United States.[23]

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[18] See the Communist daily *The Morning Star* (London), Jan. 27, 1979. Moscow quickly reported the Tudeh's support for Khomeini and the Islamic Republic; see Radio Moscow, Feb. 13, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6043/A4/2, Feb. 15, 1979.

[19] National Voice of Iran (Baku—hereafter NVOI), May 7, 1979.

[20] Radio Moscow, Feb. 15, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6045/1, Feb. 17, 1979. See also TASS, Apr. 26, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6104/A4/1, Apr. 30, 1979.

[21] See, for example, NVOI, Mar. 25 and 27, Apr. 17, June 11, July 17. Aug. 2, Sept. 10, 15 and 17, and Oct. 1, 26 and 29, 1979.

Suppression produced a hardening of the Tudeh's tone throughout August and September 1979. While appealing for unity, the Tudeh charged that the repression was "despotic" and threatened the revolution; it also pointedly alluded to the Bazargan government's failure and "unnecessary delay" in initiating reforms or providing help to the workers. The Bazargan government, the Tudeh argued, had been slow to nationalize the banks and to move to genuine agrarian reform; it had tolerated cooperation between the "ultra-Leftists" and the Right at the expense of the progressive forces (i.e., the Tudeh); it had failed to fight imperialism while stirring up the people against the socialists, the Left, and the USSR. "The unholy alliance of Muslim reactionaries, 'new leftists,' and liberals," the Tudeh argued, "could divert the revolution from its original course." The Tudeh therefore demanded a united front of patriotic, progressive, and "truly revolutionary forces."[24]

Tudeh demands, together with explicit Soviet pressure (which we shall go into later in another context) and the threat implicit in Soviet proximity, apparently paid dividends. By October 2, 1979, the restrictions on the Tudeh had been lifted, and the party newspaper *Mardom* reappeared in Tehran (leading former Prime Minister Bakhtiar to speculate that Khomeini had made a deal with the Tudeh).[25]

Furthermore, the issue of the US hostages provided a basis for the Tudeh to exploit anti-Americanism and to press its own views on the government. It is often forgotten today that in February 1979 there had been a dry-run occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, which lasted only a few hours before the occupiers were ejected by the government. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Tudeh may have had a hand in instigating this undertaking. When questioned as to their motives, the individuals involved in the episode replied that they had been seeking SAVAK members and counterrevolutionaries. It may not have been merely a coincidence that the Tudeh broadcasts of February 14, two days earlier, had pinpointed the US embassy as the "focal point of conspiracy against the people of Iran."[26]

Whatever the case in this instance, there appears to have been no Tudeh involvement in the seizure of the embassy in November 1979. The seizure was in fact the work of the "Struggling Muslim Movement," a group ostensibly anti-Communist and devoutly Muslim. Nevertheless, the Tudeh welcomed the seizure, calling it a "decisive response to US conspiracies" and to the provisional government's failure to follow Khomeini's instructions.[27] And it used the seizure to give a focus to several of its persistent demands: the abrogation of all existing agreements with the United States and the renunciation of any new agreement, a thorough purging of the government, and a complete end to US "domination" in Iran.[28] Only after intense US pressure on the USSR did the Tudeh change its tone: the hostages should be released after all, the Tudeh radio argued, as it at the same time criticized the United States for exploiting the situation to carry out a military buildup in the region.[29]

The Tudeh was quite frank in its appreciation of the stakes involved in the hostage question. Kianuri told a French journalist that the issue was nothing less than the foreign policy orientation of the regime: "As long as we hold the hostages, we block the normalization of relations with the US which certain Iranian politicians want."[30] In short, the Tudeh saw the whole matter in the context of its aim of destroying all ties with the United States and the socioeconomic base of the "colonial" system, nationalizing all foreign trade, bringing anticommunism and anti-Sovietism to an end, and forming a large, anti-imperialist popular front.

Subsequent events have continued to provide openings for the Tudeh to press its case home. The unsuccessful US attempt to free the hostages in April 1980 afforded an occasion for further reiteration of the Tudeh's themes, and the Tudeh Central Committee observed that the attack was but one link in a chain intended "to re-establish a regime of exploiters dependent on imperialism." The US rescue mission was therefore a warning to Iranians, the Tudeh argued, and to defend themselves, the Iranians must establish a "wider national and anti-imperialist front," purge the army, and utilize "all the patriotic military personnel committed to the revolution by mobilizing all the progressive forces."[31]

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[22] E.g., ibid., Apr. 24, July 20, Aug. 6 and 29, Oct. 20, 1979.

[23] For example, ibid., Oct. 11, 1979.

[24] Ibid., Aug. 14, 16, 21 and 24, and Sept. 6, 1979.

[25] Interview on British Broadcasting Company (London) in October 1979.

[26] NVOI, Feb. 14, 1979, p. 56.

[27] For example, ibid., Nov. 10, 20, and 23, 1979.

[28] Ibid., Nov 5, 1979, quoting the Tudeh party's support for the seizure.

[29] Ibid., Nov. 20 and 23, 1979.

[30] Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, Apr. 18, 1980. See also Kianuri's interview with Radio Budapest, Mar. 12, 1980, as reported in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), Apr. 16, 1980, pp. 1–4. For the reason Kianuri articulated, some Tudeh officials called for a trial of the hostages. *The Washington Post*, Apr. 11, 1980.

The Tudeh's base of support. In endeavoring to strengthen its hand domestically, the Tudeh has been quick to appreciate the most strategic factors in any future power struggle. It has persisted in its efforts among its traditional constituencies, such as the Westernized bourgeoisie and intellectuals, although both the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin have strong followings here, too. At the same time, it has recognized that the industrial proletariat constitutes a natural target for recruitment to its ranks. Indeed, as one of the few groups with support among factory workers, the Tudeh stands to benefit from unemployment and economic malaise. The party claims that Iran's working class has a "high degree of consciousness";[32] certainly, it has been active in raising working-class consciousness. In 1979, 30 party workers returned from abroad "to rebuild" the party. They enlisted older, more experienced factory workers as "guides" in this process.[33] Former Tudeh loyalists and sympathizers were actively sought out, apostates were reconverted, and attempts were made to rejuvenate the ranks of the party. Apparently, there has been some success, although the large floating and restless student population has embraced the party somewhat more easily than have the workers, who prefer the "immediate fruits of the revolution" to "building up trade unions for long-term economic and political benefits."[34]

Tudeh activity is particularly pronounced in the oil sector, especially in the Ahvaz oil fields and the Abadan refinery. Kianuri claimed in January 1979 that the oil workers "only obey Tudeh directives"[35]—an exaggeration but indicative of a lack of reticence on this question. Tudeh influence here, if consolidated, could be decisive in a future power struggle among the various groups. As events in Iran in 1978 demonstrated, there are few ways of forcing striking workers to return to work, and on a day-to-day basis, the industry could act as an interest group to veto appointments or policies or to demand specific government policies.

Although the Tudeh has traditionally drawn most of its support from the Persian areas (with the notable exception of its foothold in Tabriz, the center of the Azerbaijani movement), it has increasingly turned its attention to areas populated by national minorities, such as the Kurds, the Baluchi, the Azeri Turks, and the Arabs. In a population where 14 out of 35 million belong to national minority groups, it has considerable scope for progress in this regard. The party has consistently endorsed the right of the minorities to self-government and autonomy, as well as the peaceful resolution of differences on the issue. There is considerable evidence today of Tudeh activity and recruitment in northern Iran—along the Caspian Sea, in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces.[36]

Before the 1979 revolution, the Imperial Iranian armed forces, with some 12,000 officers trained by the United States in the postwar period, had been the symbol par excellence of Iran's dependent relationship with the United States, and the Tudeh, like the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin, sought to dismantle them immediately. Unlike the other two groups, though, the Tudeh had no (known) military arm of its own and thus devoted more effort to infiltrating and weakening the armed forces rather than actually to replacing them. In this context, a principal objective has been to assure that the armed forces are thoroughly purged, that their past relationship has been terminated, and that they are reconstituted on "national" and "progressive" lines. The Tudeh's energies have therefore been devoted to securing the dismissal of senior officers and to preventing any reconciliation with the United States.[37] Although it is difficult to judge with any precision, it appears to many observers in Tehran that the Tudeh is again organizing cells in the armed forces.[38]

Within these strategic sectors, the Tudeh has worked hard to increase its base of support. But it can also expect significant support from its traditional

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[31] NVOI, Apr. 25, 1980, in *SWB*, ME/6407/A9, Apr. 29, 1980.

[32] Kianuri, in *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.

[33] Ibid., and *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.

[34] Kianuri, in *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.

[35] Kianuri, in *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.

[36] Personal sources. The Tudeh is also active in Kurdistan and has reportedly infiltrated the Kurdish Democratic Party. See Andrew Whitley, "The Kurds: Pressures and Prospects," *The Round Table* (London), July 1980, p. 251.

[37] NVOI, Apr. 24, June 30, and Nov. 19, 1979.

[38] Communications from private sources. If true, the Tudeh's effort in this regard would be consistent with its behavior in the 1950's. It has been confirmed recently—and strikingly—by President Bani-Sadr, who has admitted that information about a potential coup within the Iranian army has on at least one occasion come from the Tudeh. The implication is that the Tudeh (or the USSR's Committee on State

(continued on page 9)

mentor, the USSR, which continues to cast a "giant political shadow" over Iran.

The Soviet connection. For the USSR, the stakes in Iran are enormous. A bastion of Western influence has crumbled. Iranian society is in disarray, and the populace is politically mobilized, radicalized, and suggestible.

The Tudeh has remained the USSR's local agent throughout the revolution. Soviet and Tudeh objectives have been indistinguishable—in sum, to keep Iran weak and divided and to increase its dependence on the USSR.[39] Moreover, Soviet policies and propaganda themes have been virtually identical to those of the Tudeh. As long as the Tudeh was tolerated (and, preferably, legalized), Moscow eschewed any public criticism of Khomeini's regime. It played down such difficulties as Iranian criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan and problems over negotiating gas prices—in the interests of improving the Soviet (and Tudeh) standing in the power struggle that lay ahead. It likewise called for revolutionary unity among Iran's progressive forces, characterized the current state of affairs in Iran as only the first step toward a total revolution, and castigated the US role in Iran.[40] Like the Tudeh, in short, the USSR adopted a conciliatory approach to the Iranian regime.

Nevertheless, a new basic principle of Soviet policy toward Iran emerged when the religious Right subjected the Tudeh (and the Left in general) to official harassment in August and September 1979. As soon as the Tudeh was banned, the Soviet dissatisfaction with the Khomeini regime spilled out. Moscow surfaced criticism of the Iranian government's repression of the Kurds and of its overtures to the United States for spare parts, and it gave wide circulation to the Tudeh's letter of protest to Iranian authorities over measures taken against the party.[41] The most striking instance of Moscow's disapprobation was the highly critical commentary by Aleksandr Bovin in the weekly newspaper *Nedelya*. Bovin called Khomeini's regime "a disaster," characterized by reactionary tendencies and a profoundly anti-Soviet bias.[42] Yet, a few days later, *Izvestiya*'s Tehran correspondent praised the Iranian revolution.[43] This last episode reflected careful Soviet policy rather than a double volte-face. The Bovin piece was a trial balloon—a warning to Tehran that Soviet support was not unconditional and Soviet patience not infinite. As noted above, it was not without effect.

As before, though, the USSR's first priority in Iran is to prevent the emergence of a strong government unfriendly to it. Ideally, it would even probably like to see a government sufficiently deferential to Soviet interests to serve as a launching pad for the expansion of Soviet influence farther afield in the Persian Gulf region. In this regard, the Tudeh would be an attractive partner. It defines Iran's security needs in terms of Soviet interests and has gone on record as supporting the Soviet Union's call for a collective security agreement in Asia, in which the USSR would participate.[44] It stands for a policy of nonalignment, Cuban style, and it would undoubtedly strengthen Iran's economic relations with the Soviet bloc, including the barter of oil and gas for machinery.

Under present conditions, with the long, porous frontier between the Soviet Union and Iran only partly secured, Moscow can provide substantial assistance to the Tudeh. Just what scale of assistance is at the moment impossible to determine, but Soviet covert activity is clearly thriving in Iran today. While the Soviet connection can often be a liability in peacetime, it may well be a formidable asset in any future power struggle in Iran.

Prospects. As of mid-1980, the Tudeh strategy is clear. The Tudeh identifies the present phase in Iran's revolution as the second stage, marked for "radicalization." At this stage, it argues, the Tudeh backs Khomeini because its aims coincide with those of the Imam. The next step would be the creation of a "broad popular front" of forces (still) supporting the Imam, which would lead into a "struggle between op-

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Security—the KGB) has infiltrated the armed forces and is in a position also to *withhold* such information. Bani-Sadr's comments are reinforced by Qotbzadeh's simultaneous insistence that the Tudeh is actively pursuing Soviet goals and that the USSR has too large an official presence in Iran. See *Le Monde*, July 2, 1980; and *International Herald Tribune*, July 4, 1980.

[39] At minimum, both the Tudeh and Moscow have wanted to prevent any Iranian moderation toward and reconciliation with the United States. On the Soviet attitude, see, for example, TASS, Feb. 16, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6046/A4/2, Feb. 16, 1979; and Radio Moscow, Mar. 8, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6064/A4/5, Mar. 12, 1979.

[40] See, for instance, Yuriy Zhukov, on Moscow television, June 2, 1979, text in *SWB*, SU/6142/A4/1, June 15, 1979.

[41] TASS (and Radio Moscow in Persian), Aug. 17, 1979, in *SWB*, SU/6196/A4/1, Aug. 20, 1979. See also Persian Service, Home Service, and TASS, Aug. 28, 1979, in *SWB*, ME/6205/i, Aug. 29, 1979; and SU/6206/A4/9, Aug. 30, 1979. See also *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 26, 1979, for criticism of repression of the Kurds.

[42] See the reports in *Le Monde*, Sept. 9–10, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1979.

[43] A. Akhmedzhanov, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 13, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1979.

[44] The Tudeh Party Manifesto was published in *Horizont* (East Berlin) and is reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Apr. 19, 1979. See also *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 23, 1979.

posing class forces." The central question of the revolution—who defeats whom?—would then be decided in favor of the people. The third stage would witness a "transformation of social conditions in the interests of the working people" (i.e., Communist party rule).[45]

What are the Tudeh's prospects for success? The Tudeh is politically realistic, experienced, and tightly disciplined. Its purposeful and consistent quest for power has set it apart from all other political parties in Iran. Its small numbers can be offset by good organization—especially amid social and political turmoil, radicalization, and heightened expectations among the populace. Indeed, by the end of 1979, Tudeh party leader Kianuri could boast that the Tudeh had "succeeded in becoming a political agent that is recognized by all political forces and has propagated its program in every part of the country."[46]

It is difficult to dispute this claim, although it is equally difficult to gauge the exact extent to which the Tudeh has made up for its long years of inactivity. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1979, for example, the first Tudeh candidate (Ehsan Tabari, a party founder) obtained 50,000 votes in Tehran. The victory of Bani-Sadr in the presidential elections of January 1980 was seen as a setback for the Tudeh, which rationalized its loss with reference to the fact that 3 million workers had abstained from voting.[47] In the parliamentary elections of March 1980, the Tudeh modestly improved its vote totals to 60,000, up from 40,000 in mid-1979. Nevertheless, this constituted only 3 percent of the

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[45] Article published in a Communist periodical in Czechoslovakia by Tudeh Politburo member Ali Havari, as reported in *The Financial Times* (London), Apr. 16, 1980.

[46] Kianuri, in *The Washington Star*, Dec. 2, 1979.

[47] *Le Monde*, Feb. 2, 1980. The Tudeh had supported Hasan Habibi for president.

Headquarters of the Feda'iyin at Mahabad, in the Kurdistan region of Iran.

—Photoreporters.

electorate.[48]

Other indicators, however, may be more revealing of the Tudeh's true strength. One observer has recently contended that the Tudeh could mobilize several hundred thousand people for its marches and demonstrations.[49] Perhaps more telling, the Tudeh newspaper *Mardom* has a readership of 40,000, and the IRP newspaper *Jomhuriyeh Islam*, a readership of only 20,000.[50] If these figures are correct, they aptly demonstrate the different constituencies of the parties—support of the Tudeh (and the Left in general) by the more literate, and support of the clerical party by the masses.

Whatever the precise figures, there is no question that by mid-1980 the Tudeh has made up a great deal of lost ground. Unlikely to be able to compete with the religious party in attracting sheer numbers, it has focused on specific sectors of the populace. Unable to challenge the clerics directly, it has sought to buy time by embracing their cause, all the while hammering away at its own key themes.

The Feda'iyin-e Khalq

The second major leftist group in Iran is the Feda'iyin-e Khalq (People's Fighters). The Feda'iyin is a secular, Marxist group, an offshoot of the Tudeh. Unlike the Tudeh, it is a coalition, which includes several different currents and tendencies. Unlike the Tudeh, too, it is in part a guerrilla organization. And unlike the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin has no known direct ties with the USSR, its principal foreign links being with Libya and the PLO.

Prerevolutionary period. The Feda'iyin's origins date from the 1960's, when a younger, more militant opposition began to emerge from the universities. Various factors lay behind the frustration felt by this younger opposition. One was the establishment of full political control by the Shah in the mid-1960's. Another was the inactivity of the Tudeh. Yet another was the exposure to Western culture and the experience of study and travel abroad, during which many Iranian youths succumbed to the romance of revolutionary violence, guerrilla movements, and national liberation so prevalent in the youth culture of the late 1960's. For many in the younger generation, the Tupamaros (not the Tudeh) were the role model, and urban guerrilla operations (not party political organization), the means to attain freedom.

This growing radicalization found expression in, among other things, the Feda'iyin. In 1963, six members of the Tudeh decided to establish an independent offshoot espousing Marxism. Two of the founders—'Ali Akbar Safa-e Farahani and Muhammad Ashtiani—went to Palestine. The other four—among them, Hamid Ashraf and Bizhan Jazani—remained in Iran.

Jazani subsequently became the principal exponent of guerrilla operations and "one of the brilliant theoreticians of a reborn communism."[51] In his writings—notably, "Armed Struggle in Iran"[52]—he took stock of the hopelessly disunited opposition to the Shah, a quiescent clergy, a discredited Tudeh, and an effete National Front. The only way to mobilize an apathetic people to assure their politicization, he argued, was through armed struggle by the avant-garde of the revolutionary class. Selected armed actions would be important in two distinct ways: they would undermine the myth of the regime's invincibility, and, followed by the inevitable cycle of repression and attack, they would politicize the populace.

The Feda'iyin soon found considerable foreign support for its emphasis on guerrilla operations. After 1969, the Palestinians provided training in Lebanon.[53] Libya supplied arms and money through the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command). China, Cuba, and South Yemen furnished training for the Feda'iyin core cadres, numbering perhaps 1,200. The Feda'iyin was pro-Chinese until Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Its link with the USSR was probably only indirect, through the PLO. The sanctuary, training, and financial assistance that these foreign backers provided made a considerable difference (and were known to the Shah's government).[54]

In February 1971, the Feda'iyin began a new phase of opposition by attacking a gendarmerie post in Siahkal, near the Caspian Sea. Another group, led by Masud Ahmadzadeh Puyan, commenced its activities independently, combining bank robberies and attacks on military personnel. The two groups—the original Feda'iyin faction and the Puyan faction—subsequently combined to form the Organization of the Iranian People's Feda'iyin Guerrillas (Sazman-e Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq-e Iran).

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[48] Edward Mortimer, *The Times* (London), Apr. 16, 1980.

[49] Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, Apr. 18, 1980.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit., pp. 161–63. For more detail on the origins and evolution of the Feda'iyin (and Mojahedin), see Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963–1977," *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 86, March–April 1980.

[52] Translated and published by the "Iran Committee," London, 1973(?).

[53] See, e.g., *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 21 and Feb. 12, 1979.

[54] See *The Guardian* (London), Sept. 17, 1978.

Several thousand members of the Feda'iyin demonstrate at Tehran University on February 23, 1979.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

By the end of 1978, the Feda'iyin was an umbrella organization, integrating three main groups: (1) a pro-Tudeh faction, whose principal claim was its long opposition to the regime and which sought to identify itself as "Eurocommunist" rather than pro-Soviet; (2) the followers of the theorist Jazani, who stressed the importance of political organization and who campaigned in the oilfields; and (3) the Puyan faction, which emphasized armed struggle.

The revolution of 1979. The Feda'iyin had played an important role in the early active opposition to the Shah, and it had been able to generate a base of literate, white-collar supporters, much like that of the Tudeh, especially in the universities and technical colleges. For example, its losses (killed and executed) up to January 1979 totaled 155, of which 50 percent were students, 30 percent were government and office workers, and 20 percent were engineers, manual workers, and others.[55] The organization could claim some 5,000 hard-core supporters. Indeed, in the first rallies after the revolution it could assemble as many as 50,000 sympathizers, including factory workers, teachers, farmers, and oil workers.[56] The Feda'iyin's role just before and during the revolution was significant in two distinctive respects: the group's willingness to risk casualties even when the chances of success appeared remote, and its very effective organization, demonstrated in attacks on military barracks and armories in February 1979 during the final armed phase of the revolution.

Nevertheless, the Feda'iyin was unprepared for the rapid demise of the monarchy. Its emphasis on paramilitary activity, its assassinations, and the autonomous cellular structure of what was in essence a guerrilla organization with no political program—all were ill suited to the political needs of postrevolutionary Iran.[57] And since arms were generally available throughout Iran after February 1979, the holding of arms was no longer the source of influence it had been before the revolution. The Feda'iyin had failed to create a broad national political base, and its prior role was largely overtaken after the revolution.

On the morrow of the revolution, the Feda'iyin was thus faced with a choice: Should it continue its struggle to seize power and combat an admittedly "nationalist" government in so doing, or should it become more political and work within the "system"? The latter would require not only a restructuring of the organization but also a change in outlook, deference to the clergy, and acceptance of the need for compromise and consensus.

The Feda'iyin delayed decision for several months, as party leaders pondered the dilemma. Initially, it accepted the Bazargan government without enthusiasm, feeling that the government was too conservative and unable to meet the people's needs. Furthermore, because it was worried about the religious tinge that the revolution had acquired, it sought to have representatives of striking workers and factories included in the Revolutionary Council, the de facto ruling organ of the country.[58] Like the Tudeh, thus, the Feda'iyin sought to prevent any group from monopolizing the revolution. Unlike the Tudeh, however, it refused to support the concept of an Islamic Republic. Since it held that a complete revolutionary victory had yet to be won, it refused to participate in any of the various staged elections or to return the weapons it now had in its possession.

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[55] These figures are compiled from Iranian newspapers, as quoted by S. Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretative Essay*, San Francisco, CA, Alchemy, 1979, p. 42. Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit., p. 164, give a total loss of 380 for the guerrillas between 1971 and 1979. This suggests almost equal losses between the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin groupings. For more detail on the guerrillas' social background and numbers, see Abrahamian, loc. cit., pp. 5 ff.

[56] Many participants in Feda'iyin rallies admitted to being Communist. See *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 24–25, 1980.

[57] However, the Feda'iyin did make attempts in late 1978 to organize strikes and demonstrations in the factories.

In February 1979, the Feda'iyin briefly occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. Consistent with its aim of maintaining revolutionary momentum, it at the same time held large rallies in the capital, at which it demanded the disbanding of the existing army and the creation of a people's army, the expulsion of foreign workers, the nationalization of foreign banks and capital, a root-and-branch reorganization of the state apparatus, and the establishment of a classless society at once free, democratic, and anti-imperialist. Its principal fear was domination of the country by a small elite at the expense of others—an elite that would cooperate with the bourgeoisie and ruin the "struggle of the people." Since Khomeini appeared to be concentrating power in his own hands, the Feda'iyin called for broader worker representation and made clear that its support for Khomeini was for only a transitional period.

After these incidents, the government turned its attention to the threat from the Left. It called support for the Left "un-Islamic" and stigmatized the Left as an agent of the United States.[59] In July, Bazargan accused the Feda'iyin of active opposition, claiming that "wherever there is trouble, the Feda'iyin is involved."[60] The following month, Feda'iyin buildings on the Tehran University campus were seized, and the Feda'iyin's activities and publications were banned.

The Feda'iyin responded to this challenge by finally making the decision it had avoided since the beginning of the revolution. In July 1979, it went underground, reverting to the opposition. While it continued its work among its traditional constituents, it also increasingly shifted to the rural areas, where government control was weaker and where it could thus recruit and train supporters. Already doctrinally committed to cultural autonomy for Iran's various nationalities, it intensified its support, first, for the Turkmen in Mazandaran Province and, subsequently, for the Kurds (in the Kurds' clashes with the army that began in August 1979). The Feda'iyin talked of using Kurdistan as their "Yenan" and extended assistance to Shaykh Ezzedin Hosayn, a Kurdish leader sympathetic to the Left.[61] In its support for the Turkmen, the Kurds, and also the Azeris, it gained valuable experience in combat.

After the Feda'iyin went underground in the summer of 1979, its position vis-à-vis the government shifted in line with the changing nature of alliances in Iranian politics. With the seizure of the American hostages in November 1979, the mutual hostility abated somewhat.[62] Common cause was made in the emotional catharsis afforded by the daily ritual of anti-Americanism. And in February and March 1980, Bani-Sadr, who had sympathy for some of the Left's goals, sought to encourage a dialogue with the Feda'iyin—although with little success. But on other occasions, members of the Feda'iyin were specifically targeted for assassination by Khomeini loyalists, and "disappearances" and "accidents" increased. In April 1980, the decision to "Islamicize" the universities was in reality a decision to confront the Left—Feda'iyin and Mojahedin alike—on its home ground. The clerical leaders waved the red flag before their militant Islamic supporters with predictable results. Thousands were injured, and perhaps 50 people were killed. While Bani-Sadr claimed victory for the "cultural revolution," the Feda'iyin, having fought back, claimed that its adherents had been martyred by a savage repression reminiscent of the prerevolutionary era.[63]

Prospects. The Feda'iyin continues to obtain support from abroad. For example, the Libyan connection seems to have survived the revolution. Iran's Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran alluded to this: "You may have noticed that one country which more than others claims to be Muslim and Islamic, which more than others attempts to defend Iran's revolution, in effect harbours communists . . . and even strengthens our Fedayin."[64] The PLO connection also appears intact.

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[58] The Feda'iyin, unlike the Mojahedin, had no known sympathizers in either the Council or the provisional government's cabinet.

[59] See Khomeini's comments on leftist demonstrators "at war with the philosophical belief of Islam," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1979.

[60] *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1979.

[61] See the excellent report in *The Economist*, Apr. 26, 1980, p. 33.

[62] The Feda'iyin's role in the hostage episode is unclear. The professionalism of the captors pointed to those with prior training, such as the Feda'iyin. But given the many groupings often trained in the same countries, it is difficult to be certain. One thing is clear: To the extent that the hostage episode has served to radicalize the populace, the Left and the Right both favored it.

[63] See, for example, *The Times*, Apr. 24, 1980.

[64] Chamran's speech of Apr. 25, 1980, was broadcast by Radio Tehran on Apr. 25, 1980. See *SWB*, ME/6406/A/4, Apr. 28, 1980. However, Chamran is a biased source, in that he represents the 'Amal group, which favors a militant Shi'a emphasis in foreign policy. Bani-Sadr's more secular "revolutionary" approach favors ties with Libya. Qotbzadeh seems to have good connections with Syria, Libya, the PLO, and the USSR.

(The PLO maintains links with both the Feda'iyin and the Mojahedin, on the one hand, and with the Khomeinists, on the other. It has attempted to mediate among these groups to reduce their animosity to one another. Such diverse linkages ensure that support for the Palestinian cause continues to be solid within Iran and that Iran remains a sanctuary and a source of passports, funds, and diplomatic support for the PLO.)

But the Feda'iyin's relationship with the USSR remains hazy. According to some, the Feda'iyin is intensely anti-Soviet and is prepared to cooperate with pro-Western groupings in opposition to Khomeini and the Tudeh. Others maintain that the Feda'iyin has sought contacts with the USSR but is disgruntled by the primacy Moscow gives to the Tudeh.[65] Both lines of thinking may be accurate, in that they may reflect different emphases within the Feda'iyin. As far as is known, however, the Feda'iyin has been only an *indirect* beneficiary, through Palestinian and Libyan ties, of Soviet assistance. In mid-1980, a split appears to have occurred within the Feda'iyin between those who wish to maintain their distance from the USSR and those who seek to establish stronger contacts with it. If a stronger tie indeed develops, it will reflect the degree to which the USSR will have succeeded in identifying the United States as the paramount threat to Iran.

In any case, the Feda'iyin's foreign orientation continues to be militantly nationalistic and strongly anti-Western. While sympathetic to the Communist states, the Feda'iyin has so far eschewed any close dependence on the USSR. It sides with the Arabs on the issue of Palestine, not out of religious solidarity but out of support for radical opposition to "imperialism." It would favor an assertive Iranian foreign policy in behalf of the Third World. It would probably support liberation movements and opposition groups where it considered governments unrepresentative or insuffi-

Kurds of the city of Saqqez march in August 1979 in a display of support for fellow Kurds in Marivan who had been encircled by Revolutionary Guards on orders from Tehran. The banner reads: "The destiny of the Kurds can be decided only by the Kurdish Democratic Party. Office of Pishqam."

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

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[65] Personal source.

ciently progressive. It would tend to cooperate with like-minded Third World states such as Libya and Algeria.

The Feda'iyin's domestic support is more significant than that which it derives from external sources. In mid-1980, the Feda'iyin clearly is becoming increasingly militant about its right to express its views and be consulted. Its willingness to resist the government and to field more than 5,000 adherents prepared to fight testifies to a new confidence. Although it is difficult to estimate the backing that the Feda'iyin enjoys, let alone the *degree* of support for the organization by its adherents, a reasonable estimate is that the Feda'iyin has 7 to 8 million sympathizers throughout the country, perhaps half a million in Tehran. It can mobilize perhaps 100,000 backers for any given demonstration or march.[66]

This scale of support within Iran is remarkable for a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization having to contend with an atheistic image in the very heartland of the "Islamic revival." The Feda'iyin's continuing problem has been the backing that the illiterate, uprooted urban poor have given to Khomeini's brand of radicalism—when the two meet in confrontation, "how can the champions of the poor hit back at the underprivileged?"[67] Until the Feda'iyin expands its support to this sector, its appeal will be restricted to the universities, the radicals, rural areas, and minority regions. This base in itself represents a substantial achievement for an organization that is scarcely political, but it limits the Feda'iyin's effectiveness as a potential alternative to the present regime.

In all likelihood, therefore, the Feda'iyin will remain an *opposition* group as long as the religious card is trumps in Iran. If the clerical Right continues to be as incompetent as it has been to date, this role may not be permanent. But as long as clerical incompetence remains to be conclusively demonstrated, the Feda'iyin's success will be in opening up the road for more "Islamic" groupings like the Mojahedin.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq

The third significant leftist force in Iran is the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People). Like the Feda'iyin, it is essentially a coalition, comprising a number of different tendencies. Like the Feda'iyin, it is in part a guerrilla organization that emphasizes armed struggle. Unlike both the Tudeh and the Feda'iyin, however, it is avowedly Islamic rather than secular. In a setting of mass popular religious militance, therefore, its base of recruitment is less narrow than that of either of its competitors on the Left. And its political language—the slogans of Islam—is more evocative than that of its secular competitors.

Prerevolutionary period. The Mojahedin traces its origins to the National Front, the secular centrist coalition of the late 1950's and early 1960's. In 1963, a group of younger people broke away from the National Front and established the Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran). In 1965–66, Sa'id Mohsen and two colleagues in turn broke away from the Liberation Movement of Iran and founded the Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People.

From the outset, the Mojahedin was a guerrilla organization, initially with extensive foreign links and subsequently with operations within Iran itself. There is evidence that as early as 1969 it received arms and training from the PLO, especially Yasir Arafat's Fatah group. Some of the earliest Mojahedin supporters took part in Black September in 1970 in support of the Palestinians in Jordan.[68] Within Iran, the Mojahedin began armed actions in 1971 at the same time as the Feda'iyin. Its assassinations of US officers in 1973 and 1975, and of American civilians associated with military projects in 1976, were highly professional—much like Soviet operations in terms of timing for maximum political effect, efficiency, and style of operation (although the Soviet link has never been proven).

From the outset, too, the Mojahedin was animated by a mixture of Islamic purity and Communist ideology and rhetoric. Mohsen justified its actions in terms of the Koran—for example, by the need to fight the "devil," tyranny, and falsehood. During his trial by the Shah's government in 1972, he also touched on many of the recurrent themes in Mojahedin rhetoric—the superiority of collective over individual interest, the need for mobilization of the masses and for solidarity against a class of exploiting capitalists, the superiority of models native to Iran (rather than imported ideas), and the necessity for the transformation of man.[69]

In 1975, the Mojahedin split into two groups. One group denounced its Islamic orientation in favor of a clear Marxist-Leninist ideology. Officially known as the Sazman-e Paykar (Battle Organization), this "Marxist Mojahedin" wing wants a People's Democratic Republic and insists that the Muslim faith remains a matter of individual commitment for its members. It is particularly critical of excessive reliance on armed action. Instead, it looks to political activity as a means of mobilizing the urban proletariat and to tactical alliances as a means of energizing the opposition.

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[66] *Le Monde*, May 3, 1980.

[67] *The Economist*, Apr. 26, 1980.

[68] See the issues of *Mojahed* (Tehran), No. 44, 6 Farvardin 1359/Apr. 15, 1980, and No. 48, 2 Ordibehesht 1359/Apr. 22, 1980.

[69] For a summary of Sa'id Mohsen's comments at his trial in 1972, see Faroughy and Reverier, op. cit.

The other wing of the party, whose leadership is today usually attributed to the 32-year-old Masud Rajavi, retained its emphasis on armed struggle and its religious identification. This Islamic Mojahedin had been active in urban warfare from 1966 and made effective use of its military training in the last, armed stages of the revolution. It seeks to establish a Socialist Islamic Republic. It stresses both the egalitarian elements in the original doctrine of Islam and the need for radical thought and action. (Its symbol is a clenched fist holding a rifle.) Its principal intellectual mentor is 'Ali Shari'ati, an Islamic modernist of the 1960's who interpreted Islam as a highly radical and progressive ideology and who saw no contradiction between the requirements of Islam, on the one hand, and the classless society and the armed anti-imperialist struggle, on the other. Nevertheless, as Abrahamian has noted, although Shari'ati's thinking was close to that of the Mojahedin and although Shari'ati assisted the Mojahedin in later years, the Mojahedin themselves had earlier concluded that Shi'ism should and could be used for revolutionary purposes.[70]

The postrevolutionary period. Like the Feda'iyin, the Mojahedin has failed to create a broad national political base. It has perhaps only 5,000 trained, hard-core members, but it can mobilize 50,000 supporters virtually at will. Both members and supporters come largely from the same strata that back the Feda'iyin, such as university students, engineers, physicians, and the like, whose numbers have increased in Iran as education has expanded. Of the 57 casualties (killed and executed) that the Mojahedin suffered in the guerrilla struggle up to January 1979, for example, almost two thirds were university students or recent university graduates in engineering, business, medicine, and accounting.[71] In addition, however, the

Members of the Mojahedin at weapons training on a range several kilometers outside Tehran.

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

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[70] Abrahamian, loc. cit., p. 10.

[71] Ibid., and Zabih, *Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval . . .*, p. 41. For biographies of some Mojahedin "martyrs" killed by security forces, see *Mojahed*, No. 44, 6 Farvardin 1359/Apr. 15, 1980.

Mojahedin has been able to appeal to the disgruntled, alienated intelligentsia who have rediscovered solace and identity in Islam. By providing an escape to the past with appropriate "approved" symbols, it can reach a larger constituency and offer a vision of a familiar future.

Each principal faction has an identifiable constituency. The Marxist Paykar faction has no difficulty in attracting 10,000 supporters in the universities.[72] Since the revolution, it has developed into a strong, tightly knit organization, with growing strength in the factories and with active recruitment efforts in the oil fields and among the urban proletariat.

The Islamic faction, for its part, retains its links to the bazaar, which funded it in the prerevolutionary period. It is also known to have supporters—how many is not clear—among the younger, activist clergy trained in the Qom Theological Seminary, whom the members of the Mojahedin often met while in jail.[73] Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, a popular, Tehran-based cleric with leftist sympathies, was the principal bridge between the Mojahedin and the clergy until his death in September 1979. Ayatollah Shaykh 'Ali Tehrani of Meshed, the teacher of 'Ali Shari'ati, represents the branch of progressive Islamic thought within the clergy and is supportive of the Mojahedin. Former Prime Minister Bazargan, who shares the Mojahedin's support for a revitalized Islam and its distaste for a theocratic regime, also remains an important potential intermediary with the clergy.

The Mojahedin has accepted the compatability of Islam and Marx, and under its broad umbrella the descendants of progressive radical Islam and religious Marxists coexist. This "identity problem" is at once a strength and a weakness.

The strength derives from the very existence of diverse elements within the umbrella organization, which encompass tendencies that cover a broad political spectrum, from the highly religious (with reformist tendencies) to the basically Marxist-Leninist (with an individual commitment to Islam). Since no rigorous attempt has been made to discipline the organization and to enforce strict adherence to a uniform doctrine, the precise "mix" of these various tendencies is therefore subject to variation. This feature of the organization provides the Mojahedin with a potential tactical flexibility and adaptability.

The weakness of the Mojahedin derives from precisely this vagueness in the coalition. If the Feda'iyin finds it difficult to confront the club-wielding mobs of underprivileged who denounce it, the Mojahedin is confused by adversaries who manipulate religious symbols. In the April 1980 clashes in the universities, for example, the Mojahedin obeyed Khomeini's order's banning political activity. Uncertain whether to respond as purveyor of radical change or as loyal Muslim, the Mojahedin has so far failed to harness the inherent ambiguity of its position to maximum political advantage.

The late Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani at the "Palestine Day" staged on the initiative of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on August 17, 1979.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

The Mojahedin's "identity problem" is not without implications for its foreign orientation as well. That orientation certainly involves an explicit emphasis on Islam. It is certainly anti-Western. The probable result is a mixture of radical Islamic and Third World perspective, a combination of Mu'ammar Qadhafi and Frantz Fanon. Nevertheless, depending on the particular balance of power within the Mojahedin, foreign policy could range from solidarity with the Eastern bloc to a stubborn form of Islamic radicalism.

In revolutionary Iran, the Mojahedin's attitudes have reflected its structural ambivalence. Under the moderate Bazargan government, it, like the secular Left, became distrustful of the pace and thrust of reforms.

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[72] See, e.g., *Le Monde*, May 3, 1980.

[73] See the discussion in *Mojahed*, No. 48, 2 Ordibehesht 1359/Apr. 22, 1980.

Like the Feda'iyin, it was faced with a choice of sullen acquiescence or resistance. It therefore sought to maintain the revolutionary momentum, disband the army, and defend the "revolutionary content of Islam." At the same time, it has no major difficulty in supporting the principle of an Islamic Republic. It had sympathizers in the cabinet of the provisional government, and owing to its strong religious credentials, it even had supporters within Khomeini's entourage. (Nonclerical members of the entourage, such as Ibrahim Yazdi, were suspected by many of being followers of Shari'ati and "closet Mojahedin.") All the same, the Mojahedin soon developed reservations about the excessive centralization of power in the Constitution, about the way in which the Constituent Assembly was set up, and about the emerging dominance of the clergy. Unwilling to confront Khomeini's regime and fearful of a counterrevolution, the Mojahedin found itself excluded from decisions or even consultations.

The Mojahedin has thus received little formal acceptance from the Khomeini regime. Indeed, perceived as a serious potential competitor, it has been systematically excluded from the political life of the country. In the euphoria attendant on the seizure of the American hostages, for example, the Mojahedin offered to train the populace with arms but met with a quick rebuff. Khomeini called instead for general mobilization and training by the Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guards loyal to Khomeini). In the elections for president, moreover, Khomeini denied Masud Rajavi the right to stand as a candidate, because the Mojahedin had opposed the Constitution. (There are indications that Rajavi would have received several million votes, principally from the young, the women, and the ethnic minorities.)[74] Subsequently, in the two rounds of elections for the Majlis in March and May 1980, Mojahedin supporters were harassed and accused of treason. Rajavi's criticism of voting irregularities was supported by Bani-Sadr and, in veiled terms, by Bazargan, who argued for the election of "all groups" loyal to the revolution. But Khomeini dismissed the criticism and called for the election of only those who were "100 percent Islamic."[75] As a result of these machinations and of electoral procedures designed to make it hard for smaller groupings to win seats, a group that enjoys wide and growing support was unable to secure a single seat in the Majlis.

Moreover, the Mojahedin has even come under outright persecution at the hands of the Khomeini regime. In August 1979, it found itself under attack from armed mobs and, like the Tudeh and Feda'iyin, under a ban on further political activity. In April 1980, in the attacks on the universities, a number of supporters of the Mojahedin were killed, and many of its sympathizers were purged from the faculties. And in June 1980, the Mojahedin was again attacked, with many casualties. This last onslaught prompted one seasoned observer to forecast a civil war in Iran.[76] Since then Khomeini has concentrated on depicting the Mojahedin as "anti-Islamic."

The systematic exclusion and persecution of a group, like the Mojahedin, that has accepted the democratic process will tend to alienate it and push it toward a more militant course. In the face of suppression, the Tudeh has sought security by embracing Khomeini, and the Feda'iyin has gone underground. But the most important political grouping of the Left has done neither. Rather, it has suffered vilification and attacks on its supporters without a major response. It would be surprising if the Mojahedin continued to do so indefinitely. Thus, with the Khomeini regime's failure to accept coexistence with the Mojahedin and other groups with differing outlooks, its attempt to impose unity on a heterogeneous population appears likely to be self-defeating.

Relationships Among the Left

To date, there has been no evidence of systematic or sustained cooperation among the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin, in which individual differences have been submerged for a broader common interest. Before the revolution, the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin pursued similar tactics, their actions were mutually reinforcing, and they were at one in their perception of the need to replace the Shah's regime. And the assistance they received came from the same external powers. But there was little formal cooperation among them except in the last year before the revolution. During that time, the two groups did clearly join forces, demonstrating an ability to bury doctrinal differences in the service of a larger interest. The Tudeh had numerous "image" problems in relation to the other two groups—because of its opportunism, its association with the USSR, and particularly its belated support for the revolution (by its own admission, only five party members died in the revolutionary struggle before January 1979[77])—but it did at least seek cooperation in a "united front" against the Shah.

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[74] See *Le Monde*, Mar. 29, 1980. Rajavi was barred by a simple declaration from Khomeini, the Faqih (Supreme Arbiter).

[75] See, for example, *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 13, 1980.

[76] See Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, June 14, 1980.

[77] Some 60–70 were arrested. See Fred Halliday interview with Kianuri, in *MERIP Reports*, No. 86, March/April 1980, p. 20.

Since the revolution, each of the three groups has adopted a different approach to the clerical regime. The Tudeh has sought security through proximity, the Feda'iyin has reverted to armed opposition, and the Mojahedin, reflecting its own doctrinal mixture, has been ambivalent. Each approach, moreover, has reflected differing vulnerabilities and strengths. The Tudeh, for example, has been acutely aware of its own weakness and of its need for time to organize and increase its membership. Its attitude toward the other groups has generally been contradictory. Less romantic about the priority of armed struggle, the Tudeh has reacted with a mixture of tolerance and contempt for the "ultra-Left's" ignorance and tendency toward "infantile leftism" (i.e., trying to outdo the Communists with popular appeals for radical measures). At the same time, it has been consistent in its call (as have Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Iran) for a "united front of progressive forces," in which it has explicitly included the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin.[78]

But while this picture may be accurate for the past, it may not afford a good guide to the future. To begin with, the different leftist groups have much in common. Each is exposed to the possibility of suppression by the intolerant and zealous theocratic regime in Tehran. Each has a shared interest in preventing the total consolidation of power in the hands of the clergy or the "monopolization" of the revolution by any group opposed to the Left. The repression of all three groups in August 1979 made this common interest all too clear. In mid-1980, the Left, including the Tudeh, is again under siege.

Moreover, apart from its principal immediate interest in guarding against suppression, the Left has been substantially united on other issues. In a more far-reaching sense, it has sought to assure the success of the revolution and the eradication of counterrevolutionary forces—objectives in which the major leftist parties have made common cause with one another and with the Islamic Right. Despite their differences, key elements of the Left are substantially agreed on the following:

(1) A complete transformation of society and a total revolution are needed. The three major groups agree that what has occurred to date has been a "first step" and partial, that "reformers" and "liberal democrats" have no place in Iranian politics and must give way to revolutionaries.

(2) Iran must achieve a classless society, render assistance to the "oppressed," institute workers' autonomy, and give the state control of foreign trade.

(3) Iran's revolution is inseparable from the general revolutionary struggle (anti-Zionist, anticapitalist), and the primary threat to the revolution comes from the West.

(4) Iran's armed forces must be dismantled and replaced by a loyal people's army or militia.

(5) The central government should be generally more tolerant of autonomy schemes for the national minorities.

With the emergence of these overlapping, but by no means identical, interests since the revolution, it is not surprising to see a gap developing between party rhetoric and reality. The leftist groups' distaste for one another has softened, and programmatic divergences are less prominent than might be expected from a simple perusal of party manifestos.

As a practical matter, tacit cooperation exists among the three major groups. The Feda'iyin is prepared to work informally with the Mojahedin, regarding it as a "useful staging post from religious to secular socialism."[79] The Mojahedin is prepared to bury its distaste for the atheism of the Feda'iyin where common interests are concerned—for example, in the achievement of workers' rights or in the "permanent struggle against imperialism." Thus, the Feda'iyin party workers active in Kurdistan have been joined by the Paykar (Mojahedin) group. In their foreign policy stances, too, the Mojahedin and Feda'iyin are not far apart.

On certain issues, all three major groups have achieved de facto cooperation. For example, they have besieged the Khomeini government with a constant stream of demands for a "representative" army. On this issue alone, the Left has exerted so much pressure that the regime has grown increasingly defensive about the army's loyalty and the army's support for the Islamic Republic. To be sure, the issue has been one of power, not ideology. Any disbanding of the armed forces in the aftermath of the revolution would have given disproportionate importance to the well-organized and armed guerrilla organizations—a fact readily appreciated by the Khomeini regime.[80] Indeed, it may not have been coincidental that the first Chief of Staff appointed after the revolution, General Valiolah Garani, was promptly assassinated, allegedly by the "Forqan" right-wing anticlerical faction, when he indicated that Iran would need Western military advisers and spare parts for arms.[81]

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[78] See, for example, Mikhail Krutikhin, "Before the Parliamentary Election," *New Times* (Moscow), February 1980, p. 10.

[79] *The Economist*, Feb. 3, 1979.

[80] Note, for example, Bazargan's comments about the aim of Marxists "who resided in Eastern Europe, Syria and Southern Lebanon" (the Tudeh, Feda'iyin, and Mojahedin) and who wish to disarm the government. See *FBIS-MEA*, Annex, Apr. 13, 1979.

In the elections to the Majlis, too, informal cooperation was evident. For instance, all three major parties supported Masud Rajavi's candidacy for the Majlis. The Tudeh leader Kianuri even attempted to form a joint electoral front (the Tudeh and Feda'iyin did not field their own candidates but supported suitable independents). Although the attempt did not succeed, the fact that it had been made was itself significant.

Will the Iranian Left continue this informal cooperation? The prospects seem fairly good. Such cooperation could take many forms. The Tudeh has apparently overcome its fear of being outflanked on the left and has established contact with the popular and progressive leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Abdel Rahman Qassemlou, whom it suspected of "deviationism." Similarly, the Feda'iyin's distrust of the Tudeh has been diminished by its distaste for the clerical forces in power. In the future, the progressive Muslims of the Mojahedin may well show a greater willingness to compromise with the Marxist Feda'iyin.

But until a number of such steps of an informal nature are taken, *formal* cooperation among the Left is likely to be minimal. Is the Left therefore doomed to failure, even though the different leftist groups have almost identical priorities and goals? Do the leftist groups' appeals to the same constituencies (the universities, the non-Persian minorities) and their internecine competition (even in the face of a regime each finds distasteful) condemn the Left to impotence, as some observers have argued?[82]

Abdel Rahman Qassemlou (center), leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, pictured in December 1979 with two Pishqam bodyguards.

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

Perhaps. But in the fluid state of politics in Iran, it is useful to keep in mind that something less than formal cooperation may have considerable effect. Each group in its own way, with its own tactical emphasis, and with its own quest for support within Iranian society, has found it expedient to pursue the common goal of a total revolution. Each group has also demanded the appointment of representative revolutionaries to power. The mass appeal of the Left's demands is undeniable. Such demands thus constitute a source of pressure that Khomeini can ignore only at his peril.

To counter these pressures and to maintain his own revolutionary credentials within a society dominated numerically by the young, Khomeini has stolen the Left's clothes, quickly incorporating the Left's demands into the language of the Islamic revolution.[83] The pressure from the Left has thus been the motive force behind the "leftward drift" of the Iranian revolution. This pressure, and the corresponding pressure from the Right, are responsible for the squeezing of the already weakened moderate Center.

It seems doubtful that Khomeini's concessions have defused the pressure from the Left and weakened the Left's role as a mutually reinforcing interest group. More likely, Khomeini has been reminded that while each leftist group is vulnerable by itself, the Left as a bloc united in advocacy of a similar program must be either appeased or extirpated. Appropriation of the Left's program is one answer. It is an answer, however, that testifies not to the weakness but to the strength of the Left.

Left and Right

In addition, one cannot adequately assess the potential role of the Left without understanding the complexities of its relationship with the Right. These have been manifest in the attitudes of Khomeini himself toward the Left.

Khomeini's view of the Left. Khomeini's public declarations about the "Left" have been as inconsistent as his policies toward the Left have been. In mid-1978, Khomeini forbade his supporters to cooperate with the Marxist Left, even in a united front to topple the Shah. He argued that the Left stood for dictatorship, but he promised freedom for the Left to organize

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[81] *The New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1980.

[82] See Eric Rouleau in *Le Monde*, June 16, 1979.

[83] See *The Economist*, Feb. 23, 1980, for a brilliant discussion of postrevolutionary Iran. The author, not identified, was Shaul Bakhash.

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini greets crowd from the rooftop of his home in Qom.

—Photoreporters.

and expressed confidence in the ability of Islam to withstand the assaults of the Left.[84] In February 1979, Khomeini qualified his pledge so as to exclude those groups that took orders from "foreign powers" (i.e., beyond the frontiers of Islam).[85]

Since the revolution, Khomeini has varied his tactics, alternating between threats and exhortations. During the first months after the revolution, he observed that "if Iranians open their eyes to the ways of the Prophet, they would forget Marx and Lenin." At the same time, however, he declared that he was the only force restraining Iran's vast Islamic majority from attacking the leftists.[86] In his admonitions to workers to end their strikes and slowdowns, he also denounced the leftist groups as dictators responsible for misleading the workers.

By August 1979, when it had become apparent that the Left as a whole had not been cowed, Khomeini banned all political activity by the Left (including the right of publication). He equated the Left with another enemy of the revolution, the United States: "Let no one expect that the corrupt and the American or non-American Left will be able to reappear in this country."[87] (Whether this obfuscation was but a tactic or reflected genuine confusion in the mind of Khomeini, it has been repeated by others since then, notably by Khomeini's putative successor, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri.[88]) At the same time, Khomeini tried to keep the Left off balance. He took an extreme anti-American stance, and he gave his support to revolutionary change—for instance, he rebuked the Revolutionary Guards in August 1979 for being insufficiently revolutionary.[89]

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[84] See *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1979.

[85] See *Financial Times*, Feb. 13, 1979; and *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 13, 1979.

[86] *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1979.

[87] *The Guardian*, Aug. 17, 1979.

[88] Montazeri stated: "The groups formed in the Shah's time, calling themselves supporters of the so-called masses, have been created and formed for American purposes. Most of these groups are tied to Washington and Moscow." See *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 23, 1980.

Since August 1979, Khomeini has sought to avoid a direct confrontation with all the forces of the Left simultaneously. He has been more tolerant of the less militant Tudeh than he has been of the Feda'iyin, and he has even allowed the Tudeh a role as a controlled safety valve.

All the same, Khomeini has not encouraged the Left to participate in the political process. In the elections to the Majlis, Khomeini pointedly called for support of those "who are faithful to Islam and the Constitution, and are free of tendencies toward the left or right."[90] The Mojahedin were labeled "atheist Marxists," Masud Rajavi was called an agent of SAVAK, and intimidation and armed assaults were typical risks for leftist sympathizers. In case of doubt, Khomeini suggested, the people (65 percent of whom are illiterate) should consult their local mullah for advice. Moreover, the elections were run on an "absolute majority" basis, which required those with less than 50 percent of the vote to run in a second round and eliminated those with less than 40 percent of the vote. The Mojahedin and Feda'iyin saw this electoral provision as an attempt to exclude them.

Khomeini's inconsistencies toward the Left reflect a number of conflicting considerations. First, there is a fundamental distaste for the Left. Khomeini has reserved his strongest criticism for the Left, which he sees as a threat to Islam and the clergy and as an impure "Westernism" imported into the country. Another consideration—the Left's powerful, if diffuse, radical appeal—has encouraged Khomeini to cover his left flank. Yet another, the strength that the Left would possess were it to become unified, kept Khomeini from mounting a direct confrontation with the Left between August 1979 and June 1980.

In a larger sense, however, these inconsistencies mirror the nature of the political situation in Iran. It is a fact, for example, that some of Khomeini's entourage entertain notions that might be labeled Marxist if they were not already labeled Islamic. That is, many of the traditional distinctions between Right and Left, secular and clerical, progressive and reactionary, are one-dimensional oversimplifications in the Iranian context. Moreover, there is genuine confusion about political orientations, and political labels are as often used to besmirch an opponent as to describe his objectives.

The ambiguities of the Iranian political context as a whole must thus be taken into account in examining the position of the Left in contemporary Iranian politics. Part of the reason for these ambiguities, for the religious Right's relative tolerance of the Left, lies in the existence of a progressive strain of Islam within Iran.

Traditional and progressive Islam. Progressive Islam in Iran took shape in the 1940's and 1950's, growing out of the work of many of the figures who inspire today's blend of religion and radicalism. For example, 'Ali Shari'ati, the intellectual patron of the Mojahedin, contributed greatly to the revolutionary appeal of Islam that so animated the early opposition to the Shah in the 1960's. Secular intellectuals took part in this opposition out of a desire to provide a progressive interpretation of the Koran and thereby to radicalize the opposition movement of Islam. Yet, the vision of a radicalized Islam—*without* clerical domination—was by no means universal. The Muslim clergy within Iran largely held to a strict religious interpretation of the Koran and the Prophet. (The division between the traditionalist clergy and the radical opposition should not be overstressed. Within the younger clergy are many radicals closer to Shari'ati and radical Islam than to either the fundamentalism of Khomeini or the traditionalism of Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari).

This division has persisted throughout the past decade and is no nearer to being bridged today. Despite the important contribution of the Mojahedin to the revolution, especially in its initial and closing stages, the Mojahedin brand of Islamic modernism is now looked upon with great disapproval by the turbaned Hojjat al-Islam ("Proofs of Islam"). For Khomeini's "notion of the sovereignty of the religious jurists is almost diametrically opposed to Shari'ati's notion of a clergyless and egalitarian social order to be born of Islamic reformation."[91]

Despite the differences between the two, the Mojahedin's progressive Muslim wing has not sought a total break with Khomeini. One reason is that, as Sharif Arani convincingly argues, the objectives of the two overlap—for example, in the "charitable patriarchal measures" taken by the mullahs to improve the lot of the poor. Taking Maxime Rodinson's view of the Islamic radical outlook as a mixture of political radicalism and social archaism, Arani maintains that young radicals tend to overlook the Islamic regime's political shortcomings and that "their moral indignation at the sinful modern world is satisfied by atavistic forms of punishment administered by Mullahs," i.e., by the regime's social archaism.[92] As a result, Arani contends, many Islamic radicals are oblivious to Khomeini's long-standing championship of Shi'ite traditionalism and his vehement attacks on Shari'at Sangelaji (the precursor of 'Ali Shari'ati in Islamic modernism) in the 1940's; they have (so far) indiscriminately equated "Shariati's vision of a reformed Islamic order and the rigidly traditionalist world view of the Shi'ite clergy."[93]

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[89] *Financial Times*, Aug. 22, 1979.

[90] *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 13, 1980. There was even some doubt whether, in view of the Left's opposition to the Constitution, those leftists who won seats would be accepted by the majority.

[91] Arani, loc. cit., p. 21. In this section, I lean heavily on Arani's superb analysis.

Another reason for the absence of a complete break so far is that the ruling group is by no means monolithic. Some of Khomeini's secular advisers have been abroad, have been influenced by Shari'ati's writings, and are sympathetic to the Mojahedin, if indeed they are not "closet Mojahedin" themselves. Yazdi and Bani-Sadr are two notable examples. In March 1980, as mentioned earlier, Bani-Sadr declared that he might be prepared to work with the Mojahedin. Nor is the clergy itself by any means of one mind. Before his death, Ayatollah Taleqani served as a link between the Left and the clerics. In a discussion with the Cuban envoy to Iran in mid-1979, he observed that while he could not accept the Marxists' notion of the "originality of matter" (i.e., atheism), "in the negation of exploitation and colonialism and defence of freedom we have common beliefs with Marxists."[94] Ayatollahs Zanjani and Khoe'ni are also known to be sympathetic to the Left. (Although not part of the ruling group, Shari'at-Madari, a centrist opposed to a theocratic political order, would be at least an important tactical ally.) The clergy even has "some contact" with the Tudeh.[95]

Here, at what seem to be the extremes of the political spectrum, there is still room for at least limited agreement. How is one to explain this accommodation between the religious Right and the secular Marxist Left?

Islam and Marxism. The compatability between Islam and Marxism is a subject that requires far more space than is available here, but a brief discussion, even at the risk of oversimplification, is essential for an understanding of the relationship between the Left and the religious Right in Iran. To grasp why a Marxist wing and a progressive-Muslim wing can coexist within the Mojahedin or why a modus vivendi exists between the Tudeh and the Islamic Republic Party, one must recognize the similarity between Marxism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. As Elie Kedourie has trenchantly observed, the two are united in their antipathies and sympathies.[96] Both are anti-Western. Both equate imperialism with capitalism and the latter with exploitation, corruption, and moral decay. Both are opposed to constitutional government, and both exalt the interests of the collectivity above those of the individual. Both have a predilection for egalitarianism: "believers are brethren, and brethren are equal."

In Islamic radicalism, this predilection has economic connotations. Bani-Sadr, for example, argues that "the Islamic notion of property means exclusively man's continuous right to his own labour, and this in turn means a classless society." The objective of the Koran, he holds, is to "abolish man's domination over man and build a unitary society."[97] This "unitary economics" (Eqtesad-e Towhidi) is popular not just with the Khomeinists but also with the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin. In substance, much of the government's economic program—the extension of state control, nationalization, and ensuring the worker's right to the fruits of his own labor—is virtually identical to what the Feda'iyin and Mojahedin called for in their programs of February 1979.[98]

Similarly, in the Third World rhetoric of opposition to the West and to "dependency," it is difficult to disentangle the Islamic and Marxist elements of support for the Palestinians and the "disinherited masses." Above all, as Kedourie observes, the Islamic doctrines preached by Khomeini, despite his periodic anti-Communist slogans, are essentially anti-Western. Although they embody a "backward looking vision of a society in which Koranic prescriptions would be supreme," they merge with "the most powerful current of revolutionary doctrine in the world today, that of Marxism."[99]

Khomeini and his advisers also encourage opposition to capitalism and imperialism, seek a classless society in which wealth is redistributed, advocate state nationalization of industries, and pursue a foreign policy of militant nonalignment. Thus, the rhetoric of Islamic militancy now "incites factory workers against their capitalist masters."[100] The government supports even the idea of "land to the peasants" and has "acquiesced in the takeover of housing by students and revolutionary committees."[101] And with regard to the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards have now had their role enshrined in the Constitution and are undergoing development as a counter to the regular army. It is scarcely surprising that the Tudeh, the Feda'iyin, and the Mojahedin find little to criticize in much of the Khomeini regime's actions.

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[92] Note Eric Rouleau's similar descriptions of Khomeini's regime as one of "archaic populism." *Le Monde*, Aug. 17, 1979.

[93] Arani, loc. cit., p. 22.

[94] Transcript in "Facts on Iran," mimeographed, Aug. 17, 1979.

[95] See Kianuri's interview, *Le Monde*, Apr. 18, 1980.

[96] I am indebted to his *Islamic Revolution*, Salisbury Papers, No. 6, London, The Salisbury Group. For a summary, see *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 14, 1979. See also Elie Kedourie, "Khomeini's Political Heresy," *Policy Review* (Washington, DC), Spring 1980, pp. 133–46.

[97] Kedourie, *Islamic Revolution*, p. 4.

[98] *The Economist*, Feb. 23, 1980, p. 32.

[99] Kedourie, *Islamic Revolution*, p. 4.

In sum, the similarity between the extreme Right and the extreme Left at times makes them virtually indistinguishable. It is precisely this interdependence between radical Right and Left that accounts for the erosion of the Center and the "leftward drift" of the Iranian revolution in the name of Islam. As a total transformation of society is achieved and as the traditional mediating institutions of Iranian society are destroyed, so will end the moderation that has characterized the "plasticity of informal politics" to date. With no discernible replacements yet in sight, it is too early to appreciate the ultimate consequences. It is possible to note, however, that if the process continues, the Left could well be in a position to vie for power. For the seizure of power becomes immeasurably easier as the political system is reduced to an empty shell.

The Left and Achievement of Power

There are numerous indicators of dissent and discontent within Iran today that under appropriate circumstances could build up to threaten the present regime. Under those circumstances, the Left would be poised to benefit—not as an interest group "radicalizing the revolution" and as a force requiring appeasement or imitation, but as a genuine contender for power.

The squeezing of the Center leaves no visible alternative. By the denial of political rights to their opponents, the clerics have hastened the radicalization of the Center (as liberal democrats and progressive Muslims defect to the ranks of the secular Left) and hence the strengthening of the Left. New evidence of clerical incompetence will only accelerate this trend and increase the Left's constituency among the young, the ethnic minorities, the workers, and the intellectuals. As the only source of opposition within Iran, the Left can only benefit from the country's current malaise.

Iranian President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr at a January 1980 press conference; at the left rear is Abu Sharif, Commander in Chief of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards).

—Abbas/Gamma-Liaison.

Furthermore, the demagoguery characteristic of Iran today will raise expectations that would be difficult for even a competent government to fulfill. Foreign diversion, parades, and exultation in purity and martyrdom will not suffice to meet the workaday needs of the populace. The crowds currently supporting the Imam have been politically mobilized. They are devoted, but they are suggestible, volatile, and (ultimately) fickle.

Khomeini's stature and his sensitivity as a charismatic leader to the reciprocal interdependence between leader and led has not yet yielded a false step. But under what conditions could the mass passion in Iran be harnessed by the Left?

As in many similar political orders, the most readily identifiable scenario is a succession crisis. Khomeini has been the cement of the revolution, but his strength has been one of personality, not dogma. It is dubious that his legitimacy will be transferable or that allegiance will automatically be extended to his successor. If Khomeini's charisma is not institutionalized (or routinized), the clerical divisions and schisms that fragment the Right would be reflected in the nation at large, and the clerical regime would lose ground to other forces.

An alternative (or complementary) scenario is the slow and steady discrediting of the clergy as a result of incapacity to produce the fruits of the revolution. The clergy may be attractive as an opposition group. But will it be equally attractive as the establishment? Starkly put—will fundamentalist Islamic credentials make corruption, arbitrariness, and ineptitude any more tolerable in the future than they have been in the past? It seems doubtful. A coalition built around opposition to a theocracy could well emerge in a society that still seeks an Islamic component in its revolution.

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[100] *The Economist*, Feb. 23, 1980, p. 32.

[101] Ibid.

A third scenario would envisage a major setback administered to the regime by a domestic or foreign foe. Already, in mid-1980, the regime is beset by problems, the nationwide consensus (though still large) has eroded, and an air of passive apathy reigns in much of the country. A major defeat at the hands of, say, the Kurds, combined with economic problems, social discontent, and restiveness among the minorities (particularly in the Turkmen/Baluchi regions), could unravel the threads that bind together the diverse elements behind Khomeini (so the scenario goes). Another variant of this scenario would be decisive military action by an outside power, such as Iraq, that inflicted heavy casualties on the Revolutionary Guards and damaged the economic infrastructure, thus dispelling the mystique of "success" that continues to surround the regime.

A final scenario takes the current situation in Iran and projects it ahead a few years to assess the political consequences. It looks to a slow collapse of the regime from its own weakness rather than from a direct challenge. It sees accelerated disaffection resulting from economic malaise and arbitrariness toward the national minorities and political opponents. It also sees increasing governmental deterioration and decreasing governmental capacity to influence developments outside a few major cities, as well as international isolation and posturing for effect overseas. For all practical purposes, a national government would no longer exist, and the country would revert to a condition of fragmentation, with autonomous rule in the provinces and multiple centers of power. The capital would contain a populace nursing heightened expectations in a revolutionary condition.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The last (a slow-motion collapse) merely describes the current situation. The third, at least in part, describes the present conflict with the Kurds and Iraq. Elements of other scenarios are even now with us. A power struggle is already under way over the question of succession to Khomeini. The IRP control of the Majlis appears to augur a fully theocratic regime—which some clerics (notably Ayatollahs Shari'at-Madari and Qomi) by no means support.

The Left stands only to benefit from the failures of the present regime. It has a more tolerant policy toward the minorities and a better idea of the economic program it would seek to implement. If the government falters, therefore, it will be there to pick up the pieces.

Within the Left, the Mojahedin is the most likely contender for power. It combines the right ingredients —revolutionary credentials and the acceptable face of Islam. If respect for the clerical side of the revolution wanes, respect for the untried and uncontaminated Mojahedin will surely rise. And the Mojahedin may emerge as the grouping most likely to bring stability and order to Iran.

Even though the Mojahedin lacks the stigma of association with either the USSR (the Tudeh) or pure Marxism (the Feda'iyin), however, it may be handicapped in a different way. If it were to erect a Marxist regime with Islamic overtones (or an Islamic regime with Marxist overtones), it would be a source of considerable concern to the USSR. Indeed, to Moscow, a strong, independent quasi-Marxist regime would be the least attractive outcome of the Iranian revolution. Allied to Islam, it would be a model that would attract attention in the Soviet empire and beyond.

The Left in Turkey

By George S. Harris

By persistent involvement in political strife, the Left has helped to make violence an established feature of political life in Turkey. Politically motivated assassinations and clashes between leftist and rightist groups currently account for some eight deaths a day on average. But the significance of the Turkish Left goes well beyond its contribution to violence. Although the parties of the Left in Turkey are so tiny that they lack even the remotest chance of coming to power in elections, leftist ideologies have held special fascination for a significant proportion of the country's opinion makers. Journalists and professors, as well as artists and literary figures, have espoused leftist causes. Their ideas have had an important impact on the thinking of the Turkish elite as a whole. Moreover, some of the positions they defended have over time become, at least in attenuated form, accepted wisdom for the masses as well.

In understanding the Left, it is necessary in the first place to inspect its origins and recent history to account for both its insignificance as an organized movement within Turkish party politics and its appeal to intellectuals. This account also will provide background for understanding the deepening involvement of the Left in terrorism, despite the best efforts of the government to extirpate this dangerous current. On this basis, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the future challenge of the Left to the political order in Turkey.

Mr. Harris has been a Professorial Lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, DC) of The Johns Hopkins University since 1968 and is currently Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia in the US Department of State. He is author of several works, including The Origins of Communism in Turkey, *1967, and* Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971, *1972, and has contributed articles on Turkey to numerous journals in the US and abroad. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Government.*

The Political Context

Multiparty politics took root in Turkey only after World War II. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's successful nationalist movement, which had squeezed out its domestic opposition by the mid-1920's, could not maintain its political monopoly after his death in 1938. With the tacit approval of Ismet Inonu (Ataturk's successor as head of the Republican People's Party), a major bourgeois opposition party—the Democrat Party—sprang up to fashion a broad vote-getting machine representing the more modern peasantry and the emerging commercial and industrial elite. Promising economic advance without the social engineering reforms dear to Ataturk's party, the Democrats swept to power in elections in 1950. Thereafter, with the exception of 1960 and 1971 when military forces intervened briefly against civilian regimes that appeared to be perverting the system or failing to protect the state, parliamentary procedure has operated relatively smoothly.

The political contest has been chiefly between the Republican People's Party on the one hand, with its tradition of state-directed reform, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the business and professional elite on the other, working through first the Democrat Party (until it was outlawed after the 1960 military intervention) and then the Justice Party. Neither of these major groups has had a strong commitment to ideology. The Ataturkist reformers of the Republican People's Party did enunciate a statist policy of economic development in the 1930's and strongly supported creation of a central planning organization at the end of the 1950's.[1] More recently, the Republican People's Party joined the Socialist International, and leaders of the party began to style it a kind of European social democratic party. Yet both the Justice Party and the Republicans are in contest for the political center in Turkey. The economic policies of both when in power have been based on a mixed economy and cooperation with Western financial organizations.

Outside of these main political organizations, which together are backed by about 80 percent of the electorate, a number of splinter parties have grown up in the favorable climate of proportional representation. A few of these have been conservative or ultranationalist factions, usually identified as "right-wing" by Turks. Others are parties called "leftist" in Turkish parlance. These latter form the primary subject of the present study.

Emergence of the Left

The Left in Turkey as it will be defined in the current investigation has a clear distinguishing feature: unlike other Turkish political formations, it does not derive in a formal sense from the Ataturkist reform movement. Instead, what will be subsumed under the rubric "Left" will be those organizations and currents of thought that grew up on the base of European Socialist



Weapons, ammunition, money, typewritten propaganda, and a banner of the Turkish National Liberation Front (THKC), confiscated by Turkey's martial-law authorities during searches of dormitories and faculty buildings of a number of high schools in early 1980.

—Camera Press.

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[1] See E. Gunçe, "Early Planning Experiences in Turkey," in Ş. Ilkin and E. Inanç, Eds., *Planning in Turkey*, Ankara, Middle East Technical University, Publication No. 9, 1967, especially p. 13.

and Communist movements as well as their later Trotskyist, Maoist, and Third World variants. These groups are the ones that see themselves and are seen as "the Left" in Turkey.[2]

Socialist thinking and practice entered the Ottoman Empire as an import from the West at the turn of the 20th century. France played the main role in this transmission. Moreover, it was minority groups—like the Jews, Bulgarians, and Greeks left in the empire—who were especially drawn into the early small-scale leftist activity. Even today, leftist currents still cater to the minorities inside Turkey (the Kurds above all), although ethnic Turks now clearly predominate in these movements.

Communist thinking made its appearance at the end of the Ottoman era after World War I. The Communists, linked to both the French and Soviet parties, visibly influenced the outlook of Ataturk's national movement. In the struggle for independence against the Ottoman Sultans and outside invaders, Ataturk himself at one time formed his own so-called "Communist party" in Turkey, in an effort to assure his domination of that brand of political activity.[3]

Greater success in incorporating leftist ideas into Turkish reformist thought came later, as a result of Ataturk's efforts to woo Communists away from the Moscow-dominated Turkish Communist Party. In the early 1930's, the Kadro movement, led by ex-Communists who had been accepted into the Republican People's Party, produced a blend of dogma that sought to bridge the gap between Ottoman state-directed reform and Soviet doctrine. But this doctrinal adaptation was never accepted by the majority of Ataturk's party, which continued to hew to an essentially pragmatic approach.

Ataturk maintained control of the political scene through a one-party regime during his lifetime. In 1925, he closed down the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party, which had provided a facade for the activity of the Turkish Communists. Yet the tiny Moscow-oriented Communist Party continued to operate illegally after its chief leaders fled abroad. It worked underground to make recruits within the intellectual community on the one hand, and within the working class on the other. While communism never attracted a significant mass following, it did succeed in winning the allegiance of Turkey's leading poet, Nazim Hikmet, as a champion of leftist ideas. His influence was important in preparing the way for the acceptance of the Left by students in a later era.

Leftists failed utterly in their bid to organize legitimate parties when the political dominance of the Republican People's Party was relaxed after World War II. Soviet pressure on Turkey in 1945 promoted a rigid national unity which rejected anything smacking of communism. Thus, various leftist parties (which surfaced as revivals of the earlier movement during the move toward multiparty democracy in Turkey after 1945) were summarily closed down without any protests from elsewhere in the body politic. The Communist movement continued mainly as an émigré party based in Eastern Europe, attending world Communist gatherings, publishing party pronouncements in *Yeni Çag* (New Age)—the Turkish-language edition of the Prague-based *World Marxist Review*—and broadcasting over the clandestine Bizim Radyo (Our Radio) from East Germany. For the next decade and a half, the Turkish elite appeared to consider socialism as well as communism tantamount to treason.

The Decade of the 1960's

In 1960, military officers took power in Turkey with the aim of correcting the errors they perceived in the Democrat Party administration of Adnan Menderes. Among the major accusations leveled at the Democrats was the charge of having neglected the obligation of promoting social justice. As a result, one of the prime concerns of the soldiers was to establish institutions to assure the more equitable division of national wealth. The slant of the new constitution (approved by referendum on July 9, 1961) expressed this intent. Its preamble spoke of "social justice," and Article 1 proclaimed the new Republic to be a "social state." The import of these statements was clarified by President Cemal Gursel, who explained that these words meant that Turkey was "open to socialism."[4]

This radical shift in view regarding the Left was an indication that beneath the surface in the 1950's distinctions between communism and socialism had been sharpening. By this time, Socialist approaches had earned respectability in Europe. Moreover, with the waning of the cold war and the start of peaceful coexistence, the foreign danger had palpably lessened in the eyes of many Turks. Thus, the stage was set for the rapid emergence of a Socialist movement.

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[2] Although the beliefs of the left wing of the Republican People's Party may shade into Marxist teachings, the Republicans will not be included in "the Left" for purposes of the present study.

[3] The party was known as the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party. For more detailed treatment of this period, see George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, Stanford, CA, The Hoover Institution, 1967, pp. 80–85.

[4] Ismet Giritli, "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution," *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Winter 1962, pp. 7, 11–12.

During the 1960's, this movement centered on the Turkish Labor Party, founded by a small group of second-echelon union leaders in March 1961. Inexperienced in the ways of politics, they offered the party presidency in February 1962 to Mehmet Ali Aybar, a prominent Istanbul lawyer with a long history of anti-imperialist crusading.

The decision to go outside of union circles for a leader reflected the fact that by this time the educated elite had begun to take up social reform with vigor. A group of intellectuals had at the end of 1961 founded a periodical, *Yon* (Direction), that for the next six years would point the way for an impressive body of Turkish political thought exploring leftist ideological currents. *Yon* grouped the left wing of the Republican People's Party with social reformers of far more extreme views, who eventually dominated its pages. From an initial concentration on Turkey's domestic problems, the journal gradually shifted its emphasis to calls on Turkey to abandon its close bilateral ties with the United States and to adopt a neutralist stance.

Aybar's arrival changed the nature of the Labor Party. Even in theory, it ceased to be exclusively a working-class organization; its statutes now called it "the party of the people" as well as "the party of the workers."[5] Moreover, the Turkish Labor Party was not yet avowedly Marxist (it became so only after 1968). It rejected revolution as a way to power and specifically proclaimed its willingness to work gradually to win popular support. To punctuate these points, it accepted as members Kurdish tribal figures from eastern Turkey and wealthy landowners, alongside manual workers.

The Labor Party hit its stride only after the Cyprus crisis broke out in December 1963. Although Aybar did not at first exploit anti-American and anti-NATO themes (as late as May 1964, he said "for us there exists no problem called the Cyprus problem"[6]), by the summer of 1964 he was strongly attacking the Ankara government for relying on the United States. This foreign policy line provided the party with its first significant entrée into university circles. In fact, anti-imperialism was the most popular issue the party ever found to generate support. By harping on these themes, it was finally able to build a sufficient organization to qualify to run in the 1965 general elections.

Mehmet Ali Aybar at a rally of the Turkish Labor Party, which he headed from 1962 to 1969.

—From the back cover of Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bagimsizlik, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm* (Independence, Democracy, Socialism), Istanbul, Gerçek Yayinevi, 1968.

The effort of the Labor Party to exploit these issues played a role in impelling the Republican People's Party to adopt a left-of-center stance for the 1965 elections. While the Republicans were generally silent on Aybar's proposal for a united front, they echoed many of the notes his party sounded in the campaign.

In the election, the Republican People's Party experienced a sharp decline in votes as some of its more conservative constituents stayed away from the polls. The Turkish Labor Party, on the other hand, turned in an impressive performance for a minor party. It won nearly 3 percent of the ballots and managed to elect 15 members to the 450-man National Assembly.

Most of the Labor Party's urban vote came from upper-class districts; elsewhere, it traded on traditional political alignments with Kurdish tribal leaders rather than on the appeal of its socialist doctrine. The shantytown quarters of the major cities and the peasantry in general gave few votes to the party.

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[5] See Dr. Muzaffer Sencer, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler'in Sosyal Temelleri* (The Social Foundations of Political Parties in Turkey), Istanbul, May Yayinlari, 1974, pp. 315–31; and an unsigned article, "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," *Ilke* (Istanbul), October 1974, p. 86.

[6] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), May 11, 1964. The next day, the Turkish National Students Federation protested Aybar's words. Thereupon the Labor Party issued a "clarification" that the Turkish people's "fundamental rights should be safeguarded" on Cyprus. Ibid., May 12 and 13, 1964.

Behice Boran, leader of the Turkish Labor Party.

—Wide World.

Lack of worker support testified to the Labor Party's difficulties in organizing union backing. The principal labor confederation, Turk-Iş, had seen the obvious advantage of keeping on good terms with the governing Republican People's Party and had been wary of violating the law against outright political affiliation. Turk-Iş thus displayed no interest in the fortunes of the Turkish Labor Party. It was only in 1967, when in protest against this moderate stand several small constituent unions broke off from Turk-Iş to form the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK), that Aybar's party gained active union support. However, DISK's membership was still relatively small and could not effectively deliver the labor vote.

Ironically, the Labor Party's promising beginning in the 1965 elections raised problems for the unity of the Left. The division of the spoils under the proportional representation system of the day (which left decisions on the allocation of 13 of the 15 seats won to the party leadership) set the workers in the party against the intellectuals, who, thanks to Aybar's prestige, ended up with the major share of seats. The party's brightened prospects also inspired former convicted Communists to try to take over the organization. Aybar turned back their challenge and a number were purged for damaging party unity.[7]

Those expelled fought back. In November 1967, the followers of Mihri Belli, who himself had been excluded from the Labor Party because of his Communist past, set up the publication *Turk Solu* (Turkish Left) as an organ outside of the party, in opposition to Aybar. It called for a union of revolutionary forces and argued that a "national democratic revolution" was needed as a first step toward socialism. Belli's belief in the desirability of rendering the government helpless through popular anarchy appeared to conflict with the Labor Party's commitment to parliamentary procedures and formed an ideological underpinning for the leftist violence to follow. Indeed, this public dispute was a harbinger of the splits that were to characterize the Left in the 1970's.[8]

The underlying disunity of the Left in Turkey was revealed more starkly by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Aybar wasted no time in condemning Moscow. He took the position that Turkey should follow its own brand of socialism, a "human-faced socialism" that depended not only on Marx but on all socialist thinkers from Proudhon onward. This frontal assault on Soviet imperialism came as a rude shock to many in the Turkish Labor Party, who had preached improving relations with Moscow. While a majority supported Aybar, his rivals scented the chance to attack his leadership. Professor Behice Boran, who was soon to supplant Aybar as party president, and her supporters branded his new formulations as "unscientific."[9]

Aybar was able to remain party leader until the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1969, when the Labor Party scored poorly, losing 13 of its 15 seats. Although the decline in seats was due more to the changes in the election law than to the dropoff in party votes (from 3 percent of the ballots to 2.7 percent), Aybar was held responsible. He resigned in October 1969. Two temporary successors occupied the presidency until Boran was elected at the party's National Congress in November 1970.

With the departure of Aybar, the Turkish Labor Party began to slide toward extremism. Although the last supporters of Belli's anarchist line quit when they

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[7] "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., p. 93.

[8] See the unsigned article, "The Need for a Union of Forces," *Turk Solu* (Ankara), Nov. 17, 1967, p. 1; and Mihri Belli, "Turkey's Revolution Strategy," in ibid., Jan. 16, 1968, pp. 4–5.

[9] *Akşam* (Istanbul), Aug. 23, 1968; also, "Forward for the Working Class Party," *Ant* (Istanbul), November 1970, pp. 21–22; Aclan Sayilgan, *Turkiye'de Sol Hareketler* (Leftist Movements in Turkey), Istanbul, Hareket Yayinlari, 1972, pp. 467–71; and Sadun Aren, "Rift in the TLP," *Tum* (Ankara), Dec. 11, 1968, p. 9.

Left-wing students rushing to attack the Turkish-American trade bank and the Pan American Airways offices in Ankara on April 20, 1970.

—Pictorial Parade.

failed to win over the majority at the Congress, the Labor Party under Boran frankly pointed itself toward the urban proletariat and the rural minorities (specifically the Kurds). The party henceforth minimized the role of the peasant and put more emphasis on the need for revolutionary change. However, it did continue to reiterate its commitment to legal paths and condemned the trend toward terrorism emerging among students in the later 1960's.

The emphasis on rights for the Kurds added to the party statutes in November 1970[10] set the stage for the court order in 1971 outlawing the party. The above-party government installed after the generals' intervention of March 1971 was particularly sensitive to threats to national unity. In that climate, the Labor Party leaders were given long prison terms for violating the Constitution and the Political Parties Law.[11]

The Turn Toward Terrorism

The Labor Party's difficulties came at a time of growing violence on the political scene. This phenomenon seemed to have its genesis among Turkish students who used the freedom afforded by university autonomy (granted in 1960) to engage in political activity. Leftist students struggled fiercely against rightists for control of both the old-line Turkish National Students Union and the newer Turkish National Students Federation. Although the leftists failed to dominate these large organizations, they did score success with the far smaller Federation of Intellectual Clubs—a grouping of student debating societies which had burgeoned in the mid-1960's under the leadership of the Turkish Labor Party. In 1969, the Federation of Intellectual Clubs was reorganized as the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev Genç) under the control of leftists far more radical than those of the Labor Party. Under this leadership, Dev Genç ceased to anticipate an eventual electoral victory of the Left.

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[10] "Decisions of the Fourth Grand Congress of the Turkish Labor Party," *Emek* (Istanbul), December 1970, pp. 1–8.

[11] "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., p. 119.

By this time, the rivalry between rightist and leftist students had turned violent. The example of the university demonstrations of 1968 in France powerfully affected student leaders in Turkey. Physical conflict sprang up between student organizations on the campuses, at Turkish Labor Party gatherings, and at meetings of rightists called to condemn communism. The public at large felt the effects of this strife more directly when the leftists undertook a concerted campaign of off-campus protests against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in general and the United States in particular. Student extremists also turned to bank robberies, a heretofore unknown crime in Turkey, to finance political activities.

Preeminent among the groups on the Left that carried out such acts was the so-called Turkish People's Liberation Army, organized in about 1970. Drawing on the intellectual underpinnings of Carlos Marighella and Ché Guevara and on training by the Palestinians, this tiny conspiratorial group proclaimed that the country could attain genuine national independence only by armed struggle. Its most prominent leader, Deniz Gezmiş, was far more an activist than a theoretician of revolution. While he believed that revolution should start in the urban areas, he expected that it would subsequently spread to the countryside. Indeed, he himself was finally arrested on his way to the mountains near Malatya after a spree of politically-inspired terrorism that included capturing several American servicemen in an abortive effort to collect ransom. Although he and his principal lieutenants were executed in 1972 in a government effort to deter imitators, he is hailed as one of the martyrs of the revolution by the current generation of leftist youth.[12]



Deniz Gezmiş, Turkish terrorist leader, hurls an accusation at a Turkish military tribunal in 1972, in a proceeding which resulted in the death sentence for Gezmiş.

—Camera Press.

The other major student leftist terrorist figure of the early 1970's was Mahir Çayan, who headed a sister group, the Turkish People's Liberation Front, organized in October 1970. Çayan was far more intellectually inclined than Gezmiş; he for a time in mid-1970 edited the radical journal *Aydinlik* (Clarity). In his ideological experimentation, Çayan attempted to meld Maoist and Leninist formulas into a two-stage model of revolutionary tactics. In the first stage, he saw the workers taking the lead, with the peasants playing a supporting role. But for the revolution to succeed, he believed, the rural population would eventually have to be drawn into a mass popular movement, with workers taking a back seat.[13] Because of these views, some Turkish leftists labeled Çayan a Maoist. However, both he and Gezmiş actively opposed the faction which split off from *Aydinlik* in mid-1970 to found a rival journal—*Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Clarity)—which specifically celebrated the Chinese interpretation of revolution.

Çayan's intellectual and organizational vigor brought him and his confederates to a leading role in the radical movement. His small band was responsible for the May 1971 kidnap-killing of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom. Çayan was subsequently wounded and captured by security forces, but engineered an escape which appeared to have been assisted by air force officers assigned to guard him.[14] He was finally killed early in 1972 in a shoot-out after seizing three British and Canadian technicians as hostages. He, too, has taken a prominent place in the pantheon of leftist martyrs for the present student generation.

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[12] *I. THKO Davasi (Mahkeme Dosyasi)* (The First TPLA Case [Trial Record]), Istanbul, Yontem Yayinlari, 1974, passim.

[13] For Çayan's views, see *Aydinlik* (Istanbul), January 1970, pp. 188–221, and ibid., June 1970, pp. 127–58.

[14] *Milliyet*, Mar. 12, 1972, reported that 57 officers and 11 noncommissioned officers were involved in the escape.

The kidnapings of foreigners, the rash of bank robberies, and the increasingly frequent clashes between leftist and rightist students caused increasing concern among Turkey's military. Their decision in 1971 to demand more effective government was probably reinforced by the belated discovery that the university campuses, off limits to normal police procedures, had become arsenals of small arms. Moreover, when the security forces finally got permission to launch broad searches, they met with armed resistance from the leftist students. The resulting casualties among regular troops brought home to the generals just how far out of control the situation in Turkey had become.

Above-Party Government

The advent of nonparty governments in March 1971 had immediate consequences for the Left in Turkey. The more radical leftist publications, such as *Aydinlik* and its Maoist competitor, were summarily closed. Widespread arrests swept up leftist professors, journalists, and others, whether or not they were involved in the political violence. The entire leadership of the Turkish Labor Party was jailed. Using extensive search authority, the martial-law forces managed to track down the remainder of the Gezmiş and Çayan bands in bloody clashes that left few survivors among the terrorists.

These government security measures were generally successful in stopping the student violence. While extremists on the right for the most part escaped incarceration, it was clear that efforts to organize leftist students would be severely punished. Fortunately, the taste for political violence had not yet spread widely beyond university circles.

The general crackdown on leftist activities in Turkey gave impetus to the efforts of the émigré Turkish Communist Party (TCP) in Europe. Ismail Bilen, who formally took over leadership of the party from Zeki Baştimar in May 1973, substantially expanded its propaganda activity. The main target of its operations appeared to be the Turkish workers in West Germany, whose numbers had risen rapidly in the late 1960's, reaching (with family members) about 1 million by the early 1970's. TCP propaganda was spread there by

Three Turkish Gastarbeiter *in Gelsenkirchen, West Germany. Such Turks working abroad have been the target of propaganda and organizational efforts by the émigré Turkish Communist Party.*

—Katherine Young.

such clandestine bodies as the Şafak (Dawn) organization. Some of this material was also filtered into Turkey. Martial-law authorities periodically confiscated Şafak literature calling for a "people's army" of armed workers and peasants to rise and oust the government and take Turkey out of NATO.[15] Broadcasts of the so-called "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" also began in the early 1970's. The increasing agitation from Turks in Europe led Prime Minister Nihat Erim to complain in 1972 of unrelenting Communist pressure from without seeking to subvert the Turkish state.[16]

Return to Politics as Usual

Nonetheless, pressure was mounting within Turkey to release the artificial clamp put on political activity, including that of the Left. The Republican People's Party complained that the wholesale arrests of Left sympathizers had included Republicans as well. The party was eager to campaign freely in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 1973. For its part, the Justice Party pressed to be rid of restrictions to carry on its own campaign to recover after its fall from power through the military ultimatum of 1971. Under this pressure from the major parties, martial law was lifted in September 1973 to allow political competition to resume before the October elections.

However, the Left was not able to take immediate advantage of the easing of restraints. Indeed, many leftists, including the leaders of the Turkish Labor Party, were not released from jail until after the general amnesty enacted in mid-1974 by the coalition government headed by the Republican People's Party (and the Turkish Labor Party itself had to wait until 1975 to be officially revived). Some of the more radical leftists were either in self-imposed exile or had died. The 1973 elections, therefore, passed without any leftist party being eligible to participate and without much visible leftist agitation.

In this situation, those of leftist persuasion generally voted for the Republican People's Party. DISK, which despite its close ties to the Turkish Labor Party had survived the 1971–73 period intact by avoiding overt political acts, shifted its backing to the Republicans. Even the émigré Communists used Bizim Radyo broadcasts to urge their followers to vote for the Republican People's Party rather than sit out the election. And by adding the far larger quantity of votes from the Center as well, the Republicans gained sharply over their previous showing. The party was able to form a coalition government in conjunction with the small Islamic traditionalist National Salvation Party.[17]

As the specter of military intervention receded and a more tolerant atmosphere was ushered in during 1974 with the formation of the coalition regime headed by Bulent Ecevit, a procession of leftist parties emerged to vie with each other for the allegiance of the leftist constituency. This process was abetted by the severe foreign policy crisis that the use of Turkish troops on Cyprus triggered. The resulting arms embargo that Washington imposed in February 1975 threatened Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation. Continuance of this embargo in partial form until September 1978 generated a wide receptivity to the anti-Western propaganda that has been the stock-in-trade of the Left in Turkey.

First to organize was the Turkish Socialist Labor Party, established in June 1974 by a group of former second-level Turkish Labor Party members headed by Ahmet Kaçmaz. The new party strongly condemned association with the West in foreign policy and was notable for its public dissent from the general Turkish consensus in calling for an "independent" Cyprus while Turkish troops were still conducting military operations on the island. In the domestic realm, it attacked the former Turkish Labor Party for "syndicalism and populism," which it saw as responsible for the "cancer of parliamentarism" practiced by dilettantes; and it prescribed a united front of all leftist parties and individuals.[18] While the new party attracted a significant fraction of the Left, it suffered from factional disputes and was not able to extend its organization sufficiently even by 1977 to qualify to run in the general elections of that year.

In 1975, several other fragments of the Left also organized as formal parties. Mihri Belli took advantage of the opportunity to create the Workers Party, a legal organization, to advocate a "national democratic revolution." The party remained essentially a debating society rather than an effective political machine, though its nationalist approach aroused some response in university circles. The followers of another former Communist, Hikmet Kivilcimli (who had died in

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[15] Ibid., Mar. 22 and May 17, 1972.

[16] Cited in "Chronology: Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1972, p. 304.

[17] In the October 1973 elections, the Republicans won 185 seats in the 450-seat National Assembly, and the National Salvation Party won 48 seats. See David E. Long and Bernard Reich, Eds., *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 50–51.

[18] See "Critique of the Turkish Labor Party," loc. cit., pp. 119–21. *Ilke* is the organ of the Turkish Socialist Labor Party.

Yugoslavia in 1971, revived his minuscule Fatherland Party with the mission of attacking both Moscow and Beijing.[19]

The final leftist party to be founded in 1975 was the Socialist Revolution Party of Mehmet Ali Aybar. Resting on Aybar's personal prestige, this organization appealed to the more conservative elements of the Turkish Left. In addition to elaborating Socialist solutions for Turkey's domestic problems, it expressed suspicions of both Western defense arrangements for Turkey and Moscow's intentions regarding Turkey. Although he was joined by some of his longtime admirers, Aybar experienced difficulty in extending his organization outside of the major urban centers. His party was unable to qualify for the 1977 elections.

The spectacle of five legal parties (the Turkish Labor Party plus the four new groups) contesting for the tiny share of the Turkish electorate that was receptive to leftist ideas did not bode well for the future of the Turkish Left. Much of the energy of these factions was devoted to emphasizing their mutual differences, although Belli's group and the Fatherland Party did associate themselves for a time with the Turkish Socialist Labor Party in seeking a union of forces on the left. Moreover, all leftist parties had to confront the Republican People's Party, which, with its left-of-center wing firmly in control, asserted its own claims to represent the leftist constituency. And those who looked to Moscow for guidance found that through the general elections of 1977, the Kremlin appeared to regard the Republicans as the only force capable of defeating the Justice Party coalition which the émigré Communists identified as their principal enemy. Radio Moscow acknowledged the Republicans "to be linked to the Turkish leftist democratic movement," and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party called the election outcome (in which the Republicans won a plurality of 214 seats in the National Assembly) a "victory for the progressive democratic forces,"[20] despite the failure of the Turkish Labor Party to elect a single deputy.

The factionalization of the leftist political constituency was mirrored by divisions among its sympathizers in the labor movement. DISK as an organization remained committed to the Republican People's Party, although more radical elements continued to oppose this position. Indeed, the confederation's president, who championed support of the Republicans, barely won reelection in 1975. Sentiment among many of the constituent unions in DISK was strongly leftist, and this body was clearly not a reliable ally of the Republican People's Party.



Ismail Bilen, General Secretary of the Turkish Communist Party.

—*TKP MK Genel Sekreteri I. Bilen Yoldaşin Merkez Komitesi Plenumu'nda okudugu Politik Buro Raporu 1978* (Report of the Politburo by TCP CC General Secretary Comrade I. Bilen to a 1978 Central Committee Plenum), Istanbul, Uran Yayinlari, 1978, p. 3.

Another prominent labor organization that housed Marxists of all varieties was the Turkish Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association (TOB-DER). It was the successor to the Turkish Teachers Union, which had been closed by the martial-law authorities in 1971, when the Constitution was amended to prohibit government employees (including teachers) from engaging in formal union activity. The new teachers' associ-

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[19] The Fatherland Party was the sole legal leftist party to be sharply attacked by Moscow in this period. On Jan. 4, 1976, the clandestine Voice of the Turkish Communist Party branded the Fatherland Front as a "pseudo-Communist organization" seeking to sabotage the Soviet-line party. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-WEU*), Jan. 6, 1976. The Fatherland Party was lauded by Turkish Trotskyists in their "revolutionary Marxist monthly" *Ne Yapmali* (Istanbul), April 1980, pp. 12–13.

[20] Radio Moscow, June 6, 1977, in *FBIS-WEU*, June 7, 1977; and Voice of the Turkish Communist Party, June 8, 1977, in ibid., June 9, 1977.



A demonstration of tens of thousands on September 9, 1975, in Istanbul, organized by the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK) and almost all leftist political groups, protests "the repressive attitude of the government against the democratic and social rights of the workers."

—Pictorial Parade.

ation paid only lip service to the legal requirements banning union and political action. With more than 150,000 members, including village teachers in the remotest corners of Turkey, TOB-DER organized militant demonstrations protesting abuses of the rights of the working class. Its often Marxist rhetoric doubtless encouraged the tendency among leftists to slip into violence.[21]

Descent into Disorder

Statistically, it was not until 1976 that political violence became a major problem. In that year, 104 politically-related killings took place, a threefold increase over the previous year. The pace quickened during the 22 months of the Republican-led government in 1978–79, when more than 2,400 such deaths were recorded.[22] And the violence has accelerated still more in 1980 under the minority government of Suleyman Demirel.[23]

While some type of conflict between the Right and Left has been involved in most of these events, the totals conceal at least three quite different forms of violence. The smallest number of political killings have been attributable to tiny, radical leftist, clandestine plotting groups which are the successors to the People's Liberation Army movement of an earlier era. Among the most active of these organizations seem to be, on the one hand, the Armed Propaganda Unit and the Action Unit of the Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and on the other hand, the Turkish

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[21] "TOB-DER," *Pulse Supplement* (Ankara), No. 113, Dec. 19, 1975.

[22] For an analysis of the violence, see Serif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* (Paris), Vol. XIX (1979), pp. 229–54.

[23] Alfred Friendly, "Mounting Political Violence Pushes Turkey Toward Chaos," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1980, p. C1.

Workers and Peasants Liberation Army, often labeled Maoist. These largely student-led conspiratorial bodies apparently seek to upset the system and bring down the political order. They have selected high-impact targets to alarm the elite, possibly with the hope of triggering retaliation by the Right and/or intervention by the military to create a climate of disorder from which they might prosper. Before 1979, their main targets appeared to be university administrators and professors. More recently, they have turned on American servicemen and Turkish journalists (though the most sensational murder of a journalist was carried out by a right-wing extremist[24]), as well as members of the Turkish police, the military establishment, and—increasingly—Turkish national politicians.

A much larger number of the deaths resulted from clashes between members of rightist and leftist legal organizations, rather than intentional murders. Members of the TOB-DER teachers' association, the Progressive Youth Association of university students, and the reformed Dev Genç have battled against the commandos associated with the radical right-wing Turkish Nationalist Movement Party. These clashes have typically taken place on university campuses or during public demonstrations on such occasions as May Day rallies. The victims have usually been students or innocent bystanders. These killings have thus lacked the sensational character of the incidents carried out by the secret plotting groups. However, the violence has disrupted the educational process by necessitating frequent university closings and spreading a climate of fear.

By far the largest cause of violence, however, has been more sociological than political in nature—in the form of traditional feuds imported from the countryside to the city and only subsequently garbed in ideological trappings. Rapidly growing urbanization in Turkey created shantytown quarters grouped to reflect the solidarity of origin in common villages or sections of Turkey. After the mid-1970's, these urban groups tended to take on ideological identity, sometimes reinforced by identification with one or another Islamic sect—either Sunni conservative orthodoxy or Alevi (Shiite) heterodoxy. Labor or educational affiliations of leading families in these settlements may also have helped to form such Right-Left cleavages in

A family seeks shelter during the communal rioting that ripped the provincial capital of Kahramanmaraş in December 1978.

—Wide World.

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[24] Abdi Ipekçi, editor of *Milliyet*, was assassinated by Mehmet Ali Agca, a right-wing terrorist. Agca escaped from military prison in Istanbul several months later, apparently with the help of military personnel. See "Abdi Ipekçi Was Killed," *Hurriyet 1980 Ansiklopedik Yilligi* (Hurriyet's 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook). Istanbul, Hurriyet Ofset Matbaasi, 1980, pp. 137–40.

community consciousness. The resulting rivalries and feuds between family or larger solidarity groups were responsible for large-scale violence, of which the riots of December 1978 in the provincial capital Kahramanmaraş were only the most striking example. This clash between leftist Alevis and rightist Sunnis, which grew out of the shooting of two Alevi teachers, left over 100 dead and led to the imposition of martial law, which continues to this day in most of Turkey's major cities and in the volatile eastern provinces.

Some Turkish observers see yet another major factor contributing to leftist violence—attacks against security forces in the eastern provinces by radical leftist organizations seeking autonomy or independence for the Kurds. The shadowy Kawa society (named for a blacksmith who in bygone times revolted against the tyrannical regime), the so-called Apocu militants organized in 1975, and the group that published the journal *Ozgurluk Yolu* (Freedom Path) are among the main organizations periodically identified as perpetrators of political violence in the east.[25] What little we know about these groups suggests that they differ mainly in the personality of their leaders. In addition to educated elements and others attracted by their philosophy, the Apocus especially appear to have drawn adherents from those who had fallen afoul of the law for nonideological reasons.

Security measures alone have been unable to arrest the spread of violence, fed as it is from such complex sources. Moreover, the police themselves seem to have been divided to a degree between leftists and rightists. The rash of jailbreaks, which increased visibly after the mid-1970's, seemingly reflected the sympathy of some of the security forces for the Left. As one of its first steps, the martial-law administration of Ankara Province moved to reduce this factionalism by



Police forces search households in Istanbul in late 1979 in an attempt to quell communal and political violence.

—Camera Press.

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[25] "Disturbances in East Anatolia and Their True Nature," *Hurriyet 1979 Ansiklopedik Yilligi* (Hirriyet's 1979 Encyclopedic Yearbook), Istanbul, Hurriyet Ofset Matbaasi, 1979, pp. 180–81; 15 Groups in the East in Documents and Incidents," *Aydinlik*, June 21–July 11, 1979.

The émigré TCP has encouraged Turkey's Kurds to press only for "regional autonomy," i.e., not seek to secede from the Turkish state. See "Secretary General Bilen's Report to Turkish Communist Party Plenum," Joint Publications Research Service, *West Europe* (Arlington, VA), Report No. 1585, JPRS 75817, June 3, 1980.

banning leftist and rightist police organizations within its jurisdction.[26]

Martial law disrupted the Left only fitfully. The Turkish Communist Party did not stop its agitation to gain legal status and infiltrate unions and political parties. It even pressed to expand publication of its literature in Turkey, especially through Urun (Product) publishing house, which printed the party program as well as reports of party plenums. According to its Maoist rivals, the Communist Party also formed a Kurdish Bureau to direct propaganda and arms into Kurdish areas of Eastern Turkey.[27]

In the first flush after the Kahramanmaraş rioting, the military commanders closed some of the more extreme publications and banned circulation of others in the martial-law area. That prevented the public sale of radical leftist literature in Ankara and Istanbul, although even some Communist publications continued to circulate. Izmir was subject to no restrictions until after the violence of February 1980, when a sit-in of cotton-yarn workers at a factory of the producers' sales cooperative union brought martial law to that city. But this slowed the active distribution only of those leftist works that were deemed to incite revolution or violence.

At this time, Turkey's Maoists came forward to lay their claim to legal party status. The Turkish Worker and Peasant Party organized by Dogu Perinçek in January 1978 specifically renounced violence. Moreover, the party was so anti-Soviet that it saw some merit in NATO and at a number of points paralleled the positions of the Republicans and the Justice Party. Much of its foreign policy position was devoted to such issues as supporting Pol Pot in Kampuchea against the Heng Samrin regime. Domestically, it focused on "fascism," celebrating what it interpreted as Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist recipes for confronting this danger.[28] The party's organizers had been jailed for antiregime activities in the 1971 era (some of its members had previously worked alongside Çayan and Gezmiş). While in jail, they apparently concluded that clandestine activities would help only the USSR, which they now accused of stirring up the Kurds and trying to take over Turkey. Because of its strong support of the authorities against disorder and separatism, the new party was able to operate and publish freely under the martial-law government.

The operation of martial law after 1978 (as distinguished from the period between 1971 and 1973) was as much against the Right as against the Left. Nonetheless, the Republican People's Party's involvement in the administering of martial law apparently dissipated some of the support it had received from the extreme Left in the 1977 elections.[29] In the 1979 senatorial elections, the legal leftist parties profited from this backlash against the Republicans. Both the Turkish Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Revolution Party qualified for participation. The former ran most strongly of all of the leftist parties, garnering 1.3 percent of the Senate vote, while the latter received about half as many ballots, running neck and neck with the revived Turkish Labor Party. Beria Onger, an independent running for the Senate from Istanbul Province, who was endorsed by the émigré Communist Party, got over 20,000 votes, or nearly 2 percent of those cast. Although she fell far short of election, she ran well ahead of the three leftist parties in her electoral district.[30]

Prospects for the Left

Although the Left is clearly recovering from the effects of suppression in the early 1970's, its performance in the 1979 senatorial elections fell short of the high-water mark reached in the late 1960's. Despite some progress in recapturing their old constituency, the leftist parties appear unable to cut significantly into the Republican vote. (It was the rightist and centrist support of the Republican People's Party that was most eroded by the exigencies of coalition rule; the party's left wing appears to have been less affected.)

A major reason for the inability of the Left to do better has been its extreme fragmentation and the absence of an accepted overall leader. The involvement of some leftists in violence may also have reduced the appeal of leftist parties, which right-wing opponents have branded as disloyal and subversive. Moreover, the knowledge that a vote for the tiny parties of the Left would have only protest value may have discouraged would-be voters in Turkey, where much emphasis is put on being on the winning side.

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[26] *Milliyet*, Jan. 29, 1979.

[27] See "15 Groups in the East in Documents and Incidents," *Aydinlik*, July 6 and 7, 1979.

[28] See "Let's Unite Against the Reactionary Civil War that Russia and the NAP Are Provoking," in *Turkiye* (Istanbul), March 1979, pp. 37–38.

[29] The TCP now called for "solidarity among the leftist parties and leftist independent candidates . . ." rather than support for the Republicans. See Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcast of Sept. 22, 1979, in *FBIS-WEU*, Sept. 25, 1979; and Hasan Şerif, "Truths Behind the Election Results and Figures," *Ilke*, October-December 1979, pp. 57–67.

[30] *Milliyet*, Oct. 15, 16, 1979; *Hurriyet 1980 Ansiklopedik Yilligi*, p. 152; and "Distribution of Votes in Istanbul by County," *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), Oct. 16, 1979.

Dogu Perinçek (left), leader of the Turkish Worker and Peasant Party, photographed in July 1979 with Turkey's Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (right) and Başkani Beyhan Cenkçi (center), head of the Ankara Journalist Society. At the Journalist Society, Perinçek attacked Demirel for failing to criticize the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union.

—*Aydinlik* (Istanbul), July 10, 1979, p. 1.

These problems are not likely to be overcome in significant degree in the foreseeable future. Stubborn personality clashes perpetuate the divisions of the Left. The competition that has raged for more than a decade between Aybar and the current leaders of the Turkish Labor Party has left a background of bitterness that cannot be erased. It is unrealistic to expect either Ahmet Kaçmaz or Behice Boran to agree amicably to subordination to the other. And Mihri Belli's independent course no doubt reflects his personal rivalry with the leaders of the Turkish Communist Party.

The deep personality conflicts are reinforced by important differences over principle and tactics. One continuing controversy has focused on the theory and practice of the united front. The Turkish Labor Party's journal *Yurt ve Dunya* (Homeland and World) has ridiculed the Socialist Labor Party's protestations of attachment to the concept of unity, charging it with actually working to sabotage cooperation.[31] Differences over this issue have also split the émigré Turkish Communist Party in two. The Voice of the Workers faction, led by Veli Dursun in London, put forth its own program in 1977 challenging the party's call for a national democratic front. While those advocating such a front initially attempted to compromise with the dissidents, the latter were expelled from the TCP in 1979.[32]

Clearly, the cleavage between the Maoists and the rest of the leftist groups regarding the Soviet Union remains unbridgeable. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 also has generated differing responses. Thus, Perinçek's Turkish Worker and Peasant Party and Aybar's Socialist Revolution Party sharply condemned the Soviets, as did various other leftist individuals and organizations. By contrast, Boran and the Turkish Labor Party made excuses for the Soviet action. The Turkish Socialist Labor Party came down even more explicitly on the side of the Soviets. Its executive committee justified the invasion as being "within the framework of proletarian internationalism," and warned against new American efforts to conclude "additional imperialistic military plots" in the Middle East. These last two parties, along with such other organizations as the TOB-DER teachers' association, the Revolutionary Youth Association, and various constituent unions in DISK, joined in issuing a declaration in January 1980 defending the Soviet move.[33]

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[31] Yavuz Unal, "The Unity Question and the TSLP's Concept of 'Unity,'" *Yurt ve Dunya* (Istanbul), July 1979, pp. 7–29.

[32] See "Secretary General Bilen's Report to Turkish Communist Party Plenum," loc. cit.

The Fatherland Front seized this opportunity to taunt the Turkish Communist Party for its "weakness." "*Zayif*" *Halkasi TKP* (The TCP, the "Weak Link"), Istanbul Kivilcim Yayinlari, 1980, passim.

Despite this controversy, the Soviet invasion did not fundamentally discredit the Left in Turkey. Nor has the spread of leftist ideas and dogma, especially among the student population, been materially affected by martial-law restrictions or the ups and downs of factional bickering. Freedom of debate in Turkey is by now quite well established, and literature reflecting schools of thought of almost all varieties is easily available in all major urban centers. Exposure to these political currents begins early in adolescence, and since the mid-1960's a majority of university students have considered themselves "socialists."

It is still far too early to tell what the long-term effects of this exposure will be for Turkish society. Thus far, most of the youthful advocates of leftist approaches have in time come to terms with the existing order. This process has been abetted by the existence of the reformist Kemalist movement, which has provided a natural bridge whereby radicals can be integrated into the traditional structure of political activity. That route appears destined to remain important for the sons and daughters of today's educated elite.

At the same time, the Republican People's Party seems to recognize more clearly than at some times past the need to combat the radical extremists of both the Left and the Right. In part, that recognition grew out of experience in power. Under challenge from leftist radicals, who were unimpressed by the reformist credentials of the Kemalists, the Republican leaders are now agreed on the necessity to support martial law and tough security. The Justice Party is also more than ever convinced of the need for strong action. Thus, the relatively timid approach of governments in the 1960's and the appearance in the 1970's that the Republicans were protecting the Left are not likely to be repeated.

In the current climate, clandestine leftist plotting groups will probably be limited in their operations. They still have a capability to stage occasional disruptive acts against the kinds of targets they have hit in the past. But arrests of their members are continuing, and police work should be able to frustrate at least a significant portion of their activity. Provided that the terrorists can be prevented from carrying out numerous spectacular killings, their ability to shake the body politic seems destined to be limited.

Social violence in which ideology is only an overtone, however, will be harder for the government to handle effectively. The institutionalization of traditional feuding mechanisms in an urban setting has no easy antidote. Economic improvement and decreasing unemployment—neither of which is likely in the short run—may be important in the long-term eradication of this problem. But as long as social conflict garbed in ideological guise continues, the Left will have a place in Turkey's political process far more significant than its numbers would otherwise suggest.

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[33] "Professor's Reaction to the Afghanistan Events," *Yeni Forum* (Ankara), Mar. 1, 1980, p. 4; *Politika* (Istanbul), Jan. 15, 1980; and Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcast of Jan. 16, 1980, in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 18, 1980.

Hanoi's Domestic Dilemmas

By William S. Turley

Few countries have emerged from war more challenged by peace than was Vietnam at the cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina in the spring of 1975. In duration and destruction, relative to size of population and territory, the previous armed conflict had matched any in this century. Even if the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) managed to overcome the effects of war quickly, it would still confront major problems of economic development, as one of the poorest countries in the world.

Nonetheless, the leaders of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) looked forward with optimism to the rapid and peaceful transformation of their formerly divided nation into a united, modern, socialist state. To them—and to many foreign observers as well—this optimism seemed justified, partly because Vietnam was now freer to concentrate on internal development, without fear of foreign intervention or major armed conflict, than it had been since the middle of the 19th century.

A combination of international events and internal difficulties dashed these expectations of the leadership. Although the former delivered the final blow, it was already apparent before the international situation deteriorated sharply that domestic development was not proceeding as smoothly as SRV planners had initially anticipated. Not until 1978 did external factors add much to the economic and administrative distortions, natural calamities, postwar malaise, corruption, and indiscipline that were slowing recovery. External and internal influences became closely intertwined with the worsening of Vietnam's relations with Kampuchea and China (culminating in the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979) and the failure of efforts to improve relations with non-Communist powers. Though the precise reasons for the return to war may be moot, the Vietnamese leadership perceived it to be unavoidable.[1] In any case, these international events exacerbated the domestic problems, without restoring much of the self-sacrifice, cooperation, and discipline through which the North had prevailed over earlier threats. It then became impossible to continue holding optimistic expectations and necessary to question some of the most important decisions on which the SRV's postwar development had been based. Hanoi thus has been forced to reassess its priorities and lower its sights.

The present article focuses on key internal developments since the VCP's Fourth Party Congress in December 1976. Since that date, the SRV leadership has had to face several dilemmas concerning development strategy, long-standing party commitments, and structural characteristics of a reunified Vietnamese society, that would have complicated postwar development even if the conflicts with China and Kampuchea had not occurred. The party finds itself in charge of a much more refractory society than that which it governed before 1975. In the North, former enemies had obligingly departed in 1954, the party could build upon the significant degree of integration with the population that it had achieved before taking power, and the cleavages within society were weaker than the bonds that held society together. In the South, the party enjoyed no such broad popular consensus behind its rule. Ethnic and religious cleavages were deep. Some groups such as the Hoa Hao sect had long held grudges against the party; highland

Mr. Turley is Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University (Carbondale, IL). He has edited Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective, *1980, and has contributed articles on Vietnam to various symposia and to journals such as* Foreign Policy, Pacific Affairs, *and* Problems of Communism.

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[1] For an analysis of this background, see William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1980. pp. 92–116.

QUỐC HỘI NƯỚC
ỆT NAM THỐNG NHẤT

The first session of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in July 1976.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

minorities under the banner of a revived Front Unifié pour la Lutte des Races Opprimeés (FULRO) clung stubbornly to what little autonomy they still had; the well-organized Catholics were dominated by elements that had fled Communist rule in 1954 and presumably were no more enthusiastic about it now than they had been then; and the large Kampuchean and Chinese communities represented potential fifth columns in the event of conflict with neighbors. Some 40 percent of the South's population lived in the cities, where the party's presence had been minimal before 1975 and where the petit bourgeois and commercial classes were much larger than they had been in the North. Self-sufficient peasant freeholders—not tenants, landless laborers, and other natural allies of the party—dominated the rural 60 percent of the population. And of course the sizable proportion of the South's population that had served in the old Saigon government's army or administration, lacking another part of Vietnam in which to take refuge, remained behind. Under such circumstances, the party could hardly expect to enjoy instant universal acceptance, and it has demonstrated an abiding suspicion of at least some former enemies by continuing to hold putatively unreliable elements in "reeducation camps." Some actual opposition plainly exists, though in the absence of conclusive evidence, views may differ as to whether such opposition reflects rejection of specifically Communist rule and objectives. But the exact nature of opposition, particularly whether it is ideological or nonideological, is not really germane to the present discussion, for implementation of the VCP program requires the active, preferably voluntary, participation of the general population. For the VCP, therefore, the central dilemma is constructing a modern socialist industrial state with a minimum of coercion in a context of agrarian poverty and social division.

Key Decisions

For a time after the victory in 1975, the party refrained from making decisions on two issues that it previously had ignored, hedged, or avoided. Its hesitation was probably due as much to the complexity of the issues and the war's unexpectedly quick ending as to the difficulties of achieving consensus. The first issue concerned whether priority should be given to strengthening socialist institutions or to building the means of production. In ideological parlance, the issue was whether to stress the development of "new relations of production" or of "new productive forces," to emphasize "transformation" or "construction." "Transformation" implied a largely organizational approach to development; "construction," an emphasis on material factors, with incentive policies designed to achieve immediate production increases. During the 1950's and 1960's, this issue had cropped up in party debate in the North on the pace, scope, and methods of cooperativization—which had usually pitted Party Secretary-General Le Duan against fellow Political Bureau member Truong Chinh—until the subject was displaced by war as the center of attention. In 1973, the debate had reappeared in connection with the North's return to recovery and development, and it was being debated right up until the Communist victory in the South in 1975. A compromise then emerged on the need to employ both approaches simultaneously, although in the recovery period some priority for "construction" was necessary. The Fourth Congress described this line as "combining transformation with construction, in which construction is the main aspect."[2] Ambiguities in the statements of some leaders, however, indicated that the matter was not regarded as permanently closed.[3]

In the spring of 1975, the party also turned to the issue of how fast and by what means to transform military victory into political and economic integration. Amid indications that some leaders wanted the South to commence reconstruction separately from the North and to postpone major institutional change until recovery was complete, the Central Committee decided in mid-1975 to move directly toward integration by having the South combine reconstruction with transformation. A national conference on reunification announced this decision in November, elections for a unified National Assembly took place in April 1976, and subsequent statements by top leaders reaffirmed the decision.[4] This approach to integration followed inexorably from the decision to combine transformation with construction in national development policy, because such a decision, by resuming the North's effort to perfect socialist institutions, left no choice but to begin the South's socialist transformation immediately if it were to catch up.

The decisions on these two key issues cleared the way for the first comprehensive national Five-Year Plan (1976–80), which was unveiled at the Fourth Congress at the end of 1976. The plan provided that the South should begin reconstruction and transformation simultaneously, with emphasis on agriculture and light industry. Meanwhile, the North was to recentralize its economy and resume development of large-scale socialist production, including heavy industry. Other significant features of the plan were balanced investment in industry and agriculture, with a focus on industries that served agricultural needs; a gradual shift of investment priority from agriculture to industry as the plan progressed; dependence on foreign aid for more than half of all investment outlays; rapid expansion of export industries and foreign trade; dispersal of population to open vast new tracts of land for cultivation; achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency in the mid-1980's; and projected annual growth of 13 to 14 percent.[5] The long-term goal was the construction of a modern industrial state on a model combining East European and Soviet elements.

Integration of the South

These decisions placed the greatest demand for change on the South, where the party's resources for effecting change were weakest, so it is not surprising that the greatest difficulties should have been encountered there. In one sense, the party had an advantage that few other revolutions upon achieving power have had—namely, 20 years' experience in administering the North. But this experience was not always directly applicable to the South.

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[2] "Resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party," *Hoc Tap* (Hanoi), December 1976, p. 27. For further discussion, see David Elliott, "Institutionalizing the Revolution: Vietnam's Search for a Model of Development," in William S. Turley, Ed., *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 214–15.

[3] In an article published on the eve of the Congress, Nguyen Duy Trinh, for example, used the formulation, "construction is the key factor, and transformation is an extremely important factor"; then he added that "a bias toward either aspect is incorrect." "Determine a Correct Viewpoint, Raise the Capability and Quality of Cadres and Party Members," *Hoc Tap*, September 1976, p. 21. Truong Chinh, speaking at the Congress, uncharacteristically glossed over the issue without declaring either transformation or construction to be "key" or "most important." Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Dec. 21, 1976.

[4] See Truong Chinh, "Achieving National Unity with Respect to the State," *Hoc Tap*, November 1975, pp. 20–22; Le Duan "All Unite to Build the Unified Socialist Fatherland of Vietnam," ibid., July 1976, p. 20; and Pham Hung, "The South Vows to Commit All Its Spirit and Energy with Compatriots Nationwide to Maintain Peace . . . ," ibid., July 1976, pp. 51–53.

[5] For further details on the Fourth Party Congress, see William S. Turley, "Vietnam Since Reunification," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1977, pp. 36–54.

In the countryside in the South, war, revolution, and reform had by 1975 virtually abolished tenancy and created a large class of peasant freeholders. A majority of the southern rural population owned sufficient land and tools to meet the party's criteria for middle peasants. Since local party organs were weak and the restoration of southern agricultural production was crucial to national economic recovery, the party could not afford to antagonize this important group. Until 1977, therefore, the southern system of individual proprietorship was left largely untouched.

At its second plenum, in late June 1977, the VCP's Central Committee issued instructions on the reorganization of agriculture whose main purpose was to set a course toward the institutional convergence of North and South. While the North initiated cooperative management at the district level, the South was to begin setting up pilot cooperatives in late 1977, with a view to establishing "socialist relations of production" by the early 1980's.[6]

In the fall, the Political Bureau created a Committee for the Transformation of Southern Agriculture, chaired by Vo Chi Cong, a Political Bureau member who had been a secret leader in the southern party organization before 1975, and the Bureau issued instructions to organize "production solidarity teams" and "production collectives" as steps toward larger-scale cooperativization. Thus, except in a few localities where large landholdings survived, the transformation of southern agriculture skipped the stage of redistribution of land to equalize wealth and destroy the landlord class that had been so disruptive in the North. The somewhat larger size of cooperatives in the South than in the North at a comparable time also represented a skipping of stages. Although the campaign's ambitions were high, directives stressed the need to secure voluntary participation, to transfer authority promptly to local leaders recruited during the move-

Workers photographed in July 1975 in one of the "new economic zones" established by Hanoi in southern Vietnam.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[6] "Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Fourth Party Central Committee," *Tap chi Cong san* (Hanoi), September 1977, pp. 21-23.

ment, and to avoid coercion or pressure tactics.[7]

Why did the party embark on this course in June 1977, when party and state institutions in the South were still quite weak? The main objective was to implement earlier decisions on integration and to build economies of scale, as directed by the Five-Year Plan.[8] At least one Political Bureau member indicated that for those who had consistently stressed the importance of transforming the relations of production, the belief that pausing at early stages risked backsliding or at least loss of momentum, as had occurred in the North in 1960, was also a factor.[9]

Over the next year, the campaign yielded uneven results. It certainly had no positive impact on the productivity of southern agriculture, although the shortfalls in output in the South had additional explanations. The region continued to be plagued by adverse weather, and there were other distracting factors such as Kampuchean commando raids, which Hanoi called "deep penetration raids," into some of the most fertile areas of the Mekong delta. According to official claims, these raids during 1977–78 turned "almost all the villages lying along the border of Kien Giang Province . . . into wilderness." Villages in other provinces were affected as well. Some 40,000 persons were said to have been dislocated, leaving more than 100,000 hectares to lie fallow, while the SRV became host to 120,000 refugees from Kampuchea.[10]

In February 1979, Vo Chi Cong, who in the meanwhile had become Minister of Agriculture, was replaced at this post by Nguyen Ngoc Triu, a Central Committee member only since 1976. But as Chairman of the Central Committee Department for the Transformation of Agriculture as well as of the Committee for the Transformation of Southern Agriculture, Cong remained the leading voice on agricultural policy for the entire country.

At a review conference in April on agricultural transformation in the Mekong delta, Cong reported that nearly 16 percent of the land and 18.5 percent of peasant families in this area had been brought into "collective production organizations."[11] In some provinces, these proportions were as high as 30 percent; in others, as low as 2 percent. The difference in rates of progress stemmed from the great variety of local conditions with which the movement had to cope. In localities that had been under the control of revolutionary forces throughout the war, the availability of cadres and favorable popular attitudes made it possible to skip some introductory steps and advance quickly through others to the formation of cooperatives. But where peasants had become habituated to "individual cultivation" or where cadre resources were unavailable, progress was slow. It turned out to be slow, too, in provinces such as Binh-Tri-Thien, where local cadres had put down deep roots in their communities and were reluctant to lead a campaign for change. It also tended to be slow in provinces heavily populated by the Hoa Hao, a religious sect that had resisted the party ever since the late 1940's. "The cooperativization movement," said Cong, "has not yet become popular among the peasants. It has been active only in certain areas and has not yet become wide-spread." If this situation continued, he added, "we are not likely to achieve the goal of basically completing cooperativization activities by 1980."

Whereas in mid-1977 a grand strategy for the political and economic integration of the South had dictated collectivization, concern for the SRV's security now dominated Cong's report. The target date for completion remained the same, but uneven progress in the context of the Chinese threat and the implications of that threat for the SRV's internal stability made the accomplishment of this goal an urgent requirement. It was necessary to push the movement in the South, Cong declared, in order to stabilize production and to organize the rural population for the purpose of strengthening national defense. Collectivization would likewise enhance the capacity of communities to reform and absorb "members of the former puppet army and government and to re-educate bad elements." The sooner southern peasants were collectivized, the sooner they would have a stake in the socialist system and cease to provide "operational bases" for "coun-

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[7] For more detailed discussion, see David Elliott, "Vietnam: Institutional Development in a Time of Crisis," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1979*, Singapore, Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Ltd., 1980, pp. 350–55. The paragraph in the text draws heavily upon this source.

[8] At the Fourth Congress, Political Bureau member Pham Hung, speaking on policy toward the South, noted that the North's earlier accomplishments, combined with peace, independence, and unification, had enabled "the southern provinces to promptly catch up with and match the north in socialism. The economy of our entire country will, by the end of the second 5-year plan [1976–80], have the necessary conditions to be thoroughly unified on the basis of advancing toward large-scale socialist production. . . . In reforming the former economy and building large-scale socialist production in the southern provinces, in the coming years the problem of first importance is to actively reform the former production relations and build new, socialist production relations. . . ." Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 27, 1976.

[9] Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Hold Firm to the Relationship Between Transformation and Construction in Our Country's Socialist Revolution," *Tap chi Cong san*, January 1978, p. 18.

[10] "Communique of the Commission of Inquiry into PRC Aggression," Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), Aug. 31, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 5, 1979.

[11] Broadcast in installments over Radio Ho Chi Minh City, May 14, 15, 18, and 28, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, May 17, 18, and 31, 1979.

Workers at an irrigation project on a state farm some 70 kilometers outside of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).

—Matthew Naythons/Liaison.

terrevolutionary elements." But Cong remained adamantly opposed to the use of coercion to achieve these ends and condemned local party and state organs that had allowed coercion to occur.

The drive to conclude the basic stages of collectivization throughout the South by 1980 involved some tension with the party's commitment to an orderly, voluntary process largely under the supervision of local citizens recruited during the movement. Cadres charged with pushing the movement were bound to feel that they could meet the target only by intimidation or perfunctory efforts. By late 1979, more than 30 percent of peasant households in the Mekong delta and "almost all" peasant households in central Vietnam were reported to have joined production collectives or agricultural cooperatives,[12] but this achievement was marred by "violation of the principles of mutually beneficial voluntariness," "a tendency to resort to drastic administrative measures to force peasants to join collectives," and "hastiness in attaining high results." In reflection of the revived interest of party leaders in boosting agricultural output, if necessary at the expense of ideological purity, "negativism in production" was attributed to poorly conceived incentive policies.[13]

The other sector of the economy in the South that needed integration—commerce—was in some ways an even greater challenge for the party than agriculture. Before 1975, the party organization in the South had never administered any cities, where commerce was concentrated. War and revolution, instead of removing obstacles to socialist-oriented change as they had in agriculture, had only enlarged the classes whose interests were incompatible with socialism. Lacking adequate cadre resources and heavily dependent upon private initiative for economic recovery, the regime had little choice at first but to limit changes to the rounding-up of "comprador bourgeoisie"—i.e., wealthy merchants who had parlayed war-profiteering into sectoral monopolies—and to attempts (largely unsuccessful) to control prices, speculative hoarding, and black marketeering.[14] Only gradually did the state take over construction and transportation, form joint enterprises with the larger manufacturing concerns, organize consumer and marketing cooperatives, and set up shops and distribution under its control. By 1978, these measures had brought a large segment of southern commerce under state management or influence, but an undetermined amount of commerce, primarily in Ho Chi Minh City, remained beyond effective control because of the enterprising efforts of small traders, who were predominantly from the Chinese or "Hoa" minority.

Up to this point, the policy on commerce had been modeled after that carried out in the North in 1954–57, but it had not proved as effective with the South's much larger and more complex commercial sector. Therefore, in March 1978, a "Communique on Private Trade" ordered the complete and immediate abolition of trade carried on by "bourgeois tradesmen."[15]

The communique reiterated charges against private traders that had been made ever since 1975. The continued existence of a sizable free market alongside the socialist one, according to the communique, encour-

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[12] Report by Le Thanh Nghi to the National Assembly, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 10, 1980.

[13] Speech by Vo Chi Cong at a conference on collectivization in former Mekong delta provinces, broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Sept. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 13, 1979.

[14] For further discussion, see William S. Turley, "Urban Transformation in South Vietnam," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, British Columbia), Winter 1976–77, pp. 607–24.

[15] For the text, see Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Mar. 23, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 27, 1978.

A sidewalk "flea market" in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in early 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

aged speculation, black marketeering, and hoarding, to the detriment of price stability and state purchasing operations. Private traders capitalized on shortages to peddle stolen, smuggled, and illicitly manufactured goods; "enriched" themselves; and thus perpetuated inequalities of wealth. Traders corrupted state cadres and then used "this very corruption to denigrate the new regime."[16]

Many traders, especially what the communique called small merchants, were simply individuals with no alternative employment (except in the New Economic Zones in the countryside, to which they were loathe to move) who were trying to make a living within the cracks of an economy of scarcity.[17] But the combined effects of their activities were to thwart state plans, to mock egalitarian ideals, and to undermine popular respect for the socialist system. However constricted the free market, it held potential for the regeneration of capitalism and, by affording peasants an alternative to compulsory sales to the state, undermined the cooperativization campaign then under way.

Private trade was abolished by physical seizures of goods, commodities, and business facilities. The assets of "bourgeois tradesmen" were absorbed by state enterprises, while according to the communique, "progressive bourgeois tradesmen who formerly served the revolution," especially those with technical and professional skills, stood a good chance of finding employment in the state trade sector. "Small merchants" were exempt from expropriation until employment could be found for them—which could mean relocation to a New Economic Zone. The communique implicitly acknowledged that the effects would fall most heavily on one ethnic group (the Chinese) and, foreseeing the international response, warned against conducting the campaign in a way that would leave the regime open to a charge of discrimination:

> *The city people's committee reminds everyone that the policy . . . will be carried out in a unified manner throughout the city and all southern provinces, regardless of nationality or religion. Our people must remain vigilant against all reactionary plots to distort this policy and to divide our laboring people.*

There is little evidence that the abolition of private trade was a deliberate attempt to provoke an exodus of Chinese for reasons of security or racial antipathy. The campaign addressed long-standing problems, it was part of the party's larger strategy of socialist transformation, it was consistent with the objectives and methods of the Five-Year Plan, it implemented important tenets of party doctrine, a Political Bureau resolution in May 1976 and subsequent statements by party leaders had foreshadowed it, and there was precedent for it in the history of the North.[18] Refugee testimony confirms that the campaign was conducted for the most part without discrimination between Vietnamese and Chinese and that Chinese felt more strongly moti-

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Since 1975, it was claimed, the number of small traders in the South, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, had actually increased. Many traders were making a minimal livelihood, and of these, "the majority supported and followed the revolution." Do Muoi, "Push Socialist Transformation of Privately Operated Capitalist Industry and Commerce in the South," *Tap chi Cong san,* May 1978, p. 57.

[18] The campaign to socialize private industry and commerce in the North had been most intense in 1957–58, in conjunction with the parallel movement to collectivize agriculture. By late 1960, 100 percent of private industry, 98 percent of private commerce, 88 percent of handicrafts workers, and 45 percent of all small traders in the North's urban centers had been socialized or drawn into some form of

(continued on page 49)

Closed shops in the Chinese section of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in July 1978 after issuance of a government decree limiting private trade.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Liaison.

vated to leave than did Vietnamese because Chinese feared persecution in the event of war with China.[19] The first major exodus in the spring of 1978 was from the North, not the South, and came in response to war rumors which SRV authorities attempted to still.

Although it anticipated hostile reaction from the West, Hanoi seems to have been genuinely surprised by the intensity with which its avowedly Marxist-Leninist neighbor denounced the abolition of private trade as an anti-Chinese measure. When, after the SRV's admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) on June 29, Beijing suspended its US$300-million aid program, the Vietnamese concluded that they had more to gain than to lose by encouraging the departures.

National Economic Performance

The emphasis on transforming production relations, however, ran afoul of poor economic performance. For a time, party leaders blamed economic shortcomings on natural calamities and objective structural defects over which the regime had limited control. They apparently did not believe that the emphasis on transformation was itself to blame, if only because in the

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cooperative production. Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Hold Firm to the Relationship," p. 18.

But the campaign had been much easier to execute in the North than it was to prove to be in the South because the cities in the North had been relatively small, the scale of commerce even in Hanoi, primarily an administrative center, had been modest, and the organizational resources had been substantial. Despite this fact, the regime had still found it expedient for both economic and diplomatic reasons to tolerate the private commercial activities, minor black marketeering, and smuggling across the Chinese border by which families in the North's small Chinese community managed to earn significantly higher incomes than average. (The Chinese were also exempt from the draft.) About 1970, however, Hanoi began urging Chinese residents to adopt Vietnamese citizenship, and it sharply accelerated this effort in May 1978, when a simultaneous campaign against corruption caused many northern Chinese to foresee the end of their economic privileges and therefore to flee. On the Chinese in the North, see Charles Benoit, "Vietnam's Boat People," unpublished manuscript, September 1979.

The campaign in the South was if anything behind schedule. At the National Assembly meeting in January 1977, Le Thanh Nghi had said that the "pressing issue" for the South that year was "to rapidly advance socialist transformation in circulation and distribution." Speech to the National Assembly, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Jan. 17, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 27, 1977. The sharpness of the crackdown in the spring of 1978 was simply a reaction to the failure of preceding measures to make sufficient inroads against the South's private commercial sector.

[19] On these and related points concerning the exodus, see Benoit, loc. cit., and Gareth Porter, "Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict," paper presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC, Mar. 21–23, 1980.

absence of large capital resources they believed they had little choice but to stress an organizational approach. But unremitting difficulties, exacerbated by the conflicts with Kampuchea and China, forced them to reassess certain aspects of this approach in terms of the country's immediate material needs rather than in terms of their long-range development goals.

It was apparent by the Central Committee's fifth plenum in July 1978 that performance in many sectors of the economy would fall short of the Five-Year Plan targets. Speaking to the National Assembly in late December 1978, Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, noted that significant gains in a few areas, sometimes exceeding plan targets, were more than offset by shortfalls in others.[20] Industrial production suffered generally from poor management; from shortages of raw materials, accessories, and energy; and from underutilization of the labor force. In agriculture, the gap between production and consumption had widened rather than narrowed. According to Nghi, the reasons for these disappointing results were the country's weak economic base at the start, the lingering effects of war, economic distortions left by the "neocolonialist regime," the sharpening conflict with Kampuchea over the preceding year, and two consecutive years of bad weather that matched the worst in history. The storms and floods, he held, had been largely responsible for holding food production to 3 million tons below minimum consumption requirements and for reducing cattle herds by 20 percent.

In these circumstances, Hanoi had little choice but to revise its priorities for the remainder of the plan period in favor of agriculture, although the basic methods and many objectives of the plan remained intact. This revision of priorities must have been accepted with chagrin by leaders who had hoped that investment capital could be shifted from agriculture to industry as the plan progressed.

A Vietnamese casualty in the fighting along the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border in early 1978.

—Jean-Claude Labbe/Gamma-Liaison.

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[20] Report by Le Thanh Nghi to the National Assembly, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 23, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 23, 1979, Supplement.

Le Thanh Nghi (second from right), Vietnam Communist Party Political Bureau member and then Chairman of Vietnam's Planning Commission, meets with Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin (far left) in Moscow in July 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

By the end of 1979, the situation had grown worse. Capital construction was slowing down, despite the fact that only 281 out of 774 "key and high priority projects" had been completed since 1976. Owing to construction delays, many nominally finished projects were operating at a fraction of capacity and returning little or no capital.[21] A year-end report on industrial production noted that gross industrial output in 1979, showing the effects of destruction, diversion of resources, and loss of foreign aid and supplies caused by the conflicts with Kampuchea and China, was just equal to what it had been in 1978. (Nevertheless, this source indicated that industrial output had been expected to decline, suggesting the leaders' willingness to bear even more serious costs to sustain their international policies.)[22]

The problems of agriculture were still more grave. Le Thanh Nghi, again citing the seemingly endless cycle of drought and flood as the main source of difficulty, noted that production of foodstuffs had increased only 19.5 percent since 1975, even though that had been a year of low output and since then an additional 1.1 million hectares had been brought under cultivation.[23] An editorial in the party organ *Nhan dan* confirmed that the deficit in foodstuffs was continuing to run at 3 million metric tons a year and that per capita food consumption had declined.[24] In fiscal 1978–79, the SRV imported 2.1 million metric tons of foodstuffs from the Soviet Union alone.[25]

Coming at a time when by Hanoi's own admission the country had "too little foreign exchange to pay our creditors," these procurements severely limited purchases of supplies and capital goods desperately needed for development in all sectors.[26] The entire economy seemed on the verge of lapsing into worse poverty and dependency.

Circumstances no longer permitted the revision of plan goals downward without questioning of the plan's basic premises. Organization and incentives now had to share responsibility with weather and war for bad performance. The international situation, too, was a factor in the setting-aside of long-term objectives in order to meet the immediate need for production increases. The overriding importance of defense was underscored when General Vo Nguyen Giap, rather than Premier Pham Van Dong, presented the government report to the National Assembly in May 1979.[27] All aspects of economic development, said Giap, had to be subordinated to national defense. It was necessary to "race against time" during peace to "accelerate economic construction" for this purpose.

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[21] Editorial, *Nhan dan* (Hanoi), Dec. 18, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 21, 1979.

[22] Radio Hanoi, Dec. 26, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 2, 1980.

[23] Report by Le Thanh Nghi, Vietnam News Agency, Dec. 25, 1979, loc. cit.

[24] *Nhan dan*, Oct. 9, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 11, 1979.

[25] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Oct. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 11, 1979.

[26] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Oct. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 16, 1979.

In agriculture, the focus turned to the inability of the state grain-purchasing system to extract adequate supplies from rural areas to feed the urban population, workers, and the troops then in Kampuchea or defending the northern border.[28] The system worked poorly because peasants had little motivation to produce more than they could consume. Lacking consumer goods to buy with the proceeds of surplus production, peasants turned what surplus they did produce into alcohol, hog feed, and sales on the black market. The leadership could have recommended strengthening the extractive apparatus or using force, as the Soviet regime had done during the period of War Communism, but such an approach was beyond the state's capacity, especially in the South, and would only have shifted the hardship from city to country without increasing output. It followed that a solution had to be found in the revision of incentives and the removal of obstacles to individual initiative and circulation of goods.

This solution emerged from the sixth plenum of the Central Committee, in the summer of 1979. The plenum focused on the "unnecessary confusion" in the local handicrafts and consumer goods industries owing to excessive haste in the recent past to bring them under centralized state management, and emphasized the need to mobilize all productive forces in addition to those already socialized.[29] "If," the resolution said, "some type of state-produced goods can now be better produced and developed by the handicrafts and artisan industry and private capitalists, they must be boldly assigned to the latter. The organizational forms of production must not be fixed." The resolution in effect halted further socialization of these sectors and revised supply, marketing, and banking procedures so as to stimulate private production. One of the first steps taken to implement the resolution was to remove the control stations set up earlier throughout the South to check "dishonest merchants."[30] The stations, manned by poorly trained, sometimes overzealous, and often corrupt cadres, had impeded the flow of goods and stirred popular resentment.[31]

By removing the stations and in other ways stimulating the production and circulation of consumer goods, the government sought to "buy" the agricultural output it could not obtain by organizational means alone. The approach invited comparison with Lenin's New Economic Policy, despite significant differences of context (the SRV was still at war, and most of its economy was already collectivized).

Condition of the Party

There is probably no doubt in the minds of SRV leaders that their problems could be more successfully addressed by organizational means if the party were not, from their point of view, in so poor a condition. Not long after the war ended, the party press began to report widespread corruption, avoidance of responsibility, indiscipline, bureaucratic detachment, resort to oppressive techniques, and general inefficiency among cadres at all levels.[32] These difficulties have persisted in spite of a succession of campaigns attacking them.

Many problems have resulted from poor training, unfamiliarity with peacetime priorities, and organizational distortions left by war. Another cause of difficulties has been the predominance in leadership and management ranks of older cadres who are set in their ways, who lack sufficient technical training to carry out the new tasks assigned by the Five-Year Plan, and who, owing to past sacrifices for the revolution, are now often weak, sick, and absent from their posts. "In not a few central and province level organs," it was reported in early 1978, one half to one third of the leadership and management cadres would be eligible for retirement in three to five years.[33] At lower levels, there has been a decline in morale, motivation, and ethics that has eroded interpersonal solidarity and damaged the bases of trust and cooperation. According to an article in *Tap chi Cong san* in October 1979, "Communists loved and protected one another of necessity during the war," but "a number of individuals" found this mutual devotion difficult to sustain when they shifted to peacetime administration.[34] Such individuals tended to become "divorced from reality and the people," "degenerate and debauched," and more concerned with competition for "profits and social titles" than with cooperation for the common good. Furthermore, cadres whose careers had stagnated while they had languished in the jails of the non-Communist government in the South were jealous of comrades whose careers had experienced no such interruption.

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[27] Broadcast in installments over Radio Hanoi, May 29–31, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 5, 1979, Supplement.

[28] *Nhan dan*, May 23, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 5, 1979.

[29] Sixth VCP Central Committee Plenum Resolution, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Oct. 9 and 11, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 12 and 16, 1979.

[30] Radio Hanoi, Aug. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 9, 1979.

[31] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 13, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 20, 1979.

[32] Campaigns against such faults commenced with an emulation movement and anti-bureaucracy drive in late 1976. See the Premier's directive on the emulation movement, Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Dec. 21, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 29, 1976; and the Premier's directive on the anti-bureaucracy drive, Radio Ho Chi Minh City, Dec. 22, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 29, 1976.

[33] Le Duc Binh, "Gradual Replacement of Leadership and Management Cadres," *Tap chi Cong san*, February 1978, p. 54.

It was inevitable that cadre problems would be most severe in the South. There the supply of locally recruited cadres was shortest, the demands on the administrative structure were heaviest, the justifications for violating procedure seemed strongest, and the opportunities for corruption were greatest. The intractability of these problems was evident in the decision of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Council in December 1979 to launch still another campaign against "negativism, bureaucracy, officialism, thievery, bribery and . . . oppression of the masses. . . [,] sabotage . . .[,] speculative hoarding, smuggling and hooliganism."[35] In promulgating this decision, the council revealed that some cadres at "high echelons" had intervened to obstruct proceedings against corrupt individuals, while others had "persecuted their denouncers." Collusion among cadres at all levels to cover up each other's thievery, bribery, and extortion was a major obstacle to correction.[36] And there was fear that the contagion would spread as the South took its odd revenge: "Because of the 'interaction' between the two parts of our country, the vestiges of the blatant practice of bribery left behind by the neocolonialist system in the southern society have invaded the North."[37]

One of the party's principal problems in the South has been its relatively small size there. Party membership probably was not more than 200,000 at the war's end and in mid-1978 stood at 273,000, about 1.3 percent of the South's population.[38] This figure contrasted with a total party membership at the time of the Fourth Congress of 1,533,500, or 3.13 percent of the total population. Northern membership was then about 6.3 percent of the North's population.[39] The small size of the party organization in the South was attributable to combat deaths, assassination, imprisonment, and the difficulty between 1965 and 1975 of finding people who were willing to risk such fates among that portion of the population that was susceptible to mobilization.

It was this condition of limited party membership that required Hanoi to send large numbers of northern party and state cadres to the South in 1975. But the assignment of personnel (and some "regroupees" of Southern origin who had lived in the North since 1954) could only be a stop-gap measure, as it depleted resources needed in the North and risked a backlash in the South. Nonetheless, the Fourth Congress stressed the need to recruit cautiously, because of unfavorable social conditions.[40] The peasantry was not yet collectivized, even poor peasants and farm laborers were still dominated by the "small-producer mentality," and the intelligentsia was overwhelmingly bourgeois. Thus, there was fear that "reactionaries and spies" would infiltrate the party.

To southern cadres, these guidelines must have seemed to legitimize the prejudices that they held against that part of the population which in their view had been implicated in the effort to exterminate them. Recruitment of new members proceeded very slowly because these cadres tended to disqualify candidates on the basis of extremely tenuous connections to the old Saigon government, citing the "complex" situation to justify elaborate screening procedures and impossibly high standards for political reliability. According to an article in the party theoretical journal in 1978, potentially valuable assets such as "the former regime's scientific and technical cadres and intellectuals" were going unexploited.[41] The effect of denying membership to anyone who had had any connection whatsoever with the former government, the journal pointed out, would be the permanent underdevelopment of the party organization in the South because "very few families did not have one or more of their members in the puppet army and administration."

Throughout the country, the party has suffered from disorganization, inadequate education levels, neglect of the preparation and recruitment of new members, and failure to weed out substandard members. To try to restore the party to health, the Central Committee Secretariat in May 1979 announced a campaign to intensify party development work. The campaign was to culminate in a general review and requalification of members, i.e., a purge, extending into 1980.[42] Although this and related pronouncements drew a parallel with the campaign to recruit a "Ho Chi Minh class" of party members in 1970, the present campaign seems more systematic and far-reaching.

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[34] Trong-Nghia, "Comradeship," ibid., October 1979, pp. 76–79.

[35] Radio Hanoi, Dec. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 11, 1979.

[36] Official SRV sources have reported trials of cadres for corruption, and a recent inmate of Ho Chi Minh City's Chi Hoa prison has claimed that "most of the prisoners are bureaucrats of the present regime accused of accepting bribes." Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), May 10, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 13, 1980.

[37] Phan Lang, "Practice of Bribery," *Tap chi Cong san*, March 1980, pp. 68–71, translated in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 16, 1980.

[38] Elliott, "Vietnam," p. 358, citing Alexander Casella in *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Spring 1978, p. 72, and *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 18, 1978.

[39] Speech by Le Duc Tho at Fourth Party Congress, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Dec. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 23, 1976.

[40] Central Committee Political Report, Part II, as conveyed by the Vietnam News Agency, in *FBIS-APA*, Supplement, Vol. 2, Dec. 27, 1976, p. 9. See also Le Duc Tho's speech at the Congress, loc. cit.

[41] Nguoi xay dung (pseud., "The Builder"), "Relationship," *Tap chi Cong san*, November 1978, pp. 93–95, translated in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 4, 1979.

As the Secretariat observed in launching the campaign, many hamlets, factories, military units, and schools, especially in southern and mountainous regions, still lacked party chapters. The unevenness of the party's geographic and functional distribution translated into uneven performance in the implementation of orders.

The party also suffered from chronological unevenness, the result of "massive recruitment" in one period (the party doubled in size from 1965 to 1975) followed by "sluggish recruiting" in the next.[43] According to *Tap chi Cong san*, "very many" basic-level party organs had failed in the preceeding 10 years to recruit a single new member, and in some localities upwards of 70 percent of these organs had conducted no party development work.[44] The result, in the words of the Secretariat's directive, was an "inordinately high average age of party members." Actually, the problem was not so much the high average as the extreme shortage of members in the 18 to 30 range, which meant that the party soon would have difficulty replenishing its mid-level and leadership ranks with selected, experienced people.[45] This was a problem to which veteran but otherwise unqualified senior members had contributed by "obstinately holding on to their positions, . . . obstructing the party's efforts to absorb new vitality from society."[46]

Another kind of unevenness was the underrepresentation of important groups. Workers (*cong nhan*) accounted for only 8.8 percent of party membership; ethnic minorities, 9.6 percent; and women, 17 percent.[47] Now that national independence and reunification had been achieved, it was time to erase the legacy of largely peasant-based struggles and to make the VCP a party of the proletariat in more than rhetoric.

And finally, there were elliptical references to party members who were "very courageous . . . in one struggle" but "cowardly or corrupt in a new one."[48] These pointed to the singular lack of enthusiasm for the conflicts with China and Kampuchea among members who, after lifetimes of war, had found peace congenial.

The Secretariat directed that party chapters be established in all basic-level organizations of society by the end of 1980. Recruitment of new members was to give priority to people who had been active in revolutionary movements during the war, to people in the South and mountainous areas, and to youth, women, and ethnic minorities. Special effort was to be made to recruit people between the ages of 18 and 30 who were technical workers in factories, members of cooperatives or production collectives, military personnel, or students in colleges and vocational schools.

The Secretariat further directed that all existing members be evaluated for political awareness, functional competence, and motivation, and, if found unfit, be reeducated or ejected from the party. Even "key cadres" were to be "decisively removed" if they were found to "have committed errors."[49] The review process was completed in late 1979, and members who passed review began to receive membership cards on the party's 50th anniversary, February 3, 1980. (This was the first time in the party's history that it had used the device of distributing new cards to all qualified members to effect a purge.) Card No. 000001 was issued in memoriam to Ho Chi Minh, No. 000002 went to Le Duan, and No. 000003 to Truong Chinh.[50]

Some indication of how many members may be dropped when this process is completed in late 1980 appeared in a report in April 1980. In the nearly 12 percent of all party organizations then finished with the campaign, "more than 80 percent of the members . . . were declared as qualified for receiving party membership cards."[51] During the first quarter of 1980, almost 70 percent of the new members were from military party organizations, and more than 90 percent were 30 or younger.[52]

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[42] Radio Hanoi, May 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, May 25, 1979.

[43] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, June 12, 1979.

[44] Editorial, "Pay Attention to Developing the Party and to Perfecting and Consolidating the Party's Organization," *Tap chi Cong san*, July 1979, p. 2.

[45] In many party committees (*dan bo*) where this was reported to be a problem, the average age was from 40 to 42, sometimes higher. Ibid., p. 3.

[46] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, loc. cit.

[47] "Pay Attention to Developing . . . ," p. 6.

[48] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, June 8, 1979, loc. cit.

[49] Central Committee Secretariat directive, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, May 25, 1979, loc. cit.

[50] Radio Hanoi, Feb. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 6, 1980.

[51] Radio Hanoi, Apr. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 24, 1980.

[52] Radio Hanoi, May 5, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 6, 1980.

Hoang Van Hoan, then a member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers' Party, renamed the Vietnam Communist Party in December 1976, shown at the 11th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in March 1976.

—EUPRA.

The Intraparty Debate

The foregoing developments could not have occurred without provoking debate within the party; they also held potential for exacerbating its divisions. While there were already signs of a variety of frictions at the Fourth Congress, no party source has mentioned debate on the issue upon which it was obviously most difficult to achieve consensus—namely, the strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union at the risk of confrontation with China.[53] Subsequent evidence suggests that some leaders refused to be reconciled with the majority position. Political Bureau member Hoang Van Hoan, a former ambassador to China, was divested of all his party posts, and four other former emissaries to the People's Republic of China (Ly Ban, Ngo Minh Loan, Ngo Thuyen, and Nguyen Trong Vinh) lost their seats on the Central Committee. Three individuals with links to the minorities that straddle the China-Vietnam border (Chu Van Tan, Le Quang Ba, and Tran Dinh Tri) also were dropped from the Central Committee.

Opposition to the international line did not completely subside, however, as events following the fifth plenum in July 1978 made clear. By this time, the SRV had joined CMEA, China had suspended aid to the SRV, the final decision to invade Kampuchea had been reached, and Hanoi was about to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. The movement toward confrontation was irreversible. Yet editorials still inveighed against unnamed "bourgeois nationalist" elements within the party who, under the influence of "opportunists and reactionaries in the international revolutionary movement" (i.e. China), had strayed from the true path of proletarian internationalism.[54] China was "opportunistic" and "bourgeois nationalist" because it went so far in pursuing its national interests, in opposition to the world revolution led by the Soviet Union, as to seek a tacit alliance with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. "Opportunists" and "bourgeois nationalists" in the VCP obviously were party members who refused to accept one or a combination of the following: the growing dependence on the Soviet Union, the forcible overthrow of Pol Pot, the confrontation with China, and the alienation of non-Communist neighbors.

The charge against this internal opposition was the most serious that could be made. One editorial, naming three "traitors" during the French colonial period, noted that "no party engaged in revolutionary struggle has ever been able to avoid losses and betrayal by some people" and that a party "often has to leave behind or discard weak elements incapable of enduring trials or bent on giving up or betraying the cause."[55] Thus, it was apparently felt necessary to suppress the still strong dissent with the threat of a purge.

A year later, Hoang Van Hoan deplaned at Karachi while en route to East Berlin and took the "Kissinger Trail" to Beijing, where he issued a lengthy rebuttal to Hanoi's charge of Chinese duplicity. Shortly thereafter, Ly Ban, Tran Dinh Tri, Le Quang Ba, and Chu Van Tan were reported to have been placed under house arrest.[56]

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[53] In retrospect, Le Duc Tho's references at the Fourth Congress to "great power chauvinistic tendencies," "selfish nationalism," and "arbitrary patriarchy" in passages discussing the party's commitment to proletarian internationalism and traditions of unity appear to have been veiled attacks on members of the party who resisted this trend. See his speech to the Congress, loc. cit.

[54] See especially *Nhan dan*, Aug. 1, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 2, 1978; *Nhan dan*, Aug. 2, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 2, 1978; and "Proletarian Internationalism and Bourgeois Nationalism," *Tap chi Cong san*, September 1970, pp. 35–40.

[55] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Aug. 4, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 3, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 8, 1978.

As the fifth plenum in July 1978 sought to impose unity on international issues, it also had to deal with the reappearance of dissent in domestic politics. From party commentary at the time, it appears that this dissent arose from the inability of many party members to adjust to new peacetime roles and from economic difficulties that provided these members an opportunity to vent their grievances against the party's choice of a development model. The core of the dissent was in the large proportion of party members who had been recruited during the "national democratic" phase of the revolution (pre-1954 in the North and pre-1975 in the South), who were accustomed by experience in that phase to be "bourgeois patriotic" and were lacking in class consciousness, and who were mostly of rural, often middle-peasant, origin. Such cadres were inclined to "overemphasize the role of the peasantry and to deny the leadership of the working class,"[57] or to hold the "counterscientific concept that the poorest social class is the most revolutionary one and that the communist party is the party of the poor and landless peasants."[58] These views led many members to misinterpret or even deliberately subvert directives on building the dictatorship of the proletariat, centralizing management under the "people's collective mastership," distributing income according to labor, and proletarianizing the party. Clinging to "utopian" and "pseudosocialist" fantasies, they preferred an agrarian road to socialism over the established line on developing industry, a long-range goal from which the leadership refused to swerve despite existing difficulties.[59]

While these issues highlighted the domestic tension between the party's origins in largely peasant-based revolutionary struggles and the peacetime priorities of socialist industrialization, they were entwined with the debate over the international line. Criticisms of overemphasis on the role of the peasantry appeared alongside attacks on "traitors" and suggested parallels with Chinese—or, more specifically, "Maoist"—positions that had long been discredited within the party. Although some members may have seized upon economic difficulties to intensify objections to the development model, the party majority obviously sought to stigmatize dissent with a Chinese association. It is inconceivable that the current purge is not intended in part to remove members who oppose or weakly support the anti-China line and the long-term development strategy aimed at shifting the nation's center of gravity from agriculture to industry and from peasants to workers.

Key figures in the Vietnamese government in early 1980: from left to right, Interior Minister Pham Hung, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Defense Minister Van Tien Dong.

—Jean-Claude Labbé/Gamma-Liaison.

The terms of debate shifted, without significantly affecting the tensions discussed above, when the sixth plenum made changes in economic policy in 1979. These changes, it will be recalled, softened some of the emphasis on socialist transformation that had been quite marked since the acceleration of cooperativization in 1977 and the abolition of private trade in the South in 1978. While the modifications undoubtedly pleased individuals who believed priority had to be given to increasing production by whatever means worked, these modifications were opposed by those who remained dedicated to transforming production relations first. One might think that, given the circumstances, no cadre could persist in advocating the liquidation of any productive potential, but public explanations of the plenum resolution made clear that opposition existed. "It is wrong," *Nhan dan* editorialized, "to regard the sideline family economy and the other private activities . . . as the tail of capitalism, to oppose them to the interests of socialism and to seek ways to reduce or prohibit these activities."[60] Similarly, overstress on psychological as opposed to material incentives was criticized:

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[56] Nayan Chanda, "A Massive Shock for Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 10, 1979. But note that Chu Van Tan spoke on "the settlement of nomads and the training of ethnic minority cadres" at the National Assembly meeting of Dec. 28, 1978. Radio Hanoi, Dec. 28, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 23, 1979, Supplement.

Hoang Van Hoan was sentenced to death in absentia for high treason by the Supreme People's Court in June 1980. For the court communique, see Vietnam News Agency, June 26, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, June 27, 1980.

[57] *Nhan dan*, Aug. 1, 1978, loc. cit.

[58] *Nhan dan*, Aug. 2, 1978, loc. cit.

[59] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Aug. 5, 1978, as broadcast over Radio Hanoi, Aug. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 8, 1978.

> *Any tendency to regard attention to individual material incentives as inconducive to the working masses' revolutionary zeal is erroneous. On the contrary, completely ignoring the workers' economic interests while emptily calling for revolutionary zeal is nothing more than the manifestation of an extremely dangerous kind of voluntarism.*[61]

Thus, between the fifth and sixth plenums, the weight of opinion in the leadership shifted from emphasizing socialist transformation to emphasizing immediate production increases at some cost to ideological purity, but support for this shift was not universal. No doubt this issue will be an important agenda item when circumstances permit a return to the earlier order of priorities.

Leadership Changes

In most Communist countries, developments as complex and divisive as those which the SRV has experienced since 1976 would lead to major changes of leadership as a matter of course, and there is good reason to believe that the Vietnamese, no longer facing a threat to national survival and now nearing a generational succession, will not continue to be immune to such changes. For the moment, however, the remarkable solidarity of the top leadership (which the singular Hoang Van Hoan affair served only to affirm) provides a foundation of stability and continuity, regardless of shuffles in responsibility or rank. The Political Bureau apparently still practices a consensual style of decision-making, and alignments within the Bureau evidently still shift depending on the issue. In analyzing the SRV leadership, therefore, it remains essential to avoid assumptions about dichotomous factions, misleading labels for presumed ideological tendencies, and hasty conclusions. Furthermore, it is necessary to be cautious about imputing specific policy positions to individuals or drawing relationships between policy and personnel shifts, because in the SRV's constricted policy process interpersonal accommodation often supersedes diametrical opposition. The interpretation of leadership changes in the SRV must assume this process is complex and fluid yet held together by traditions of consensus and incrementalism among top leaders.

Early 1979 brought the first leadership changes of any consequence since the Fourth Congress in 1976, in the form of several new appointments in the SRV Council of Ministers.[62] About the same time, there was speculation that so-called "pro-Soviet hard-liners" led by Le Duan were in the ascendancy and that the "moderate" Premier Pham Van Dong was about to be shunted aside by "promotion" to the Presidency, making way for Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to become Premier and for Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung to replace Giap at Defense.[63] The massive cabinet reshuffle announced in February 1980 seemed to confirm this prediction.[64] General Giap relinquished his post as Minister of Defense, which he had held continuously since 1946 except for one brief interlude, but he remained a vice-premier and very active in important state affairs. Dung was duly promoted to Minister of Defense.

But speculation about future shifts and the motives for them should be regarded with skepticism. Pham Van Dong remains Premier (his position since 1955) without any decline in status, and though the death of Ton Duc Thang on March 30, 1980, left the Presidency vacant, the current Acting President and former head of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Tho, could stay in this position as a symbol of regional solidarity.[65] Moreover, General Giap seems an implausible candidate for the premier-

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[60] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 27, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 4, 1979.

[61] Editorial, *Nhan dan*, Sept. 24, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 28, 1979.

[62] Nguyen Ngoc Triu replaced Vo Chi Cong as Minister of Agriculture, Huynh Tan Phat became Chairman of the State Commission for Capital Construction, and Nguyen Tuan Tai succeeded Hoang Van Kieu as Minister of Afforestation, freeing Kieu to replace Le Quang Ba as Chairman of the State Commission for Nationalities. Vietnam News Agency, Feb. 24, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 26, 1979. Only the substitution of Kieu for Ba, one of the men reportedly placed under house arrest in connection with the debate over policy toward China, had clear political significance.

[63] Derek Davies, "Carter's Neglect, Moscow's Victory," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 2, 1979, pp. 16–21.

[64] Vietnam News Agency, Feb. 7, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 8, 1980.

[65] An alternative "promotion" that some analysts have hypothesized is that Dong might receive the chairmanship of the State Council that will come into existence upon promulgation of the new constitution. (For the draft version of the constitution, see *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 21, 1979, Supplement. Recent indications suggest that the final version will contain some minor modifications when it appears in the near future.) However, the Council in effect will supplant the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, an organ that Truong Chinh, ranked second in the Political Bureau, just ahead of Dong, has chaired since 1960 and managed to use as a base of influence. If Dong is named Chairman of the Council, the problem then would be to compensate Chinh, who could make his own claim to the Council chairmanship.

A Vietnamese military delegation in Moscow on March 11, 1977: from left to right, Le Trong Tan, then Deputy Chief and now Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN); Soviet Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov; Vo Nguyen Giap, then Vietnamese Minister of Defense; Le Quang Hoa, then Deputy Chief of the Main Political Department of the PAVN; First Deputy USSR Defense Minister N.V. Ogarkov; Soviet Air Force Colonel General G.P. Skorikov; and First Deputy USSR Defense Minister V.G. Kulikov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ship, because of his personality and because of latent fears within the leadership of Bonapartism.[66]

If these shifts do occur, the top leaders' consciousness of their mortality may play a larger role than differences over policy. Signs of a desire to groom successors were evident at the Fourth Congress, and the subsequent policy shifts have been made without disturbing party ranks. Moreover, the age factor grows inexorably in importance. With the 12 most senior Political Bureau members averaging 70 years of age and differing in age by only seven years, there is good reason to make way for younger men by "promoting" elder statesmen. Trying to explain the specific shift mentioned above in terms of age, however, is somewhat dubious. While Dong at 74 is the oldest of the senior leaders, he is only two years older than Party Secretary-General Le Duan. Giap, at 68, is one of the youngest of the top leaders. (See Table 1.)

The February 1980 cabinet changes affected 19 people altogether. One potentially significant change was Vice-Premier Pham Hung's appointment as Minister of Interior to replace Tran Quoc Hoan. Hoan had held the post since 1953. This change may have come about as the result of the Ministry of Interior's inability to cope effectively with several internal security problems, especially the stubborn dissidence of ethnic minorities in southern central Vietnam. Certainly, Pham Hung, a southern-born leader who headed the southern party organization from 1967 to 1975, focused attention on security in the central highlands immediately upon taking office. But official Vietnamese sources claimed Hoan's health was the primary consideration.[67]

Another suggestive cluster of changes involved the State Planning Commission. In all, five men lost or gained positions in the Commission. The longtime chairman, Le Thanh Nghi, and his assistant, Nguyen Huu Mai, were removed from their posts; Vice-Chairman Nguyen Lam was promoted to the chairmanship; and two men of essentially "technocratic" persuasion were named vice-chairmen. These changes may have reflected disenchantment with Nghi, but it is noteworthy that he presented the government's economic report to the National Assembly

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[66] A volatile and brusque individual, Giap does not enjoy such broad trust among his colleagues as Dong. For a somewhat fanciful account of intraelite maneuvers that focuses on Giap's political ambitions, see the interview with a former major in the SRV intelligence services by Jean-Louis Arnaud in *Le Matin* (Paris), Oct. 17 and 27–28, 1979.

[67] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Apr. 1, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 1, 1980.

Table 1. Members of the Vietnam Communist Party's Political Bureau and Their Responsibilities

(as of June 1980)

	Position in central party organs			Position in the central government			Other positions
(Year of birth)	Secretariat of the VCP	VCP Central Committee Dept. headed	Central Military Party Committee	N. Assembly Standing Committee	Council of Ministers	National Defense Council	
Full members							
Le Duan (1908)	Secretary-General					Member	
Truong Chinh (1908)		Legislation; Research on Party History		Chairman		Member	
Pham Van Dong (1906)					Premier	Vice-Chairman	President, Central Committee for Educational Reform
Pham Hung (1912)					Vice-Premier; Minister of Interior		
Le Duc Tho (1910)	Member	Organization	Deputy Secretary				
Vo Nguyen Giap (1912)			Secretary		Vice-Premier	Member	
Nguyen Duy Trinh (1910)	Member					Member	
Le Thanh Nghi (1911)	Member[a]				Vice-Premier	Member	
Van Tien Dung (1917)			Deputy Secretary		Minister of National Defense	Member	
Tran Quoc Hoan (1910)	Member[a]					Member	
Le Van Luong (1910)							Secretary, Hanoi Party Committee
Nguyen Van Linh (1913)	Member						President, Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions
Vo Chi Cong (1912)		Agricultural Transformation			Vice-Premier		Chairman, Committee for Transformation of Southern Agric.
Chu Huy Man (1920)			Deputy Secretary; head, Control Committee				
To Huu (1920)		Science and Education					Vice-President, CC for Educ. Reform
Alternate members							
Vo Van Kiet[b] (not available)							Secretary, Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee
Do Muoi (1910)					Vice-Premier		Chairman, Central Committee for Transformation of Industry and Trade

[a] Nghi and Hoan recently have ceased to be cited as members of the Secretariat and may have been dropped from it. See Vietnam News Agency (hereafter, VNA), June 20, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), June 20, 1980; and VNA, June 20, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, June 25, 1980.

[b] VNA, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980, referred to him as a full Political Bureau member, but so far there has been no other report which would confirm this promotion from alternate member.

SOURCES: VNA, Dec. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 21, 1978; VNA, Aug. 25, 1979, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 29, 1979; Radio Hanoi, Feb. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 21, 1980; name list of state funeral committee for President Ton Duc Thang, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, Mar. 30, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 31, 1980; report on memorial services for President Ton Duc Thang, Radio Hanoi, Apr. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 3, 1980; and VNA, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980.

in December 1979 and has continued to speak on development policy. Moreover, the new appointees have not articulated any major modifications of long-range goals or strategy.

Health quite likely was a factor in the departure of Nguyen Duy Trinh from his posts as Minister of Foreign Affairs and vice-premier. Trinh was replaced by Nguyen Co Thach, who already had taken over many of Trinh's duties the preceding year as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, attached to the Premier's Office. Trinh also may have wished to return to party organization work in connection with the campaign to rebuild the party.

Other changes in the state structure involved mainly exchanges of portfolios. What significance they might have is even more speculative.

In the army, Giap's departure and Dung's promotion opened the position of Chief of the General Staff for Le Trong Tan, a Soviet- and East German-trained professional officer who had been deputy commander of armed forces in the South for much of the war against the United States. Tan also was promoted to the rank of colonel general at this time. Chu Huy Man, Tan's political officer in the final campaign of the war in the South and head of the Army's General Political Directorate since the Fourth Congress, was accorded the rank of senior general, equal in status to Giap, Dung, and Hoan Van Thai.[68]

Though it may seem such sweeping changes should have important political implications, the foolhardiness of inferring much from them is evident in the fact that few parallel changes occurred in the party. The order of precedence in the Political Bureau (as shown in Table 1) remains the same as it was at the Fourth Congress, except that Van Tien Dung has leapfrogged over Tran Quoc Hoan. To Huu and possibly Vo Van Kiet have been promoted from alternate to full membership.[69] The political ambiguity is underlined by the case of To Huu. Though made a full Political Bureau member and vice-premier in February, he was replaced by Hoan Tung, the editor of *Nhan dan*, as Chairman of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Ideological Education Department and apparently no longer occupies the seat on the Secretariat that he held at the Fourth Congress. Likewise, Le Thanh Nghi, no longer Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Tran Quoc Hoan, no longer Minister of Interior, both won seats on the Secretariat subsequent to the Fourth Congress, and may still hold them. At the level of the Central Committee, it is equally difficult to determine the precise significance of reassignments of party responsibilities.

About the only patterns that can be discerned in the foregoing leadership changes (and a few others at lower levels, not discussed here) are the gravitation of power toward leaders who are likely to give consistent support to the policies of Le Duan. Advances also were made by leaders who had key roles in the planning and execution of the war for reunification. Since Le Duan was perhaps the most persistent advocate among top party leaders of forcible reunfication, there is a great deal of overlap between the two groups. It is not inconceivable that a mutual regard built up among those men while they were jointly arguing for particular strategies during that war has become mutual support in postwar politics. If these observations are justified, they point to consolidation rather than erosion of support for the basic principles enunciated at the Fourth Congress. Thus, they indicate continuity rather than change in the fundamentals of both international and domestic policy.

The Future

Despite adjustments such as those adopted at the sixth plenum, the VCP remains committed to the construction of a modern, industrialized socialist state based on adaptation of the post-1960 East European and Soviet models. It will revise its priorities to reflect this commitment as soon as conditions permit. This long-range goal implies, internationally, continuing dependence on the Soviet Union and therefore confrontation with China; and, internally, favorable prospects for the emergence of new leaders from the ranks of the professionally trained and technocratically oriented.

To the extent that departing leaders are successful in arranging their replacement by people from this background, the flexible, rational bureaucratic, and revisionist tendencies in Vietnamese communism will be further strengthened. But it is inevitable that some new leaders will also emerge from the ranks of cadres whose careers matured in the struggle for reunification. The two groups are by no means incompatible, as many individuals who fulfill the first description can be found in the ranks of the latter, but there is more diversity in the origins and qualifications of VCP members now than at any time in the party's past. One change that is bound to flow from the transfer of power to these groups is a shift from leadership by the sophisticated, cosmopolitan "mandarin proletarians" who founded the party or joined in the 1930's to leadership by individuals of somewhat more parochial experience from lower-class, provincial backgrounds.[70]

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[68] Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Jan. 31, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 31, 1980.

[69] Ibid., and Vietnam News Agency, May 21, 1980, in *FBIS-APA*, May 22, 1980.

These facts cannot help but affect the political process in the future, probably in the direction of greater turbulence than has been customary for this very stable, unified party. Reflection on this prospect probably lies behind the apparent ambivalence of top leaders about whether they should step aside for younger men at the upcoming party congress (in late 1980, if held on schedule) and direct the transition from honorific posts, or should retain firm control.

Regardless of the individuals or generations in power, the SRV for the next several years will confront much the same sort of dilemmas that it has faced since the Fourth Congress. Principal among these is how much emphasis should be placed on socialist transformation, when the virtual certainty of continuing economic dependence and external threat must focus attention overwhelmingly on the need for production increases. Against the argument that reorganization of production is the only viable means for the SRV to lay the foundations of development, present conditions require that ideological prescriptions be leavened with flexibility. But the latter approach lengthens the road to socialism. A related dilemma involves the difficulty of reconciling the commitment of party leaders to pushing transformation no faster than the population will tolerate, on the one hand, and the social divisions and malaise, especially in the South, that inhibit building popular consensus on the matter, on the other. The temptation to resort, in the name of national security or the socialist utopia, to coercion, or to tolerate it on the part of harried cadres, must be ever present. The ways in which the VCP resolves these dilemmas will leave lasting marks on the character of the Vietnamese revolution.

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[70] "Mandarin proletarians" refers to the progeny of upper-class Confucian scholars and imperial bureaucrats who had led earlier generations in resistance to French rule. Such individuals dominated the founding generation of the Indochinese Communist Party. See Alexander B. Woodside, *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam,* Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, pp. 201–45.

Books

Political Participation and the Soviet System

By D. Richard Little

JAN S. ADAMS. *Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

THEODORE H. FRIEDGUT. *Political Participation in the USSR*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

ARCADIUS KAHAN and BLAIR A. RUBLE, Eds. *Industrial Labor in the USSR*. Elmsford, NY, Pergamon, 1979.

DAVID LANE and FELICITY O'DELL. *The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education and Control*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

MURRAY YANOWITCH, Ed. *Soviet Work Attitudes: The Issue of Participation in Management*. White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, and London, Martin Robertson, 1979.

IN HIS ACCOUNT of his life as a dissenter and frequent inmate of Soviet penal institutions, Vladimir Bukovsky relates a remarkable instance of participation in the Soviet political system.[1] A number of incarcerated dissidents reacted to a 1975 governmental decree ordering political prisoners to be put to work along with criminal inmates, by launching a letter-writing campaign from their cells. Within two years, this campaign resulted in the rescinding of the decree and the dismissal of several prominent officials. In the land of democratic centralism and mobilizational politics, the success of Bukovsky and his outcast friends in opposing the system through legal channels reminds us once again of the complexities involved in the relationship between Soviet citizens and their government.

On the one hand, no people is more actively involved in governmental activities than the Soviet population. They regularly cast ballots for millions of legislative candidates who assemble in parliamentary bodies (soviets) to vote on bills proposed by the government and party, they belong to a huge variety of social and political organizations which have public functions, they write letters to elected officials expressing complaints and suggestions for public action, and they attend countless public meetings convened to discuss political issues.

On the other hand, the authoritarian nature of the Soviet political system seems to deprive these activities of much real significance beyond the symbolic legitimation of the regime. There is no record of a soviet at any level ever having rejected a government proposal, much of the "popular participation" is formalistic, and the underlying power of the Communist Party leadership to have its way is indisputable.

Still, it is true that much of the leadership's power has been devoted over the years to promoting not only obedient mass compliance with party policies but the enthusiastic involvement of citizens in the generation, implementation, and verification of those policies, always of course within strictly defined limits. What this has produced in the Soviet Union may be "participation" of a sort, but it is not what Americans and most Europeans mean by that term. Soviet participation does not involve the citizenry in the selection of leaders, in the definition of major policy objectives, or in public opposition to those objectives. It is not, therefore, the participation of "citizens," as Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba have defined that term,[2] but a different kind of relationship, one that has proved difficult for Western observers to grasp and conceptualize.

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[1] Vladimir Bukovsky, *To Build a Castle—My Life as a Dissenter*, New York, NY, Viking, 1978.

The books under review have, in different ways, addressed themselves to this task, and they reflect some of the major points of disagreement on the subject. There is a wealth of detailed analysis in the works, much of it based on extensive personal interviews. This is especially true of the volumes by Jan Adams and Theodore Friedgut, which treat in a definitive way the participation of citizens in, respectively, the people's control commissions and organizations associated with local soviets. The book edited by Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble is a collection of conference papers which are on the whole of high quality and which blend well into a coherent and broad-based study of industrial labor in the Soviet Union. The work by David Lane and Felicity O'Dell provides a synthesis of recent Soviet and Western research on the Soviet industrial labor force. It portrays the impressive extent to which Soviet scholars have delved into environmental and attitudinal aspects of the working class and summarizes a good deal of useful information. The collection of six Soviet essays brought together by Murray Yanowitch provides a brief overview of the evolution of Soviet thinking about some aspects of the labor problem. These are nicely integrated in his introductory essay.

THE COLLECTIVE importance of these works lies mainly in the empirical evidence they offer for addressing the complex issue of popular participation in the Soviet Union. They are particularly informative in regard to types of citizen involvement which are not widely practiced in Western countries but which encompass great numbers of Soviet citizens. These types include "control," administrative support, and job-related initiatives.

The control function is the subject of Adams' study of the people's control commissions, which enlist 9.5 million citizen inspectors in a wide variety of activities. They are part of an even larger "public compliance system," which includes 13 million activists attached to soviets or serving as soviet deputies, 10 million trade union inspectors, and more than 4 million Komsomol *prozhektory*. These 36.5 million public inspectors amount to 22 percent of the adult population of the country, and this figure does not include the membership of newspaper inspectorates and a large assortment of smaller, specialized volunteer associations. Adams concludes that "it is likely that one out of every four or five adult citizens participates in some form of public control activity, and this places the citizen inspector in almost every area of economic and social life in the Soviet Union today" (p. 139). The general function of these "citizen inspectors" is to ensure that government and party policies are efficiently and honestly carried out, but as Adams makes clear, they perform other functions as well, involving inputs to policymaking and planning, processing of citizen demands, and socialization.

A second major citizen activity is direct administrative efforts which supplement the work of paid administrators. "The Druzhiny," says Friedgut in his excellent study of political participation, "are a civilian extension of the militia; the house and block committees have functional links to the housing administration in terms of maintaining residence registration and rent

Reviewers in This Issue

D. RICHARD LITTLE—Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University (San Diego, CA); editor of *Liberalization in the USSR*, 1968; contributor of articles on Soviet politics to various symposia and journals such as *Slavic Review*, *Soviet Studies*, and *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.

ROBERT M. SLUSSER—Professor of History, Michigan State University (East Lansing, MI); author of *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, 1973.

HANS H. BAERWALD—Professor of Political Science and Vice-Chairman of the Council on International Comparative Studies, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); author of *Japan's Parliament: An Introduction*, 1974, and essays on Japanese electoral politics in *Asian Survey*.

VLAD GEORGESCU—International Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution (Washington, DC); author of many works on Balkan and Romanian history, including *Politics and History: The Case of the Romanian Communists* and *The Rise of Balkan Nationalism*, both forthcoming.

DENNIS REINHARTZ—Associate Professor of History and Russian, University of Texas (Arlington, TX); contributor to *Slavic Review*, *Problems of Communism*, and other journals; and author of a forthcoming literary biography of Milovan Djilas.

JONATHAN D. POLLACK—Staff Member of the Social Science Department, Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, CA); coeditor and contributor, *Military Power and Policy in Asian States*, 1980; author of *Security, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Foreign Policy*, forthcoming.

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[2] *The Civic Culture*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1965.

records; volunteer staffs attached to clinics help carry out the nonmedical and paramedical work of the clinics" (p. 286). Bernice Madison, in the Kahan and Ruble volume, describes the work of 2.3 million "social insurance representatives," who are elected at general meetings of union groups to assist in the administration of public health and medical care programs. "The delegaty visit union members in their homes and in hospitals; they see to it that the children of the disabled are properly cared for, at home or through placement in day-care centers and institutions; and sometimes they shop and clean house for incapacitated members" (p. 95).

While such undertakings no doubt have some of the characteristics of voluntary participation, it is difficult to distinguish the activities of volunteers from those of their paid counterparts in the bureaucracy. As Rensselaer Lee (in Kahan and Ruble) states, many volunteers "duplicate the assigned responsibilities of some of the overburdened factory administrative offices. In this respect, the mobilization function is less a corrective of formal administration than an extension of it" (p. 121). Nevertheless, they do fulfill some of the regime's participatory goals since "member workers increase their awareness of the technical environment of the enterprise," and thereby "increase their participation in changing this environment . . ." (p. 121).

The third major category of volunteer activity is work directly related to one's job, work which in the American industrial environment would not be viewed as social participation but as a normal activity of employment. The main organizations established to promote this kind of activity are the Society of Inventors and Rationalizers (VOIR) and the Scientific-Technical Societies (NTO), which are described in the Lane and O'Dell volume. While "innovation" is purportedly the major purpose of these organizations, the main activities in practice are providing on-the-job technical training for workers, organizing interbrigade competition for greater productivity, and stimulating worker suggestions for improving the efficiency of machines, production lines, and the quality control of products. The two organizations together have a total membership of nearly 14 million, and their activities are heavily promoted by economic and party officials. While there is obvious economic gain involved, Lane and O'Dell argue:

> *For the Soviet authorities the value of such organizations is as much in providing psychological satisfaction as in economic gain. They have the effect of developing a sense of active participation in the system and attempt to make work more fulfilling for many workers.* (p. 33)

ALL OF these activities involve Soviet citizens in governmental affairs in ways that are not widely practiced in Western democracies. Whether such activities constitute genuine participation in the political system is a matter about which various authors are in sharp disagreement with each other. In addressing the issue, much of this research exhibits a disappointing degree of conceptual vagueness. In every one of the books, virtually all activities of workers are referred to as "participation," and only Friedgut defines the concept in empirically useful terms. Evidence of the involvement of public organizations, trade unions, and collectives of various kinds in reviewing and "approving" policy proposals tends to be offered as proof of participation in policymaking, without clear distinctions being drawn between the legal rights of organizations and their political effectiveness. This is especially true in regard to two fundamental issues: whether the involvement of Soviet citizens is really voluntary, and whether such involvement significantly affects the policy decisions of the top leadership.

Friedgut argues that a citizen's involvement should be considered participation only if it is a voluntary act, which he distinguishes from compulsory acts, "the nonperformance of which draw[s] state-invoked coercive sanctions as distinct from social pressures" (p. 18). But he accepts the Soviet definition of "voluntary" as those acts which are "unpaid and performed (at least theoretically) in addition to the citizen's professional employment . . ." (p. 20). In this sense, all members of mass organizations are "volunteers," since there is no statutory requirement that citizens belong.

Data from other studies make this conclusion unacceptable. For example, Lee, in the Kahan and Ruble volume, reports a Soviet survey that revealed that "a minority of members—one-fourth of the technical staff, two-fifths of the workers —participate by choice" in union activities. For the rest, such involvement amounts to "an involuntary extension of the working day" (p. 126). Adams cites no specific figures regarding the "voluntary" nature of participation in the people's control commissions, but she suggests that in addition to "thousands, or hundreds of thousands" of committed, enthusiastic inspectors, there are probably millions who are disinterested and bored (p. 184). The "voluntary" character of the latter group's activities is highly questionable.

Despite the dubious nature of Friedgut's use of the term "voluntary," the term does have applicability to the Soviet context. The mobilization character of the political system does not prevent many citizens from choosing not to become involved in mass organizations, even when doing so may generate official pressure and unofficial penalties. The Lane and O'Dell study of industrial workers offers persuasive data showing that some of the most heavily promoted collective activities fail to attract many workers. Although the VOIR and NTO together contain nearly 14 million members, a recent Soviet study indicated that 90 percent of unskilled workers and 37.7 percent of skilled workers never participate in these organizations (p. 33). Another study revealed that "participation in some form of social work (such as Komsomol, trade union or club activity) included 64% of the workers on a 'practically always' basis, while 28% 'rarely' participated and 9% 'never' did" (p. 34). In a survey of 10 different Soviet studies of sociopolitical participation, Stephen White (cited in Lane and O'Dell, p. 35) concluded that the average level of participation for technical staff was 67.7 percent and for manual workers, 35.37 percent. Clearly, both technical and manual workers have a choice in the matter, and many choose not be become involved.

Soviet researchers in recent years have also attempted to assess worker attitudes toward participation, with interesting results. Lane and O'Dell cite one study that found that 11 percent of the workers surveyed believed that it was "completely unnecessary" to take part in the administration of production, while 44 percent "said that they did not see the necessity for such participation by everybody . . ." (p. 35). A survey of worker participants in "permanent production conferences" in the Urals showed that less than half of them thought their participation had any significant effect on the efficiency and quality of production (p. 36). In the Yanowitch volume, several Soviet authors attempt to relate the incidence of worker participation to attitudes toward work, with positive results. N.I. Alekseev, for example, finds strong correlations between, on the one hand, the frequency of participation in discussions on production methods and, on the other, the degree to which workers find their jobs interesting and satisfying (pp. 92–93).

These studies make clear that despite the incessant urging of officials and the media, many workers choose not to participate in public organizations and activities. Many others participate reluctantly and indifferently, preferring to avoid unpleasant pressures by contributing a half hour or so a week to public service. And no doubt many participate with enthusiasm and conviction. To a considerable extent, the decision appears to rest with the individual and to impart to the participatory process an important voluntary character.

THE MORE fundamental question is whether these types of participation have any significant effect on policymaking. Most of the authors reviewed here have moved beyond the simple distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation, often applied to the Soviet process, to a view of policymaking as a continuous process of addressing long-term problems. Adams especially has recognized decision-making as:

> . . . *an interlinking series of decisions, in which the partial realization of past decisions provides the premises for new decisions. The degree of implementation of past decisions therefore becomes an input into future decision-making. To the extent that the work of the inspector alters policy outcomes—to the extent that it reduces the "distortion in application of Soviet policy"—it alters the conditions for ensuing decisions in this endless process whereby old policy outcomes are converted to new policy inputs.* (p. 195)

Jerry Hough, in his analysis of policymaking related to wage differentiation in industry (in Kahan and Ruble), goes a step further in arguing that the trade unions have actually exercised political power in advocating a more egalitarian wage policy, a policy which "has been adopted against the advice of leading economists, industrialists, and top officials in the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions" (p. 387). In fact, he states that "all Soviet written sources and all persons who were interviewed insist unequivocally that no governmental agency can take an action that touches on labor relations without the approval—'the second signature' — of the appropriate trade union" (pp. 382–83), a conclusion he cites without disagreement.

This conclusion is rejected by other authors. Ruble (in Kahan and Ruble) argues that while trade union committees may play an instrumental role in protecting workers' rights, "a significant number of factory union and management officials tend to overlook the juridical rights" when those rights conflict with other ends, such as increased production (p. 79). In a work not reviewed here, Mary McAuley has concluded that trade union actions are essentially determined by party policy and not the independent interests of the workers or the unions. "There is no evidence," she states, "that the trade union leadership adopts a different attitude on, for example, wage questions from that of the government's State Committee on Labour and Wages or of individual ministries. (And incidentally, personnel seem to move between posts in the State Committee and top trade-union jobs quite naturally.)"[3]

Regarding the role of the VOIR and NTO in protecting the rights of workers to their inventions and innovations, Lee (in Kahan and Ruble) points out that "in the real world of Soviet enterprise, bureaucratic violations of authorship rights are common, and except in flagrant instances, go unpunished" (p. 123). Furthermore, these two organizations are, according to Lee, dominated by engineering-technical personnel who are directly subordinate to plant management: "In the case of VOIR, workers make up a little over 50 percent of the membership; however, well over 90 percent of the leadership positions are held by engineering-technical personnel." In general, he maintains, the staffs of these and other control agencies "do not, except in rare cases, exist apart from the enterprise collective" (p. 126).

Hough concedes that the adoption of trade union positions on the wage issue by the party leadership "may simply have been a coincidence between Politburo and trade union views" (p. 387), caused by conditions unrelated to the policy objectives of the unions. In fact, as other authors point out, there are persuasive reasons for believing that the apparent success of the trade unions on this issue was heavily, if not totally, dependent on economic and political conditions that might well have determined the Politburo's policy regardless of the unions' advocacy. Lane and O'Dell, for example, stress the importance of structural characteristics of advanced industrial systems as prime determinants of wage scales, personnel policies, educational requirements, and authority structures. Kahan (in Kahan and Ruble) argues that "the strongest impetus toward income equalization during the last decades" (p. 296) has been a demographic factor:

> *The phenomenon of large families among low-earning, low-skilled workers is fast disappearing. The extreme of per capita income inequality was taken care of by those who suffered most. Their response was to have fewer children, and thus ensure a relatively higher income level to the diminished number of their family members.* (p. 297)

Hough himself cites the regime's sensitivity to worker unrest in Czechoslovakia and Poland and an eagerness to prevent a similar phenomenon in the Soviet Union as a factor in moving the Politburo toward greater wage equalization (p. 397). Likewise, Alex Pravda (in Kahan and Ruble) attributes the regime's increasing attention to worker benefits and working conditions to a serious problem of rapid job turnover in industry (p. 337). This approach has long been advocated by unions and by academics, but the regime's recent willingness to move in such a direction seems more easily explained by the desire to solve the problem than by the importunings of interest aggregations.

Academics, like trade unions, are credited by Hough with considerable influence on policymaking. "The scale of scholarly participation in the Soviet policy process," he states, "is enormous" (p. 378), and he cites as an example the Institute of Labor, which employs some 280 research associates and is attached to the State Committee for Labor and Social Questions. No doubt the Institute is an important source of analysis and policy recommendations for officials in the State Committee, but it is also true that the policy positions of academics often find little support among top decision-makers, without which their ability to affect policy decisions is practically nil. In the introduction to his anthology of Soviet articles on participation in industrial management, Yanowitch identifies a number of policy positions representing the strongly held views of prominent academics. Yet he concludes that "none of the findings or proposals included in the studies collected here (or in any other studies that I am aware of) have been translated into institutional changes that would redistribute managerial authority and reduce the enduring barriers between those who plan and control the enterprise's operations and those who execute its work assignments" (p. xiii). Whatever changes along these lines the regime may decide to make, he suggests, are likely to result from evidence that they will improve productivity rather than from advocacy by academics or trade unions.

Whether the Politburo is really listening to the unions, the control commissions, and the myriad other organizations that involve the mass public is very difficult to know, and the present volumes do not, and probably could not, resolve the issue. But one fact seems clear from the works reviewed here: These organizations seem to have established their right, even duty, to speak for the interests of their members. If they also promote party policies—which they obviously do—and are thus part of the overall mobilization mechanism of the regime, they often appear to find, or at least seek, ways to harmonize the objectives of the party and the interests of their members. The advocacy by the trade unions of reduced wage differentiation, in contradiction to the position of many academics and economic leaders, clearly serves the interests of the wage earner against those of management. And since this is an ongoing issue, the union's position is obviously an input to the policymaking process, not merely a matter of implementation.

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[3] Mary McAuley, *Politics and the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Penguin, 1977, p. 247.

Nevertheless, the limits on effective participation are also clear and give no indication of a basic change in the authoritarian, mobilizational nature of the Soviet system. There is no evidence that the party leadership's ability to go either way on the wage issue, for example, is constrained by any forces other than the anticipated success or failure of either policy in stimulating economic growth.

IT REMAINS to consider, therefore, whether there is any real manifestation of popular participation in the factors contributing to that success or failure. Friedgut raises this point in alluding to the failure of some TVA programs in the United States because of "officials who failed to create a desire for solution of local problems among the population of a particular area" (p. 18). A Soviet working class that is unmotivated to contribute to greater productivity may effectively nullify policy decisions of the highest political authorities. Friedgut quotes Teodore Shanin as arguing that "enormous numbers of government decrees and orders all over the world have been voided of effect by the peasant's spontaneous, stubborn, and silent nonfulfillment" (p. 18). If Kahan is correct in attributing the falling birthrate among Soviet urban families to the low wages earned by industrial workers, it is not unreasonable to argue that these families are challenging the Politburo's wage policy and succeeding in forcing a new policy of diminished wage differentiation on that august body, a policy for which the trade unions can take very little credit.

This is surely participation in policymaking, but of a peculiar type. It is, first of all, unorganized and unrepresented by any existing unions, committees, or collectives. The decision to have fewer children, to be frequently late for work, to abandon defective machinery rather than attempt to repair it, to move restlessly from job to job, or to fail to show up for evening classes, is purely an individual decision which nevertheless has important consequences for the party's ability to establish realistic and achievable policy goals.

Second, such actions present the regime not with countervailing power, as is often implied in studies of union and other organizational activities, but only with alternative policy choices, concerning which the regime must weigh the cost, as related to the success of the policy, of failing or refusing to accommodate the interests of the working population.

Third, the effects of this kind of participation are gradual and longterm, rather than focused in time and circumstance. And it depends to a considerable extent on how much, and for how long, the workers are willing to endure the consequences of refusing to cooperate with a powerful and determined party leadership. It is worth remembering that Bukovsky and his friends did not win their struggle with the leadership merely by writing letters. They also endured severe deprivations and punishments from officials and engaged in a desperate hunger strike before the regime finally caved in.

This is political participation in a genuine and determined sense. But it is not the participation of citizens or organized groups interacting in legitimate ways with decision-makers on the basis of shared power. That kind of participation in the Soviet Union is still in a primitive state of development.

The USSR and Western Europe

By Robert M. Slusser

RICHARD PIPES, Ed. *Soviet Strategy in Europe*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1976.

GEORGE GINSBURGS and ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, Eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

EBERHARD SCHULZ, Ed. *Die Ostbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Von nationalstaatlicher Politik zu gemeinsamer Verantwortung* (The Relations of the European Community with the East. From National-State Policy to Common Responsibility). Vienna, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1977.

A.W. DEPORTE. *Europe Between the Superpowers. The Enduring Balance*. New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1979.

CHRISTOPH ROYEN. *Die sowjetische Koexistenzpolitik gegenüber Westeuropa. Voraussetzungen, Ziele, Risiken* (Soviet Coexistence Policy Toward Western Europe. Assumptions, Goals, Risks). Ebenhausen, Haus Eggenberg, 1977.

RENATA FRITSCH-BOURNAZEL. *L'Union Soviétique et les Allemagnes* (The Soviet Union and the Germanies). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH. *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Cambridge, MA, and London, MIT Press, 1978.

THE SOVIET invasion of Afghanistan marked a decisive turning point in Soviet foreign policy. For the first time, strategic military considerations were allowed to outweigh all other factors in the setting of Soviet medium- and short-range goals. The clear implication was that the spokesmen for the military and their civilian allies on the Politburo had been able to put through a decision which radically changed the relationship between the Soviet Union and other nations in the international system.

Although it was not overtly directed against Western Europe, the invasion carried grave implications for that part of the world. It put the Soviets in a strong position to dominate Iran and the Persian Gulf and thereby to threaten the vital flow of Middle East oil to West European industry. Less direct but more ominous were the long-term implications. If a majority in the Politiburo now felt free to launch aggression against an independent nation outside the European theater, what might it not be tempted to do in Europe itself, where the stakes were far higher?

For the nations of Western Europe, therefore, the invasion constituted an urgent call for a reassessment of their relations, individual and collective, with the Soviet Union. Conditions which had grown familiar through usage could no longer be depended upon to continue indefinitely; a new and unpredictable element had been added to the calculus of Soviet foreign policy behavior. Thus, the invasion, coming as it did at the end of December 1979, had the effect of transforming the 1970's from an ongoing present into part of the historical past. Analysis of that past might help cast light on the opportunities and dangers of the new phase which was emerging, but it could no longer claim to define them within reasonably precise limits.

The books under review constitute a significant part of the rich and varied literature on Soviet–West European relations which has appeared in recent years. With all their divergences of approach and focus, they present a coherent picture of a relationship which for a time seemed to possess the attributes of long-term stability. Now that that stability can no longer be trusted to endure, one reads these books with sharpened interest, searching for clues to the seismic shift which has taken place in the formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy.

TWO OF the books under review—those edited by Richard Pipes and by George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein—are the products of collective research efforts undertaken to explore the Soviet-West European relationship in a variety of aspects. We may begin our survey with the Pipes volume because it predates the other (it reflects research undertaken in 1974, while the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein volume is the outcome of a conference held in October 1977) and because it is broadly conceived and wide-ranging in its coverage. The tone of the volume, set at the outset by the editor, is uncompromisingly harsh in its evaluation of Soviet motives. Not surprisingly for a distinguished historian of prerevolutionary Russia, Pipes finds evidence of a continuity between the foreign policy of the USSR and that of Imperial Russia. In his view, there is an organic link between the internal political base of both policies and their strategic objectives, centering upon an unswerving dedication to continuous expansion.

By far the most disquieting contribution to the Pipes volume is that by the well-known British expert on Soviet military affairs, John Erickson. Differing from Thomas W. Wolfe in the same volume, Erickson finds that Soviet military potential in Europe has grown steadily, to the point where it "seems to defy the strictly rational" (p. 206). Soviet levels of force in Europe, he argues, are "now [i.e., 1974] well past purely defensive requirements" (p. 206). Coupled with Western Europe's increasing tendency "to ignore the military factor," this has created a situation, in Erickson's opinion, where "Europe may well become that 'low-risk' option that will suit the Soviet command perfectly" (p. 207).

Erickson thus raises the specter of the ultimate Soviet threat to Western Europe—direct military action. As the world now knows, however, it was another "low-risk option," namely Afghanistan, that caught the fancy of the Soviet leadership.

The essays in the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein volume help cast light on the background of that decision. The editors of the volume announce at the outset their concurrence in Erickson's estimate of Soviet power in Europe. "The sustained Soviet military buildup and deployment of conventional forces in Europe," they write, "has proceeded far beyond what might be presumed necessary for a secure defense or effective deterrent against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . . ." (p. 3). Finding scant evidence, however, of an intention on Moscow's part actually to use its preponderant military force to conquer Western Europe, the editors suggest that its purpose is rather to implement "a Soviet strategy of neutralizing Western Europe" (p. 4). Its goal, in other words, may be to produce "the ultimate form of neutralization," i.e., "Finlandization" (p. 5). Helpfully, Ginsburgs and Rubinstein provide a seven-point checklist of attitudes and policies characteristic of a country which has been "Finlandized," the most cogent of which is the first, "responsiveness in foreign policy to Soviet preferences." The implications of this analysis are driven home in the following essay, by Ginsburgs, which dissects the Soviet concept of neutralism and shows how it has come to incorporate "some of the basic principles that determine Finland's status" (p. 36).

Against this background, half a dozen specialists assess the extent to which the concept of "Finlandization" is applicable to individual nations in Western Europe. Perhaps to the surprise of the editors, the answer in almost every case turns out to be "little or none." The closest approximation to the "Finlandization" model is probably Austria, but even here the analyst, Konrad Ginther, reaches the conclusion that Austria's accommodation of its foreign policy to the Soviet concept of neutrality "has not affected the intrinsic substance of the country's independence as a pluralistic democracy nor has it divested Austria's foreign policy of an identity of its own" (p. 82). With regard to France, Robert Legvold contends that "if Finlandization is a steady slide toward neutralism and bondage to the sensitivities of the Soviet Union, France is not a candidate and is even less a victim" (p. 100). In the case of West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany—FRG), Angela Stent Yergin rules out the alteration of FRG policies through fear of Soviet military power "as long as the FRG has American protection" (p. 129). In Britain, according to Elizabeth Young, the tendency toward "neutralism à la Russe" (Ginsburgs' felicitous expression) is concentrated on the left wing of the Labor Party, but Young believes that while it would be a mistake to rule out the possibility of this group's victory in national politics, a development along these lines is by no means inevitable and can be headed off by better understanding and coordination of policies between London and Washington. As to Norway, C.G. Jacobsen finds that the elaborate Soviet military and naval buildup in the Kola Peninsula "has not sapped [Norway's] will nor . . . her determination" (p. 176). Even Finland itself, the prototype for "Finlandization," fails to fit the Ginsburgs-Rubinstein model, according to George Maude, who maintains that "Finland's constitutional democratic system has been strengthened" as a result of its wartime defeat by and postwar relations with the Soviet Union (p. 61).

Granted that each of the authors cited finds some degree of accommodation to Soviet wishes in the policies of the West European nations surveyed, the general conclusion is unmistakable: the Soviet Union's enormous military buildup in Europe has not produced a commensurate payoff in the form of adoption by the principal nations of Western Europe of policies tailored to Soviet wishes or demands. This conclusion serves to highlight a methodological weakness in the concept of "Finlandization" which merits attention. If "Finlandization" is a process designed to produce certain effects in the policy of a nation through the application of various forms of pressure, then the perceived merits of particular means will likely affect the choice of means by the nation applying the pressure—the Soviet Union. It is here, in all likelihood, that one should look for the root cause of the increasing Soviet emphasis on military power. More than 60 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leaders have seen their hopes for the extension of their system around the globe through nonmilitary means dwindle and die. From the early postrevolutionary expectations of a wave of Marxist-oriented revolutions in Europe to Nikita Khrushchev's unfulfilled prophecies that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in basic indices of production by 1980, the Soviet leaders have had to defer or abandon their hopes for a decisive breakthrough on a world scale. World War II taught them that military power was an indispensable tool for the enlargement of their system, and the conflicts of the cold war, from the Berlin blockade to the Cuban missile crisis, reinforced the lesson by demonstrating that, lacking supreme military power, the Soviet Union could not achieve its objectives in a test of wills with the United States. Alternate means—for example, pressure through trade or the use of national Communist parties in the West—have proven unsatisfactory.

The Soviet leadership's response to this realization took the form of a dramatic change in personalities and style, with the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 and a significant increase in military spending, formalized at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966.

WHAT OF the supranational organizations which have been established in Western Europe, especially the Common Market (EEC)? What has been the Soviet attitude toward such groups? Does Moscow regard them as favorable or hostile to its goals?

These questions are considered but not conclusively answered in the survey edited by Eberhard Schulz, a West German scholar. From the Soviet perspective, Schulz finds, the EEC is fairly effective in integrating the economies of its member states but is far from a genuine regional superstate. In the field of security, moreover, the defense of Western Europe continues to depend on the US nuclear shield and the coordination of West European-US military policies in NATO (pp. 259–60). The most concise formulation of the Soviet attitude toward the EEC, NATO, and similar groupings is provided by Pipes:

> *A persistent feature of Soviet policy toward Western Europe has been the effort to break up all political, economic, and military alliances, the very existence of which obstructs Soviet objectives.* (Pipes, p. 30)

TWO OF the books under review survey Soviet-West European relations in historical perspective but reach sharply diverging conclusions. A.W. DePorte, a former member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State and now head of the West European office of the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, sums up his view of the relationship in his book's title, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance*. For DePorte, the division of Europe, including Germany, into an Eastern and a Western component, each of which is oriented toward one of the two superpowers, is the fortunate result of a historical process which, through no one's deliberate calculation, produced a system possessing stability, internal coherence, and durability. After an able review of the historical process which led to the present division of Europe, DePorte concludes that today's state system reflects "the true balance of power in the Europe that has emerged from the crises of the twentieth century," and he predicts for this system "a strong lease on the future" (p. 244).

A parallel survey by a West German scholar, Christoph Royen, directs its attention primarily to what the author sees as the internal contradictions in Soviet foreign policy, especially in the policy of détente. To Royen, there is a fundamental clash between the goals of that policy and the use of military force by the Soviets to achieve their foreign policy goals. Moscow's failure to reconcile these and other sources of conflict in its policies, in Royen's opinion, prevents it from achieving a truly stable relationship with Western Europe and forces the states of that region to organize for their common defense, despite their reluctance to assume military burdens, their internecine disputes, and their occasionally sharp divergence from the policies of the United States. For Royen, therefore, the balance achieved in Europe since 1945 is an inherently unstable one, and he takes a much less sanguine view of its prospects than does DePorte.

About the only point on which DePorte and Royen wholeheartedly agree is that it is the German problem which lies at the heart of the Soviet-West European relationship. Two of the books under review, those by Renata Fritsch-Bournazel and William E. Griffith, address themselves specifically to the historical process whereby Germany, after its defeat in World War II, underwent a process of bifurcation which saw the emergence of two German states, the (West) German Federal Republic (FRG), a member of NATO and the cornerstone of the European Community, and the (East) German Democratic Republic (GDR), a member of the Warsaw Pact and a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. The two books necessarily cover much of the same ground, each devoting particular attention to the series of interlocking treaties which the FRG concluded in 1970–73 with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, and of which the 1971 Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin forms an integral part. These treaties, which marked the opening of a new phase in Soviet-West European relations, stemmed from foreign policy initiatives of both the USSR and West Germany.

Fritsch-Bournazel's treatise, sponsored by the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, is comparatively restrained in its documentation and soberly optimistic in its conclusion, echoing DePorte's view of a basic equilibrium in Soviet policy toward the two German states that yields a fundamental stability in Soviet-West European relations. In his coverage of the same historical data, the American scholar William E. Griffith goes into much greater detail in tracing the successive stages of West German *Ostpolitik* (policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) and makes clear how significant were the concessions granted by the Soviets in order to reach agreement with the FRG. Griffith specifically brings out the political price paid by the Soviets, including the exertion of intense pressure on the GDR leadership and the forced retirement of its strongman, Walter Ulbricht, whom the Soviets saw as an obstacle in the path of reconciliation with West Germany. Also apparent from Griffith's account is the personal stake of Leonid Brezhnev in the accommodation with the FRG. Griffith's careful historical analysis thus serves to underline the conclusion reached by Royen as to the paradoxical and contradictory nature of Soviet policies toward Western Europe, since it was Brezhnev, by his sanction of the enormous Soviet military buildup in Europe, who helped undermine the conditions under which the Soviet-FRG reconciliation could have achieved the kind of quasi-permanent status which DePorte and Fritsch-Bournazel attribute to it.

AT THE Tehran Conference in 1943, Stalin voiced the brutal truth which lies at the heart of the Soviet dilemma in Europe. In the course of the Big Three discussion of the possibility of dismembering Germany after its defeat, Stalin uttered a warning: "There are no means," he said, "which can rule out the possibility of the unification of Germany" (cited by Fritsch-Bournazel, p. 20, from the 1967 Soviet publication *Tegeran — Yalta — Potsdam).* The deceptively solid-looking equilibrium which has been reached in Europe since the emergence of the two German states in 1949 suffers from this fatal flaw. Only continued Soviet military pressure can ensure maintenance of a balance which rests ultimately on a violation of basic political realities, and, paradoxically, the more the Soviets increase their military preponderance in Europe, the more precarious becomes the continuation of détente in that region.

When Brezhnev's November 1979 offer of a token troop withdrawal from the GDR in return for NATO's abandonment of its plans to upgrade its missile strength was unceremoniously brushed aside by NATO policymakers, the Soviets' European détente policy suffered a crippling blow. Was it in part because of this fiasco that the Politburo decided on the Afghanistan adventure? Whatever the connection may have been between the two events, the overall conclusion is unmistakable. As the new decade gets under way, the Soviet leadership has locked itself into a foreign policy strategy in which military force constitutes the preferred modus operandi. Perhaps the recognition of that fact, unpalatable though it may be, will help the West European nations overcome their internecine squabbles as well as their quarrels with their trans-Atlantic allies.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

By Hans H. Baerwald

RODGER SWEARINGEN. *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

CYRIL E. BLACK et al. *The Modernization of Japan and Russia*. New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975.

DAGMAR AHRENS-THIELE. *Japans Rohstoffpolitik im Kräftefeld Moskau-Peking* (Japan's Raw Materials Policy in the Moscow-Peking Sphere of Influence). Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1977.

MANFRED POHL. *Die Kommunistische Partei Japans* (The Japan Communist Party). Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1976.

THE CLOSENESS of Japan and Russia geographically has rarely been reflected in close political relations between the two countries, periodic protestations of mutual admiration and substantial commercial and cultural interaction notwithstanding. Public opinion surveys conducted by Japanese newspapers during the post-World War II era, for example, have consistently reflected the attitude that the Soviet Union rivals Korea as the country "most disliked" in Japan.[1]

Scattered evidence suggests that many Russians share similar feelings for the Japanese. Some years ago, a senior Soviet specialist on "things Japanese" criticized me personally (and, by implication, Americans generally) for being too "soft" in our assessments of the Japanese. He summed up his warning with the well-worn cliché, "give the Japanese a centimeter, and they'll take several kilometers."

The latter comments arose in a discussion of Soviet policy concerning the "northern islands," whose occupation by the USSR since World War II has remained a burr in the saddle for the Japanese. Ever since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1956, the Russians have shunted aside discussion of the issue. Moreover, lest anyone forget, Japan and the Soviet Union have not signed a World War II peace treaty with each other.

Rodger Swearingen's book, *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan*, is useful in providing an overview of the diplomatic and strategic dimensions of this troubled relationship. The author's personal experience in the headquarters of US General Douglas MacArthur in postwar Tokyo and the pioneering research that he and Paul Langer published a quarter of a century ago[2] serve him particularly well in discussion of the early stages of Russo-Japanese relations after World War II.

AT FIRST GLANCE, the gulf between the two states might seem to be rooted in the dissimilarities of the two societies. Indeed, to specialists familiar with either the Soviet Union or Japan, the societies would appear to be so different as to be noncomparable. Japan is insular, ethnically homogeneous, and monolingual, whereas Russia is continental, ethnically heterogeneous, and polyglot—to mention only the most superficial contrasts. Therefore, the findings of *The Modernization of Japan and Russia* come as something of a shock. In this breathtakingly wide-ranging comparative effort, Professor Cyril E. Black and his colleagues (mostly of Princeton University) provide meticulously amassed evidence to support their overall hypothesis that "in most of the ways in which their development can be measured—in education, urbanization, production—[Japan and Russia] have achieved comparable levels" (p. 2).

Both societies were latecomers in embarking on the road to modernization—defined in the Black volume as "the process by which societies have been and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution" (p. 3). The two began their transformation in the latter half of the 19th century, during which decades they made substantial strides economically and educationally, and more halting changes in political structures.

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[1] See Chart 2 in Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1964–1973," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977, p. 125.

[2] *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1952.

Their paths of modernization first crossed as a result of their increasing conflict over Korea and northeast China, which generated a dispute that provided the seeds for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Ostensibly, the Japanese won that contest on land and (possibly more important) on the seas—in the Tsushima Straits that separate southwestern Japan from the tip of the Korean peninsula. At this juncture, Japan's transformation—as exemplified by one of the key slogans of the Meiji era (1868-1912), *fukoku-kyohei*, usually translated as "rich country, strong military"—would seem to have been more successful, especially if Japan's then relatively stable political structure were contrasted with the increasingly unstable Tsarist regime. Nonetheless, the presumably benign intervention by US President Theodore Roosevelt, which brought the combatants to the conference table in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, denied Japan many of the potential territorial fruits of its near victory, even if it saved the Japanese from the dangers of serious overexertion and of a possible undermining of their as yet frail modern economic base.

In many respects, the Russo-Japanese War set a pattern of conflictual relations between the two countries in this century. After the end of World War I, during which both were among the Allied and Associated Powers, Japan participated in the Siberian intervention against the newly established Bolshevik government. At the very end of World War II, during nearly all of which Japan and the USSR had observed the terms of their mutual neutrality pact, the Russians—prodded by the United States—helped to bring about Japan's somewhat conditional "unconditional surrender" (it permitted retention of the institution of the Emperor).

Throughout this period of international trauma, both societies continued their modernizing transformation, and in both cases, considerable domestic violence accompanied the process. This was more noticeable in Russia than in Japan. Black et al. offer in explanation the suggestion that "some of the violence of Japanese life during the years 1860-1941 was not so much quelled as exported through foreign war and colonial exploitation" (p. 57). If valid, this explanation raises an interesting further hypothesis: that the Soviet Union might have been more tranquil domestically in the 1920's and 1930's if only the Russian Revolution had triggered a worldwide—or, at least a Europe-wide—revolution, as Lenin had envisaged and predicted.

SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES began to appear between the two societies as they approached the level of high modernity in the decades after World War II. For Japan, the war "broke the influence of the policies of transition that had become dogmatic articles of faith, whereas in Russia it tended to reinforce them" (Black, p. 339).

Not to be ignored in this divergence of patterns was the role of the United States as the principal agent in the postwar occupation of Japan, which lasted nearly seven years. Increasing amounts of ink are being devoted—especially in Japan—to exploring the substance of the occupation and its impact on Japanese society. One of the central questions—still unresolved on both sides of the Pacific—is the degree to which the many changes in postwar Japan were the products of alien tutelage, and the degree to which they were the outcomes of indigenous socioeconomic and political forces that surfaced as a consequence of internal developments in earlier years and of the defeat of the old order.

What is certain is that Japan embarked on a radically different course from the one it had pursued before World War II. No longer was glory to be sought by military means. Instead, emphasis was to be given to economic growth—at almost any cost. It was not until 1970, for instance, that the Japanese began to pay serious attention to the increasing blight of pollution that was among the less desirable by-products of their zealous creation of new wealth.

For their part Yosif Stalin and most of his successors, both by choice and by necessity (as they defined it), propelled Soviet society in the direction of emphasis on military power and the security that it provides. The Soviet Union is now, and has been for more than two decades, a certified superpower. Nowhere is the contrast between the two societies greater than in their power as defined in military strength alone. At the same time, in achieving "high modernity"—especially in responding to the needs of citizens in their role as consumers—Japan has the better record. As the Black volume observes, Japan's experience "suggests that it is desirable to avoid a highly authoritarian approach to the problem of transformation despite the undeniable need for strict control and coordination" (p. 353).

DESPITE the almost overwhelming differences in their current national goals and priorities, however, Japan and the Soviet Union do have a number of complementary requirements. For example, both perceive Siberia as a treasure trove of raw materials that urgently calls for development and exploitation. Swearingen devotes one chapter in his book to Soviet-Japanese joint ventures in that region. This overview serves as an outline for Dagmar Ahrens-Thiele's highly detailed monograph regarding Japan's overall raw materials policy. The latter provides a plethora of well-organized and easily comprehensible tables and a good bibliography of research materials in English, German, Japanese, and Russian. It is recommended to anyone seeking a concise rundown of Soviet-Japanese projects, many of which failed. In a very brief summary, the author posits that Japan needs Asia more than vice versa and that "Tokyo" understands this. While perhaps some Japanese officials (say in the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) would probably agree, it is risky to impute such a monolithic outlook to the Japanese government as a whole.

In any case, both Japan and the USSR have periodically given prominence to their respective needs for each other. Japan would like nothing better than to expand its sources of petroleum, natural gas, and timber; the Soviet Union would like to have the assistance of Japanese capital and technology in various Siberian development schemes. Japan wants to expand the market for its manufactured goods and its sophisticated engineering know-how in such fields as building harbors and drydocks; the Soviet Union wants both. A mutuality of interests can easily be envisaged, and is occasionally realized.

Yet the interaction only moves forward by fits and starts. Negotiations progress only ponderously, if at all, largely because political considerations take precedence over "purely" economic matters.

In the 1950's and 1960's, Tokyo kept a wary eye on American reactions to Japan's slowly increasing trade with the Soviet Union. Even the decision to enter into diplomatic relations with the USSR was undertaken with great caution and with the acquiescence, grudgingly given, of the United States.[3] Conversely, the Soviet Union viewed Japan with great suspicion, considering it nothing more than an American satellite.

By the late 1960's or 1970's, the situation had changed sufficiently so that there were active discussions among Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States about possible cooperation in developing Siberian natural gas and petroleum deposits. However, many of the projects remained in abeyance as the 1970's drew to a close. There are several reasons for this state of affairs. First, some of the technical problems posed by the harsh Siberian environment proved to be more of an obstacle than had been anticipated. Second, according to the Japanese negotiators, the Russians kept changing contractual agreements. Third, and possibly most important from the Soviet perspective, the Japanese government, after trying desperately to pursue a policy of equidistance vis-à-vis their large continental neighbors, tilted toward China by concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with it in 1978.

What lay behind this decision that so dramatically altered Japan's political priorities? For one, China had its own oil, and the Chinese seemed far more eager for Japanese assistance than the Russians had ever been. Like the Soviet Union, China was interested in Japanese products and technology. Furthermore, some Chinese leaders, most notably Deng Xiaoping, expressed eagerness to adopt the Japanese model of economic development, something that the Russians had never done. One final factor that conceivably influenced the decision by the conservative Liberal-Democrats governing Japan was the poor state of relations between the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By contrast, relations between the JCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were beginning to improve in the later 1970's. Thus, there appeared to be far less danger, after the departure of the "gang of four" from power in Beijing, for Japan to be on friendly terms with China than with the USSR.

The history, ideology, and political role of the JCP are dealt with both in Swearingen and in the monograph by Manfred Pohl, although neither treatment is totally satisfactory. Swearingen's perspective is predominantly from the outside in, and he tends to overlook the JCP's struggle for survival in a largely hostile society. For example, he leaves the impression that the JCP's leaders "disappeared" on the eve of the Korean war, as if they had prior information regarding the North Korean attack. Only in a footnote (fn. 36, p. 315) does one learn that SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Powers, i.e., General MacArthur's headquarters) had previously "purged" 24 members of the JCP Central Committee from public office—an action that most Japanese believe was far more consequential in determining the subsequent behavior of senior Japanese Communists.[4] Then, in discussing the years 1970–78, Swearingen chooses to use quotation marks in discussing the JCP's "independence" from the Soviet and Chinese parties. While I would concede the possibility that the JCP might be drawn again into the orbit of Moscow or Beijing, in the period discussed the party unquestionably pursued an autonomous, independent line.

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[3] **For some indication of US attitudes in this regard, see Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy—The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1969, esp. pp. 65–67, 135–42.**

For his part, Pohl concentrates on internal ideological disputes of the JCP. His formidably researched study relies on a vast array of Japanese-language materials, judiciously supplemented by the best available literature in English and German.[5] The approach does have its limitations, however. In particular, the JCP's break with the Chinese Communist Party in 1966 is not fully explained (see pp. 219–23)—by contrast, Pohl's analysis of the JCP's split with its counterpart in Moscow is much more fully developed (cf. pp. 154–76). One suspects that Pohl might have benefited from the opportunity to visit Japan and conduct interviews with JCP leaders, as well as with journalists and with JCP-watchers in the Japanese government.

In the overall scheme of Japanese politics, of course, the JCP never has been more than a minor participant. A brief flurry of substantial popular support in the late 1940's was followed by two decades of wandering in the wilderness. Only in the 1970's did the party gain the allegiance of 10 percent of the nation's electorate, a level of support that in 1979 translated itself into 8 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives.[6] Even at this level, the JCP was hardly significant enough to have a major impact on Soviet-Japanese relations. Moreover, it suffered a sharp reversal in June 1980.[7]

OBJECTIVELY, there are no compelling reasons for Japan and the Soviet Union to be hostile toward each other. Both are among the industrially and technologically advanced countries of the world, even if Japan's search for survival through international trade has given its economy a different cast and shape than that which Moscow's seemingly relentless emphasis on military security has brought about in the USSR. Indeed, this very difference suggests even greater complementarity were both governments inclined to capitalize on it.

In fact, however, the most recent "White Paper" of the Japan Defense Agency specifically mentions the Soviet Union as a potential threat to Japan's security.[8] The growth of the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet, the patrols that it conducts off the coast of Japan's islands, the presence of Soviet military forces on the disputed (by Japan) northern islands—in sharp contrast to Japan's officially stated desire to negotiate the issue of ownership—have contributed to a sense of foreboding in Japan about the intentions of the USSR.

The Soviet Union does not perceive Japan to be a military threat, but the Russians do seem to find the Japanese irritating, especially in light of the manifest unwillingness of the latter to desist from fishing areas which the USSR claims as territorial waters. Furthermore, Japan's close alignment with the United States and growing collaboration with China are affronts to Russian sensibilities. The more the Japanese protest that the "anti-hegemony clause" in the Sino-Japanese treaty was not directed at the Soviet Union, the more their protestations tend to be discounted by the Kremlin.

There is no evidence to suggest that these attitudes of mutual distrust are immutable or frozen in the Siberian tundra. Consultations continue at the private, and even at the governmental, level. Some trade does flow across the Sea of Okhotsk. Some Japanese do read Russian (especially 19th-century) literature; similarly, some Russians do read translations of Japanese novels. Hence, all is not bleak. It is just that relations between the two nations might be so much brighter were the political impediments not so severe.

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[4] For further details, see Hans H. Baerwald, *The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1959.

[5] The Pohl and Ahrens-Thiele volumes, products of the Institute for Asian Studies in Hamburg, attest to the strides made in the last decade in West German research on contemporary Asia. Unfortunately, the publishing technique—photo offset of typed pages—makes the reading of these books difficult.

[6] In October 1979, the JCP elected 39 official party candidates and 2 affiliated independents to the 511-member House of Representatives, and already had an additional 16 members in the House of Councillors. This was the high point in JCP fortunes. (Inexplicably, the Swearingen volume, on page 117, refers to the hopes of the JCP to return "to the day when it controlled 70[!] seats in the Diet.")

[7] In balloting at that time, the number of JCP seats in the Diet fell to 29 Representatives and 4 Councillors. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), June 23, 1980, p. C/1.

[8] Defense Agency of Japan, *Defense of Japan, 1979*, English translation by the Mainichi Daily News, Tokyo, 1980. See, particularly, pp. 13–49.

Dissident Images of Eastern Europe

By Vlad Georgescu

FRANTISEK SILNITSKY et al., Eds. *Communism and Eastern Europe*. New York, NY, Karz Publishers, 1977.

OTA SIK. *The Third Way*. London, Wildwood House, and White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

RUDOLF BAHRO. *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*. London, New Left Books, 1978.

MARC RAKOVSKI. *Towards an East European Marxism*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

PAVEL TIGRID. *Amère révolution* (Bitter Revolution). Paris, Albin Michel, 1977.

PAUL GOMA. *Le tremblement des hommes* (The Quaking of Men). Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1979.

ROMAN RAKHMANNY. *In Defense of the Ukrainian Cause*. North Quincy, MA, The Christopher Publishing House, 1979.

FEW SOVIET and East European dissidents today would admit that their type of society follows the true Marxist pattern, and this view is largely shared by the authors under review. Their judgment is particularly interesting since most of the writers were for many years true believers or fellow travelers, convinced that communism was the only alternative to the evil capitalist system. Some—like Czechoslovaks Ota Sik and Pavel Kohout and East German Robert Havemann—belong to the older guard; they were not only Marxists but also pro-Soviet, identifying their ideal with the pattern of development under Vladimir I. Lenin and Yosif Stalin. Others—like East German Rudolf Bahro, members of the new Hungarian Left, and many Poles—belong to the younger generation. As Marxists but not Stalinists, they were supposed to represent the generation of the future. At some point in their lives, however, all these intellectuals decided to give up a promising future by daring to compare communism's aims with its achievements, its theory with its practice.

The books and collections of articles reviewed here express the results of the painful attempt to understand why the gap widened so far and to explain what went wrong with a theory and a practice considered sacred by generations of believers. They also represent the writers' efforts to salvage some of their faith and to propose their own models for the future.

IT IS striking that all these authors consider today's Communist regimes to be failures and betrayals of true Marxism. For Sik, the East European system is "antisocialist." To Kohout, "the fundamental principles of Marxism have been turned upside down." Bahro thinks that the party, which he once helped to force peasants into collectivization, has "distorted," "betrayed," and "spoiled" Marxism. Even Hungary's "goulash socialism," the most liberal and affluent in the Eastern bloc, is considered by the new Hungarian Left to be a "miserable failure" (Tamas Bauer in Silnitsky et al.), a "deformation of the authentic true Marxist pattern" (Gyorgy Markus in Silnitsky et al.).

Thus, most of the authors distinguish the practical pattern from the ideal model. They question Marxism not as a theory but as a policy; they think that if Marxism had had a chance to evolve naturally, the world would now look different. They consider the unfortunate beginning of this unnatural evolution to be the year 1917, when, contrary to Karl Marx's forecasts, the "imperialist chain" broke at its weakest, least developed link instead of its strongest and most developed one. Eager to justify the original model, they slip into the easiest explanation of its failure: today's communism is not authentic because it was molded (and then imposed on the outside world) by a Russian society which, because of its backwardness, was not ready for socialism. Once this happened, Marxism was perverted, giving birth to unnatural excesses like Stalinism and bringing the whole system to a dead end. These writers take obvious satisfaction in proclaiming the Russian background as the main reason for today's situation. Hungarians such as Marc Rakovski, (a pseudonym for two Hungarian dissidents) and all of the East Germans represented here speak extremely harshly and invidiously of Russian history, and even the Russian people, whom they consider traditionally tolerant of bureaucracy and incapable of progress. The "Manifesto" of the illegal League of Democratic Communists of Germany seems to be against everything Russian, from Lenin ("the Holy Ghost") to "sloppy Russian workmanship." Such anti-Russian feelings also permeate Bahro's book. Bahro appears to take particular pleasure not only in destroying many established myths, such as that of an evil Stalinism as opposed to a virtuous Leninism, but also in rejecting the possibility of a humane evolution of Marxism in a country whose history "has never stood under a lucky star."

One could, of course, debate at length this at least partially correct attribution of communism's failures to its Russian setting. But of greater political interest are the answers the books under review provide to the question: What is it that these intellectuals dislike in the "antisocialist" socialism of Eastern Europe?

A NUMBER of essays in the Silnitsky collection, *Communism and Eastern Europe*, reflect the views of members of the new Hungarian Left. This movement, very much in the tradition of Gyorgy Lukacs, is more philosophical than political. It rejects the dogmatic, uncritical approach of today's Marxism-Leninism; it seeks discussions, even confrontations, with its antagonists (Markus); it regrets that communism has neither kept its promises to liberate the individual (Miklos Haraszti), nor even maintained contact with reality (Bauer); and it requests the right to practice a "constructive Marxism" (Gyorgy Bence).

If the young Hungarian Marxists seem to be mainly interested in existential problems and sometimes give the impression that they are as distant from socialist reality as the dogmatism they criticize, veterans like Sik and Bahro are engaged in a more thorough and profound analysis of the essence of Sovietized East European society. Sik's aim is a very ambitious one: to create a social theory which offers a viable alternative to "both the present communist and capitalist systems." His critique of capitalism is matched only by his critique of communism, both considered incapable of solving mankind's problems. If his analysis of the "first world" contains nothing new or original, what he has to say about the "second world" is interesting and innovative. Sik does not completely reject the idea that because of the Soviet experience, communism acquired certain negative, authoritarian traits. But his main explanation of the gulf between the "founding fathers" and today's reality lies in the different course taken by capitalism from the original Marxian forecasts. He does not hesitate to admit that Marx's views in many fields were superficial, and he argues that it is a mistake to use them as the basis of current policy. Two of the main Marxian predictions—the continuous impoverishment of the working class and its transformation into a numerical majority of the population—did not materialize, thus raising serious doubts about the inevitability of capitalism's downfall and about the "historical necessity" of Soviet-style socialism. The new reality, according to Sik, calls into question such concepts as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the supreme role assigned to the Communist party. The blending of outdated Marxian precepts and Leninism, he believes, has led to the blocking of any potential progress and is ultimately responsible for the antisocialist system now prevailing in Eastern Europe.

Sik is extremely critical of the ways the economies of Eastern Europe are handled. His main concern, however, seems to be not the economy but the lack of democracy, understood literally as the power of the people. He no longer believes in the theory of freedom as "recognized necessity"; he pleads instead for the acceptance of the individual's freedom of action. In this respect, he differs strongly from Bahro, whose critique of communism comes from a more typically Marxist point of view.

Bahro considers himself a true Communist, one who is aware of Lenin's negative impact on Marxism and of the necessity of going back to the original sources. Basing his analysis mostly on the young Marx, he makes very clear what he dislikes in Soviet-style socialism. He is against the class character of a society which is supposed to be classless; he is against political dictatorship and the rise of what the Yugoslav Milovan Djilas has called the red bourgeoisie; he is against the bureaucratization of society, which he sees as an instrument for perpetuating a monopoly of power; and he strongly opposes the "subalternity" of individuals, a term which he seems to employ to describe the "rule of man over man," the persistence of inequality between individuals, and their subjection to structures and goals over which they have no control.

THE SUBTLE dissociation of Marxism from Sovietism leads Sik, Bahro, and most of the other leftist dissidents to condemn the East European versions of socialism but to exonerate socialism itself, which they still consider to be a third way, an alternative to both capitalism and present-day communism. The harder they criticize the actual pattern followed by Communist regimes, the more strongly they urge the renaissance of Marxism, especially in a form suited to East European conditions.

Such a revived socialism, "the socialism of tomorrow" (Robert Havemann), is considered by most of the authors to be not only possible but also necessary and inevitable. But very few have tried to draw a clear picture of what that type of socialism looks like; and when they do, what we get is a rather utopian image of an ideal society which nobody really knows how to build and make workable.

Bahro's alternative is a most elusive one, for where one would expect an answer, one finds instead another quotation from Marx or high-sounding words like freedom, progress, democracy, and economic development. When Bahro seeks to explain what these words really mean, he asserts that the main problem is that "we must rather raise to a high level Marx's own legacy, the most developed theory and method of social science that we have, and transform it into the communism of the present." The "historical task" he has in mind is a general restructuring of society that would reduce social hierarchies and increase individual freedom. But Bahro is against any kind of liberalism, economic or political, and this position leaves him little room for innovative proposals. Instead, he offers vague notions: the one-party system should be reformed but maintained, and the initiatives for change will come from within this new enlightened party, which will be progressive and open because it is based on a real understanding of social laws. Apparently carried away by this cloudy sketch of a reformed Communist party, Bahro envisions it as the instrument of a "true cultural revolution" aimed at imposing (1) a new division of power, (2) a universal form of education for "fully socialized individuals," (3) a new communal life, and (4) a real "socialization (democratization) of the general process of knowledge and decision making." Bahro calls his program "the radical political alternative" to the existing, unnatural system!

When Sik comes to explaining the essence of *his* "third way," he is not much clearer or more concrete. What he wants is a "democratically controlled" government, "macroeconomic overall planning" that is scientific and market-oriented, and collective ownership of the means of production. Like Bahro, Sik seems to favor a society somewhere between the Yugoslav model and Eurocommunism. Again like Bahro, he is able to present a devastating critique of the Soviet-style system without being very specific either about the future or about ways in which the new model could be made to work under present conditions.

But Bahro and Sik are not the only ones to nourish the hope that today's socialism can be revived from within, that there are internal forces capable of changing the Sovietized course. Even Rakovski's extremely intelligent book accepts this view, despite the fact that neither "he" nor the other "new" Marxists can specify what those forces might be. The Hungarian Zoltan Endreffy, for example, is so convinced of the potential materialist perfection of real socialism that his main concern in his contribution to *Communism and Eastern Europe* is how to avoid converting such a society into "one huge Sweden, with a very high standard of living, perfect hygiene, splendidly organized social relations, and a population that resembles the characters of a Bergman film."

UNFORTUNATELY, Eastern Europe does not seem ready to move in a direction which could bring it even close to Sweden, and I have serious doubts that replacing today's communism with the "socialism of tomorrow" would make such a step more likely. Moreover, Rakhmanny's moving "defense of the Ukrainian cause" makes it clear that there are people within the Soviet empire who would prefer the alternative of capitalism to any "third way."

Even those whom Sik likes to call the "thinking Marxists" fail to offer a convincing and realistic image of the future. Sik himself is probably the most interesting of these authors, and he goes only half the way. Extremely technical and profound when he discusses economic matters, he becomes superficial, even naive, when he deals with political problems. His wishes seem to be constantly contradicted by reality, and it is difficult indeed to see how his collective ownership, his economic planning, and his controlled democracy could coexist with a market-oriented society and real freedom. Like many other leaders of the Prague Spring, he shows a disarming ingenuousness when he comes to the Soviet factor. In *Communism and Eastern Europe*, A.J. Liehm, another important Czechoslovak figure in 1968, makes this surprising confession: "What would I have done differently in 1968? Everything, had I known then what I know today about the USSR." Nevertheless Sik's "third way" makes it clear that the lesson has still not been learned by all.

The East Germans Havemann and Bahro do not have the theoretical profundity of the Czechoslovaks, but neither do they share their naiveté. They know very well what they want. Yet their back-to-the-sources movement does not mean that their alternative would be much different from present reality. In contrast to the Czechoslovaks, who would like to put a human face on their "third way," the East Germans would be content just to change the mask. Their attitude is as dogmatic as the one they criticize. They are absolutely certain that they alone know the correct answers.

Unlike the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents, who are "thinking Marxists" well aware of the great diversity of the world we live in, and thus of the existence of many alternatives, the East Germans still use the old Marxist clichés regarding capitalist society and the West. A certain air of outdatedness in their analysis often causes them to fight pointless and useless battles. Despite its many imperfections, the Western world is today quite different from what it used to be, and any "alternative" suggested should take account of this fact.

Both the drama and the limitations of these dissident Marxist movements are clearly exposed to view in Pavel Tigrid's *Amère révolution*, an excellent essay on some of the most important East European and Soviet dissidents, and in the introduction to *Communism and Eastern Europe*. Paul Goma's captivating and well-written story of the short-lived Romanian dissidence, *Le tremblement des hommes*, leaves no doubt that behind such catchwords as "socialism," "Marxism," and "mankind's future," there lies only a cynical, selfish struggle for power. These penetrating critiques indicate that few viable alternatives are likely to emerge from dissident writers who simply ignore the fact that for three quarters of a century any attempts at reforming the system have invariably ended, as Tigrid puts it, "in fiasco."

Nevertheless, it takes a great deal of courage to speak out, even in defense of Marx, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union today, and those who do so, Marxist or non-Marxist, deserve respect. And although the brutal repression that they so much despise and consider alien to their ideal obstructs the pursuit of any alternative ways for the moment, it may not do so forever.

Dissent in Yugoslavia

By Dennis Reinhartz

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Moscow Summer*. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Russian Themes*. Translated by Marija Mihajlov. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Underground Notes*. Translated by Marija Mihajlov Ivusic and Christopher Ivusic. Kansas City, KS, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1976.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. *Nenauchnyye Mysli* (Nonscientific Thoughts). Translated from Serbo-Croatian by V. Mihajlov. London, Ont., Zaria, 1979.

AS COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA nears the end of the Fourth decade of its often turbulent and precarious existence, there is once again apprehension about tomorrow. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Partisan struggle and the Yugoslav revolution, the first president of his country, and the great constant of Yugoslav life, is now gone, and his successors face an uncertain future. Moreover, recent events on the world political scene, such as the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have only heightened the apprehension. "After Tito, what?"—a question Yugoslavs asked themselves for many years—now has to be answered.

Yugoslavia may well have a perilous future. But it has survived almost four postwar decades, marked by vitality and a continuing process of legitimation. And Tito and the Yugoslav leadership made elaborate provisions for the continuance of their revolution after Tito's departure from the scene. Perhaps the question of Yugoslavia's future is not really as pressing as it may seem to some Western journalists and social scientists. Yugoslavia may simply follow a pragmatic course along currently indicated lines.[1]

A major source of uneasiness at this time of potential instability, however, is the growth of dissent in Yugoslavia. National diversity and economic underdevelopment remain the spawning grounds for discord within the country. Nationalists from Slovenia and Croatia to Macedonia and Kosovo, Serbian liberals, radical students, religious groups (e.g., Catholics), Praxists (the group formerly associated with the Zagreb philosophical journal *Praxis*, banned in 1972), and prominent individuals like Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov—all persist in speaking out against what they see as the evils of the ideology and system and in offering options that may be as unacceptable to Tito's successors as they were to Tito himself.[2] Traditionally, Yugoslavia's dissidents have achieved little consensus as to alternative policies and the tactics of dissent. More recently, though, Djilas and Mihajlov have moved closer together in viewpoint. This concurrence, along with the stimulus provided by the death of Tito in May 1980, by the death of Tito's longtime close collaborator and heir-apparent, Edvard Kardelj, in February 1979, and by the "pushing aside" of Kardelj's fellow Slovene Stane Dolanc in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in May 1979, seems to point toward the emergence of a community of dissent in Yugoslavia. The dissidents are few in number. But they are courageous and committed. As if through some unspoken agreement and with as yet minimal cooperation among themselves, but building on a native tradition of independence and dissent, they have had a growing impact in this time of transition for Yugoslavia. In this community of dissent, Mihajlo Mihajlov, a writer and critic, occupies a prominent position.

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[1] For an excellent study, see Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1976.

[2] See Dragan Markovic and Savo Krzavac, *Liberalizam: Od Djilas do danas* (Liberalism: From Djilas to the Present), 2 vols., Belgrade, "Sloboda," 1978.

IN HIS various works, Mihajlov confronts the problems facing Yugoslavia from the perspective of a political prisoner or, now, a dissident in exile in the West. He began his rise to prominence in 1965, when, upon his return from an exchange program in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1964, he published the first two parts of *Moscow Summer,* his now famous and controversial account of the contemporary Soviet intellectual and cultural scene. In these two parts, which appeared in the January and February 1965 issues of the Belgrade literary magazine *Delo,* and in the rest of his manuscript, he explicitly equated the Soviet Union with Hitler's Germany for establishing death camps near Arkhangel'sk in 1921, more than a decade before the Nazis came to power in Germany. After *Delo* was banned on April 29–30, Mihajlov sent his manuscript to Rome, where it was published under the title *Moscow Summer.* Thereupon, for "damaging the reputation of a foreign state," Mihajlov—an unknown Dostoevsky scholar and minor academician—was publicly chastised by Tito, fired from his teaching position at Zadar University, arrested, tried under Article 175 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code and Article 125 of the Press Law, and eventually given a nine-month suspended sentence (suspended, but upheld by the Supreme Court of Croatia) with two years' probation.

Mihajlov has spent about half the 15 years since the appearance of *Moscow Summer* in prison in Yugoslavia, gaining recognition as a major Yugoslav dissident and gadfly, second in importance only to Djilas. Too young to have been a Partisan like his Russian-émigré father, he has never been a Communist. Today, he sees himself as a "post-Communist" rather than an "anti-Communist":

> *People who suffered a loss of freedom due to a Communist dictatorship realize that in some sense they too are responsible for this evil, and not only the Communists. Anti-Communists lack this consciousness of their own guilt because they believe that everyone else, in this case the Communists, are to blame for everything.*[3]

The fundamental themes broached by Mihajlov in *Moscow Summer* are more fully developed in his later works. *Russian Themes* is composed of 14 essays, dealing in part with Abram Tertz (the pseudonym of Andrey Sinyavskiy), Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Sholokhov, Boris Pasternak, and Yevgeniy Zamyatin. It includes three penetrating critiques of Dostoevsky, as well as "Why We Are Silent," which in 1966 led to Mihajlov's second term of imprisonment, and "The Unspoken Defense," which Mihajlov was not permitted to deliver at his 1966 trial. It also includes essays written and published in Yugoslavia before the publication of *Moscow Summer.* In the 14 essays, while reviewing the literary works of others, Mihajlov uses the opportunity to continue his attack on Soviet and other forms of totalitarianism. In discussing Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn, for example, he decries the degradation of the individual by the Soviet "cult of work" and forced labor and condemns the Soviet concentration camps. In the process, Mihajlov's own suffering and deep spiritual values are revealed. Thus, *Russian Themes* is not only solid literary criticism but also a resounding statement in the campaign for human rights in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

The 18 essays of *Underground Notes*—including one on "The Artist as the Enemy," one on Dostoevsky, and two on Djilas—explore a broad array of literary, political, and religious topics. Collectively, they predict a renaissance of the human spirit under the impact of the truths revealed by human suffering. *Nenauchnyye Mysli* (Nonscientific Thoughts) was written mostly during Mihajlov's last term of imprisonment (1975–77) and is made up of loosely knit and loosely grouped impressions. It is more metaphysical than Mihajlov's earlier works but follows the same philosophical lines and pursues the same vision of man and his future as were laid down in *Underground Notes* and other recent works.[4]

IN THESE four volumes and in his other, peripheral writings, Mihajlov gives expression to a tenaciously held world view, which underlies his vision of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the place of dissenters in it. Much of his analysis of the present situation and many of his hopes for the future are shared by his good friend Djilas. Many of Mihajlov's basic themes are endorsed by other Yugoslav dissidents as well. Indeed, a common dissident viewpoint about post-Tito Yugoslavia appears to be taking shape on the basis of a common belief in democratic socialism, pluralism, nonalignment, and, perhaps most fundamental, existential humanism.

Perhaps the broadest theme running through the views of the various dissenting factions in

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[3] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Advice from a Post-Communist," *The News World* (New York, NY), Aug. 4, 1978, p. 13.

[4] See, for example, Mihajlo Mihajlov, "What Should Be Fought For," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Feb. 22, 1979, pp. 34–36.

Yugoslavia is that of democratic socialism, which Djilas describes in the most general terms as the establishment of a more rational society through the achievement of "greater security for the individual, better organized production, and a fairer sharing."[5] In such a society, human rights and freedom will be guaranteed, and totalitarianism (e.g., Stalinism), especially that of a bureaucratic absolutism or a cult of personality, will not be tolerated. Within the context of present-day Yugoslavia, democratic socialism means greater true self-management and sustained federalism. While almost happily conceding that their country is not a dictatorship, some Yugoslav dissidents worry that there is no real authority either. They fear that self-management has become too pragmatic. They also accuse the government of trying to pass off economic progress as political progress.

Another theme, one inherent in the very notion of democratic socialism, is pluralism. Pluralism is not yet advocated by all of the dissidents. It has long been championed by Mihajlov and Djilas, and it is underwritten by various nationalist and religious groups. Only recently, however, has it found acceptance among the Praxists, and then only among the "most revisionist" of them, such as the philosopher Svetozar Stojanovic.[6]

Yet another theme, likewise closely related to democratic socialism, is true nonalignment. Yugoslav dissidents recognize that the Soviet Union's response to the post-Tito regime will be critical to the future of Yugoslavia and that anti-Sovietism will continue to be a significant unifying factor among Yugoslavs. In Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union quite possibly will find itself on the horns of a dilemma of its own making. If it wishes to gain ascendancy over Yugoslavia, it must fan potential nationalities crises and other divisive trends and events in order to foster internal chaos. Yet, the more aggressively and deeply it involves itself in Yugoslavia, the more solidarity it will engender within Yugoslavia and among Yugoslav dissidents. In the short run, therefore, the Soviet Union may be its own worst enemy vis-à-vis post-Tito Yugoslavia. But in the long run, as Mihajlov and other dissidents have often indicated, only the underlying strengths of the Yugoslav system and increased support from the West will help Yugoslavia withstand the threat of Soviet imperialism.

In accord with true nonalignment, the dissidents want Yugoslavia vigorously to oppose totalitarianism and imperialism (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and great-power involvement in Indochina) as well as violence and terrorism (revolutionary and émigré) at home and abroad. They champion the cause of human rights and affirm the right of national self-determination. They wish to live in peaceful coexistence with all peoples. The dissidents see Yugoslavia as a Western country, and they feel that closer cooperation with the West, especially with the nonaligned European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), and with the real Eurocommunists is essential to Yugoslavia and the achievement of their broad domestic goals. Mihajlov goes so far as to state that "legal and fruitful" cooperation between the dissidents themselves and the West is essential to the preservation of global democracy.[7]

Perhaps the most fundamental theme common to Yugoslav dissidents, a theme that underlies their views on democratic socialism and nonalignment, is existential humanism—or more simply put, the belief that "man is all-important!" Predictably, Mihajlov's religiosity causes him to differ somewhat with his fellow intellectual outcasts on the sources and nature of human freedom. For Djilas and some others, freedom is a birthright, an integral part of one's humanity. For Mihajlov, in contrast, freedom is a gift of the Creator, a reflection of one's divine nature. Unlike Marxists, many of whom view religious belief as a source of slavery, and unlike other materialists, atheists, and agnostics who consider a supreme being an impossibility or irrelevancy, Mihajlov equates God with immortality and human freedom. For Mihajlov and many other dissidents, existential humanism and democratic socialism offer liberation from all forms of dogma.

EVEN THOUGH differences still exist between the various dissident factions in Yugoslavia and abroad, the future may well bring accelerated cooperation and greater cohesion, fed by official harassment. Meanwhile, some dissidents like Mihajlov and even certain government officials look forward to a "dissident D-Day," a positive "destabilization," "a new 1948 where they will shatter the one-party monopoly and demonstrate the possibility of the transition into pluralistic society."[8] "Detitoization" is inevitable, they maintain, and if a post-Tito power struggle in the LCY breaks out in which a liberal party faction seeks the support of some of the dissidents, a transition to a "Dubcek-type of democracy" could be triggered. For Yugoslav dissidents, this would indeed be a "historical miracle, rivaling in significance the French Revolution."[9]

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[5] Milovan Djilas, "Where Is Eurocommunism Leading?" *Playboy Deutschland* (Hamburg), June 1977, p. 181.

[6] Author's interviews with Svetozar Stojanovic, Fort Worth, TX, Apr. 6, 1979, and Belgrade, June 25, 1979.

[7] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Impressions of America," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Apr. 23, 1979, p. 11; and the author's interviews with Mihajlo Mihajlov, Arlington, VA, July 23, 1978, and Arlington, TX, Sept. 28–30, 1978.

[8] Mihajlov, "Impressions of America," p. 10.

While this line of speculation may yet be too optimistic, some noteworthy trends already seem to be emerging. Mihajlov and Djilas have at least laid the groundwork for a confluence of Yugoslav dissidents, and—because of their international reputations, their growing understanding and toleration of the peculiarities of the other factions' outlooks (Mihajlov even advocates free political activity for pro-Soviet dissenters), their continued initiatives, and the broad spectrum of issues that concern them—they will clearly play an increasingly important role if such a confluence actually does take place. As to the possibilities for a confluence, the willingness of some nationalists to explore avenues of cooperation may have portents for the days to come. Now that Tito is dead, new waves of nationalism could sweep across Yugoslavia, leading to more autonomy for the country's Slovenes, Croats, Albanians, and other nationalities and, eventually, to a fairer sharing for all under democratic socialism. In the process, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, the Catholic Church could advance its campaign for tolerance, political as well as religious. And the *Praxis* group, with its "continuous revisionism" and its assertion that Marxism offers but one model, based on specific conditions and not on an iron law,[10] could move toward further cooperation with other dissident factions.

If the dissidents do in fact persist in coordinating their undertakings and at the same time continue to exercise extreme caution, they will probably not create too much instability or produce major rents in the Yugoslav political and social fabric, as long as Yugoslav authorities in turn show restraint toward them. Djilas wrote in early 1980:

> *The political structure and external situation make difficult any sudden transition to democracy, because suddenness would cause chaos and conflict and make Soviet intervention easier. This is the reason why democratization, at least at the outset, has to be modest and cautious. "Democratizations" that meant maintenance of the monopoly of Communist forms ended with purges and repressions. There is no democracy if it is not democracy for everyone. The storms are already raging: Yugoslavia can survive only if it introduces democracy and attaches itself to countries that effectively oppose the new conqueror.*[11]

Certainly, this is a view to which Mihajlov and many other Yugoslav dissidents would subscribe.

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[9] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Prospects for the Post-Tito Era," *New America* (New York, NY), January 1980, pp. 6–7; and idem, "Fear and Hope in Yugoslavia," *The New Leader*, Feb. 11, 1980, pp. 6–7.

[10] Mihajlo Markovic, *From Affluence to Praxis*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1974, pp. 67–69.

[11] Milovan Djilas, "Yugoslavia After Tito," *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1980, p. A19.

Interpreting China's Foreign Policy

By Jonathan D. Pollack

MICHAEL B. YAHUDA. *China's Role in World Affairs.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

ROBERT G. SUTTER. *Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

KING C. CHEN, Ed. *China and the Three Worlds–A Foreign Policy Reader.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

WANG GUNGWU. *China and the World Since 1949.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1977.

SAMUEL S. KIM. *China, the United Nations, and World Order.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

DURING THE PAST decade, the field of modern Chinese studies has experienced enormous growth in both the quantity and quality of scholarly effort. However, this intellectual expansion and maturation has been far from uniform. If the books under review here are an accurate indication of the state of knowledge about Chinese foreign policy, then a profound gap exists between the analysis of it and numerous associated fields of research.

With one conspicuous exception, these five volumes provide abundant testimony not so much to a field's loss of its way, but to its lack of a road map in the first place. While much information and intermittent insight can be gleaned from several of these studies, their cumulative weight and contribution is not particularly impressive.

What went wrong? A brief review essay is not the appropriate context for diagnosing this malady, or prescribing a potential cure, in great detail. Nevertheless, I find it both ironic and disquieting that, at a time of China's increasing visibility and activity in both regional and global politics, study of the foreign policy of the People's Republic (PRC) still seems in critical respects such a rudderless endeavor. Indeed, if a single ailment seems to afflict foreign policy studies, it is the disease of particularity. The richness and frequent drama of China's interactions with the outside world over the past century and a half is undeniable. Yet this fact cannot by itself account for the insularity and isolation which continues to afflict most (though not all) students of PRC foreign policy.

A more plausible explanation derives from the sheer enormity of effort required to enter the China field. The time and energy involved in acquiring the requisite skills to conduct research on China leads many practitioners to adopt a protective attitude toward ideas, issues, and approaches. At the same time, international relations specialists, perhaps somewhat intimidated by not knowing China's language, history, or culture, assume a comparably detached attitude. As a consequence of these considerations, many writings on PRC foreign policy are ignorant of the world beyond China, while studies of world politics which seek to include China within their purview demonstrate a simplistic and often ill-informed sense of what can be learned from the Chinese case.

To be sure, one should not minimize the problems in straddling disciplines distinct in orientation, training, and professional outlook. Moreover, the disparate fields comprising the discipline ("indiscipline" seems a more appropriate label) of international relations hardly offer an abundance of compelling concepts and methods. Nor does the analysis of Chinese foreign policy readily lend itself to the abstract, somewhat disembodied description characteristic of much research on world politics.

An additional key factor has discouraged scholars from moving beyond their conventional methods of inquiry—the inherent frustrations of trying to penetrate the dynamics of Chinese behavior. Few areas of Chinese politics are deemed more sensitive by the PRC leadership than those dealing with foreign policy decision-making. As a result, the usual secretiveness of the Chinese political process is accentuated with respect to questions of particular interest to the international relations specialist. It is no surprise that practitioners in the field (and this reviewer is no exception) grow attached to certain styles of research. Why discard a particular approach if it can (at least on occasion) yield the insight which makes analysis worthwhile?

If an answer to this question seems necessary, then these books undoubtedly provide the reasons. Only Samuel Kim's study — clearly the solitary example of conceptual and methodological innovation — yields sufficient benefit in terms of content and insight to justify the cost of the effort. In various ways, each of the other volumes either does not succeed in its stated objectives or (worse yet) prompts the "so what?" retort. While the books obviously vary in their scope and detail, this overall judgment is hardly cause for satisfaction about the current state of knowledge.

THE MOST DISAPPOINTING of these volumes is Michael Yahuda's study, *China's Role in World Affairs*. Because it is the first book to appear that traces the course of Chinese foreign policy during Mao Zedong's entire post-1949 career, one quite possibly expects too much from this volume. Even if one puts aside what may be unreasonable expectations, the book still suffers from the absence of both a consistent, coherent structure and a persuasive intellectual rationale. The author's principal argument (stated rather inelegantly on page 14) is that "China's international position suggests very much a picture of a country whose political system is perhaps one of the most autonomous in the world, and of a country which internationally is untrammelled by the kind of interdependencies and alliance systems which limit the freedom of manoeuvre of other major powers." According to Yahuda, the entire history of China's external conduct since 1949 (for which Mao is given predominant credit) has been an effort to enhance China's capacity for independent action—both politically and militarily—all the while striving to guarantee the PRC its legitimate international standing both as a major power and as a nation with special links to the socialist states, revolutionary movements, the Third World, and the small or medium powers. These multiple concerns are revealed through what Yahuda terms China's international "role definitions"—that is, expressed Chinese views about the PRC's position in an endlessly shifting environment of both enemies and friends. "China's foreign policy," he suggests, "is best understood within China's own frame of reference" (p. 238).

Unfortunately, the findings yielded by such unabashed sinocentrism are neither compelling nor consistent. At a purely descriptive level, it is true, Yahuda's effort is worthy of commendation, for he has pulled together disparate source materials (both official and unofficial) into a chronologically continuous account of the twists and turns of PRC state policy. But what major new insights does his approach yield? The generalization that China has consistently sought to enhance its autonomy in world affairs seems on the one hand unexceptional — what major state, within the confines of its own resources, does not? — and on the other mistaken in critical respects. Over the last several decades, the PRC has clearly sought to insulate itself from many of the political and military conflicts among the great powers, and, more so than most nations, it has succeeded in standing above or apart from the fray while still encouraging others to do its bidding. Yet China's political and diplomatic involvements, both regional and global, are undeniable and growing; moreover, Beijing's international course has not infrequently led China into armed conflict or to the brink of war. To deal with such dangerous circumstances, the PRC has all too often found it necessary to seek external support.

Yahuda, to be sure, would not deny that China is involved with an outside world; rather, he would insist that PRC policy has never been mortgaged to the preferences of others. But his effort to demonstrate an unyielding Chinese commitment to this core principle ultimately assumes a rather forced quality. In central respects, the book becomes less a chronicling of the conceptual basis of Chinese foreign policy strategy — a study which very much needs to be done —and more a discursive rendering of the extraordinary political and diplomatic gymnastics in which China's leaders have recurrently been compelled to engage.

The basic problems with the volume, moreover, are both analytical and methodological. For reasons which are never altogether clear, Yahuda deems it sufficient simply to describe certain key assumptions related to the structure of world politics at any given moment and how China "fits" within the array of global political, economic, and military forces. These assumptions and "fits" derive from various PRC declaratory statements of policy, assessments of the international situation, and leadership speeches, both private and public. Yahuda relies to an exceptional degree on the manifest content of such materials, arguing that the expressed views (in presumed contrast with those of other states) have an immediate operational significance in the Chinese case.

Thus, openly and without apology, Yahuda has committed the offense of literalism. Communications, however, cannot be detached so mechanically from the political context in which they are conveyed. How a Chinese politician depicts the nature of the outside world has an undeniable impact not only on the theory and practice of PRC diplomacy and foreign policy strategy, but on the possible goals and programs pursued in a domestic context. Yahuda surely recognizes this obvious fact; indeed, intermittently he feels compelled to explore some of its consequences. But we are never told whether Chinese "role definitions" are an independent, dependent, or mediating variable. And, notwithstanding his intention to avoid discussions of Chinese behavior, he frequently puts aside the analysis of "China's role," focusing instead on various concrete political situations and episodes of elite conflict which have affected that role.

It is the author's recurrent insistence on China's uniqueness which ultimately proves most troubling. If Yahuda is to be believed, the PRC is simply unlike all other great powers. However, the same case can be made for others as well. Is France's political and military posture equivalent to that of the United Kingdom? And are the UK's policies a carbon copy of those of West Germany or Japan? Are there no conspicuous differences in the global behavior of the USSR and the United States? And (to cite perhaps the most appropriate example) what comparisons can be drawn between India and China? Taken to a logical conclusion, cannot all nations make a legitimate claim to uniqueness?

Yahuda declines to ask this last question. Instead, he contends that "the Chinese people have developed a unique political system which is self-generating and which is deliberately kept apart from penetration from outside factors" (p. 275). In addition, he asserts that the "three worlds" doctrine[1] will serve as a "grand strategy" by which China will continue to "set itself apart from the interdependencies of others" (p. 284). Conclusive verdicts on these and related questions surely seem premature.

By casting his argument exclusively within what he acknowledges as a Chinese frame of reference, Yahuda loses the perspective and detachment for which scholars, unlike nations, can strive and which they can occasionally achieve. In view of the very substantial research efforts involved in preparing this study, the book's shortcomings are all the more regrettable.

THE SCOPE of Robert Sutter's book is much narrower than that of Yahuda's volume, but this work too must be faulted as a study which achieves considerably less than one might have hoped. Sutter's intention is to survey Chinese foreign policy with respect to key events and specific bilateral issues from the onset of the Cultural Revolution until the months following the death of Mao. Somehow, the history of this tumultuous and remarkable decade is reduced to 160 pages of rather lifeless prose. Perhaps it is unfair to fault an author for not attempting more. Yet so much cries out to be done in this study. By being unduly restrictive in both approach and objective, Sutter misses the opportunity to explore the complicated and fascinating foreign policy issues that have preoccupied Chinese decision-makers since the mid-1960's.

Indeed, in critical respects this is not so much a book-length work as a compilation of largely unedited intelligence materials. The monitoring and interpretation of Chinese state behavior is a very necessary task in the context of day-to-day intelligence analysis; however, the value of issuing these studies (some more than a decade old) in book form can be seriously questioned. By merely describing Chinese statements and actions with no effort to place them in a meaningful policy context, Sutter often produces more confusion than clarification. Thematically, analytically, and chronologically, he fails to capture the intricacies of the Chinese political process which so centrally affected the formulation and exercise of foreign policy during this period. His entire focus is on the output of the decision process, with virtually no attention to (or even sustained speculation about) how and why such decisions might have been made. It is a disappointing book, because it could have significantly enhanced our understanding of the complex politics submerged under the facade of unitary state behavior.

Chen's volume is intended to fill a niche in courses in PRC foreign policy, and at that level it probably succeeds. By compiling primary source materials (predominantly PRC official statements and editorials) on various key foreign policy themes, Chen has provided a reasonable introduction to both the style and substance of Chinese documentation. Far less clear is how these various documents "fit" in any scheme of PRC behavior or policy objectives. A long introductory essay should have provided such clarification; instead, Chen's essay hopscotches across the historical record of three decades of Chinese foreign policy, and to no apparent end. Chen exhibits little or no sensitivity to (1) differences within the Chinese elite over foreign policy strategy, even when some of his documentation makes reference to these differences; (2) the obvious tensions between a "pure" conception of the "three worlds" doctrine as opposed to the practical use of this idea in Chinese diplomacy and strategy; and (3) the major shifts over time in the emphasis and operational significance attributed to various official policy formulations. His inattention to these and related issues diminishes the worth of what is otherwise a necessary and welcome compilation of documents. The value of contemporary political history is in illuminating how and why ideas and issues have assumed significance for a given set of leaders; unfortunately, this quality is conspiciously absent from Chen's volume.

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[1] According to this doctrine, the world contains three major subdivisions: the superpowers, other industrialized countries, and the developing countries.

Wang Gungwu's study is intended to demonstrate the continuing relevance of a broader historical approach to understanding Chinese perspectives on contemporary international relations. The belief that various historical associations serve as an enduring and even pivotal "filter" for elite values is a sensible and necessary idea. Toward proving this point, Wang argues that China's foreign relations since 1949 are best understood within the context of three recurring themes: "the desire to assert independence, the problems of modernity, and the determination to make revolution" (p. 1).

For two chapters, Wang elucidates these themes with considerable clarity. Unfortunately, these two chapters bring the reader only up to 1949, at which point the author then offers a conventional historical narrative of events, rather than the interpretive essay which he had earlier promised.

Not only that, he immediately puts aside his chosen framework, and asserts that other issues took precedence. For example, in the immediate "post-liberation" period, preservation of China's sovereignty and security was purportedly "more urgent and vital" than the goals of revolution; thus, "in terms of independence, modernisation, and revolution, China's achievements by 1953 were modest" (pp. 43, 45). Even if one ignores the very considerable aid that the PRC proffered to both Korean and Vietnamese Communists during these years, the contention suggests a rather severe limitation (or omission) in his framework. Unfortunately, it is an analytical problem which he never addresses.

Equally troublesome, Wang deems it sufficient simply to note how one or another historical episode illustrates the validity of his three key themes. When events deviate from these premises, he suggests without much elaboration that the Chinese were merely revealing their concerns about one of the issues in altered form. For example, Wang asserts that during the Cultural Revolution, "the deep [Chinese] desire to be independent and to grow independently . . . took a very aggressive form in China's international relations" (p. 116). Whether China's external behavior during this period was in fact aggressive or not, why should events yet again depart from a revolutionary course whose "driving spirit is wholly rational" (p. 141)? For this and other questions, Wang has no answers. The study which demonstrates systematically where, when, and how China's past serves its present remains unwritten.

FORTUNATELY, in *China, the United Nations, and World Order,* Samuel Kim demonstrates most impressively what can be achieved by thoughtful, creative inquiry. This is a meticulously researched volume, whose length and detail alone may regrettably deny it the attention it richly deserves.

The idea that a study of Chinese behavior in various international organizations can provide singular insights into both the style and the substance of PRC foreign policy is not widely held, yet Kim has very much succeeded in doing just that, first by asking the right questions and then by knowing how to investigate them. The conventional lament that the absence of sufficient data prevents serious work on Chinese foreign policy is considerably less compelling in light of his findings. By studying Chinese behavior, he has shown that much can be learned from evidence removed both from the decision-making process and conventional documentary analysis. Without question, this is among the most important works yet published on Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, it clearly merits the attention of international relations specialists in general.

While it is not easy to reduce a long and complicated book to a single proposition, Kim's study has a consistent, recurring concern: What is the relationship between expressed Chinese values about world politics and China's actual diplomatic practice? To investigate this issue, Kim undertook an exhaustive study of PRC behavior in the United Nations (including Chinese involvement in various conferences and participation in specialized agencies) from the time of Beijing's initial entry into the world body in October 1971 until August 1977. His approach is decidedly empirical: What did those acting in the name of China do, say, and seek to accomplish in various international forums? How does this behavior accord with expressed or implicit Chinese values? How does it compare with the behavior of other nations? What inferences can be drawn about the relationship of the PRC's global policy to emergent Chinese conceptions of a future world order?

Kim concludes that there is a discernible, relatively consistent orientation in Chinese diplomatic practice, and that this orientation represents more than expedient lip service to current international fashion. By lending support to the efforts of various less developed states to enhance national sovereignty, control natural resources, and pursue the development of a new international economic order—all under the general rubric of "opposing the hegemonism of the superpowers"—the PRC has staked its claim as an articulator of Third World concerns. However, this support has always been restrained and undemonstrative — a curious mixture of what Kim terms "symbolic activism and substantive passivism" (p. 493). As Kim observes, "China's support for the Third World is generally that of a partisan spectator who cheers, moralizes, and votes, when necessary, rather than an active, not to say leading, player in the game of global politics" (p. 262). Such "low-keyed and self-effacing behavior has enhanced both [China's] political legitimacy and [the UN's] political stability at one and the same time" (p. 199). Nevertheless, Kim also notes that the Chinese have demonstrated an impressive ability "to disguise their interests in terms of principles" (p. 264). By pursuing these interests with conscious understatement, the PRC has succeeded as "a major power commanding respect and influence without really trying" (p. 161).

The cumulative impact of Chinese participation in the UN, then, has been one of "mutual legitimation" for both the People's Republic and the world body. Over a period of time, Beijing's representatives have learned a considerable amount about the prevailing norms of international law and organization, and how China can best function within them. At the same time, the PRC has deliberately if unobtrusively cultivated a principled image in pursuit of its long-term strategy of world order. As Kim concludes,

> *The Chinese strength lies in symbolic capability—ideological, political, and behavioral. Chinese multilateral diplomacy has concentrated more on the making of new rules, new norms, and new structures . . . than on commanding the capabilities that would assure implementation of a new order.* (p. 492)

In the past three years, it should be noted, the PRC has departed in significant ways from the value-oriented approach that Mao favored and Kim describes at length. Specifically, it has adopted a more power-oriented view. Chinese references to the "three worlds" theory have become far less frequent and at times almost perfunctory. Various international involvements unthinkable in the era of Mao have now come into existence, thereby undermining the presumed immutable Chinese commitment to at least some of the values which Kim identifies. To this extent, the author can be faulted (along with all other China specialists) for overstating the extent to which past "principled commitments" would stand in the way of responses to new imperatives and opportunities.

This shortcoming aside, however, Kim's book is a pioneering effort. Unlike so many other analysts, he did not succumb to the temptation of treating China in isolation. The lasting value of his study is that it places the PRC within an existing legal and institutional context, to which China, like every other international actor, must adapt, if not conform. Whatever one's view of the value of studies of world order or international organization, Kim's work would have been rendered largely meaningless in the absence of his obvious command of these fields. China's emergence as a world power is no less of a fascinating issue from either of these alternative frames of reference. For specialist and generalist alike, Kim has shown what can and must be done to link China to the larger field of international studies. If these five studies offer a reasonable estimation of the current "state of the art," then this effort has only just begun.

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THE WARSAW PACT AT 25

Dale R. Herspring

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Articles

The Warsaw Pact at 25

Dale R. Herspring

In its first 25 years, the Warsaw Pact has developed into a vital if complex instrument for management of Soviet–East European political-military relations. While Moscow has tried—with considerable success—to use the Pact for its own ends, the East Europeans have attempted to use it to weaken the Soviet hold over them and have succeeded at times in forcing Moscow to make concessions, drop policies, or push ahead without Pact imprimatur.

Venezuela's MAS

David J. Myers

Since its birth in 1971, Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has become the most significant electoral force on the Venezuelan left. Its "Eurocommunist"-style appeal to Venezuelan nationalism and to Iberian instincts of unity and harmony among leftists contrasts favorably in voters' eyes with the rigid sectarianism and loyalty to Moscow demonstrated by the traditional Venezuelan Communist Party. Despite its multipronged electoral strategy, though, MAS is unlikely to pass up any good chance to seize power by force.

The Roots of Autonomy in West European Communism

J.W. Friend

Firm Stalinist control over the international Communist movement began to wane with Stalin's death and subsequent desanctification under Khrushchev. Yet, European parties remained reluctant to express views independent from Moscow until the Sino-Soviet split and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Today, the Soviets exercise diplomatic-style influence over Western parties, which have full autonomy but do not constantly assert it, since in practice they agree with the Soviets much of the time.

• • •

Essay-reviews

Marxist Theories, Socialist Policies, and African Realities

Ali A. Mazrui

Despite the considerable intellectual bases for African attraction to Marxism (and the considerable concrete achievements registered by Marxists on the continent in the 1970's), there are important social and economic conditions that make Africa inhospitable for Marxism. The 1980's are likely to reveal more fully the basic tensions between cultural myths and structural realities in an Africa caught up in the uncertainties of change.

The Rise of the African State

Thomas M. Callaghy

The rise of the state to a position of central importance has been a major development in Africa in the past decade. In the domestic realm, the state has increasingly become the focus of actions and interests. In the international realm, older notions of statecraft have gained a new ascendancy. With the emergence of an African state system, interstate conflict and outside intervention have increased, and broader notions such as pan-Africanism have declined.

Marxism on the Horn of Africa

Richard F. Sherman

Since 1974, dramatic changes inside Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti and international realignments have focused superpower attention on the Horn of Africa and led to the introduction to the region of non-native weaponries and ideologies. One result of the superimposition of Soviet ideology and power on local realities has been a serious gap between the rhetoric and reality of the area's so-called Marxist movements. This gap will probably persist, as nationalism and international forces shape the future of Marxism in the region.

Political Forces in Latin America

Lynn-Darrell Bender

Most Latin American countries—democratic Venezuela being the most notable exception—today are ruled by authoritarian regimes in which a dominant military is committed to the "depolitization of politics" and in which the masses exert little political influence beyond the local level. The challenge to such authoritarian regimes now comes less from old-line Marxist parties than from radical nationalists pledged to revolutionary change.

Perspectives on Communist Totalitarianism

Werner Cohn

Totalitarianism remains a useful concept for analyzing Communist systems. Recent Western works on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe leave no doubt of its continuing relevance. Works on China, in contrast, have tended to ignore the methodological precepts developed in the study of totalitarianism. As a result, much of current Western sinology gives an implicitly favorable, but not fully reliable, picture of China.

West-East Technology Transfer

Gary K. Bertsch

The nature and endurance of technological ties between West and East are plainly problematic during a period of heightened East-West tension. However, the present low level of understanding regarding many questions related to West-East technology transfer—e.g, scientific and technological capabilities in the East, or the impact of transfers on sending and receiving countries—makes rational formulation of policy difficult in any case.

The Warsaw Pact at 25

By Dale R. Herspring

The role of the Warsaw Pact has expanded radically during the 25 years of its existence. From a military standpoint, the Pact in 1955 was a loosely organized "socialist military coalition," created to counter "possible aggression."[1] Its East European contingents were still using weapons of World War II vintage; the nature of military coordination among the various military units was primitive at best. By 1980, however, the Pact's East European militaries could boast of modern—if not the latest—military equipment, and the Pact itself had evolved into a tightly knit military organization with a variety of high-level military bodies exercising close supervision over a multitude of military activities, including large-scale maneuvers, military research and development, and weapons acquisition.

From a political standpoint, the role of the Pact in 1955 was very limited. In fact, the Pact's highest political decision-making body, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), met only three times during the first five years of its existence. By 1980, however, high-level political meetings sponsored by or associated with the Pact had become regular occurrences, and an elaborate mechanism for coordinating Pact positions on political questions had emerged. This mechanism permits extensive bilateral cooperation—even in the military sphere—to take place under Pact auspices.

While Moscow is clearly the dominant member of the Pact, the alliance is not a rubber-stamp organization in the hands of Soviet policymakers. Rather, it is the arena of a recurring struggle between the Soviets, who attempt to employ the Pact for their own ends, and the East Europeans (notably the Romanians), who seek to use it as a means for increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the Kremlin. The Pact also has a secondary function for the East Europeans—as a forum in which they try to gain support from the Soviets and other East Europeans for their own favored policies. Consequently, the outcome of policy debates often serves as a barometer of overall Soviet–East European relations and, to a lesser degree, as an indicator of the degree of influence exerted by individual East European states within the Pact.

In short, the Pact has developed into a vital institution for the management of Soviet–East European political-military affairs. Indeed, despite the extensive system of bilateral treaties linking Moscow and its East European allies, the Pact has become so important that its sudden disappearance would, to paraphrase Voltaire, force Pact members to invent another structure to take its place.

The evolution of the Pact can be divided into three general periods: 1955–60, years when the Pact suffered benign neglect as an institution; 1961–68, a time of increased but unstructured activity; and 1969–80, a period of major alterations in the Pact's political-military structures. During this most recent phase, the Pact has also played an increasingly important role in the regulation of important aspects of

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[1] I.I. Yakubovskiy, Ed., *Boyevoye sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armiy* (The Military Commonwealth of the Fraternal Peoples and Armies), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp. 90, 86.

Mr. Herspring is a Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State, who has written extensively on Communist military affairs. He is author of East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–1972, *1973, co-editor of* Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, *1979, and contributor of articles to various journals and symposia, including* Armed Forces and Society *and* Studies in Comparative Communism. *The author would like to thank Rudolf Perina and A. Ross Johnson for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Opinions expressed in the article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the US government.*

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Soviet–East European relations. To fully appreciate the impact of the changes of the late 1960's and mid-1970's on Soviet–East European relations, it is essential to set these changes in historical context.

The Early Years

Despite the relative inactivity of the Pact's political and military organs during the first five years of the alliance's existence, there were major efforts in the military sphere to "raise the combat capability and combat readiness" of the individual armies.[2] These undertakings appear to have been inspired primarily by a recognition on the part of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership that modern, highly technical conventional forces—East European as well as Soviet—were vital to the successful outcome of a future conflict.[3]

Essentially, Moscow decided to sacrifice quantity for quality in the manpower area and to modernize weapons systems. Thus, Soviet forces were reduced by 2,140,000 men between 1955 and 1959, and East European Pact forces were cut back by 464,000 men.[4] Vigorous efforts were also made to improve the educational qualifications of officers and noncommissioned officers. In Poland, for example, the proportion of officers with an academic degree increased from 12 percent in 1956 to 20 percent in 1962, and the proportion of officers with secondary school education rose from 30 percent in 1956 to more than 64 percent in 1961.[5]

With regard to equipment, the motorization of infantry units was pushed, new armored units were established, and tables of equipment of tactical forces were modified to permit operations under conditions of nuclear war. For example, T-54 tanks, antitank weapons, long-range artillery, and MiG-17 aircraft were introduced.[6]



Figure 1: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Functions, 1956-79

SOURCE: V.G. Kulikov, Ed., *Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact--An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 272-93.

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[2] K. Schutzle, "The Construction and Development of the NPA into a Modern Socialist Coalition Army," *Militärwesen* ([East] Berlin), No. 1, 1976, p. 47.

[3] See Stephan Tiedtke's excellent analysis of the military factor in Pact development, in *Die Warschauer Vertragsorganisation* (The Warsaw Treaty Organization), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1978.

[4] These figures were arrived at on the basis of data in ibid., pp. 23–24, which derives from Soviet and East German sources.

[5] See Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and the Political Officer in the Polish and East German Armed Forces," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Winter 1977, p. 393.

[6] Autorenkollektiv des Deutschen Instituts für Militärgeschichte, *Zeittafel zur Militärgeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen*

(continued on page 3)



A Soviet TU-26 "Backfire B" bomber over the northern part of the German Democratic Republic during joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers in August-September 1980.

—Camera Press.

Soviet sources list only one Pact-wide military exercise during this period. However, numerous exercises did take place at the national level.[7]

In sum, although Thomas Wolfe is correct in stating that "the Soviet Union made no major effort to weld the Warsaw Pact into an integrated military alliance" during this period,[8] there were still major changes in the individual Pact armies. These changes were a prerequisite to the closer military integration which was to follow during the 1960's.

Closer Pact Integration

The year 1961 witnessed a major shift in the Pact's political-military role in Soviet–East European relations. Benign neglect of the Pact as an institution gave way to greater efforts at cooperation. In the military sphere, for instance, the Pact's defense organs began to meet on an annual basis (see Figure 1), although these meetings were not always at the highest level. While details on the agenda of such meetings are lacking, information available from Soviet and Polish sources suggests that they were primarily concerned with operational matters such as the coming year's training program.[9] Broader defense-related questions appear to have been dealt with by the PCC. For example, "conditions" in the Warsaw Pact armed forces were discussed at the 1963 PCC meeting.[10]

There was also emphasis on the upgrading of equipment and the further education of cadres. With respect to the former, MiG-21 and SU-7 aircraft as well as antitank missiles and self-propelled guns were introduced into Pact inventories. In addition, the process of replacing the older T-34 tank with the newer T-54/55 model was completed.

Republik 1949 bis 1968 (Chronological Table of Military History of the German Democratic Republic, 1949 to 1968), (East) Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1969, p. 87; and R. Wustner, "The Polish Army—30 Years in the Service of Peace and Socialism," *Militärwesen*, No. 9, 1973, p. 14.

[7] For the GDR, see *Zeittafel zur Militärgeschichte . . .*, pp. 82–152; for Poland, see Mikolaj Plikus, Ed., *Mala kronika Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, 1943–1973* (Short Chronicle of the Polish People's Army, 1943–1973), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975, pp. 324–50.

[8] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 148.

[9] V.G. Kulikov, Ed. *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 274–79; and Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypowski, *Tarcza pokoju* (Shield of Peace), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975, pp. 338–48.

[10] N.N. Rodinov et al., *Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora, 1955–1975* (The Organization of the Warsaw Treaty, 1955–1975), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975, p. 75.

Most important, a new stress was placed on joint Pact military exercises/maneuvers. While only one exercise had been held during the 1950's, 19 took place in the 1961–68 period (see Figure 1).

The Pact likewise became more active in a political sense during this period. Although its political organs had met only four times during the first five years of its existence, they held a total of 10 meetings during 1961–68 (see Figure 1). Furthermore, these meetings were increasingly closely associated with current events. For example, the meetings of the PCC on March 28–29, 1961, and of the first secretaries of the Communist parties of the member states on August 3–5, 1961, made important statements on the Berlin question, and the 1966 and 1968 PCC meetings in Bucharest and Sofia issued statements on US "aggression in Vietnam."[11] Throughout the 1960's, the PCC and foreign minister meetings continued to focus on problems of current interest such as European security.

By the end of 1968, the Pact had become a more active political-military alliance. The Soviets found it useful not only as a means of justifying and facilitating their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also as a forum in which to float their proposal for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Rising Western concern over the Pact's growing military potential was likewise presumably a source of some satisfaction in Moscow.

The East Europeans, too, quickly learned how to employ the Pact for their own ends. The Romanian case is probably the best known,[12] but it was not the only one. For example, according to N. Edwina Moreton, the GDR made considerable use of the Pact during the 1960's to try to counter Bonn's attempt to expand its influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of East Berlin. By the time of the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties in 1967, she reports, all the member states of the Warsaw Pact except Romania "were prepared or had been persuaded to subordinate their established interest in . . . the German question to the overall framework on that issue."[13]

The inaugural meeting—on December 22–23, 1969, in Moscow—of the Council of Defense Ministers of Warsaw Treaty member-states, formed in accordance with a decision of the March 1969 meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The ministers are seated at the left, with Soviet Marshal A.A. Grechko in the center (filling his glass).

—EUPRA.

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[11] Ibid., pp. 97, 103.

[12] See, for example, Robin Remington's analysis in *The Warsaw Pact, Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 56–93.

[13] N. Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Détente*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, p. 67.

Despite this increased reliance on the Pact by its Soviet and East European members, however, the alliance still had problems. In particular, there was no regularized procedure for bringing about closer integration, either military or political.

The Pact Comes of Age

This difficulty received heightened attention in the subsequent period, which began at the end of the 1960's. The reforms introduced in the military sphere in 1969 and in the political realm in 1976 were major steps in the process of improving and intensifying Pact unity. These reforms provided for regularized meetings of high-level Pact organs and assigned such organs more specific functions than they had had in the past.

The March 1969 PCC meeting in Budapest added three new bodies to the Pact's military structure. First, it created a Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) as the Pact's supreme military consultative organ. The CDM appears to have taken over some of the broader policy-oriented functions previously dealt with by the PCC. As one Soviet source puts it, the CDM "works out joint recommendations and proposals for organizing the defense" of the Warsaw Pact and deals "with other questions requiring joint agreement."[14]

The Budapest meeting also established a Military Council, which appears to be subordinate to the Pact's Joint Command. This council seems to be responsible for some of the planning and quality-control functions formerly assigned to the defense ministers and chiefs of staff. For instance, in discussing the work of the Military Council, Marshal V.G. Kulikov, the current commander in chief of Pact forces, has stated that it analyzes "the results of combat and operational activities for the preceding year and determines the tasks of the armies and fleets for the coming year."[15]

The third organ that emerged as a result of the 1969 reforms—the Technical Council—does not appear to have a precursor. Not much is known about this body except that it deals with "the development and modernization of weapons and technology, the coordination of the efforts of the unified armies in the area of scientific research and experimental-design work of a defensive nature."[16] Yet the relative frequency with which it is mentioned in Soviet and East European writings on the Pact suggests that it plays an important integrative role. To quote Marshal Kulikov, "its creation speeded up the outfitting of the armies and the Warsaw Pact states with new types of weapons and equipment."[17]

As a consequence of these changes, responsibilities in the military sphere have become more differentiated. Very broad political-military issues are discussed within the PCC, whose meetings usually include defense ministers as well as foreign ministers. Specific multilateral military issues are handled within the CDM, and the Joint Command oversees the implementation of "decisions by the Communist and Workers' Parties of the [Member] States."[18] The actual planning and organizing of military activities such as "maneuvers, exercises, and war games" are carried out by the Staff of the Joint Command.[19]

Since it was established, the CDM has met annually (see Table 1). The Military Council convenes twice a year on the average—once during the spring and once toward the end of the year. There is no information on how frequently the Technical Council meets.

Another manifestation of the mounting effort at Pact integration in the military sphere after the 1969 PCC meeting was the sudden increase in Pact military maneuvers. During the first 14 years of its existence, the Pact had held only 18 exercises, but there were 21 in the period from 1969 to 1972—11 of them in 1969 alone (see Figure 1). This striking increase in military exercises appears to have been designed primarily to give Pact forces extensive training on a multilateral level, a prerequisite for efficient employment of Pact forces on a broad scale in combat. Such a conclusion is borne out by the great number of certain types of exercises largely ignored in the past (see Table 2). During 1969-71, for example, five air defense/air force exercises took place, whereas there had been only one previously. Similarly, four rear-services exercises were held between 1969 and 1974, in contrast with just one in earlier years. Moreover, while four ground forces exercises had taken place in 1965-68, the frequency of such exercises grew significantly after 1969. A total of 13 were held between 1969 and 1972.

Apparently satisfied that the groundwork for multilateral cooperation had been laid, Pact officials let the number of multilateral maneuvers drop off after

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[14] K. Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh* (A Mighty Factor of Peace and Stability in International Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980, p. 17.

[15] Kulikov, *Varshavskiy Dogovor* . . . , p. 167.

[16] Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti* . . . , p. 19.

[17] V. Kulikov, "A Quarter Century Guarding the Achievements of Socialism and Peace," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5, 1980, p. 26.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

Table 1: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Military and Political Meetings by Type, 1956–79

	Military meetings[a]			Political meetings				
Year	Defense Ministers	Chiefs of Staff or their reps.	Military Council	Political Consultative Committee	Crimean mtgs. of First Secretaries	Other mtgs. of First Secretaries	Foreign Ministers	Deputy Foreign Ministers
1956	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1958	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1959	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1960	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1961	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
1962	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1963	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
1964	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1965	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
1966	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—
1967	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
1968	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1969	1	1	1	1	—	1	1	—
1970	1	—	2	2	—	—	1	1
1971	1	1	2	—	1	—	2	—
1972	1	—	2	1	1	—	—	—
1973	1	—	2	—	1	—	1	1
1974	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	—
1975	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
1976	1	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
1977	1	—	2	—	1	—	1	—
1978	1	—	2	1	1	—	1	—
1979	1	—	2	—	1	—	2	—

[a]The totals in this breakdown do not coincide exactly with those in Figure 1, for the listing here covers only the major types of military meetings. Included in the sums in Figure 1 are some miscellaneous meetings, such as those of chiefs of main political administrations.

SOURCE: V.G. Kulikov, Ed., *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 272–93.

about 1972. But Pact military cooperation of a new type, which has generally been overlooked in the West, began to emerge in the mid-1970's. This consists of bilateral cooperation among East European armies, in which the Soviet Union appears to be only minimally involved. Such cooperation is particularly prevalent among the northern tier countries, i.e., Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Czechoslovakia. For example, Polish officers attend the GDR's Friedrich Engels Military Academy, and Polish, Czechoslovakian, and East German forces train together—without the presence of Soviet military units—and use each other's facilities.[20] Such training significantly enhances the ability of these forces to operate independently of Soviet troops either in rear areas or on a separate front.

Finally, continued emphasis has been placed on updating equipment available to non-Soviet Pact forces. By the end of the 1970's, for instance, these forces were supposed to have been outfitted with such relatively modern items as advanced MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft, T-62 tanks, and SA-6 ground-to-air missiles.[21]

With regard to enhancing Pact unity on the political

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[20] See, for example, the references to GDR-Polish military cooperation in a 1975 speech by General Heinz Hoffmann, GDR Minister of National Defense, during the visit to East Germany by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Minister of National Defense. Published in *Zolnierz wolnosci* (Warsaw), Mar. 14, 1975. See also the Polish report of the results of the visit in ibid., Mar. 15–16, 1975. There have been numerous other references to widespread Polish-GDR military cooperation in *Zolnierz wolnosci* and *Volksarmee* ([East] Berlin), the East German military newspaper, during the last five years.

[21] *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York, NY), Mar. 19, 1973, cited in A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1979, p. 251.

Table 2: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Military Exercises by Type, 1956-79[a]

	Type of exercise						
Year	Ground forces	Naval	Command staff	Air defense	Air force	Rear services	Communications
1956	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1958	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1959	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1960	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1961	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1962	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
1963	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1964	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
1965	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
1966	1	1	—	—	1	—	—
1967	1	1	2	—	—	—	—
1968	—	1	3	—	—	1	1
1969	7	—	4	1	1	1	1
1970	2	—	1	1	—	—	—
1971	1	—	2	1	1	1	—
1972	3	1	2	—	—	—	—
1973	1	—	2	—	—	1	—
1974	1	—	5	—	—	1	—
1975	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1976	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1977	1	—	2	—	—	—	—
1978	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1979	2	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a] The totals of military exercises in the respective years at times exceed the totals noted in Figure 1; this is because on several occasions different types of forces held joint exercises.

SOURCES: Paul Wollina, "The Strengthening of the Warsaw Military Alliance—An Expression of the Regular Process of Bringing Socialist States Together," *Militärgeschichte* ([East] Berlin), No. 2, 1980, pp. 152–53; and V.G. Kulikov, Ed., *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 272–93.

side, the PCC meeting in Bucharest in November 1976 introduced a new political institution for the alliance. According to the official communique, the Pact "adopted a resolution to create an organ of the PCC—a Committee of Foreign Ministers with an associated Secretariat."[22] To be sure, a standing commission tasked with working out recommendations on foreign policy questions and an associated secretariat had existed since the first meeting of the PCC in 1956, but a Soviet source claims that these organs had not been active during the Pact's first 21 years.[23] In any event, as a result of this decision, Pact foreign ministers, who had met only once during 1972–76, began in 1977 to meet annually (see Table 1).

Little is known about the work of the Secretariat attached to the Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM), other than that its headquarters is in Moscow, that it is staffed by representatives from the various Warsaw Pact states, and that it handles administrative matters such as arranging CFM meetings and implementing decisions taken by the latter. But it clearly provides the Pact with the continuity in the political sphere that formerly had been lacking. As for the CFM itself, assessing its value after its only slightly more than four years of existence is difficult. Nevertheless, a high-level Soviet official speaking in 1980 praised it, stating that it was helping ensure continuity and had assisted in the implementation of decisions taken by the PCC.[24]

The 1976 PCC meeting also sanctioned "consultative meetings of Warsaw Pact parliamentarians."[25]

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[22] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 27, 1976.

[23] Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti . . .*, p. 10.

[24] K.V. Rusakov, "In the Service of Peace and Socialism," *Pravda*, May 22, 1980.

[25] See the statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, endorsing the Nov. 25–26 PCC meeting, in *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1976.

Amphibious PT-76 tanks being loaded onto a landing craft on a lake in the southeast of the German Democratic Republic during joint Warsaw Treaty maneuvers in September 1980.

—Camera Press.

While these meetings cannot be considered a Pact institution, they have played an important propaganda role. The October 1979 meeting, for example, issued a well-publicized statement calling on Western parliamentarians to oppose NATO's plans to modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces.[26]

East European Interests

By the beginning of the 1980's, thus, the Soviets had turned the Pact into a highly integrated body capable of fielding modern conventional military forces in the vital Central European theater while at the same time able to launch large-scale propaganda campaigns. In the process, however, the Soviets had found it necessary to give in to East European policy preferences on a number of occasions. If one looks at the last three PCC meetings, for example, there have been several cases in which the Soviets have accepted language which differed—in some cases significantly—from that advocated by Soviet leaders. In other instances, they have been forced to omit mention of controversial subjects to gain unanimous Pact consent to the documents issued by the PCC.

Soviet concessions appear to have been required in two particular areas in order to achieve unanimous agreement on the text of the 1976 PCC declaration: China and relations between ruling parties. The Soviet position on the Sino-Soviet split had been laid out by Leonid Brezhnev in a speech to a CPSU plenum in October 1976. He stated that Beijing's foreign policy "has been discredited throughout the world," that Moscow nevertheless wanted better relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that the USSR was convinced that "there are no problems between the PRC and the USSR which cannot be resolved in the spirit of good neighborliness."[27] This line had been repeated by Politburo member F.D. Kulakov in a speech on November 5, 1976.[28] However, the PCC document, like the Soviet-Romanian statement of November 25, 1976,[29] did not refer to China.[30] This omission suggests that Romanian opposition to inclusion of Moscow's preferred language kept it out of the PCC document.

Many of the USSR's East European allies—and Romania in particular—have long objected to Moscow's use of the term "socialist internationalism" as a catchword for Soviet preeminence within the alliance. While the Soviets were successful in getting the term into the communique issued on November 5, 1976, after Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's visit to Bulgaria,[31] it did not appear in the PCC document. Instead, the more neutral term favored by the Romanians and some others, "international solidarity," was employed.

The same two issues seem to have been points of contention as well at the November 22–23, 1978, PCC meeting in Moscow. Prior to the meeting, on November 4, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin had criticized Beijing, while calling for a "normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations."[32] In addition, there is a report that participants at the Moscow talks were handed a statement which "implicitly opposed China by supporting Vietnam in its struggle with Cambodia."[33] But

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[26] For this statement, see ibid., Oct. 18, 1979.

[27] L.I. Brezhnev, *O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo Gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i* (Concerning the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978, p. 570.

[28] F.D. Kulakov, "The Light of the Great October Illuminates the Path Toward Communism," *Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1976.

[29] *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1976.

[30] For the PCC document entitled "Toward New Frontiers in International Détente, Toward Strengthening of Security and Development of Cooperation in Europe," see ibid., Nov. 27, 1976.

[31] *Pravda*, Nov. 5, 1976.

[32] A.N. Kosygin, "The Creative Force of the Great October Idea," in A.N. Kosygin, *K velikoy tseli* (Toward the Great Goal), Vol. 2, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, p. 629.

[33] David Binder, "The Challenge by the Romanians," *The New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1978.



Romanian Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu, by flag, and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev at the conclusion of a November 1976 bilateral meeting in Bucharest at which the USSR failed to win Romanian approval for formulations which Moscow wished to present to an upcoming Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting the same month in the Romanian capital.

—SYGMA.

the PCC declaration said nothing whatsoever about China. This omission would appear to indicate that the Soviets could not obtain agreement on language even indirectly critical of the PRC. Like the 1976 declaration, the 1978 one employed the term "international solidarity," rather than "socialist internationalism," to describe intra-Pact relations.[34]

However, the major areas of disagreement at the 1978 meeting seem to have concerned the Middle East and the Pact's military budget. In addressing the Middle East question in a September 22, 1978, speech, Brezhnev had strongly condemned the Camp David accords, as had Gromyko in his subsequent speech of September 26 at the UN.[35] Yet the PCC document itself did not touch on the accords. That the omission was primarily due to Romanian opposition became clear on November 25 when a special statement condemning the Camp David accords and praising the Baghdad conference was published in *Pravda* with the support of all Pact members except Romania.[36]

The 1978 PCC declaration differed as well from past Soviet statements on the international situation. In a speech on October 14, 1978, Soviet Defense Minister Dimitriy Ustinov had warned of a possible return to the cold war and given heavy play to the importance of the military factor in protecting the USSR and the "socialist commonwealth."[37] Yet the PCC document, while recognizing that détente faced "great difficulties," was by and large more upbeat on the subject, noting that "in general, the political atmosphere in Europe is being freed from the vestiges and prejudices of the 'cold war.' "[38]

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[34] *Deklaratsiya Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora* (Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978, p. 24.

[35] L.I. Brezhnev, "Speech in Baku at the Palace by the Name of V.I. Lenin at the Ceremonial Meeting Devoted to the Awarding of the Order of Lenin to the Capital of Azerbaydzhan," in L.I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (On a Leninist Course), Vol. 7, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, p. 478; A.A. Gromyko, "Speech of A.A. Gromyko," *Pravda*, Sept. 27, 1978.

[36] "Statement of the Leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties and Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1978.

This difference was indicative of a much more profound and evidently heated debate at the PCC over the question of how the Pact should respond to NATO's May 1978 approval of the Long-Term Defense Program. The Program called for a real increase of 3 percent in the defense budgets of NATO members in order to modernize alliance forces. Moscow had reacted by proposing a 3 percent increase in Pact military spending together with intensified Pact control over the various national armies. Ceausescu, according to press reports, not only opposed Brezhnev on both of these points but also took the unusual step of publicizing the proposal as well as his opposition in a speech in Bucharest upon his return from Moscow.[39] From the statements of support issued by some of the East European Pact members, furthermore, it is plain that both suggestions were opposed in varying degrees by others as well. Thus, while the statement from Prague called for a "further strengthening" of the Pact's "security and defensive might" in the face of threats from the West, the Poles limited their support to opposing "any weakening" of the "unity and defensive capability" of the Pact.[40] Although the Hungarians eventually came out in favor of bolstering the Pact's military capabilities, they waited more than two weeks before issuing such a statement, thereby implying that they too were less than enthusiastic about the Soviet plan.[41]

Comparing the declaration adopted by the May 1980 PCC meeting in Warsaw and the lengthy speech on the Warsaw Pact delivered a week later in Moscow by CPSU Secretary K.V. Rusakov,[42] it would appear that some of the East Europeans, who are fearful that

Poland's Edward Gierek, Hungary's János Kádár, and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu joined other Warsaw Pact country party leaders in signing the communique at the end of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on November 23, 1978. Their countries have resisted implementation of the expansion of Pact defense outlays "approved" in that document.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[37] D.F. Ustinov, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces," in D.F. Ustinov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, pp. 493, 496–97.

[38] *Deklaratsiya Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora.*

[39] See David A. Andelman, "Ceausescu Seeks Support of Party Against Moscow," and "Ceausescu Appeals for Socialist Unity," *The New York Times*, Nov. 30 and Dec. 2, 1978, respectively; David Binder, "The Challenge by the Romanians," loc. cit.

[40] The Czechoslovakian and Polish statements, as carried by TASS, may be found in *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1978.

[41] For the Hungarian statement, as carried by TASS, see ibid., Dec. 8, 1978.

[42] "The Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Treaty States," *Pravda*, May 16, 1980; Rusakov, "In the Service of Peace and Socialism."

a further heightening of East-West tensions could weaken their own room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviets, persuaded Moscow to modify the tone of its language on several issues. For instance, the PCC declaration, although it criticized hegemonism, did not attack China. Rusakov, in contrast, declared that the USSR will continue to resist Beijing's "policy of aggression and hegemonism." The PCC declaration described the international situation in much less negative terms than did Rusakov. While both assessed it as "complex," Rusakov argued with considerable vigor that there were two increasingly clear contrary lines in international politics: that of NATO and that of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, he repeated Brezhnev's March 31, 1980, warning on the need for the USSR to "keep its powder dry," in the face of the threat from the West.[43] Such elements were missing from the PCC declaration. Finally, the PCC declaration differed from Rusakov's speech in its handling of the Afghanistan question. Both called for an end to outside interference. But Rusakov went further, by sharply criticizing the United States, Pakistan, and China for their support of "armed actions against the DRA."

Living Without the Pact

Despite the problems that Pact policymakers face in constructing a common position on some issues, the alliance nonetheless is a vital cog in the conduct of Soviet-East European relations. To understand the Pact's overall importance, it might be useful to look at what the alliance's absence would mean for both the Soviets and the East Europeans.

Militarily, the primary advantage that Moscow derives from the Pact is access to East European territory for its forward-based theater forces. The USSR has deployed some 31 divisions in the area (16 armored and 15 mechanized-infantry), equipped with nuclear-capable tactical missiles (Scuds and Frogs), modern fighter aircraft (e.g., MiG-23/27's, SU-17/20's, and SU-19's), and a wide variety of tanks, artillery, and other military equipment.[44] Not only does the presence of Soviet forces in this region provide Moscow with a defensive buffer against the West, but it also gives the Kremlin a forward staging area from which to launch an offensive campaign against Western Europe. While these same ends could presumably be achieved through bilateral arrangements with the individual East European countries, such arrangements would not allow the Kremlin to employ East European armies effectively in a future conflict.

To be sure, although the East European armies—and particularly the northern tier forces—appear to have an important place in Soviet theater doctrine, their exact function in it is unclear. For example, Moscow is plainly aware that the political reliability of the East European forces remains an open question in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation and that the willingness of such forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them will be influenced by a number of factors over which the Kremlin has no control.[45] This awareness may explain why the USSR has not provided its East European allies with the most modern military equipment. One source maintains that Moscow intentionally withholds the latest equipment from the normally favored Poles, East Germans, and Czechoslovakians until three or four years after it has entered the inventories of Soviet forces stationed in Central Europe.[46] The lack of the most modern equipment, taken together with the increase in bilateral East European military cooperation mentioned above, suggests that the Soviets do not see the East Europeans—with the possible exception of some special units and the East German army (although it is debatable how useful the latter would be outside the GDR)—as playing a frontline role in combination with Soviet forces. Instead, it could be argued, Moscow intends to employ East European forces primarily in a supportive role, i.e., in securing rear areas or on a peripheral front.[47]

Whatever function East European forces have in Soviet theater doctrine, however, the Kremlin's ability to deploy them in a coordinated manner in support of Soviet forces would be seriously diminished in the absence of the Pact. For one thing, both large and small multilateral maneuvers, which are a sine qua non for successful combined operations on a large scale, would be more difficult to carry out. In the end, Moscow would probably find it increasingly necessary to rely on bilateral exercises involving Soviet forces and a single East European army. Similarly, the nonexistence of institutions such as the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, the Technical Council, the Joint Command, and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces would significantly increase the problems of coordination on many matters currently handled within the Pact. These include not only relatively simple things such as weapons standardization but also more complex undertakings such as integrating communications, command, and control; setting up Pact-wide training programs; and assigning specialized tasks among Pact members. Finally, the extensive bilateral military cooperation between East European states that currently takes place under Pact auspices would be much harder to organize.

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[43] Brezhnev's comment was published in *Pravda*, Apr. 1, 1980.

[44] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, London, 1979, pp. 10, 110–12.

[45] Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Winter 1980, pp. 270–96.

[46] M. Checinski, "Structural Causes of Soviet Arms Exports," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 3, 1977, p. 177.

[47] See John Erickson, "The European Military Balance," in Grayson Kirk and Nils Wessell, Eds., *The Soviet Threat*, New York, NY, The Academy of Political Science, 1978, p. 115; and Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 257.

Politically, the Soviets gain a number of advantages from the Pact. First and foremost, the Pact helps legitimize Moscow's continued political-military presence in Eastern Europe as well as its policing actions to keep its East European allies in line. For example, Moscow's use of Pact forces (i.e., forces from Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Bulgaria) in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia may not have been important from a military standpoint, but it did serve to demonstrate that sufficient solidarity existed among Pact members to permit the mounting of a joint military operation against another Pact country which did not involve combat. (What it did not show, however, was whether the solidarity is strong enough to ensure deployment of non-Soviet Pact troops in the face of determined military opposition on the part of the country being invaded.)[48]

The Pact also provides the Kremlin with an instrumentality for enforcing ideological orthodoxy.[49] If the Pact disappeared, so would the close cooperation which exists in the political-ideological sphere under Pact auspices (e.g., frequent meetings of Central Committee Secretaries on how to deal with a variety of ideological problems). The result would probably be intensification of the already considerable problems the Kremlin confronts in maintaining political-ideological discipline in the region.

Meetings of Pact organs such as the PCC and the CFM afford forums for the announcement of Moscow's numerous "peace" initiatives. Although the USSR could undoubtedly find substitute forums, these would probably not be as useful as Pact forums have proved to be from the standpoint of awakening Western interest.

Through Pact institutions, the USSR can work out coordinated positions with its allies on important foreign policy questions. For example, *Pravda* announced on July 10, 1980, that a meeting of Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers had taken place in Prague on July 8–9 to coordinate strategy for the November 1980 conference in Madrid to review the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. While

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[48] See Herspring and Volgyes, "Political Reliability . . . ," p. 285.

[49] See, for example, Kulikov, "A Quarter Century Guarding the Achievements of Socialism and Peace"; and Yu. S. Novopashin, *Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya novogo tipa* (International Relations of a New Type), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodyye Otnosheniya, 1978, pp. 76–77.



Advanced Soviet military equipment filters down to Warsaw Pact forces with some delay. By the end of the 1980's, the Soviet T-72 tank was just entering the tables of equipment of East European armies, although the MiG-23 aircraft (right) was in wide use in Eastern Europe.

—Daniel Simon and J.P. Quittard/both for Gamma-Liaison.

Erich Honecker (left), General Secretary of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party, receives members of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty states, in East Berlin for a meeting on December 5–6, 1979. Pact foreign ministers pictured with Honecker are: from right to left, Petur Mladenov of Bulgaria, Emil Wojtaszek of Poland, Andrey Gromyko of the USSR, Bohuslav Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia (partly obscured), Frigyes Puja of Hungary, and Stefan Andrei of Romania. (GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer is not in the photo.)

—Eastfoto.

the working out of a common strategy would have been possible in the absence of a Pact-organized meeting, it would have been more difficult and more time-consuming.

Finally, there are suggestions that Moscow is using the Pact as a vehicle for assigning a division of labor among some members with regard to activities in the Third World.[50] Disbandment of the Pact would at the minimum create problems for the Kremlin in making effective use of its allies throughout the world.

Aside from depriving the USSR of these advantages, dismantlement of the Pact might have other negative effects from Moscow's perspective. It might send shock waves among the East Europeans. Indeed, many of them would probably take it as a sign that the Soviets were lessening their grip on the region. Such a conviction would encourage at least some East Europeans to try to expand their room for maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. If things got out of control, as they did in the mid-1950's following destalinization, the Kremlin's relations with the West could be badly damaged. In addition, if the Soviets are serious in saying that the Pact would disband if NATO disbanded, then they would have to face the prospect of dealing with a possibly resurgent West Germany unencumbered by the restrictions which the NATO alliance places on it. The same might also be true with respect to the GDR, which is now under special restrictions within the Warsaw Pact. Given their deep concern about Germany and things German, the Soviets are not likely to welcome such a prospect.

For the East Europeans, the chief value of the Pact—in both political and military terms—is that it helps to diffuse Soviet pressure on them. Direct Romanian opposition to Soviet policies, often reinforced by less than enthusiastic—even passive—support for Moscow's policies within Pact councils, often results in greater room for maneuver for all of the East Europeans. For example, insofar as is known, the Soviets have not succeeded in winning Pact acceptance of either an increase in military spending or a tightening of the integration of the military command structure, as they reportedly attempted to do in 1978. Because such measures could only be introduced on a bloc-wide basis, Romania's opposition to them effectively thwarts them, but given the extent of economic problems of other East European Pact members and their aversion to total Soviet control of their national armies, they probably take considerable satisfaction in

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[50] For the GDR, see "We have sent you weapons and bread," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Mar. 3, 1980, pp. 42–61. For Poland, see Dale R. Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy Process," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crises: Policy and Politics in Poland*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980.

At the May 1980 Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact: front left, Pact Commander in Chief, Soviet Marshal V.G. Kulikov; front right, Soviet Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; rear left, Soviet Army General A.I. Gribkov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of Pact forces; and rear right, Polish General of Arms Jozef Urbanowicz, Under Secretary of State of the Polish Ministry of Defense. The fifth figure, a Soviet officer, is unidentified.

—Gamma-Liaison.

Romania's adamancy.

Furthermore, although the 1969 and 1976 reforms can be viewed as devices for increasing Moscow's control over the Pact, they may in some measure have contributed to an enhancement of East European autonomy within the Pact. Some observers, for instance, have speculated that the 1969 reforms, by designating the Pact deputy ministers of defense as deputy commanders of the alliance, resulted in a strengthening of national decision-making, at least in peacetime.[51] Others have questioned this assertion, arguing that the change had little impact on the role that the East Europeans play in Pact military decision-making, particularly in wartime.[52] Regardless of which of these contentions is correct—and I find the latter more plausible—it is still highly unlikely that the Romanians in particular would have agreed to either the 1969 or the 1976 reforms if these had meant a serious erosion of East European autonomy.

Conclusion

Looking at the situation today, it appears that the Pact will continue to be a major factor in Soviet-East European relations for some time to come. For their part, the Soviets recognize the Pact's vital importance as a device for coordinating and managing relations with their East European allies, and they show no signs of a willingness to decrease reliance on the Pact for this purpose. In fact, Moscow seems to be assigning the Pact even greater weight in dealing with other Pact members. The East Europeans, faced with the reality and proximity of Soviet power, understand that there is no practical alternative to the Pact, and as a result attempt to the degree possible to use it as a vehicle for diffusing Soviet pressure on them. Thus, suggestions that the currently existing system of bilateral treaties could serve as a substitute for the Pact are a "fiction: it is hardly conceivable how the [currently existing] integration level of the WTO (i.e., the Joint Command structure and training, the operative division of labor) could be maintained on the level of bilateral treaties."[53]

Nevertheless, there will be continued strains within the alliance as Soviet efforts to weld the Pact into a more tightly knit organization subordinate to its will clash with East European efforts to achieve greater autonomy in their relations with the Kremlin. Some of the issues upon which such strains may manifest themselves within the Pact in coming years include the extent of Pact support for Soviet policy outside Europe (e.g., in China, Afghanistan, the Middle East),[54] the possible incorporation of new members in the Pact, East European resentment at not being supplied with the latest weapons,[55] the size of Pact military budgets, Moscow's monopoloy of top military positions within the Pact,[56] and the degree of military integration within the Pact.

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[51] Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1975, p. 3.

[52] See Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 257.

[53] Tiedtke, *Die Warschauer Vertragsorganisation*, p. 166.

[54] General A.A. Yepishev hinted at such a possibility in discussing events in Afghanistan. He stated that "the unified strength of the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth, embodied in the Warsaw Pact, serves to reliably secure the security of the peoples constructing a new life." "V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1980.

[55] Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 262.

[56] The Soviets have monopolized the Pact's two top positions,

(continued on page 15)

MI-8C helicopters of the East German National People's Army in action during the Comradeship in Arms 80 maneuvers of Warsaw Treaty forces, August 26-September 14, 1980, in the German Democratic Republic.

—Camera Press.

Writing more than 10 years ago, Roman Kolkowicz labeled the Pact an "entangling alliance" in which "the Soviet leaders seek to entangle their unwilling allies in the web of Soviet interests."[57] While there is little question that as a result of their membership in the Pact, the East Europeans have found themselves more "entangled" in supporting Soviet policies than they might have preferred, it is important not to exaggerate the extent of the USSR's hegemony within the Pact's political-military councils. Despite their unquestioned preeminence within the Pact, the Soviets, as noted above, have found it necessary to make concessions—in some cases, significant ones—in exchange for Pact support for some of their favored policies. In certain instances where they have refused to be forthcoming in meeting East European concerns (e.g., Romanian objections to criticism of China) or where they have attempted to force their allies to accept greater Pact interference in internal affairs (the 1978 effort to increase Pact control over national armies), Moscow has come out empty-handed. This is not to suggest that the East European tail wags the Soviet dog. Such evidence does indicate, however, that more careful attention to Pact affairs is in order. This is true not only because of the importance of the alliance itself as an institution, but also because the outcome of policy debates within the Pact may provide us with useful and perhaps unique insights into the nature of Soviet-East European relations.

Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, since the formation of the alliance in 1955. The military officers who have occupied these posts include:(a) *Commander in Chief*—I.S. Konev, May 1955–June 1960; A.A. Grechko, July 1960–July 1967; I.I. Yakubovskiy, July 1967–December 1976; V.G. Kulikov, January 1977–present; (b) *Chief of Staff*—A.I. Antonov, May 1955–June 1962; P.I. Batov, October 1962–November 1965; M.I. Kasakov, November 1965–August 1968; S.M. Shtemenko, August 1968–April 1976; A.I. Gribkov, October 1976–present.

[57] R. Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," *Survey* (London), No. 70/71, 1969, p. 101.

Venezuela's MAS

By David J. Myers

Use of the Soviet Red Army to crush the "Prague Spring" in 1968 shocked radical leftists throughout the Third World. In Venezuela, the refusal of the traditional Communist Party (Partido Comunista Venezolano—PCV) to condemn this violation of national sovereignty caused many party members to search for ways to dissociate themselves from Moscow's international adventures. Led by Pompeyo Márquez and Teodoro Petkoff, they formed an independent Communist party called the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS). Since its appearance in 1971, MAS has become Venezuela's third political force, the only one with even a remote chance of breaking the domination over Venezuelan politics currently exercised by the Social Christians through their Committee for Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI) and by the social democratic party, Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD).

While MAS has tried consistently to shape its image as a radical leftist but non-Communist movement, it maintains close ties with the Italian and Spanish Communist parties.[1] Because of these ties, as well as its origins and ideology, MAS perhaps should be considered a Third World "Eurocommunist" movement. Its growing strength in Venezuela raises the possibility that those who broke with the PCV in 1971 may be blazing a path whereby radical leftists in Latin America, Africa, and Asia can emerge from the electoral limbo into which most have fallen as they have conducted political activity within the framework of traditional Moscow-oriented Communist parties.

This article focuses on how and why the Movement Toward Socialism was able to establish itself as a significant electoral force where the traditional Communist party had failed, and on the extent to which MAS's success may be a harbinger of new trends in the Third World. First, we will explore the way in which decisions by the PCV during the 1960's were often out of touch with the feelings of most Venezuelans. Next, we will consider the strategies of MAS, especially as revealed in the election campaigns of 1978 and 1979 and in the party's relationship to the incumbent administration of Luis Herrera Campíns. Finally, we will assess the broader implications of the experience of MAS for the Communist movement throughout the Third World and for politics in the Western hemisphere.

The PCV's Failings

The Venezuelan Communist Party of Gustavo and Edwardo Machado has been only marginally less inept and unimaginative electorally than traditional Communist parties elsewhere in the Third World. Historically, such parties, especially in Latin America, have been surprisingly unsuccessful at the polls. Among

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Mr. Myers is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA). He is coeditor and contributor to Venezuela: The Democratic Experience, *1977, and author of numerous other books and articles on election campaigning, urban politics, and national security policy in Latin America, particularly Venezuela and Brazil. Mr. Myers is also founder and codirector of Mycon, a firm that performed consulting and polling work during the 1978 Venezuelan elections.*

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[1] In an August 1977 interview with the author, Teodoro Petkoff of MAS acknowledged that his party maintained cordial relations with the Spanish Communist Party.

During the 1978 presidential election campaign, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) sent its political consultants to Venezuela to help shape MAS's presentation to the electorate. From personal observation by the author.


SOLUCIONES SOCIALISTAS AL DESASTRE NACIONAL
PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO DEL MAS Y DE SU CANDIDATO PRESIDENCIAL EL DR. JOSE VICENTE RANGEL
JOSE VICENTE
mas
ESTA ES UNA PUBLICACION DEL MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO MAS

The 1978 Program for Government of the Movement Toward Socialism and its presidential candidate, Dr. José Vicente Rangel. The title reads: "Socialist Solutions to the National Disaster."

—Newsprint handout from the 1978 campaign.

Latin American Communist parties, only the Chilean Communist Party consistently could count on more than 10 percent of the total vote in open and free elections.[2] In Cuba, where Fidel Castro imposed communism following his legendary guerrilla campaign, the original Cuban Communist party supported General Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship until victory was almost within the insurgents' grasp. Since its appearance in the early 1930's, the PCV, too, has either been outmaneuvered by its domestic rivals or has thrown away opportunities from which it might have emerged as the spokesman for important elements in Venezuelan society.[3]

To understand the PCV's history, it is useful to examine three factors which help to explain the general lack of success that has plagued traditional Communist parties throughout the Third World. First, these parties have often behaved as if they were the agents of a foreign power. For example, the Venezuelan Communist Party's about-face to oppose the Nazis only after Adolf Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 convinced most Venezuelans that the party served other than national interests. This perception has persisted, and in an era when most Third World countries are struggling to reduce North American and West European influence on their domestic societies, the prospect of becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union holds little appeal.

The Communists' lack of success is also attributable to the kinds of converts they have initially tended to make. Most often they have attracted "Westernized" intellectuals who have found the Soviet model seductive as a path to socioeconomic modernization. However, the alienation of these intellectuals from their own society has inhibited attempts to convert the masses, most of whom remained highly traditional. Only where Communist movements fled their country's "Westernized" cities, and had to adapt Marxist ideology and tactics to reality among the masses, were they able to transform themselves into broadly based, popular movements. Such transformations occurred in China and Vietnam, but in both instances a protracted war against a foreign presence immeasurably assisted Communist elites in establishing legitimacy and control.

A final factor hindering traditional Communist parties in the Third World from broadening their support base relates to centralism. Opposition to rule from the capital city is an old theme in the provinces throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Historically, Communist party strength has been concentrated in national administrative centers. From the perspective of provincials, therefore, Communist parties have appeared to be one more political group from the capital city seeking to dominate the periphery. Consequently, few regional leaders have felt the Communist party to be an appropriate vehicle for channeling demands or for expressing discontent.

Venezuela's traditional Communist Party, the PCV, as implied earlier, experienced most of the electoral frustrations characteristic of its relatively unsuccessful counterparts elsewhere in Latin America. As can be seen in Table 1, the high point in PCV electoral fortunes came in December 1958 when the party, bask-

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[2] A useful but dated introduction to the region's Communist parties is Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1957. Also see Ronald H. McDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America*, Chicago, IL, Markham, 1971.

[3] The best history of Venezuela's Communist Party is Robert J. Alexander, *The Communist Party of Venezuela*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1969.

Table 1: The Venezuelan Communist Party in Legislative Voting, 1946–78[a]

Year	1946	1947	1958	1963[b]	1968[c]	1973	1978
Percent of the total vote	3.6	3.7	6.0	—	2.8	1.2	1.1
Total votes for MAS	50,387	43,190	160,791	—	103,368	50,228	55,068

[a] In Venezuela, a single vote is cast for party legislative lists that include senators, congressmen, and state legislators. In every instance, the vote received by the PCV presidential candidate, when the party offered one, was less than that obtained by the legislative list.

[b] The PCV was illegal at the time of the 1963 elections, because of its guerrilla activities.

[c] In 1968, the party appeared on the ballot as the Advancement Union (Union para Avanzar—UPA).

SOURCE: Calculated from official statistics of Venezuela's Supreme Electoral Council.

ing in unparalleled prestige and enjoying important support among urban intellectuals and slum dwellers for its role in the resistance that finally overthrew the military dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, polled 6 percent of the total votes cast in the legislative balloting. Two and a half years later, the PCV turned its back on Venezuela's fledgling democratic regime and joined with Castroite guerrillas in an abortive effort to overthrow the government of President Rómulo Betancourt (1959-64).[4] More than six years were to pass before the PCV reversed itself and rejoined the ranks of those agreeing to accept elections as the only legitimate procedure for choosing a government. Electoral returns in December 1968, less than a year after the PCV had abandoned the guerrilla struggle, shocked and dismayed its leaders. The party was reduced to a smaller percentage of the total vote than it had received in the election which preceded the 1948 military coup. And, as Table 1 illustrates, the PCV continued to lose support after 1968.

The decline in PCV fortunes is rooted in four characteristics of Venezuelan political life that PCV leaders either failed to grasp or were unable to deal with. These are: (1) a weak sense of class struggle, (2) the popularity of competitive democracy, (3) the skill of the leaders of AD and COPEI, and (4) a high level of political and economic nationalism in Venezuela, which rendered PCV links with the Soviet Union a fatal liability.

The first of these characteristics presents a problem for Communist parties in all countries boasting an Iberian political tradition. This tradition—closely linked to medieval Thomistic philosophy, which attaches great importance to maintaining intrasocietal harmony[5]—frowns upon those who would generate conflict to pursue individual or class interests.

Because Latin America's political and cultural heritage is strongly Iberian, the region's most prestigious intellects have generally written and talked about society in a manner diametrically opposed to the Marxist theory of class struggle. Since the late 19th century, the coexistence of Marxism and traditional Iberian modes of thinking has led to interesting anomalies in Latin American politics. For example, in Venezuela both Marxist and non-Marxist political parties officially describe themselves as multiclass (*polyclasista*).[6] Even the PCV claims to welcome membership by "progressive" elements of the national bourgeoisie. Entrepreneurs who have successfully competed with foreign corporations receive grudging respect.[7] (In contrast, foreign businessmen, especially ones linked with multinational corporations, are bitterly denounced as blood-sucking imperialists. No charge against the local oligarchy is considered more damaging politically than that of being allied with foreign imperialism.)

This inclination to believe that all one's countrymen, save those hopelessly corrupted by outsiders, can play a useful role in whatever social order might evolve, made PCV efforts to intensify interclass antagonism during the 1960's seem heavy-handed. In the urban slums, for example, party members found themselves isolated when they destroyed self-help projects on the grounds that government-supplied materials were mere crumbs given by the exploiters to the exploited.[8] Even worse, PCV violence against what the party called "repressive" instruments of official power—the police and national guard—often involved attacks by middle-class students on the upwardly mobile sons of the working poor. This incongruity aided the democratic governments in portraying themselves as the people's only true representatives.

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[4] For a comprehensive discussion of events during the Betancourt administration, see Robert J. Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of Romulo Betancourt*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1964.

[5] On this, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations," *Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, IN), January 1974, pp. 3–33.

[6] Particularly informative along these lines is Chapter 8, "Program and Doctrine," in John D. Martz, *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966.

[7] For example, leftist politicians were almost unanimous in approving of the purchase by Venezuelan entrepreneurs in 1965 of the electricity distribution system in Caracas that had been owned by American Foreign Power and Light Corporation.

[8] Talton Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 34–35, 105–07, and 130–38.

Second, doubts by the PCV and many foreign and domestic observers in 1959 about the viability of Western-style electoral democracy in Venezuela proved ill-founded. True, throughout almost a century and a half of independence, the country had experienced only 11 months of rule by popularly elected governments. This history led PCV leaders to anticipate that Rómulo Betancourt's administration would be overthrown before he completed his constitutional term, and that the PCV would emerge even stronger from a second period in the underground resistance. Consequently, the PCV refused to join with the other major political parties in a unity government that would have had as one of its principal aims the establishing and legitimating of democratic rules of the game.[9]

However, three administrations that governed during the 1960's—the AD governments of Betancourt and of Raúl Leoni (1964–69), and the COPEI government of Rafael Caldera Rodríguez (1969–74)—proved surprisingly able and popular. Betancourt initiated an ambitious agrarian reform project, held the country together during a concerted effort by Castro-supported guerrillas to overthrow him, and handed over power after free and open balloting to his elected successor. Leoni pushed industrial development, provided access for the business community to national planning, and turned over power to the opposition when his friend and fellow party member Gonzalo Barrios suffered a narrow defeat in the December 1968 election. Caldera's Social Christian administration focused on housing, integrated most of the remaining guerrillas into the electoral process, and paved the way for nationalization of the multinational petroleum corporations. Overall, the people approved of this record. A survey conducted by John D. Martz and Enrique Baloyra in 1973 found that 74 percent of all Venezuelans were highly supportive of elections, 73 percent opposed military coups, and 77 percent believed in the right of the opposition to criticize the government.[10] PCV estimates in 1959 about the viability of electoral democracy had proved to be grossly mistaken.

The Venezuelan Communist Party also became more isolated during the 1960's because it was outmaneuvered by Democratic Action and the Social Christians. When AD's grip on the peasants began slipping in the middle 1960's, it was the Social Christians who expanded their own support base into the countryside. The Social Christians likewise engineered

A Soviet photo of the September 1972 founding congress of the New Force (Nueva Fuerza) electoral coalition, joining the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), and the Democratic Republican Union. Despite such efforts to regain electoral favor, the PCV made a dismal showing in the 1973 legislative elections.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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[9] See Martz, op. cit., pp. 104–08.

[10] See Martz and Baloyra, *Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political Opinion*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 1979, pp. 46–48.

Gustavo Machado, leader of the traditional Venezuelan Communist Party, pictured in 1968.

—Wide World.

major successes in organizing students and slum dwellers. AD, after sustaining three factional splits during the 1960's, used its five years in the opposition (1969–74) to rebuild much of the coalition that had allowed it to dominate electoral politics between 1946 and 1968. In effect, while PCV leaders agonized over the desirability of participating in democratic politics, AD and the Social Christians had turned their energies toward building and maintaining societal support. As the 1970's dawned, the PCV no longer had the option of challenging as a major force in the electoral process.

It was not surprising that the unbroken string of miscalculations by PCV leaders after the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez created widespread dissatisfaction within the party during the late 1960's. However, it was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that magnified this dissatisfaction beyond the breaking point. Teodoro Petkoff, a young PCV leader who had distinguished himself in the resistance to General Pérez Jiménez, voiced the sentiments of many disgruntled PCV members in his widely read *Checoslovaquia: el socialismo como problema* (Czechosolovakia: Socialism as a Problem).[11] In that work, Petkoff condemned the Soviet Union's suppression of the "Prague Spring" and argued that revolutionaries in the Third World must be willing to condemn with equal vigor Moscow's imperialism and exploitation by the advanced capitalist countries.

Petkoff continued to sound the call for a truly Venezuelan version of socialism,[12] and soon found an important ally in Pompeyo Márquez, long an important figure within the PCV. Márquez had grown increasingly disillusioned at his party's subservience to the Soviet Union and at the consequences of the dominant faction's decision to join in the unsuccessful guerrilla movement.[13] Márquez and Petkoff initially attempted to reform the traditional Communist Party from within. However, it proved impossible to shake Gustavo Machado's control over the institution that he had established during the early 1930's. After much soul-searching, the PCV dissidents decided to establish a nationalistically revolutionary socialist force that would be attuned to conditions in Venezuela and the Third World in general. In January 1971, Márquez, Petkoff, and their followers organized the Movement Toward Socialism as a separate political party.[14]

Unexpectedly, this new grouping came up with roughly 5 percent of the total "small-card," or legislative, vote in the general elections of 1973, more than four times what the PCV received. The national legislative slate of MAS also outpolled the slates of all the other radical leftist political parties, some of which had been trying for years to become major vehicles of opposition to AD and the Social Christians. Nevertheless, the People's Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—MEP—an offshoot of AD) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR—an earlier and even more radical offshoot of AD) both continued to hold some attraction for leftist voters.[15]

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[11] Caracas, Editorial Fuentes, 1969.

[12] Other important books by Petkoff include: *Socialismo para Venezuela?* (Socialism for Venezuela?), Caracas, Editorial Fuentes, 1972, and *Proceso a la izquierda* (The Leftward Movement), Barcelona, Editorial Planeta, 1976.

[13] Márquez's thinking is summarized in the chapter entitled "El Alias" in Alicia Freilich de Segal's *La Venedemocracia* (Venezuelan Democracy), Caracas, Monte Avila, 1978, pp. 137–62.

[14] Ibid., pp. 149–53.

[15] The most comprehensive account of the 1973 election is John D. Martz and Enrique Baloyra, *Electoral Mobilization and Public Opinion: The Venezuelan Campaign of 1973*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1976.



Cofounders of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS): at left, Pompeyo Márquez, shown in 1963 shortly before his arrest with 22 other congressmen on terrorist charges; at right, Teodoro Petkoff, shown in September 1980, several months after his election as President of MAS.

—Wide World and *Bohemia* (Caracas), Sept. 15, 1980.

Capitalizing on Success

Márquez and Petkoff have proved themselves able organizers and strategists in building upon the auspicious electoral debut of MAS. While seeking to develop leftist unity on a wide variety of issues, they have never abandoned their goal of transforming MAS into the only significant electoral organization on the radical left. Furthermore, they affirmed to all who would listen that MAS eventually would displace either AD or the Social Christians as one of Venezuela's two major political parties.

MAS has boldly and tenaciously pursued a multipronged strategy since 1973. The most important elements of this strategy have been: (1) reaching out to leftists and others in the electorate who historically rejected the PCV; (2) crafting a network of organizational links with a wide variety of social groups, a policy favored by most Marxist political parties; (3) cooperating with AD and the Social Christians in arrangements of convenience that might increase party strength and gain acceptance for MAS within the electorate at large; (4) public championing of social justice and of honesty in government at every opportunity; and (5) attempting to convince those historically most hostile to the PCV—especially the Venezuelan military and North Americans—that they could live with a democratically elected MAS administration.

In attempting to gain support among leftists and those inclined toward leftist outlooks, the leaders of MAS have taken great care to cultivate an image of reasonableness, openness, and flexibility—a posture which contrasts with the strident, sectarian rigidity of



José Vicente Rangel, an independent leftist who ran as the presidential candidate of Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in 1973 and 1978.

—*Bohemia* (Caracas), May 15, 1978.

the PCV. In 1973, MAS chose as its presidential candidate José Vicente Rangel, long a noted leftist, who had never belonged to the PCV but who also chose not to become a member of MAS. Such an alignment, with minimal regard for ideological or organizational purity, has become a hallmark of MAS.[16] Prior to the 1978 presidential elections, MAS took the lead in attempting to rally radical leftists behind the idea of a single presidential standard-bearer. When this effort failed, the party ran its own candidate, again Rangel. Although Rangel did only marginally better than his 4 percent showing of 1973, MAS itself elected 11 congressmen, more than the combined total of 10 elected by all other radical leftist parties. In the process, the party garnered 6 percent of the legislative vote.

The 1973 and 1978 elections provide some basis for analyzing the sorts of social groupings that MAS has succeeded in attracting by its leftist appeals. Specifically, the author has been able to examine the percent of the vote for MAS in each of Venezuela's 642 municipalities in 1973 and in 1978 as a function of each of three independent variables: (1) the percent of the municipality's population that lives in the capital of the municipality; (2) the percent of literacy in the municipality; and (3) the percent of the municipality's population living in substandard housing. The results of feeding these variables into a multiple regression equation were striking (see Table 2). There proved to be a remarkably strong relationship between MAS voting and the percent of population living in the municipality capital (Beta equaled .43 in 1973 and .50 in 1978) and a significant link as well between MAS voting and literacy (Beta equaled .33 and .12 respectively). Since the population of municipal capitals continues to swell and literacy rates are rising, MAS can look forward in the 1980's to expanded opportunities to win over newly urbanized, newly literate voters—as it seems to have done in the 1970's.

Analysis of the 1973 and 1978 voting patterns suggests, too, that MAS has no special appeal in areas characterized by high levels of substandard housing—i.e., in poor neighborhoods. In this case, the relationship was weak (Beta equaled -.02 in 1973 and .02 in 1978). Similar analysis of the vote for the Social Christians and for Democratic Action tends to indicate that the latter retains the allegiance of the poor in most parts of Venezuela, with the former enjoying significant support in disadvantaged areas throughout the Andes. Thus, one of the most important challenges still facing MAS leaders is to expand the party's appeal among Venezuelan have-nots.

Results of the experimental 1979 elections to district municipal councils suggested further success for MAS in its efforts to broaden its leftist base. The 1979 balloting was an experiment in direct election of municipal council members. Previously, these officials had been chosen on the same ballot with the senators, congressmen, and state legislators. Consequently, municipal council races rarely figured in the electorate's decision about the party for which the single legislative vote would be cast. Councilmen, after being elected, did the bidding of those who positioned them on the party ballot. Voters had become increasingly alienated by this situation, feeling that citizens had no means of holding local officials responsible for their actions. Mindful of this growing disenchantment with local government, AD and the Social Christians opted to hold separate municipal elections in June of 1979. For these elections, as in the 1978 campaign, Petkoff and Márquez called for leftist unity in order to present a viable alternative to the Social Christians and AD. This time, however, the other leftist political parties did agree to form a single slate of candidates

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[16] See John D. Martz, "The Minor Parties," in Howard Penniman, Ed., *Venezuela at the Polls*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

Table 2: Regression Analysis of Socioeconomic Bases of Support for the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in 1973 and 1978

(The dependent variable in each case is MAS's percent of the total legislative vote in the respective years)

	1973	1978
Independent variables:	(Beta weights)	
Urbanization[a]	.43	.50
Literacy[b]	.33	.12
Poverty[c]	−.02	.02
R^2 =	**.42**	**.30**
constant =	−.43	.44

[a] Measured as the percent of the municipality's population living in the municipality capital.

[b] Measured as the percent of literacy in the municipality's population.

[c] Measured as the percent of the municipality's population living in substandard housing.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The election data for the 642 municipalities were found in publications of the Supreme Electoral Council. The socioeconomic indicators were drawn from the 1971 Venezuelan census. For a technical and theoretical discussion of the variables used, see David J. Myers, "Urban Voting, Structural Cleavages, and Party System Evolution, The Case of Venezuela," *Comparative Politics* (Rutgers, NJ), October 1975, pp. 119–51.

for each of Venezuela's 190 council election districts.[17]

The united leftist slate polled some 3 percent more than the combined legislative slate of all radical leftist parties had in December 1978 (16.3 percent vs. 13.1 percent). More important, from the perspective of MAS, were signs that the party's strength within the Left had increased. While the author has not yet seen council-by-council returns, it was reported that in Caracas, MAS's share of the total leftist vote rose to 74 percent (it had been 56 percent in 1978).[18] Petkoff and Márquez, in the name of unity, had achieved their immediate strategic objective—domination of the political spectrum's radical Left.

Optimists in MAS interpreted the June 1979 municipal election results as evidence that the party might jump more quickly than expected to second position in Venezuelan politics. AD's share of the vote in the elections had fallen to 30 percent (compared to 40 percent in the 1978 legislative elections). In the ensuing 11 months, Democratic Action was also paralyzed by a bitter and inconclusive struggle for power between supporters of former president Carlos Andrés Pérez and party founder Rómulo Betancourt. MAS, in contrast, emerged from its May 1980 convention more united than ever. Polls taken in mid-1980 confirmed that MAS, at least in the populous central region, was running close to both of the major parties in overall popularity.[19] (Surprisingly, these polls showed that AD had recovered, to replace COPEI as the public's preferred political instrument.) For the Masistas,[20] continuation of recent trends in popular support might, by the 1983 elections, put their party within striking distance of AD and the Social Christians, parties that have dominated Venezuelan politics since 1959. Under these circumstances, MAS would be seen as a viable option for disgruntled voters.

Such favorable readings of public opinion, however, are weak reeds on which to rest long-range hopes for political success. Petkoff and Márquez have seen such "support" evaporate before.[21] Consequently, MAS has pursued other lines of its broad strategy, particularly the effort to weave organizational ties and patterns of influence with a variety of socially important groups. Since 1973, MAS has undertaken major organizing drives among workers, students, and the inhabitants of the urban slums.

The workers have by and large remained loyal to AD, with the Social Christians having an important minority following. But MAS is emerging as a force to be reckoned with in union elections. A MAS-coordinated leftist unity slate won control of the strategic steelworkers' union following elections in December 1979.[22] Subsequently, one of AD's most influential leaders, Leandro Mora, called on the Social Christians to join in developing "new strategies to stop the leftist tide from surging over the labor force."[23]

From its beginning, MAS commanded a significant following among high-school and university students. The universities, in particular, have long attracted those troubled by the unequal distribution of wealth in Venezuela and inclined to believe that the ruling Social Christians and social democrats (AD) serve the interests of domestic oligarchs and international capitalists.[24] Such circles were, at the same time, troubled by Soviet imperialism. Therefore, the circumstances of MAS's origin and its radical socialist ideology give the party an appeal and legitimacy among Venezuela's *inteligencia* that the traditional PCV never enjoyed.

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[17] See Rafael Hernández, "A Contribution from the Grass Roots to the Unity of the Left," *SIC* (Caracas), July–August 1979, pp. 301–02.

[18] See José A. Lazcano, "Election Results," *SIC*, July–August 1979, p. 298.

[19] This was found by the respected polling firm *Datos* and in private soundings made by the individual political parties.

[20] Members of MAS are commonly referred to as "Masistas."

[21] Prior to the 1973 presidential election, public opinion polls suggested that MAS would receive at least 10 percent of the total vote. The party captured only 5 percent.

[22] *Resumen* (Caracas), December 1979.

[23] Ibid.

[24] This theme has been repeated by a host of radical leftist writers. See, for example, Moises Moleiro, *El Partido del Pueblo: Crónica de un Fraude* (The People's Party: Chronicle of a Fraud), Valencia, Vadell hermanos, 1978; and Carlos Ramires Faria, *La Democrácia Petrolera: de Rómulo Betancourt a Carlos Andrés Pérez* (Petroleum Democracy: From Rómulo Betancourt to Carlos Andrés Pérez), Caracas, El cid, 1978.

In the 1977 student elections, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left did win a string of victories in the major universities, but subsequently, MIR student officers and administrators became involved in corruption, and the national party degenerated into an alliance of convenience among two and possibly three squabbling factions.[25] Consequently, in the December 1979 elections at the prestigious Central University, MAS won more votes than any other party.[26] In an alliance of convenience with the Social Christians, it now shares control of the university. Cooperation between MAS and the Social Christians for the purpose of controlling universities and other educational institutions has become a basic fact of political life during the first years of the Herrera government.

The Social Christians and Masistas, while cooperating in the universities, are competing intensely for the support of the urban poor. President Herrera has given considerable attention to strengthening neighborhood councils (*juntas comunales*) in the slums of Caracas, Maracaibo, and other major cities. Social Christian strategists calculate that a strong network of neighborhood councils under their control can balance AD's domination of organized labor and overcome traditional COPEI weakness among the urban poor.[27] However, MAS has also given high priority to obtaining influence within these councils. During May and June of 1980, reports began to seep out of the slums suggesting that MAS was having more success than the government in gaining control of the newly strengthened councils. Information on this matter, however, remains fragmentary and impressionistic.

Willingness to cooperate with the Social Christians in the universities while competing with them among the urban poor highlights MAS's readiness to enter short-term cooperative arrangements as long as they are seen as leading to the growth of party influence and support. Arrangements of convenience between MAS and either of the two major parties are, of course, never publicly proclaimed. Evidence of behind-the-scenes cooperation between MAS and AD during the Pérez administration has yet to be documented, but the Social Christians charge that AD helped to finance MAS television commercials during the 1978 presidential election campaign. One possible indication that these assertions may indeed be true is that throughout the campaign, public opinion polls indicated that voters inclining to José Vicente Rangel would support the Social Christians' Luís Herrera if forced to choose between only the candidates of the two major parties.[28] AD, on the other hand, maintains that the Herrera government has virtually turned over the Ministry of Education to MAS. While this seems unlikely because of continuing Social Christian recruitment in the high schools and universities, a significant number of Masistas have assumed middle- and upper-middle-level positions in the educational bureaucracy over the last 12 months or so. This suggests cooperation between the Herrera government and MAS in an effort to isolate AD supporters inside the educational establishment.[29]

A fourth aspect of the MAS strategy involves championing of social justice and of honesty in government.



A 1979 photo of Pompeyo Márquez, then Secretary General of Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism.

—*Bohemia* (Caracas), Nov. 25, 1979.

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[25] *SIC*, December 1979.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Social Christian difficulties with the urban poor were confirmed in the "epilogue" of David J. Myers, *Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela: Caldera's Victory*, Caracas, Editorial Sucre, 1973.

[28] From polling conducted by the author.

[29] From interviews during early 1980 with several former upper-middle-level officials in the Ministry of Education.

In this area, MAS leaders cultivate the image of being more concerned about human needs and more trustworthy than leaders of either of the major political parties.

MAS repeated the first of these themes throughout the 1978 election campaign, particularly a variant suggesting that the AD and Social Christian parties have failed to bring about a just society because they have sold out to international capitalism. The MAS electoral program promised a state takeover of banking and of the economic empires of the Venezuelan oligarchy.[30] Under this program, multinational corporations would be permitted to operate if their activities could be shown to be in the national interest. Finally, small and medium-sized businesses would remain in private hands, at least initially. This restructuring of the economy was presented as a first major step toward the goal of a more equitable distribution of wealth and income.

MAS made corruption in government a major issue as well in both the 1978 national election campaign and the 1979 municipal council races. Moreover, MAS congressmen voted unanimously to hold former president Carlos Andrés Pérez responsible for administrative, political, and moral negligence in a 9-million-bolivar kickback involving the purchase during his administration of a Norwegian refrigerator ship.[31] Congress, however, found Pérez guilty only of "political" negligence, a relatively light slap on the wrist, considering everything. Márquez and Petkoff subsequently cited Pérez's escape from criminal prosecution as evidence that as long as AD and the Social Christians dominate Venezuelan politics, self-serving interests would short-circuit the people's will.[32] Such public statements suggest that Masistas continue to believe that disgust over official corruption, in addition to tensions associated with economic development and the continuing unequal distribution of wealth, will eventually produce a large number of alienated voters, and that MAS must position itself to attract them.

Finally, the party leadership, especially Teodoro Petkoff, has made a major effort to convince the Venezuelan military and selected North Americans that a MAS administration would not be incompatible with their interests. Events since World War II lead to a pessimistic assessment of Petkoff's chances of success here, but it is a measure of the man's acumen, boldness, and flexibility that he has been willing to try.

During the last seven years, Petkoff has regularly accepted invitations to discuss his views on important issues with officers attending Venezuela's Army War College at Los Chorros. While never deviating from his militant socialism, he has stressed his Venezuelan nationalism and disenchantment with Soviet foreign policy. Most recently, Petkoff circulated a statement by his party's director of international affairs condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[33]

The MAS leadership has generally attempted to be conciliatory toward individual North Americans, especially academics and professionals. In 1974, Petkoff spoke to the national Latin American Studies Association meeting in San Francisco. The following year, he toured a number of prestigious US universities, and he has returned periodically for limited speaking engagements. In addition, numerous Masista students currently are studying in the United States. Generally, their message to North Americans is the same: MAS is nationalistically Venezuelan and radically socialistic. The United States, they contend, has no legitimate cause for concern that MAS would convert Venezuela into a Soviet satellite or a Stalinist dictatorship. On the contrary, unless North Americans identify with the Venezuelan oligarchy or believe that multinational business should continue to make exorbitant profits, Masistas argue, they should actually support efforts to institute radical socialism in Venezuela. While the reaction to Masistas in the United States has been mixed, they have convinced their audiences that MAS is not merely a new incarnation of the historic Venezuelan Communist Party.

MAS Experience in Perspective

Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism, while not yet an effective challenger for control of the government, has the potential to become one during the late 1980's. It can be argued that MAS is the most successful "Eurocommunist" movement to appear in the Third World. For this reason, it has considerable implications in a variety of contexts. Many of the conditions that Pompeyo Márquez and Teodoro Petkoff diagnosed and turned to their advantage in Venezuela are common throughout the developing countries of the planet. MAS's experience is particularly relevant with respect to the potential for the electoral success of nationalistic radical socialist or Communist

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[30] The MAS *Programa de gobierno* was printed and distributed throughout Venezuela prior to the December 1978 elections.

[31] A comprehensive summary of this matter is contained in the May 18, 1980, issue of the Caracas news magazine *Zeta*.

[32] Ibid.

[33] *Radio Continente* (Caracas) broadcast of Jan. 14, 1980, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Jan. 14, 1980, p. L/1.

parties in the resource-rich countries of the "developing" or "Southern" nations. The MAS phenomenon also has important ramifications not only for Venezuelan politics but also with regard to the future of democracy in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America, given the 1973 overthrow of a constitutionally elected leftist president in Chile and the uneasiness with which Venezuela's economic and political elites view the growth of MAS influence.

The linkage between the birth of MAS and outrage at Soviet imperialism was probably crucial for the party's emergence as a major force on the Venezuelan left. This is a lesson of considerable significance to leftist movements elsewhere in the Third World, where the trend toward greater national assertiveness can be expected to become more pronounced in the 1980's. The success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), US withdrawal from Vietnam, and Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan indicate to many in the developing countries that they are witnessing a fundamental shift in power between the industrial "North" and the "resource-rich South." It is no longer fashionable to be tied too closely to either of the superpowers. Even Cuba has discovered that its alliance with Moscow often gets in the way of Havana's efforts to exercise Third World leadership. In light of these perceptions, Communist parties that continue with a highly visible dependence on Moscow seem condemned, unless the Soviet Union should gain massive superiority over the United States, to remain isolated within their own societies.

Throughout the Third World, democratic regimes with competitive elections are the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, a significant number of Third World countries experience intermittent periods during which more than one political party competes for power. This situation is most prevalent in Latin America, Tropical Africa, and parts of South Asia. It is for these sometime democratic countries that the MAS experience is most relevant. In them, as in Venezuela, a basic key to the success of Eurocommunist-type movements will be the skill of party leaders in grafting the symbolism associated with class struggle to local political traditions.

In its efforts toward that end, MAS, as discussed earlier, has benefited from the external technical assistance of the Spanish and Italian Communist parties; however, it is beyond the capability of these parties to offer throughout the Third World the level of assistance that MAS has received. Evidence suggests that the Italian and Spanish Communist parties will confine their efforts to a select number of countries in Latin America and Africa where they calculate that a Eurocommunist movement has some reasonable chance of success. For example, the Brazilian Communist Party recently has emerged from the underground and seems inclined to loosen its historic ties with Moscow and adopt Eurocommunist-like positions. This has led to increasing contacts between the Spanish and Italian Communist parties and the Brazilian party.[34] Moscow, however, commands enormous resources in its global crusade to spread the Soviet version of the Marxist gospel. In countries where Moscow supports a traditionalist Communist party and where Eurocommunist elements receive little outside assistance, it will be extremely difficult for MAS-type movements to grow.

MAS's emergence as a viable political party, whether or not it comes to power, has affected Venezuela's political life in several important ways. Domestically, it ensures that the major battles of Venezuelan politics will be fought to the left on the political spectrum. Multinational corporations, to the extent that they are permitted to operate in Venezuela, will be tightly regulated by the state. Domestic entrepreneurs and landowners must live indefinitely under the threat of being taken over by the public sector, and government will continue to control the lion's share of basic industry. Furthermore, much of the revenue from petroleum will be used, as in the past, to subsidize living costs for the poor. If they did otherwise, the Social Christians and Social Democrats, given the continuance of the democratic regime, would be conceding large segments of the electorate to the MAS, with its Marxist-flavored appeal for social justice.

In foreign policy, the persistence of a viable MAS in the opposition guarantees that the government (whether Social Christian or Democratic Action) must be careful not to appear too closely allied with the United States. For MAS, as for many in the Third World, closeness to the United States is interpreted as domination by international capitalism. Any democratically elected administration will find it exceedingly difficult to build a consensus for special arrangements with Washington, such as one to develop Orinoco Tar Belt petroleum for the United States market.[35] In addition, MAS sensitivity toward and use of the "rich nations/poor nations" issue suggest that democratic Venezuelan governments, at least in their dealings with the industrial "North," will seek to appear as champions of international social justice for the "South." Venezuela's comparative affluence within the "Southern" world, however, will mute use by Caracas of this theme in its dealings with other "Southern" countries.

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[34] The supposedly reformist, or Eurocommunist, orientation of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) is discussed in *Latin American Regional Report–Brazil* (London), July 4, 1980. During a visit to Brazil in August–September 1980, the author confirmed in conversations with various Brazilian scholars the existence of links between the PCB and the Italian and Spanish Communist parties.

[35] Venezuela's proven oil reserves are generally considered to run between 18 and 20 billion barrels. Estimates for the untapped Orinoco tar sands, however, vary between 700 billion and 1 trillion barrels. Of this, at least 250 billion can be recovered with existing technology.

The extent to which growing MAS influence strengthens or weakens Venezuelan democracy remains unclear. Pompeyo Márquez recently stated in a widely circulated interview that the basic error of the PCV had been to take up arms against the democratically elected Betancourt government.[36] While this implies a strong MAS commitment to electoral democracy, the party's continuing ties with the guerrillas who resumed operations in eastern Venezuela during July of 1980 causes many to wonder just how real this commitment is.[37]

Contradictory signals from MAS on this matter relate to the party's preaching of revolutionary social and economic transformation. Once effected, such transformations are almost impossible to reverse, and MAS can never be confident that should it win a presidential election, the losers would not employ force in an effort to keep it from coming to power and enacting the pledged changes. Such a use of force almost occurred in Chile when Socialist Salvador Allende's radical electoral coalition received a plurality in the 1970 presidential voting. And, in fact, less than three years later, conservatives, the middle class, and others persuaded the military to remove President Allende by force. Subsequently, those who ousted the martyred president unleashed a campaign of violence and repression that dismantled the institutions on which the radical socialists had relied to achieve their electoral victories. The new government also killed or exiled Allende's key advisers and instituted military dictatorship in one of the hemisphere's oldest and most prestigious democracies.

Indeed, events in Chile between 1970 and the present cast doubt on the long-term viability of democracy anywhere in the Third World. Neither MAS nor any other Third World radical socialist or Communist party will ever forget what happened in Chile. To such parties, those events suggest that, at best, feudal and capitalistic elites in the developing areas will support democratic rules of the game only if these procedures allow them to retain their wealth and prestige. Several conversations with Petkoff over the past six years have convinced this author that while the MAS leader sincerely prefers to fight for his ideals within a democratic framework, he is hedging his bets. Should MAS encounter a good opportunity to attain power through other than electoral procedures, the party probably would seize what would have to be considered a once-in-a-lifetime chance. A preference for coming to power over not coming to power clearly overrides any commitment to democratic rules of the game. It is, in fact, difficult to think of any revolutionary political party or movement in the Third World that has not shared this preference. However, MAS may never be confronted with such a choice.

At the same time, it is possible that as MAS gains influence within the democratic system, it may become more than ever a creature of that system, with corresponding loyalties and inhibitions. The true test for Venezuelan democracy will come—as it came in Chile—should the radical socialists capture the presidency in a free and open election.

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[36] "El Alias," loc. cit., p. 151.

[37] "The Resurgence of Guerrillas in Venezuela," *Zeta*, Mar. 30, 1980, analyzes the Venezuelan guerrilla movement one year after President Luis Herrera's proclamation of amnesty. Conversations by the author with Venezuelan friends of more than a decade, whose relatives fought during the 1960's with the guerrillas, confirm continuing links between MAS and the July 1980 mini-insurgency.

The Roots of Autonomy in West European Communism

By J.W. Friend

Recent obituary notices notwithstanding, reports of the death of Eurocommunism may be exaggerated. For if it was difficult to know what Eurocommunism was alive, it is harder yet to know what has died. Certainly, the notion that Eurocommunism was the wave of the future disappeared after the French elections of June 1979, the Spanish elections of March 1979, and the Italian elections of June 1979. All three major "Eurocommunist" parties fared poorly with the electorate, when strong showings at the polls might have propelled them to the threshold of power. Then, in January 1980, the entente among the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist parties was broken when the French Communists retreated toward Moscow.

If, as a result of these developments, the term "Eurocommunist" now loses currency, it will not be a major loss. The various phenomena which have been subsumed under the Eurocommunist label remain, but the term "Eurocommunist" has been made even more confusing by the gyrations of the French Communist Party (PCF). We may do better by avoiding a word that invites confusion of thought and using the key notion of discussions of Eurocommunism during the 1970's: "autonomy." This word implies both a willingness to use forms other than bolshevism and a dispassionate view of the identity of national party interests with those of the Soviet state. The historical antecedent of autonomy—and its apparent antonym—is the concept of Soviet "control." Recent PCF actions provide renewed impetus to reinvestigate our use of the terms and to look at the historical and causal linkages among control, autonomy, and the behavior labeled "Eurocommunism."

Such an undertaking requires a review of Communist history, for the relationships between Moscow and the national parties that prevailed in the interwar and early post-World War II years do not merely provide precedents for communism today, but also live on in the memories of the elderly mandarins who still shape Soviet policy and in Western perceptions of interparty relations. This essay cannot presume to treat all aspects of the question. It barely touches, for example, on ideology and its control functions. The intention, rather, is to trace the evolution which has taken place in the Communist movement, from ideological commitment to the Comintern, through personal loyalty to Yosif Stalin and the habit of obedience after Stalin's death, to the emergence of autonomist stirrings in the 1960's.

The discussion which follows concentrates on autonomy and control among the European parties, but makes use of evidence from the experiences of non-European parties as well. To be workable as an analytical tool, the definition of "control" must be Soviet ability to force national parties to commit actions that contradict their respective self-interests; and the definition of "autonomy" must be the ability of parties to formulate a theory or even scattered notions of self-interest and then to resist Soviet pressure and defend their self-interests as they perceive them. It should be recognized, however, that those parties distinguished by long records of compliance with Soviet wishes may be acting in perfect self-interest—unless it can be shown that they are unable to say "no" under any circumstances. Theoretically, there is no necessary link between autonomy and anti-Soviet behavior—though Western observers find this hard to believe since such

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Mr. Friend, a former senior analyst for the US Central Intelligence Agency (Langley, VA), is currently a writer and consultant in Washington, DC. He has written articles on European communism for scholarly compendia and journals such as The Washington Quarterly.

At the left, Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer with French Communist Party chief Georges Marchais at a May 19, 1979, Marseilles rally on the theme of "Europe of the Communists"; at the right, Marchais chats with Viktor Zagladin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and First Deputy Chief of its International Department, at the April 1980 Paris Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe for Peace and Disarmament, which was boycotted by the Spanish, Italian, and several other West European Communist parties.

—Georges Gobet and Arnaud de Wildenberg/both for Gamma-Liaison.

august figures as CPSU secretaries Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarëv, who have major responsibilities for dealing with non-Soviet ruling and nonruling parties respectively, are so clearly persuaded that the link is there and that it is absolute.

The Comintern and Stalinist Periods

By the 1930's, Stalin exercised absolute control over the Communist movement. This situation derived from the submission of the infant Communist parties to V.I. Lenin's famous 21 conditions formulated in 1920 for membership in the Communist International. But that submission did not result in instant Soviet control. Because the powers of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) were so great, it is easy to telescope developments and lose sight of the subtle changes which took place over the years in relationships between the national parties and a Comintern bureaucracy increasingly dominated by Soviet nationals generally and finally by Stalin alone. From the beginning, at the Second Comintern Congress (1920), the ECCI was empowered to issue directives binding on all national sections (parties) and could replace a national leadership and expel members at any level. The Fifth Congress (1924) specified the implicit powers granted in 1920 by affirming that Comintern representatives could take part in meetings at any level and even urge adoption of the Executive Committee's own views where they differed from those of a national leadership.[1]

For all its powers, however, the Comintern in its early years was unable to mold a submissive international movement. It initially accepted into its ranks leaders and even whole parties that stubbornly resisted bolshevization, and after the right-wingers among them were forced out, a group of left-extremists, originally installed by Comintern President G.Ye. Zinov'yev, challenged the Leninist Center. Growing dissension in the Russian party after 1924 created new opportunities for factionalism and intrigue at all levels. The final victory of Stalin and N.I. Bukharin over the "United Opposition" of L. Trotsky, Zinov'yev, and L.B. Kamenev in 1926–27 put an end to the power of the left wing, but only Stalin's total supremacy in the Soviet party, achieved in 1929, brought complete Soviet control over policy and personnel in the International.[2]

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[1] See Jane Degras, Ed., *The Communist International (1919–1943): Documents*, London, Oxford University Press, 1956–65, Vol. 1, p. 165, and Vol. 2, pp. 119–20.

[2] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960, pp. 365–77; and Jules Humbert-Droz, *De Lénine à Staline* (From Lenin to Stalin), Neuchâtel, La Baconniere, 1971, pp. 319–56.

German Communist leader Ernst Thälmann addresses a 1932 party rally in Berlin. A year later the party was in a shambles and Thälmann was in prison, never to emerge.

—FPG.

Ideological enthusiasm did not provide sufficient guarantees of obedience for Stalin, and he buttressed it with personal ties of loyalty to himself. The leading cadres of each foreign Communist party were part of a complicated Comintern machinery, but they were also in a very real sense atomized individuals, responsible primarily to Stalin, not to the current head of their own party. An example from early 1929 sufficiently illustrates the point. Jay Lovestone, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the United States, led a delegation to Moscow to appeal a Comintern decision. Stalin overruled Lovestone, who had thought himself master of a 90 percent majority in his Central Committee. Under Comintern pressure, the majority evaporated within three months, and in June 1929 Lovestone, now backed by only 2 percent of the Central Committee, was expelled from the party.[3]

The organizational control measures which were introduced by the Comintern starting in 1924 began to take effect just as special devotion to Stalin became a factor to be reckoned with and helped promote Stalin's central role. The Comintern schools in Moscow received and trained thousands of foreign cadres in the late 1920's and early 1930's, and sent them home stamped into the mold of bolshevism and the love of Stalin. When cadres could not be brought to Moscow, the Moscow apparatus systematically collected dossiers on them. Omniscience was part of the control system.[4]

Another factor bolstering Stalin's position in the movement was that other objects of adulation were few at the beginning of the 1930's. No foreign Communist party had a chief whose prestige could rival the Soviet dictator's. Ernst Thälmann, the earliest foreign leader to be granted a personality cult of his own, was built up not as a rival, but precisely because he was Stalin's creature. And Palmiro Togliatti, though de facto leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was made to suffer for his support of Bukharin in the late 1920's, and would have been pushed aside in 1931 in favor of Luigi Longo if Longo had not declined to accept Togliatti's job.[5] Maurice Thorez, put in charge of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1931 after a period of great leadership confusion, was nevertheless surrounded by a collegium of Comintern instructors, headed by the Czechoslovak Communist Eugene Fried.[6]

In the early 1930's, the cult of Stalin to which the interwar generation of Communist cadres had surrendered itself symbolized both the unity of communism and the passion of the cadres' aspirations. It stood in glaring contrast to the grim daily political realities faced by the cadres in their own countries. But the change in Comintern tactics in 1934 from war on social fascism to promotion of the United Front provided the cadres with new slogans and campaigns, and the Spanish civil war gave them new emotional outlets. Fighting in Spain, German Communists could burn away the shame of their party's easy defeat by Adolph Hitler in 1933, and Italian Communists, who could oppose Fascism at home only with poorly distributed leaflets, found an open battleground in Spain and a base for radio broadcasts beamed at Italy.[7]

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[3] Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1960, pp. 419–30.

[4] See Charles Tillon, *On Chantait Rouge* (Red Was the Song), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1977, pp. 138–45, for an example of the attention paid a medium-level union leader on his one trip to Moscow.

[5] Giorgio Bocca, *Palmiro Togliatti*, Bari, Laterza, 1973, pp. 216–18.

[6] Philippe Robrieux, *Maurice Thorez, vie secrète et vie politique* (Maurice Thorez, Secret and Political Lives), Paris, Fayard, 1975, pp. 144–46.

[7] Paolo Spriano, *Storia del Partito comunista italiano* (History of the Italian Communist Party), Torino, Einaudi, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 85–90.

Finally, after the wave of expulsions and resignations that washed away both the losers of the national and international struggles of the 1920's and the hapless guinea pigs of Stalin's early experiments in new leadership, there came a period of stability for leaders and higher cadres and of increased appeal at home—seen most spectacularly in the case of the PCF. At this point, the growth of their parties, actual combat in Spain, mobilization against the surging strength of Nazism, and hatred of the ineffectual conservative democracies sustained a vital need to bebelieve in Stalin and communism and to disbelieve or dismiss unwelcome evidence of Stalin's terror. Having had to justify to themselves the terrible measures of collectivization and famine in the Soviet Union and the sectarianism of the social-fascism years abroad, Communists in the mid-1930's found the burden of belief easier. They seemed to be moving forward.

Obedience to Stalin became second nature to European Communists during this period, and was usually reinforced by unreasoning and passionate faith that the Soviet dictator was always right. The purges of non-Soviet Communists in the 1930's did not indicate that beneath the veneer of obedience opposition still thrived; for the purges struck at those who had opposed Stalin in the 1920's, or at loyal men who had been too friendly with his fallen enemies, or even at those like the unfortunate members of the Polish leadership, who, in addition to having these faults, were suspect in Stalin's eyes because he feared they might prove intractable in the future.[8]

Even the subtle and unemotional Palmiro Togliatti seems to have accepted the need to worship the Moloch of historical materialism. In later years, he told Lelio Basso that Stalin "had succeeded in convincing many comrades that it was necessary to kill and allow killing for the good of Russia and the movement." It is characteristic of Togliatti that his phrase leaves one unsure whether he shared this view. But for Franco Rodano, the Catholic Communist intellectual who in Togliatti's later years was one of his few intimates, there was no doubt: "Togliatti cannot be understood if one does not accept this truth—he judged Stalin as a positive force."[9]

What was true for Togliatti was truer still for thousands of lesser men. From 1929 to 1939, Stalinist obedience became both reflex and dogma for the faithful. The first real test of Stalin's control did not come until the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact in August 1939. Although the shock was not felt equally everywhere, perhaps the tension created within the world Communist movement can best be studied by looking at the PCF, the party which after the collapse of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) thought itself the eldest daughter of the church. A loyal Comintern apparatchik working in Paris later called the pact "a blow like those they give steers in the slaughterhouse."[10]

The rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union took the PCF by surprise, but once the leaders had registered what had happened, they hoped that somehow the pact would prevent the oncoming war. When war came nonetheless, they at first saw no connection between the Nazi-Soviet pact and their own commitment to the defense of France. On September 2, 1939, Communist deputies in the National Assembly voted for supplemental war credits—emulating the French Socialists of 1914. On the next day, Thorez, followed by thousands of PCF leading cadres at all levels, obeyed the call to arms of military reservists. Clearly, the PCF leadership judged the battle ahead a patriotic and just war. But on September 20, categorical new instructions arrived from Moscow. They declared that the PCF was wrong if it believed that it could defend the national interests of France while merely paying lip service to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The war itself was an imperialist war—like World War I—and the PCF leaders had sinned gravely in voting for war credits.

Amid confusion enhanced by the dispersal of party leaders in the mobilization, the party press, by now banned and clandestine, rallied to the new Moscow line. In response, on September 26 the National Assembly, led by old enemies on the right but with the support of the Socialist Party, declared the PCF illegal. For many Communists, the ban on the party eased rationalization of the new line, but among non-Communists only the prescient former United Front Premier Leon Blum warned publicly that attacks on the PCF would slow, not speed, the party's dissolution.

Of the 67 PCF deputies in parliament, 22, or one third of the total, refused to accept the new line. Despite numerous defections at all levels, however, the party apparatus was able to maintain a tenuous existence. The reality of Soviet control of this apparatus was revealed by the case of party leader Thorez himself. Summoned by the Comintern to desert from the armed forces and "resume his place at the head of the party," Thorez agonized over what to do for two weeks, at first rejecting a demand that meant execration in France and total submission in Soviet exile. But Thorez had been an apparatchik since his youth and had no other livelihood. If he did not submit, he would lose his party, and thus his career. On October 4, he slipped away from his unit, toward a hideout in Belgium and exile in the USSR.[11]

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[8] M.K. Dziewanowski, *A History of the Polish Communist Party*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 153–54; and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror*, rev. ed., New York, NY, Collier, 1973, p. 585. Both suggest that the dissolution of the Polish party in June 1938 was Stalin's way of avoiding future opposition to a Nazi-Soviet deal concerning Poland.

[9] Bocca, op. cit., p. 270.

[10] Giulio Ceretti, *Aux ombres des deux T, quarante ans avec Maurice Thorez et Palmiro Togliatti* (In the Shadow of the Two T's: 40 Years with Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti), Paris, Julliard, 1973, p. 196.

The obedience of the reluctant Thorez in 1939 serves as a symbol of the perfection of Soviet control. While it is true that during the cold war Moscow's orders were obeyed just as absolutely, never was there so dramatic a reversal of the Soviet line as in 1939. Neither during nor since World War II has Moscow forced leaders and militants to renounce so quickly and completely what they had believed and desired a short time before.

Of course, the parties under total Soviet control lay in ruins—the KPD destroyed in 1933, the Czechoslovak party decimated after March 1939, and the PCF banned in late 1939. But their cadres remained, and Comintern discipline had become so synonymous with devotion to Stalin that in 1943 that most mistrustful of tyrants apparently saw no risk in abolishing the Comintern altogether. There is no doubt that there were immediate political reasons behind the dissolution, and the value of the organization for future work was not certain. Nevertheless, the powers vested in the Comintern in the 1920's—to depose leaders and direct member parties—could not formally be given to the CPSU. Stalin must have been confident that he had the situation under total control.

Josip Broz Tito addresses the opening session of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in June 1948, shortly after the Moscow-controlled Cominform had issued a resolution condemning the independent stance of the Yugoslav leader.

—EUPRA

This is puzzling, however, For from the outset there were signs that the *Vozhd*'s confidence was not entirely justified. The Yugoslav and Chinese Communist parties resisted Stalin's advice to be conciliatory toward other political forces in their countries, and the Communist-led Greek partisans, aided by the Yugoslavs, made a grab for power not long after Stalin had indicated to Winston Churchill that Great Britain could retain 90 percent influence in Greece. Victories by the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist parties justified their disobedience in a way (and sowed the seeds of future trouble for Soviet foreign policy). But when Churchill moved to suppress the Greek partisans, Stalin did not object, despite a potentially exploitable split between British and American public opinion on the Greek situation.[12] Win or lose, those who failed to obey Stalin were left for a time to their own devices.

With the exception of these three cases, though, the Communist parties reborn after the war with many thousands of idealistic new recruits were docile, concerned mainly with organizing and indoctrinating the new members. The key jobs related to this task were entrusted to old Comintern hands—where possible, to those trained in Moscow. There was much talk of "national roads to socialism"; but this was merely the line promulgated from the center, and even the German Communists in East Berlin mouthed it.[13] And when Communist ministers were dismissed from the governments of France and Italy in 1947, the PCF and the PCI thought they had suffered only "a temporary setback"—perhaps because Moscow did not tell them otherwise.[14]

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[11] Jacques Fauvet, *Histoire du Parti communiste français* (History of the French Communist Party), rev. ed., Paris, Fayard, 1977, pp. 221–29; and Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 245–48.

[12] Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*, London, Penguin Books, 1975, pp. 372–81.

[13] Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, London, Collins, 1957, pp. 347–50.

[14] This interesting point is made by Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 347–53.

Certainly, the French and Italian Communists were taken by surprise in September 1947 when they were summoned to a meeting in Poland and denounced as fainthearts and parliamentarians by the Yugoslavs and Stalin's lieutenant A.A. Zhdanov. They had believed—because Moscow had told them so—that their cooperation in non-Communist governments was right and useful. In contrast, the new line was total opposition to American policy and bitter opposition to all of America's friends in Europe.[15] Moreover, while the Comintern had been the planning center for world revolution, it was also clear from the outset that the Cominform was to be purely a front for Soviet state interests. Despite the obvious political disadvantages of such an arrangement, the nonruling parties rallied immediately to the change of line and new organization—and engaged in self-criticism regarding their earlier behavior. In return for their complete submission to and support of Soviet policy, the nonruling parties received the implicit promise that in the fullness of time something would come out right for them.

In fact, little did. The logic of the cold war prevented the Communist parties of Western Europe from undertaking any political action at the national level. They could only await liberation by the Red Army. In the meantime, they were given new and humiliating tasks to fulfill—for example, beating the drums for purges in Eastern Europe, and praising T.D. Lysenko's quackery in science and Zhdanov's petit bourgeois bigotry in art. Of course, not all Cominform labors were onerous. The French and Italian parties, still smarting from Yugoslav criticism at the founding session of the Cominform (and, in the Italian case, resentful of Josip Broz Tito's attempts at the end of the war to chew away at Italy's eastern frontier), welcomed orders to denigrate Tito. The PCI even organized espionage and resistance nets in Yugoslavia—nets that were later wiped out by Tito's police.[16]

The Waning of Control

Yugoslav disobedience itself was possible only because of the Yugoslav party's intense consciousness of its own national identity. The party's leaders stuck together under attack, instead of dividing to make their individual surrenders to Moscow. Yet they found no emulators while Stalin lived or during the charmed sleep of the parties for three years after his death. Stalin's death had created an incipient crisis of authority, but only by rehabilitating Tito as a good Communist in 1955 did Nikita Khrushchev unintentionally legitimize national dissent.

The next year, Khrushchev sawed off another underpinning of Soviet control in the Communist movement. His secret speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU began the profanation of the god Stalin and the humiliation of the national leaders who were Stalin's chief devotees. Communist militants, even if they had read the full revelations, could still hold to their belief in the glorious Soviet Union. But foreign leaders, their positions in potential danger, needed to know with greater precision where to attach their loyalty—to the bumbling Khrushchev, who had committed the incredible folly of admitting Stalin's crimes, or to his rivals among the old Bolsheviks. Thorez, for one, hoped that the brash first secretary would quickly be deposed,[17] and apparently tried to get Togliatti to join forces with him. The prudent Italian declined, though he too disapproved of the secret speech. Two Soviet officials had brought him a metal chest containing the text of the speech on the night it was given, and then stood guard while the PCI leader read it. Asked by his entourage what this mysterious visit had meant, Togliatti replied, "Nothing, foolishness. You know their mania for secrecy."[18] Still, after careful reflection, he rejected the temptation to oppose Khrushchev. In June, after the US Department of State had given the text of Khrushchev's speech to the world, Togliatti cautiously broached the idea of national initiative within the Communist movement, but simultaneously suggested to the Soviets means to make the criticism of Stalin more acceptable to the faithful and less damaging to the movement.[19]

The principal result of the secret speech was that non-Soviet Communist leaders ceased to direct their loyalty toward the leader of the CPSU personally, even while remaining totally loyal to the USSR and its interests. Whereas loyalty had at the outset been given to the ideas of world revolution, the Comintern, and the Soviet state, and then to Stalin and the USSR, now it attached to the USSR alone.

Devotion did not increase with the greater abstraction. Nevertheless, when riot and revolt erupted in Hungary in late 1956, the foreign parties did not waver in their reactions, despite the misgivings of many individual militants. After some minor indecision in *l'Unità*

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[15] Eugenio Reale, *Avec Jacques Duclos au banc des accusés à la réunion constitutive du Kominform* (With Jacques Duclos on the Bench of the Accused at the Founding Meeting of the Cominform), Paris, Plon, 1958.

[16] Bocca, op. cit., pp. 500–06.

[17] Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 453–64.

[18] Bocca, op. cit., p. 602.

[19] Ibid., pp. 607–13.

Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, left, and French Communist leader Maurice Thorez differed in their reactions to Khrushchev's campaign of destalinization. Togliatti is shown at a party rally in December 1961; Thorez at the 17th Congress of the French Communist Party, in May 1964, where he was replaced by Waldeck Rochet as party president.

—Pictorial Parade.

reporting on Hungary, the PCI firmly supported the Soviet thesis that the USSR's armed intervention had put an end to "counterrevolution" and "white terror." Further, Togliatti himself weighed in heavily to counter overly objective *l'Unità* reporting on the rioting in Poland and the still more dangerous suggestion by the popular Communist union chief Giuseppe Di Vittorio that the unrest was at least partially due to injustice and bad management.[20] Other parties did not register even minor doubts about the correctness of Soviet behavior. Only a hemorrhage of disillusioned members revealed that all was not as it had been.

In fact, the reactions of the foreign Communist parties to the crises of 1956 were the results of natural reflex, not Soviet control. Freed from fear of Stalin, who could easily depose or blackmail them by favoring their rivals, the little Stalins of the foreign parties had entrenched themselves in office and made themselves the objects of an adulation which no longer had to be shared with Stalin. They possessed more prestige in their own parties than the new leader of the Soviet Union; and if they upheld the interests of the USSR, they did so because they could not conceive of a world in which their interests were not best served by the protection of Soviet power and prestige, both of which had been so unexpectedly threatened by East European upheaval.

Soviet control, meanwhile, had suffered a terrible blow. The appearance of continued control was maintained briefly as a result of the intervention of Mao Zedong. Mao pressed for a world conference of Communist parties in 1957 to shore up Soviet authority—which, however, the Chinese leader intended to use to promote his own ideas. The ensuing misunderstanding led to a brief period of fictitious unanimity. But the Soviet-Chinese relationship was breaking down, and a renewed Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel was already brewing.

As early as 1958, the Soviets found it impossible to effect the quiet removal of an entrenched leader in a minor party. Axel Larsen, the prestigious Secretary-General of the Danish Communist Party (DKP), was deemed by Moscow to have been infected by pro-Titoist revisionism. The Soviets engineered his removal during an October 1958 DKP congress attended by Soviet ideological expert Pëtr Pospelov. But the rank and file followed Larsen into his new Socialist People's Party, which in national elections two years later carried off two thirds of the votes previously received by the DKP, plus a slice of the left-wing Socialist Party vote the Communists had always coveted. The DKP recovered slightly in subsequent elections, but never fully. Its vote today still constitutes only one sixth of the "radical" electorate which votes for groups to the left of the Social Democrats. In the Danish elections of 1979, the DKP received a bare 1.9 percent of the vote.[21] Not only had the future growth and influence of a minor party been sacrificed for the sake of firm Soviet control, but the Soviets themselves had been forced to engage in blatant manipulation to achieve their goal.

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[20] Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1968, pp. 68–74.

Subsequently, tampering with party leaderships would become even more difficult. The next crisis in a European party led to a defeat for Moscow and the defection of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN). Paul de Groot, the little Stalin of the CPN, had quarreled with Khrushchev as early as 1956 over destalinization. After 1961, bitterness between the two leaders intensified, and de Groot began to fear that his increasing outspokenness in international meetings would prompt the Soviets to intrigue against him. To forestall such a move, de Groot struck first. All contacts with fraternal Communist parties were forbidden; all contact with Soviet diplomats in the Netherlands was ruled out; and all travel to the East was disallowed. Of course, if the other leaders of his party had been strongly loyal to Moscow, the barriers de Groot was erecting against Soviet intrigue would speedily have crumbled. As it was, one potential challenger was removed from the Executive Committee, but the bulk of the party remained loyal to de Groot.[22] Neither Soviet control mechanisms nor devotion to the USSR worked to keep this party in line.

The Relevance of Asian Defection

De Groot was doubtless encouraged in his decision to act by the problems the Soviets had begun to encounter in 1960 in their relations with Asian parties. Soviet-Chinese tension, at first hidden, increased steadily, and by 1964 the CPSU seemed to have lost the support of all the Asian and Pacific parties except for one wing of the Indian party, which had split into two groups of approximately equal size. Not all of the Asian parties remained in the Chinese orbit, but aside from the important exceptions of the Vietnamese party and its Indochinese satellite parties, the Communist party of Sri Lanka, the small Pakistani party, and the Communists of Bangladesh, none has resumed strong ties with Moscow either. Those Asian and Pacific parties that are not pro-Chinese are "independent."[23]



Italian Communist Party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer talks with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng during an April 1980 visit to Beijing that mended an 18-year rupture in relations between the two parties.

—Eduardo Fornaciari/Gamma-Liaison.

How are these Asian events relevant to the European parties? First, they show that if Moscow had ever possessed real control over all parties, it had lost it by the early 1960's. With Stalin dead and desanctified, the Soviet system of control in Europe rested on loyalty to the Soviet Union but seldom to Khrushchev; on lingering fear that Stalinist methods and constraints would still work—i.e., that if a leader deviated from the Moscow line his peers and followers would abandon him and comply with Soviet wishes; and on inability in many parties to conceive of party interests different from those of the CPSU. But in Asia, China and Mao outweighed or at least neutralized Soviet prestige; Stalinist constraints did not work; and local party interests were more readily identifiable. As a result, the Soviets not only lost control of the Communist party of Asia's most industrialized country, Japan, but were unable to hold on to the two parties whose members were of European stock, those of Australia and New Zealand. Soviet attempts to stir up the rank and file against their leaders failed in Asia, and the USSR had to resort instead to the device of creating breakaway parties to maintain a pro-Soviet Communist presence.[24]

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[21] On Larsen, see Peter P. Rohde, "The Communist Party of Denmark," in A.F. Upton, Ed., *Communism in Scandinavia and Finland*, New York, NY, Anchor Press, 1973, pp. 26–28. For the 1979 vote, see *The Economist* (London), Oct. 27, 1979, p. 14. Also see Trond Gilberg, "Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland," in David E. Albright, Ed., *Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, p. 305.

[22] A.A. de Jonge, *Het Communisme in Nederland* (Communism in the Netherlands), The Hague, Kruseman, 1972, pp. 142 ff.

[23] Wolfgang Leonhard, "A World in Disarray," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1964, p. 21; Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

If Moscow did not possess arcane powers over the Asian—or the Dutch—parties, it is at least open to question whether it really had such powers of control elsewhere. The European parties, to be sure, were slow to formulate their own separate interests, but one can argue that their loyalty to the Moscow line now rested on perceived interest, not constraints. The PCI understood the shift in the objective situation first, and showed the other parties that one could bargain with the Soviets or even refuse them. As a consequence, a qualitative change took place—imperceptibly—in interparty relations between 1964 and 1968. When Khrushchev and then Leonid I. Brezhnev pressed for a world congress of Communist parties to condemn the Chinese, they had no success; and, while still acting within the confines of loyalty, the PCI carefully delimited Moscow's pretentions, not least effectively by publishing Togliatti's notes for a planned meeting with Khrushchev as a species of last testament. The message Togliatti had intended to deliver was clear: no centralized world organization, no world Communist conference, and no precedent-making permission to censure the Chinese, whether they had erred or not.[25] With the example of the Asian parties before them, the Western parties were beginning to differentiate their own interests from those of the CPSU.

The Czechoslovakian Crisis

By 1968, when developments in Czechoslovakia raised the possibility of the emergence of a democratic Communist state that might invite imitation in Western Europe, the readiness of the West European Communist parties to define their own interests had grown markedly. They heard threatening noises coming from Moscow with increasing concern, and in July the PCI and PCF, now acting together, obtained the support of 14 additional West European parties for a proposed conference to mediate Moscow-Prague tensions. Events soon overtook any such plans, but in reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia all but 6 of the 23 West European parties came out against the Soviets.[26] Most of these parties had been known for their loyalty to the Soviets and would be again. But in a crisis which they judged quite different from any up to that time, they thought it in their interest to protest the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union and the world.

After the invasion, the USSR immediately began the job of "normalizing" the situation in Czechoslovakia and reducing the opposition of the Western parties to what had been done. It was largely successful in both tasks because of its ability to use Alexander Dubcek and his Prague Spring associates as a bridge to the regime of Gustav Husak and because most of the Western parties did not want to be permanently at odds with the Soviet Union. In 1969, at a world Communist conference that the Soviets finally succeeded in convening, the vast majority of parties, including most of the Europeans, agreed that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been "the internal affair" of the Czechoslovakian party and government. Six European parties that had condemned the invasion—the Austrians, Belgians, Danes, Finns, French, and Swiss—now fell into line and signed the conference final document. The British, Italian, Norwegian, Spanish, and Swedish parties continued to indicate reservations in various ways.[27]

The extent, or perhaps the limits, of Soviet control over the Western parties in the late 1960's is suggested by the differing experiences of three parties that had opposed the invasion, two of which ultimately fell into line and one in which Soviet tactics failed. The Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) leadership that had criticized Soviet actions in 1968 was a mixed group of ex-dogmatists still rethinking the meaning of 1956, Stalinists who had been tempted into a brief flirtation with the latest trends in a country neighboring their own, and out-and-out opportunists. The ex-dogmatists turned revisionists were in a weak and vulnerable position because they had been unable to gain new adherents for their ideas or to win the party new strength at the polls. Therefore, when the strong Soviet influ-

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[24] Paul F. Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, January–April 1971, pp. 14–24; and Eric Aarons, "Australia, An Autonomous CP," *Wiener Tagebuch* (Vienna), October 1970, pp. 18–20.

[25] The Yalta "Testament" was published in *The New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1964, and in many collections of documents. See Blackmer, op. cit., pp. 358–68, on the maneuverings over the world congress idea.

[26] See Kevin Devlin, "The New Crisis in European Communism," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1968.

[27] See Kevin Devlin, "The Inter-Party Drama," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1975; and William E. Griffith, "The Diplomacy of Eurocommunism," in Rudolph Tökés, Ed., *Eurocommunism and Détente*, New York, NY, New York University Press, 1978, p. 408.

Dolores Ibarruri, the legendary Chairman of the Communist Party of Spain, gets a warm send-off from Moscow on May 13, 1977, as she returns to her homeland after a long exile. At Ibarruri's left is B.N. Ponomarëv, Politburo Candidate Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU); at her right, M.A. Suslov, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC CPSU, and V.V Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the CC CPSU.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ence that dated from the Comintern period and that had been reinforced during the Soviet postwar occupation of eastern Austria was brought to bear, the KPÖ had but two choices: to become a weak, politically insignificant revisionist party out of favor in Moscow, or to go back to the relative comfort of the Soviet hearth and remain a weak, politically insignificant Stalinist party. Not surprisingly, when the moment came, the Stalinists snapped to attention, the opportunists fell into line, and the revisionists were first forced out of the leadership and then expelled from the party. The whole operation was complete by 1971.[28]

If the reimposition of control was relatively easy in a burnt-out party like the KPÖ, it seemed no more difficult with the much more imposing PCF. The agreement that the Soviets forced upon Dubcek at the end of August 1968 was termed "positive" by a PCF apparently frightened by the temerity it had shown in criticizing the Soviets, and in November 1968, a top-level PCF delegation went to Moscow and signed a communique that spoke of bilateral "sincerity and fraternal friendship." Finally, the PCF cracked down on members like Roger Garaudy, who disapproved of its stand.[29]

But if the French party ceased to make noise about Czechoslovakia, it avoided a complete realignment behind Moscow. Little use was made during the next six years of the once-asserted right to disagree, and many signs pointed to renewed subservience. As successor to the incurably ill Waldeck Rochet, the brash young apparatchik Georges Marchais had no immediate interest in quarreling with the Soviets over a lost cause like Czechoslovakia. He needed their support to reinforce his new position. Old Stalinists like Jacques Duclos, meanwhile, were quite willing to forget all about 1968. Still, a precedent for independent thinking had been set, and it was no longer axiomatic that PCF and Soviet interests were com-

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[28] Leopold Spira, "The Changes in the KPÖ," *Wiener Tagebuch*, November 1971, pp. 6–9; and Franz Marek, editor's comments, untitled, in ibid., May 1970, p. 10.

[29] Fauvet, op. cit., pp. 559–62.

Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party, pays his last respects to Josip Broz Tito at the May 8, 1980, funeral of the independent Yugoslav Communist leader. —Gamma-Liaison.

pletely congruent. By the mid-1970's, it was Moscow's new man Marchais and Moscow's longtime servant Jean Kanapa who were plotting a more independent course for the PCF.[30]

The situation was different in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), which by the late 1960's was looking to the future and had decided to move closer to many positions of the PCI. Moscow may have thought that it would be easy to deal with a party in exile, many of whose militants lived in the USSR itself. But the aged party President Dolores Ibarruri could not be induced to oppose Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo, and when a group of senior PCE leaders loyal to Moscow declared their opposition to the party's stand on Czechoslovakia in open factional attack, they were expelled from the party. Moscow backed with funds and facilities the new splinter group they formed, but the group was disunited and failed to rally many supporters either among Spanish exiles or within Spain. After a period of tense relations and frequent bitter polemics between the CPSU and the PCE, Moscow finally signaled its abandonment of the loyalists during bilateral talks in October 1974.[31]

By backing an attempt to split the PCE, not only did the Soviets incur obloquy for trying to get rid of a legitimate party leadership; they suffered a loss of prestige as well by their inability to carry out their plan. Carrillo, now that his enemies in the PCE had exposed and discredited themselves, was free to show just how independent of the CPSU he could be. He knew he had little to fear from the Soviets. But while gleefully sticking banderillas in the Russian bull for the last six years, Carrillo has been careful to go no further than to tease the brute. He has not broken relations entirely, though PCE policy after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may make bad relations even worse.[32]

In sum, Moscow's answer to the challenges of 1968 was first to bring the nonruling European parties into line on the Czechoslovakian question and drive out party leaders who had left themselves vulnerable. A longer-range effort to convoke a world Communist congress as a sequel to that of 1969 was intended to set a precedent by condemning the Chinese and to introduce new discipline in the movement. In 1976, this effort culminated in Pyrrhic victory at the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties. But the Soviets have not given up. In an article commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Comintern, Boris N. Ponomarëv declared that "international solidarity is closely linked with the molding of a specific international policy by the Communists, radically opposing imperialist policy." [33] Such calls for unity seem destined to go unanswered.

Control and Autonomy in the 1970's

If the suppression of the Hungarian revolution barely affected Soviet relations with West European Communist parties in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the invasion of Czechoslovakia left a heritage of deep bitterness in these relations, which carried over into the 1970's. The reason for the difference was simple. Western Communist leaders, who had seen nothing but counterrevolution in the Hungarian case, saw in the suppression of the Czechoslovakian experiment the destruction of a model of potential usefulness to them and the assertion of a Soviet right to intervention harmful to their political, and perhaps personal, fortunes as well. In the 1960's, the West European parties had begun to become genuinely engaged in national politics, and in the 1970's several foresaw the possibility of playing major political roles in their countries—the PCI and the PCF as key members of coalition governments, the PCE as a junior partner in such a government, and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) as a participant in a coalition regime in a revolutionary, not an electoral context.

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[30] See the discussion of PCF interests by Annie Kriegel in "The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic," in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.

[31] See Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "The Spanish Communist Party," in Tökés, op. cit., pp. 229–37 and 240–42.

[32] Kevin Devlin, "Azcárate Denounces Paris Conference," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Background Report No. 126, May 28, 1980.

[33] Boris N. Ponomarëv, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Comintern," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1979, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 73578, May 31, 1979.

The Soviet task of reasserting control was more complex as a result, for while the earlier purpose of control had been merely to use the Western parties as pliant auxiliaries of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow now needed not only to prevent the domestic political concerns of the Western parties from interfering with Soviet goals, but also to preserve the capability of controlling any Communist party which might attain power in its own country in the future. The result of these not altogether compatible aims was the emergence, intended or not, of an essentially diplomatic-style relationship between Moscow and the individual West European parties. There were, to be sure, bursts of the old ideological hectoring—phrased in general terms when directed at the PCI and PCF, more specific when directed at the PCE. But at least in the short term, the main thrust was "diplomatic," in the sense that the emphasis was on compromise rather than conversion or excommunication.[34] Diplomatic compromise encouraged the autonomists of the West to back Soviet policy where their own national interests were not directly involved—in Africa, for instance, where they no doubt found it easy to applaud the transformation of an ancient feudal empire in Ethiopia into a revolutionary state. Such support provided a necessary balance to reticence regarding Soviet policy elsewhere.

In this new diplomacy, the Soviets have benefited from the availability of an elaborate apparatus created specifically to ensure control of foreign Communist parties. The International Department of the CPSU sends liaison officers protected by diplomatic passports to a large number of parties abroad.[35] In addition, a highly developed system of occasional interparty contacts provides for constant Soviet (and, frequently, East European) visits abroad and travel by senior delegations of nonruling European parties to the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe). Finally, funding from the USSR and Eastern Europe, furnished most often by means of preferential trade agreements with Communist-party-run firms, continues to flow in large amounts not only to 100-percent-loyal parties but also to the autonomists.[36]

These special assets in the hands of the Soviet superpower bolster tradition and ideology as tools of control. Certainly, the Soviets retain great influence and do not hesitate to use it. Where it falls short of affording the control of a generation ago, the explanation can be found less in the nature of the Soviet effort than in the changed world in which the Soviets and the foreign parties now operate. For example, while the Communist parties of the Comintern and Cominform periods had few sources of income available to them other than subsidies from Moscow, today the parties can tap more varied sources of funding in vastly richer Western societies. In addition, the limited value of subsidies in producing real control is now recognized by those who have provided them in the past. All evidence—not just among Communists—suggests that as often as not subsidies produce a complex situation in which it becomes necessary for the supplier to keep up payments merely to avoid having an already unsatisfactory relationship become worse.

The Role of Autonomy Today

The principal factor responsible for the decline from Soviet control to Soviet diplomatic influence with the Western parties in the 1970's, then, was that opposition to the CPSU was no longer unthinkable. Nowadays, indeed, anyone who pleads the Soviet cause directly stands out from the majority of his national leadership. Those with pro-Soviet leanings may win many arguments, but they in all likelihood do so by couching their positions in terms of party interest, abjuring the unanswerable dogmas of proletarian internationalism. And while some pro-Soviet elements may conceivably be under Moscow's control in the fullest, traditional sense, they must nevertheless oper-

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[34] On the Soviet approach to these matters, see Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union and Western European Communism," in Tökés, op. cit., especially pp. 369–78.

[35] See Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976–77, pp. 45–48.

[36] See Jean Montaldo, *Les Finances de PCF* (The Finances of the PCF), Paris, Albin Michel, 1977; and idem, *Les secrets de la banque soviétique en France* (The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France), Paris, Albin Michel, 1979. On the PCI, see Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling, "Italy's Russian Sugar Daddies," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Apr. 3, 1976; and Heinz Timmermann, "Problems of Party Financing of the Italian and French Communists," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien* (Köln), No. 15, 1971.

A meeting between a delegation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow on October 7, 1978. Identifiable from left to right are: PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer; PCI Central Committee Member A. Tato (Berlinguer's aide); A. Rubbi, Member of the PCI Central Committee and Deputy Chief of its International Department; B.N. Ponomarëv, CPSU Secretary and Politburo Candidate Member; and M.A. Suslov, CPSU Secretary and Politburo Member.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ate as individual members of their own parties, for exposing themselves to allegations of being part of a "Soviet faction" or even "Soviet agents" could blunt their effectiveness.

Despite the fact that in most Western parties pro-Soviet elements in recent years have found themselves on the defensive, however, the parties have most frequently used autonomy to say no to the Soviets on questions regarding the internal discipline of the Communist movement. Most parties show little interest in going beyond such matters to challenge the USSR on more substantive issues of international concern. This pattern becomes apparent if one looks at the nature of the various parties' responses to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; at the maneuvering preparatory to the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties in 1976; and, most recently, at the attendance record of the Paris conference of Communist parties on peace and disarmament held on April 28–29, 1980. This last meeting drew 14 West European parties as full participants. It was boycotted by seven parties. And two parties, the Belgian and the Swiss, neither of which had been a consistent protester at international Communist meetings in the past, limited themselves to sending observers.[37]

It would be unwise to conclude that parties which have recently aligned themselves with the Soviets are necessarily incapable of asserting their autonomy—or that those now flaunting their autonomy will remain forever out of the fold. We are warned from summary judgments about the faithful by the erratic behavior of the PCF in the past; the dual nature of the Finnish party, which is held together largely by the special conditions of Finnish political life; and the probability that it was the Portuguese Communists, not the Soviets, who took the initiative in pushing for revolution in Portugal in 1974–75.[38] One might even ask how pro-Soviet the staunchly pro-Soviet Cypriot party (AKEL) would remain if Moscow decided to endorse the Turkish presence in Cyprus.

The existence of autonomy clearly does not imply its constant, or even frequent, use. But why bother with subtle distinctions such as those between constantly autonomous parties, intermittently autonomous parties, and shyly autonomous parties, when center stage is occupied by large, fully autonomous parties that in practice agree with Moscow a good deal of the time? The purpose is analytic clarity. "Autonomous" in this context is not a value judgment, and the act of taking distance from Moscow is not *in and of itself* to be judged a good thing. Distinctions become important when one looks at the large and politically important Western parties, for here impatience with a very slow historical process—which for all we know may prove to be abortive—can lead to false hopes and easy disappointments. One must therefore neither deny the existence of autonomy because it has not seemed to lead anywhere, nor assume that the more vociferously assertive parties are advancing on the road to "independence" and social democracy.

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[37] See Kevin Devlin, "European Communism's Conference of Disunity," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Background Report No. 99, May 2, 1980. The Italian and Spanish parties were absent, as were the parties of Great Britain, the Netherlands, San Marino, Sweden, and Iceland. Attending were the parties of Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and West Berlin.

[38] Legvold, loc. cit., pp. 334–35.

The PCF's rapprochement with Moscow over the last 18 months illustrates this point. Are we to assume that the PCF, never as "Eurocommunist" as the PCI and PCE, was pulled back toward Moscow by the remaining leading strings of Soviet control? This author would argue not. The PCF had broken its close ties with Moscow so abruptly and disrespectfully as to suggest the burning of bridges: Marchais had refused to attend the 25th Congress of the CPSU, had refused to see the Soviet ambassador to France, S.V. Chervonenko, in early 1977, and had not met CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev when the Soviet leader visited Paris in June 1977. All of these demonstrative gestures were certainly intended to provide public proof of the PCF's autonomy and were in sharp contrast with the behavior of the Italian party, which has always been careful to keep its relations with Moscow on a courteous basis.[39] The Spaniards were "Italocommunist," but the French apparently were determined not to be.

Nevertheless, the forces that have pulled the PCF back toward Moscow in recent months are the same forces that have taken the PCI and PCE further from Moscow, i.e., calculations of what each party deems to be in its own interest. The French were not less autonomous because they were un-Italian. To say that they were less "Eurocommunist" is merely to introduce a nebulous term that itself has to be explained and clarified before it has meaning.

It is still not clear just what mix of motivations was at

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[39] Annie Kriegel, *Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism?* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, pp. 47–49; and in general, her analysis of the limits of national communism, in ibid., pp. 49–53.

Negotiations between the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on January 8, 1980, at the CPSU Central Committee headquarters. At the far right is PCF Secretary-General Georges Marchais; on the Soviet side, from left to right, Leonid I. Brezhnev, CPSU General Secretary, party secretaries M.A. Suslov and B.N. Ponomarёv; an unidentified woman; and V.V. Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department

—TASS from Sovfoto.

work in 1975 when the PCF loosened its ties with the Soviets, but clearly the dominant factor was the desire to come to power in 1978 in partnership with the French Socialist Party (PS). The Soviets opposed this plan, and by September 1977, the PCF leadership had come around to the Soviet position.[40] Still, PCF-CPSU relations remained cool for a year after the first French Communist break with the Socialists, and progress was slow thereafter. The first sign of authentic rapprochement came only with Marchais's statement on November 7, 1978, that despite the existence of problems in the USSR, the overall record of the Soviet Union was "globalement positif." In January 1979, *Pravda* found a kind word for the PCF for the first time in several years. In May 1979, the PCF Congress reasserted its "globalement positif" stance, while still allowing some criticism of the Soviet Union. The return to nearly unconditional Franco-Soviet solidarity did not finally come until January 1980.[41]

It was already evident in early 1978 that the PCF had renounced the hope of coming to power with the existing PS, and that since the party had no policy alternative other than alliance with the Socialists, it would have to attempt to change both the PS itself and the terms of the PS-PCF alliance.[42] The PCF shouted at the time that the PS had turned to the right and betrayed the alliance; and since 1978, the Communists have tried to push the PS to the right by blocking any resumption of their old relationship. The PS has stubbornly refused to play the PCF game, however, and still proclaims its desire for cooperation. In January 1980, one PS leader summed up the situation as follows: "Today the Communist leaders still hope that it is we who will crack, who will abandon to them all the territory on the left. . . . the terrible test they have imposed on us must be taken to its end."[43] In this test of wills, the PCF has made its move toward Moscow with at least two principal aims: to encourage the Socialists to renounce the plan of a left coalition and seek allies to their right, and to raise the spirits and tighten the discipline of Communist militants by first drawing universal press criticism and then requiring that all party members rally in defense of the party because it is under general attack. It certainly seems that domestic political considerations rather than pressure from Moscow have been the determining factors in PCF policy.

But whatever the rationale impelling the PCF, and however autonomously the party has decided to retreat from vociferous autonomy, is it not possible that the new course will become a permanent one? Does the current situation not give the Soviets a fresh chance to cultivate and reward those elements in the PCF who did not desire a break in the first place and then to find younger apparatchiks to emulate them? No definitive answers are possible at this time. The PCF is now prepared to renounce real electoral gains until the late 1980's, and some observers think that the PCF is banking on an increase in Soviet strategic strength to make a decisive difference in French politics by that time.[44] It is true that if a significant number of PCF leaders come to decide that their own political interests coincide with Soviet interests, the party might again become truly subservient to the Soviets. But only a bold prophet would state that the erratic and opportunist PCF will hold reliably to any course over the coming years.

That party interests are calculated differently by different Western parties is evident in the fact that as such calculations have taken the PCF closer to Moscow in 1980, they have taken the PCI and PCE further away. In opposing the invasion of Afghanistan, the latter two parties have for the first time made an implicit distinction between the expansion of world socialism and the spread of Soviet power. PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, speaking before the European Parliament in early 1980, called the invasion "a violation of the peoples' right to national independence and the free choice of their own development."[45]

It is far from certain, however, that the PCI and PCE will develop further the logic of the latest step they have taken. In pushing for the creation of a "Euroleft," the PCI is trying to rescue détente and mediate between the superpowers, while gently instructing the Soviet Union where *its* real interests lie. The PCI insists—and there is every reason to believe the party on this score—that its policy toward the USSR "is directed neither toward a break nor toward changes of hypothetical camps, but toward dialogue (*confronto*) and understanding with all the forces of peace, emancipation, and progress, with all the revolutionary and democratic forces of Europe and the world." The party

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[40] Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism, Eurocommunism, and Soviet Power," in Tökés, op. cit.; and Frank L. Wilson, "The French CP's Dilemma," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1978.

[41] See, inter alia, *L'Express* (Paris), Jan. 20, 1979; on the PCF congress, see *Preparatory Documents for the 23rd French Communist Party Congress*, No. 1405 of Joint Publications Research Service, *Translations on Western Europe*.

[42] Julius W. Friend, *The French Communist Party–Where Now?* Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1978, p. 16.

[43] Statement by Jean Poperen at a PS national convention held to adopt a "projet socialiste," cited in *Le Monde* (Paris), Jan. 15, 1980.

[44] Ibid.

[45] *L'Unità* (Rome), Jan. 17, 1980.

Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer attacks the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on January 16, 1980.

—Jean Muscat/Gamma-Liaison.

openly declares, "We want to extend and not reduce our relations in all directions."[46] Here, as elsewhere, PCI policy is to collect, not close allies, but the maximum number of non-enemies.

But this is not a real policy. It is rather the possible starting point for several policies. The PCI and the PCE have over the last two decades become increasingly disillusioned with the Soviet Union—a development which was accelerated by the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968. Still, Soviet military power commands respect, and if a clever and resourceful group took over from Brezhnev and company in the USSR in the mid-1980's, it could restore Soviet prestige in the world Communist movement. Another 15 years of dull dogmatism, on the other hand, could further widen existing gulfs, especially if Moscow makes demands the more advanced autonomists cannot accept.

The PCI and PCE have thus given themselves a wide range of choices for the future. They have shown that they are not inalterably opposed to Western—even American—foreign policy. But neither are they very reliable supporters of that policy. The PCF under the volatile Georges Marchais can hardly be considered reliable in Moscow, and Westerners ought not to expect more reliability from the PCI and PCE. To do so would be to misunderstand the anomalous position of Communist parties in the Western political system, i.e., the fact that while autonomy means that Communist party interests may have ceased to be entirely congruent with Moscow's, an autonomous Communist party still has a philosophy that does not fit well with the Western political process.

As participants in Western parliamentarism, the Communist parties of Western Europe perforce share in its logic and trust that the parliamentary system will bring them a major share of power. So far it has not done so anywhere at the national level. For by claiming to be both pluralist and revolutionary (referring to an as yet unresolved dialectic process which is genuinely taking place), the parties also give their opponents reason to fear that the eventual synthesis the Communists adopt will more closely resemble the revolutionary antithesis than the Western pluralist thesis. And it is true that even the PCI and PCE—to say nothing of the PCF—do not wish to renounce their past, and find it politically and philosophically imprudent to foreclose the future. The revolution may be on the far horizon, but it remains at least a verbal goal. While protesting that Communist parties should be treated like all others, the Communists preserve the differences which provoke discrimination against them.

Bulking large among these differences is the special relationship each party has or has had with the Soviet Union. Although these relationships have become so varied in character that we may no longer grant ourselves the intellectual convenience of supposing that a Communist party must be firmly anchored under Moscow's thumb, neither can one deduce the opposite—that the Western parties are making linear progress toward adoption of the domestic and foreign policies of Western-style social democracy. The motions of Communist parties are not to be traced on a two-dimensional chart; they are three dimensional, and as past years have shown, they are not easily plotted.

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[46] Unsigned interview with PCI foreign affairs specialist Antonio Rubbi, *Rinascita* (Rome), Apr. 11, 1980, p. 3.

Books

Marxist Theories, Socialist Policies, and African Realities

By Ali A. Mazrui

HELEN DESFOSSES and JACQUES LEVESQUE, Eds. *Socialism in the Third World*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

EDMUND W. CLARK. *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania 1964-1973*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1977.

MARINA and DAVID OTTAWAY. *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1978.

JOHN A. MARCUM. *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1978.

LADIPO ADAMOLEKUN. *Sekou Toure's Guinea*. New York, NY, Barnes and Noble, 1976.

OKWUDIBA NNOLI. *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971*. New York, NY, NOK Publishers, 1978.

ISSA G. SHIVJI. *Class Struggle in Tanzania*. New York, NY, and London, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

MAHMOOD MAMDANI. *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. New York, NY, and London, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

DOES AFRICAN MARXISM face in the 1980's the same sort of laissez-faire fate that befell the diverse strands of socialism in Black Africa during the 1960's? Are African economies so weak that they automatically tend to drift? Are conditions in Africa still uncongenial for the establishment of vigorous socialist economies? Is the proximity of the Republic of South Africa to Mozambique forcing the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) to move to the right? Is the social fabric in Ethiopia so disrupted by the overthrow of the imperial system of Haile Selassie I that Marxism does not stand a chance of being truly consolidated there? Is the continuing challenge of the United Front for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) posing a major question mark with regard to the future of Marxist structures in Angola? Is the new liberation of the government of Guinea (Conakry) the beginning of a move to the right in that country as well?.

The situation is indeed evocative of the decade of the 1960's, when laissez-faire socialism was a distinguishing feature of Black Africa. In that decade, one African leader after another proclaimed himself a socialist—but then let economic forces and class formation take their own courses. Black African leaders who claimed the label of socialist ranged in the ideological spectrum from Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea to Leopold Senghor of Senegal, from Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana to Tom Mboya in Kenya. Some of the works by Nkrumah and the speeches of Sékou Touré were in the *Marxist* tradition, while Senghor, Mboya, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania tended to romanticize about *African* socialism.

By contrast with the 1960's, the 1970's witnessed both a rising adherence to Marxism among African intellectuals and the establishment of significant Marxist and neo-Marxist regimes in Southern Africa and the Horn. The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie I in Ethiopia in 1974, the triumph of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1975-76, and the ending of colonialism in Mozambique in 1975 were all major steps in the apparent penetration of Marxism into important parts of Black Africa.

If, despite these advances, one can realistically speak of the possibility of African Marxism's going "laissez-faire"—of a repetition of the failure of Africa's socialists in the 1960's to realize in performance what they paid lip service to in theory—it raises serious analytic questions. Is this pattern due to some lack of seriousness in African leadership? Are we—paraphrasing Hamlet—to say: "Frailty, thy name is Africa!"? Should we say of Africa what Virgil said of woman: "*Varium et mutabile semper*" (Always fickle and changing)?

Such judgments are unjust, whether applied to woman or to Africa. The truth of the matter is that there are factors in the African situation which make socialism appear attractive as a solution to African problems, while at the same time there are other factors which militate against the realization of socialism in practice. Africa's interest in socialism has outstripped Africa's capacity for realizing it.

Throughout the world of underdevelopment the groping for socialism is fitful, as demonstrated in the collection of essays edited by Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, to which we shall return below. But there are distinctive elements to Africa's experience.

What, in fact, are the elements in the African condition that appear to favor the pursuit of socialist goals, and what elements militate against realization of those goals? In the ensuing pages, we shall examine this set of issues and a second pair of questions: To what extent does the African condition vindicate Marxist interpretations of reality, and to what extent do African realities contradict Marxist theory? While the latter questions seem more esoteric—of interest primarily to students of Marxism as a system of thought—the answers do bear on the success or failure of Marxism in Africa. Our exploration of these complex and interrelated issues will draw in part on insights in the volumes discussed here, which focus on various aspects of African politics and of the role of socialism on the continent and elsewhere in the Third World.

THE LURE of socialism for Africans has many explanations. In one sense, we might say that Africa's infatuation with socialism is partly a case of "courtship on the rebound"—a reflection of a deep-seated ambivalence toward Western culture. Sometimes Africans are attracted to socialism as a way of rebelling against the West. At other times, African experimentation with radical socialism can be a method of awakening Western concern and greater attentiveness to Africa—a strategy itself rooted in an ambivalent dependency.

More important, however, are underlying alignments of historical and social forces. Africans know for a fact that Western imperialism and Western capitalism came simultaneously to the African continent. Originally, Africans tended to be relatively neutral toward capitalism while opposing Western imperialism—the external domination of their own societies by Western powers. And yet, as many African leaders and thinkers came to view the alliance between capitalism and imperialism as a basic historical phenomenon rather than a result of the specific context, there developed a predisposition to distrust capitalism almost as much as

Reviewers in This Issue

ALI A. MAZRUI—Director of the Center for Afroamerican and African Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI); formerly head of the Department of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University, (Kampala, Uganda); Vice-President of the International Congress of Africanists and of the International Political Science Association; among his many works on African and international politics are *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective*, 1976, *Africa's International Relations*, 1977, and *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa*, 1978.

THOMAS M. CALLAGHY—Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA); coeditor of *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, 1979; currently working on a study of Zaire's debt crisis.

RICHARD F. SHERMAN—Director, Student Exchange, Educational Resource Development Trust (Los Angeles, CA); author of *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, 1980, and of numerous articles about politics in northeastern Africa.

LYNN-DARRELL BENDER—Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico (San Juan, Puerto Rico); author of numerous works on Latin American politics, including *Perspectivas Politicas*, 1979, and a forthcoming analysis of US-Cuban relations; currently a Fulbright lecturer at La Universidad Autónoma Nacional de México (Mexico City, Mexico).

WERNER COHN—Professor of Sociology, University of British Columbia (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada); author of *The Gypsies*, 1973; and contributor to journals such as *American Sociological Review*, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, and *Problems of Communism*, on a variety of sociological and other topics.

GARY K. BERTSCH—Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia (Athens, GA); author of many books and essays on Communist systems and of forthcoming articles on East-West technology transfer in *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, *Survey*, and *Journal of World Trade Law*; currently holder of a NATO fellowship to examine East-West technology transfer and allied export controls.

they did imperialism. The forces of anti-imperialism began to merge with the forces of anticapitalism.

If on one side of the coin there was the design of fused opposition to both imperialism and capitalism, on the other there was the shape of an alliance between nationalism and socialism. From an African perspective, the strongest enemy of imperialism is the nationalism of the colonized peoples. The strongest enemies of capitalism are the forces of socialism and class solidarity. If capitalism and imperialism in their historical role in Africa had been aligned so closely, did it not now make sense that their enemies (nationalism and socialism) should similarly fuse with each other?

Yet another set of conditions favorably disposing Africans to socialism is the frustrations which have accompanied independence. While standards of living have improved in many African societies, the gains have not sufficed to narrow the gap between reality and expectations. A number of African countries which used to export food before independence are now net importers of food and experience severe shortages of basic products. Corruption is rampant in the majority of African countries, and political institutions remain fragile and vulnerable to perversion, subversion, or total collapse. In an effort to save their societies from the overwhelming insecurities and failures of independence, many Africans scan the horizon for possible models of development and change. Inevitably, among the major contenders as a model of social transformation is the socialist paradigm. Can it be translated into practice? Could things under "genuine" socialism really be worse than under the laissez-faire ideologies that have prevailed since independence?

At the very least, socialism has attracted Africans because of its presumed effectiveness in centralizing and mobilizing societies. Many African societies are deeply fragmented, and the political fabric is often fragile. Consequently, one school of thought in Africa has emphasized the need for an ideology capable of involving the masses and giving them a sense of political engagement and participation. From this perspective, the ideology also needs to be centralizing as well. Socialism has appeared to be a strong candidate for this kind of role, especially when it has been interpreted as an ideology of state intervention in the economy and of mass mobilization in politics.

Edmund Clark's *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania* is a technically useful study of how the frustrations of independence in Tanzania, particularly before 1967, contributed to a search for socialist solutions. Other African countries, too, have flirted with socialist or neosocialist policies partly because of a similar sense of desperation.

Elements of cultural continuity have also worked to alienate Africans from capitalism and predispose them favorably to socialism. In many parts of Africa, individualism—so highly valued in liberal capitalism—is culturally alien to indigenous communities. This distrust of individualism translates into a negative attitude toward capitalism, with the latter acquiring the image of an ideology predicated on the selfishness of man in the rugged pursuit of profit.

At the same time, there tends to be a normative link between collectivist socialism and the "tribal" collectivism which formed the core of many African cultures. Thus, Kenya's Tom Mboya could argue in the euphoric days of the first decade of independence:

> *In Africa the belief that "we are all sons and daughters of the soil" has always exercised a tremendous influence on our social, economic and political relationships. From this belief springs the logic and the practise of equality, and the acceptance of communal ownership of the vital means of life—the land. . . . The acquisitive instinct, which is largely responsible for the vicious excesses and exploitation under the capitalist system, was tempered by a sense of togetherness and a rejection of graft and meanness. There was loyalty to the society, and the society gave its members much in return: a sense of security and universal hospitality.*[1]

Given this premise, it made sense for Julius Nyerere across the border from Mboya to reaffirm:

> *We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our past—in the traditional society which produced us.*[2]

What African leaders like Mboya and Nyerere were asserting was that traditional societies in their countries were based on a kind of socialist way of life within each "tribe." The question which arose on attainment of independence, however, was whether 20 welfare "tribes" added together in Kenya or Tanzania could ever produce one welfare state. This seemed to be the ultimate test for the idea of a cultural continuity from African collectivism to modern socialism.

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[1] Mboya, *Freedom and After*, London, André Deutsch, 1963, p. 163.

[2] Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa" speech at the Conference on Socialism of the Tanganyika African National Union, Dar es Salaam, April 1962. See *Africa Report* (New York, NY), May 1963.

Marxist socialism has appeal in Africa, as a result of certain cultural contradictions, too. The most important source of Marxist ideas in Africa, for example, is Western culture itself. Indeed, it is a sociolinguistic impossibility for an African to be a sophisticated Marxist without at the same time being substantiallly Westernized, for access to Marxism is overwhelmingly through works written in European languages. To become a sophisticated Marxist requires substantial exposure both to the primary literature by the founding fathers of Marxism (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) and subsequent innovators such as V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Mao Zedong, and secondly to the secondary literature on Marxism, consisting of commentaries across the generations. Very little of either is as yet available in such African languages as Yoruba, Amharic, Hausa, or Kiswahili—let alone in less widespread African languages such as Kidigo and Lunyoro-Lutoro. For Africans to enter the universe of Marxism, substantial command of a European language is therefore indispensable.

And how do Africans normally acquire their first European language? Not simply by learning a new medium of communication, as would happen if an American were learning Japanese or Kiswahili. The acquisition of the first European language by an African is in fact a whole process of socialization and acculturation. Africans in Anglophone countries go to schools which are modeled on British or American systems of education. Africans in French-speaking countries pass through the acculturation process based on the culture of France or Francophone Belgium. Such institutions Anglicize (or Gallicize as the case may be) Africans before they begin to have direct access to the works of Marx and his successors.

It is, of course, possible for some Africans to learn their Marxism after going to a university in Beijing, Moscow, or some East European capital. But none of these universities recruit their African students directly from the villages of Africa without the mediating role of West European languages. Rather, the African students selected are drawn from a pool of young Africans already partly or substantially Westernized.

In effect, Africans can arrive at a sophisticated understanding of Marxism only after or in tandem with Westernization, a process in contradiction to their traditional social and linguistic backgrounds. Such a contradiction is heightened by the fact that Marxism itself is a child of the West in rebellion against the West.

But this is not the only cultural contradiction that has tended to favor socialism in parts of Africa. There is also the strange phenomenon of African feudalism's serving as a breeding ground for African radicalism.

The most striking illustration of this phenomenon was in Ethiopia. Until the 1970's, Ethiopia was an elaborate African feudal system, in some ways reminiscent of the Russia of the Tsars. Classical Marxist theory would not have predicted the occurrence of a Marxist revolution in such conditions. Yet it was precisely in Ethiopia, and through the mediation of soldiers rather than workers, that a radical revolution got under way in 1974. Extreme backwardness had resulted in rapid radicalization. Marina and David Ottaway's book *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* echoes this paradox of feudalism radicalized. Ancient institutions have collapsed in Ethiopia under the weight of centuries of dust and decay. The collapse has meant both chaos and purposeful reform.

A form of radicalization through soldiers also occurred in Libya. The regime of King Idris I was swept aside in 1969, to be replaced by a regime which has kept on struggling to fuse Islamic fundamentalism with socialist fervor.

Farther south, the Sultanate of Zanzibar, earlier in the 1960's, had illustrated how a neofeudal system could rapidly give way to angry radicalism. Moreover, William Tordoff and the reviewer have presented the argument elsewhere that the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964 was itself a contributory factor in the radicalization of the mainland of Tanzania and the emergence of Julius Nyerere as a relatively radical innovator.[3]

Theorists of *African* socialism had assumed that what made Africa an ideal laboratory for socialism were the egalitarian and collectivist values of those African societies which were decentralized, often stateless, and frequently in an important sense classless. Thus, African thinkers in the 1960's sometimes sounded like romantic Russian socialists of the second half of the 19th century. In 1874, for instance, P.N. Tkachëv wrote and published an "Open Letter to Mr. Friedrich Engels in Zurich," disputing a statement which Engels had once made about the chances of a social revolution in Russia. Tkachëv said:

> *Our people are permeated in the large majority . . . with the principle of communal property; they are, if I may say so, instinctively, traditionally communist . . . . From this it follows that our people, despite*

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[3] See Tordoff and Mazrui, "The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge, England, and New York, NY), No. 3, 1972, pp. 427–55.

> *their ignorance, are much nearer to a socialist society than the peoples of Western Europe with their higher [level of] education.*[4]

Engels dismissed this as a "childish conception" and emphasized that

> *communal ownership of land is a form of property which was predominant in pre-historic times among the Germans, Celts, Indians—in short in all Indo-Germanic peoples—still exists in India, has only recently been forcibly suppressed in Ireland and Scotland, and occurs even here and there in Germany but is now dying out. In fact, it is an institution common to all peoples at a certain state of development.*
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> * * * * *
>
> *In some primitive and preliterate societies class distinctions are frequently absent, and every people has gone through such a stage of development. To reestablish this phase cannot be our aim. . . .*[5]

African Marxists more recently have had similar reservations about romantic schools of *African* socialism which aspire to build modern socialism on the collectivist values of traditional Africa. This traditionalist approach is seen in Julius Nyerere's own principle of *ujamaa*—a Swahili word meaning "familyhood"—which is itself in the tradition of Tkachëv. Both Issa Shivji and Okwudiba Nnoli, whose works are reviewed here, are skeptical about theories of *African* socialism. The late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana—especially after he was overthrown in 1966—also regarded such theories as dangerous to the African struggle because of their "naïveté" about the role of class struggle and imperialism. There is a growing consensus among radical African intellectuals that socialism is "universal" and not culturally relative. Nyerere, like Tkachëv, used to argue that Africans did not need to be "converted" to socialism or "taught" democracy. Yet the examples of Zanzibar in Nyerere's own country, and the later examples of Libya and Ethiopia, revealed that it is not necessarily those African societies of an egalitarian nature which become socialist. Elaborate feudalism can provide the breeding ground of rapid radicalization.

The behavior of the Soviet Union and to a much lesser extent other non-African socialist countries has also helped to foster a positive predisposition toward socialism in Africa. In particular, the USSR, despite its role as an imperialist force in Europe, has been a liberating force in Africa (its record in Asia has been mixed).

In Europe, the Soviet Union has constituted an imperialist force by permitting itself to become heir to both the Tsarist empire and the Nazi empire. What the Tsars had annexed, the Communist regime after 1917 retained—and sometimes augmented. And after World War II, Moscow maintained hegemony over what the Nazis had occupied in the 1930's and 1940's and Soviet troops had ostensibly liberated.

The impact of the Soviet Union on Africa's fortunes, in contrast, has been liberating. This is because the Soviet Union has provided a challenge to preexisting Western hegemony. Even the West's inclination to give independence to African countries has at times been a response to the Soviet challenge. Moreover, in Southern Africa, the West moved rapidly to liberalize the racial situation there only when the Soviet threat became particularly acute after the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the arrival of Soviet-backed Cuban troops in support of the Marxists of Angola. Lastly, there has been a substantial flow of Soviet arms to liberation movements in Southern Africa. It seems improbable that Western sources could have brought themselves to provide the level of military hardware that found its way into the liberation armies of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in the struggle for Zimbabwe. In sum, it appears quite likely that if the Soviet Unon had not existed, the liberation of Southern Africa would have been delayed by at least a generation.

John Marcum's masterly work on the Angolan revolution captures the remarkable interaction between ideology, ethnicity, and foreign policy formation in situations of struggle. The final outcome in Angola was Angola's independence—under the rule of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, with its Soviet backing.

To be sure, the motives of the Soviet Union are quite often cynical. As a superpower, the Soviet Union engages in rivalry with the United States for hegemony. On this issue, the Peoples' Republic of China is quite right. The superpowers always think in terms of "a power vacuum"—and tend to regard themselves as the proper "vacuum fillers." But regardless of the motives behind the Soviet role in Africa, the USSR's actual effect on the continent has indeed been emancipatory. And this diplomatic and political alignment between African liberation and Soviet foreign policy has itself been an additional factor predisposing Africans to look favorably upon socialism, even though the most powerful socialist country (the Soviet Union) and the most populous socialist country (China) have been heavily at odds with each other. Both states, after all, have adopted a basic posture against colonialism and racism.

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[4] Engels quotes Tkachëv in "Russia and the Social Revolution," an article first published on Apr. 21, 1875, in the Leipzig *Volksstaat*, organ of the German Social Democratic Workers' Party. For a translation of this article, see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, a collection of articles, speeches, letters, and news dispatches, selected and edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1952, pp. 203–18.

[5] Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution," loc. cit., p. 205, and "Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered," an essay written in 1894. The latter is translated in Marx and Engels, op. cit., pp. 229–41.

DESPITE these formidable factors which, especially in the first decade of independence, seemed to incline so much of the African continent toward socialism, the ideology has in fact had difficulties in taking political root in Africa. Many African voices that used to sing socialist songs have now gone silent. Many African leaders who attempted a socialist path of development have been relegated to the limbo of history. Is the African soil inhospitable to the seeds of socialism?

There are, indeed, a number of factors which tend to militate against the successful introduction of socialism into Africa. Admittedly, some of those factors militate against other forms of social, economic, and political organization as well, since Africa's problems are sometimes due more to general conditions of instability than merely to lack of congeniality to particular ideologies. Nevertheless, certain ideologies do stand a better chance than others. And socialism is one of the most difficult to transplant to Africa. The question therefore arises: Why?

One reason concerns historical continuities between the imperial past and the postcolonial period. Links between some African countries and the former colonial powers, and links between African economies and international capitalism, have at times turned out to be too strong to be severed abruptly. Those African states that have attempted such precipitate breaks have not infrequently experienced the agonies of serious economic hemorrhage.

For a while such hemorrhage hit Sékou Touré's Guinea—for reasons which are to some extent argued out in Ladipo Adamolekun's book. The severance of all links between France and Guinea after the colony's vote for independence in 1958 was partly a case of voluntary political disengagement by Guinea and partly a case of economic ostracism imposed by the bigger power. A period of partial isolation ensued for Guinea. But then capitalism (even the French version), with an interest in Guinea's mineral resources, began to lure the country back to its embrace. The temptations are great for a small country rich in resources but poor in living standards.

The ties may sometimes be with a country other than the former colonial power as such. This is particularly true of Mozambique, with its historical connections with the Republic of South Africa. Mozambicans still hire out by the thousands to firms in South Africa in return for gold and related contributions to Maputo's foreign-exchange reserves. Still other economic links between the two countries, severed upon Mozambique's attainment of independence, may in fact be restored in the years ahead. The possibility of encouraging South African investment in Mozambique and certainly the probability of increasing trade with South Africa are all part of the picture of historical continuities in Mozambique's predicament.

The experience of Mozambique's neighbor, Tanzania, is the subject of a stimulating study by Okwudiba Nnoli. Though sometimes naïve in the faith it places in self-reliance, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania* illustrates the tensions between political ambitions and economic limitations in a country struggling to transcend dependency.

Then there is the problem that African countries encounter when they assume that to go socialist domestically is a way of disengaging from the international capitalist system. Many soon discover that they are as heavily dependent on international capitalism as ever—despite having adopted socialist or neosocialist policies in their own countries.

In this regard, global capitalism is proving much more obstinate and resilient than its critics have assumed. Even the largest of the Communist countries—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—are sensing a growing dependence on the world market, which is in turn dominated by capitalism and its methods. International trade is substantially conducted by the rules of capitalist interaction. The major currencies of world exchange are currencies of capitalist powers. Capitalist economies account for a disproportionate share of production technology. The nerves of the world economy are at the same time the nerves of world capitalism.

Consequently, small countries in Africa that decide to go socialist domestically may find that they are still prisoners of the international monetary system, of the international markets for copper and cocoa, of the international rules of credit, and of the international fluctuations of supply and demand. Indeed, going socialist has not turned out to be an exit visa from world capitalism for countries like

Nkrumah's Ghana or Nyerere's Tanzania. Moreover, because African economies are particularly fragile, this global dominance of capitalism makes even domestic socialism shaky. That is one major reason why there has not been a single really successful socialist experiment in Africa—not even the equivalent of the success story, as *capitalist* models, of either Kenya or the Ivory Coast.

A related difficulty—of both theoretical and practical significance—confronting socialism in Africa is the nature of domestic capitalism. One can distinguish in the African context between *dependent* capitalism and *indigenous* capitalism, although the distinction is more a matter of degree than a sharp dichotomy. With dependent capitalism, there is a disproportionate role for foreign capital, personnel, and expertise. Thus, the French economic role in the Ivory Coast is much greater than seems necessary to most impartial observers. Certainly, capitalism in the Ivory Coast is more dependent than, say, capitalism in Nigeria. Kenya lies somewhere in between. Radical African analysts of the Kenyan economy in the past tended to draw no distinction between it and the model of the Ivory Coast. But there has been a growing realization that the local entrepreneurial class in Kenya is more assertive, aggressive, and autonomous than its equivalent in the Ivory Coast.[6]

On the theoretical plane, there is a classic debate among Africanist Marxists over whether indigenous capitalism of the Kenyan or Nigerian sort or dependent capitalism of the Ivorian variety is the more effective prelude to socialism. In more concrete terms, Western history would seem to teach us that when capitalism reaches a certain level of maturity it becomes difficult to dislodge. Marxists have been expecting a socialist revolution in places like Great Britain since the 19th century—but Marxists are still waiting. On the other hand, situations where capitalism has only just begun and is still very dependent have turned out historically to be precisely the appropriate breeding grounds for effective radicalism. The history of countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba, and South Yemen would seem to imply that *dependent* capitalism is a surer way toward socialism than indigenized (and more deeply entrenched) capitalism.

The collection edited by Desfosses and Levesque indirectly raises a related theoretical puzzle. Marx and Engels expected socialism to be a child of *overdevelopment.* As capitalism got more and more efficient technologically, it seemed to be raising the level of social costs. Marx expected an increasing impoverishment of the workers to occur in proportion to the increasing efficacy of the industrial machines. Capitalism was doomed to dig its own grave as it permitted itself to drift toward super-efficiency and overdevelopment.

But essays like those in the Desfosses/Levesque collection, and much of the literature on dependency, often discuss prospects for socialism in conditions of *underdevelopment.* Marx may have thought that the lure of overdevelopment was the death wish of capitalism, but many 20th-century social analysts see the curse of underdevelopment as the potential life-giving sperm for socialism.

History notwithstanding, doctrinal conceptions die slowly. Marxist theory in its classical formulation assumed that a bourgeois stage of development was a necessary and inevitable precondition for a socialist revolution. As Engels put it in 1873:

> *A bourgeoisie is . . . as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself. A person who says that this revolution can be carried out easier in a country which has no proletariat or bourgeoisie proves by his statement that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism.*[7]

By this argument, Kenya must surely be closer to socialism than Tanzania is, since Kenya has more of a bourgeoisie and more of a proletariat than Tanzania has evolved so far. By the same reasoning, the Republic of South Africa is closer to a genuine socialist revolution than Mozambique is, since South Africa is at a higher stage of capitalist development and has evolved a much larger African proletariat class, proportionately as well as absolutely, than Mozambique can claim to have developed.

Although framed somewhat differently, debates of this kind have been known to create sharp divisions among leftists at ideologically active campuses like the University of Dar es Salaam. For example, competing groups have argued over whether autonomous processes of class formation are taking place in Africa, or whether developments there merely reflect the wider forces of imperialism.

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[6] Some five years ago, a major British political economist, Colin Leys, wrote an influential book about "neocolonialism" in Kenya. The main thrust of the book was that Kenyan capitalism was of the "compradore," i.e., dependent, variety. See Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*, London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.

However, during a research trip to Nairobi in 1976, Leys confided to the author that he was coming to the conclusion that capitalism in Kenya was less dependent and more autonomous than he had at first assumed.

[7] Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution," loc. cit., p. 205.

The Dar es Salaam campus itself is on the whole to the left of and critical of Julius Nyerere and his government. It is of note that until recently, the ideological fervor on the campus was to a disproportionate degree led by non-Tanzanians. The most eloquent voices of the extreme Left were quite often white expatriate radicals or Africans from other countries. There were occasions when these ideological leaders were themselves disaffected Westerners—such as John Saul from Canada or Lionel Cliffe from the United Kingdom. Nnoli of Nigeria was a presence on campus in the period before he returned to his country. Walter Rodney, from Guyana, was also a very visible and eloquent leader of the Left when he was at the Univesity of Dar es Salaam. Rodney was tragically killed in Georgetown, Guyana, by a bomb explosion in his own car in June 1980. He is now widely regarded as a martyr to the cause of social justice. Students in Tanzania, in Kenya, and elsewhere demonstrated solidarity with Rodney's cause when news of his death reached them. He may become even more of a legend at the University of Dar es Salaam than he already was. In the 1970's, some exiles from Idi Amin's Uganda also loomed large on the Dar es Salaam ideological scene. Especially prominent were Dan Nabudere, who became a government minister in Uganda after Amin's fall, and Yash Tandon, who became a member of the interim parliament (called the National Consultative Council) formed in Kampala when Amin fell.

One theory links this prominence of non-Tanzanians with the sociological theory of marginality. In this view, the same considerations which made Jews visible in certain areas of Western life have made non-Tanzanians ideologically conspicuous on the campus of the University of Dar es Salaam. The marginality is not merely in terms of citizenship but also in terms of race. The most extensively discussed theoretical works in the late 1960's and much of the 1970's on campus in Dar es Salaam were not the works of Julius K. Nyerere but the essays of Issa Shivji. Like Nyerere, Shiviji was a Tanzanian, but of Indian extraction. His book, presenting the thesis that there was a silent class struggle going on in Tanzania, that it had a dynamism of its own, and that it included a dialectical struggle between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the commercial bourgeoisie, provoked considerable debate and controversy, much of it genuinely sophisticated and intellectually exciting. Another eloquent figure at the University of Dar es Salaam was Mahmood Mamdani, also an East African of Indian extraction but a British citizen by force of circumstances. Mamdani—who received a distinction in his Harvard Ph.D. defense—was a superb orator. He was also an eloquent theoretician, as is demonstrated here in his study of class formation in Uganda.

By the middle of the 1970's, the battle lines were basically drawn between anti-imperialists like Nabudere and Tandon, on one side, and anticapitalists like Shivji and Mamdani, on the other. The anti-imperialists defined the enemy as being basically external — the forces of world capitalism penetrating into Africa; the anticapitalists allowed the African continent the dignity of producing its own indigenous capitalist devils not necessarily subject to the machinations of external imperialist forces.

IF THERE HAS BEEN a good deal of sophisticated debate in Africa as to who are the main carriers of *capitalism* into Africa, there has been relatively limited discussion about the main carriers of *revolution*. Who, in fact, are the great instruments of change in Africa at this radical level?

One line of analysis has favorably contrasted the revolutionary credentials of the peasants to those of the urban workers. This is a debate that has been quite important in the history of Marxism. It led to heated theoretical controversies in Russia before and after the October Revolution and in China before and after the revolution of 1949. Inevitably, the debate had to rear its head on the African radical scene as well. Shivji in Tanzania tends to discount the revolutionary potential of the urban workers of Africa, who—compared with the rural masses—seem to form a privileged labor aristocracy. Frantz Fanon—more prominent than Shivji among radical theorists—had entered the debating arena even earlier, putting not only the peasantry but also the lumpen proletariat before the proletariat as instruments of revolution. Newly arrived and bewildered lumpen elements in the ghettos of African cities could, according to Fanon, be solid recruiting material for revolutionary armies.[a]

Least explored in the African radical debate is the role of the Westernized intelligentsia. Yet, as noted earlier, a Marxist revolutionary in African social conditions is inevitably a *Westernized* revolutionary.

Every revolution has ultimately two sides—the destruction of the old order and the inauguration of the new. The workers and the peasants, when they have suffered enough and will no longer tolerate the status quo, can rise and pull down the old order in one massive outburst of revolutionary fury. But can the workers and the peasants then proceed to design a new, alternative order? Can the peasants of Ethiopia or Angola shape on their own a sufficiently revolutionary alternative design?

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[a] **Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, NY, Grove Press, 1963.**

It might turn out to be that the most revolutionary of all social classes is neither the proletariat nor the peasantry, but the bourgeoisie itself. A segment of the bourgeoisie is often at odds with the system as a whole. Lenin was sensitive to this issue. He wrote:

> *The theory of socialism. . . grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the property classes, by intellectuals. By their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.*[8]

The Shivjis and Nyereres, the Nkrumahs, Tourés, and Fanons, belong to the African equivalent of the bourgeois intelligentsia. Thus, the architects and designers of revolutions in Africa are not drawn from the toiling masses in the countryside but from the more privileged sectors of African societies.

But the revolutionary intelligentsia in Black Africa is disproportionately Westernized. A combination of two forces has produced the sophisticated African Marxists or revolutionaries—domestic class formation and cultural imperialism. The former has given birth to a black bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie. Cultural imperialism has assimilated a large segment of this bourgeoisie into Western culture. They are the people that read *Das Kapital,* debate silent class struggle in Tanzania, advise bewildered soldiers like Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and tutor the rulers of Angola and Mozambique ideologically.

Who then are the ultimate carriers of revolution in the modern world? Karl Marx expected them to be the most exploited class in the most advanced societies—the Western proletariat. But in fact Africa's experience demonstrates that it is the most privileged class in the least advanced societies that is closer to that historic revolutionary role. It is the Westernized bourgeois intellegentsia of the Third World rather than the workers of Birmingham, Detroit, and Marseilles that has been carrying the torch of radicalism in the last third of the 20th century. Once again Africa's experience poses major dilemmas to radical theoreticians—both in Africa itself and in the wider world where revolution and reflection touch, recoil, and reconcile.

THUS, WE HAVE SEEN that while Africa has a favorable climate for socialism, the soil is infertile. The favorable climate is intellectual and normative. Many Africans who are politically conscious find socialist doctrines intellectually satisfying. On the other hand, the infertile soil is political and economic. The actual material conditions in Africa do not seem to be hospitable to successful socialist experiments. While the continent has indeed witnessed such relatively impressive capitalist experiments as those in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, it has not as yet been able to produce a strikingly successful socialist model.

The favorable climate for socialism in Africa is part of contemporary African political culture; the unfavorable and infertile soil for socialism is part of Africa's contemporary structure. The political culture of anti-imperialism has often evolved into intellectual anticapitalism. African nationalism has at times joined hands with socialist fervor. On the other hand, the structural realities of Africa continue to bind it to the world capitalist system. Those same structural realities reveal domestic patterns of class formation which are not yet ready to sustain a socialist structure.

The cultural climate of Africa also includes a traditional distrust of individualism, and generations of experience in collectivist behavior. This is part of Africa's cultural predisposition toward socialism. On the other hand, the disturbing impact of Western culture and the effects of capitalism have released new forms of self-interest, new patterns of self-fulfiliment, new manifestations of personal greed. Profit is often at its most naked among those who are newly converted to the profit motive.

It is because of this configuration of factors that the cultural climate of Africa appears cool and wet for socialism, but the soil is still too rocky and sandy to enable socialism to take roots. The normative orientation seems right; the material conditions are wrong. Conversion to socialism seems to have disastrously preceded class consciousness.

But in addition to demonstrating the gap between political culture and structural realities, this essay has also related those issues to some of the wider theoretical concerns posed by Marxism and African radicalism. These have included the classic dilemma of whether a shortcut to socialism is feasible, avoiding the agonies of capitalism. Since much of Black Africa has produced neither a large proletariat nor a large bourgeoisie, the problem is posed at its most dramatic in African conditions.

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[8] Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" *Selected Works*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 149.

Then there is the equally basic question of radicalism concerning revolutionary credentials of different social groups. Do we look for agents of transformation among urban workers, among peasants and the lumpen proletariat, or—in the ultimate analysis—among the bourgeoisie? The African experience once again shows a disproportionate revolutionary role for the bourgeois intelligentsia—the responsibility, if not for destroying the old order, then at least for attempting to design a new one. We have reminded ourselves that Marx and Engels thought it was the least privileged of the most advanced societies that would stage a revolution. Africa's experience seems to indicate that it is the most privileged of the least developed societies that sometimes produce leaders in revolutionary transformation.

In addition, there is in Africa the pervasive presence of Western culture and its dialectical implications for both class consciousness and ideological radicalism. We have sought to demonstrate in this essay that for the time being it is a sociolinguistic impossibility for an African to be a sophisticated Marxist without being at the same time substantially Westernized. The interplay between consciousness and culture is at its most dramatic within this particular dialectic. Bourgeois Africans become socialist not because class consciousness has at last arisen but because class consciousness has been negated. Bourgeois Africans identify with the proletariat and the peasantry in a fit of class amnesia. Shivji and Rodney used to call it "class suicide" in debates at Dar es Salaam. The culture of the imperial power becomes a factor both in individual psychology and in class behavior in the new realities of the African continent.

Finally, we have sought to demonstrate in this essay that while the 1960's were a decade of socialist rhetoric all over the continent and the 1970's were a decade of Marxist models in some parts of Africa and of capitalist paradigms in others, the 1980's are likely to reveal more fully the basic tensions between cultural myths and structural realities in an Africa caught up in the uncertainties of change.

The Rise of the African State

By Thomas M. Callaghy

ALI A. MAZRUI. *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

TIMOTHY M. SHAW and KENNETH A. HEARD, Eds. *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development*. New York, NY, Africana, 1979.

DOUGLAS G. ANGLIN and TIMOTHY M. SHAW. *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

COLIN LEGUM, Ed. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1977–1978*. New York, NY, Africana, 1979.

COLIN LEGUM, Ed. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978–1979*. New York, NY, Africana, 1980.

ZDENEK CERVENKA. *The Unfinished Quest: Africa and the OAU*. New York, NY, Africana, 1977.

AFRICA HAS EMERGED from the 1970's with much of its vaunted uniqueness destroyed and its earlier hopes and illusions shattered. Pan-Africanism and its principal organizational manifestation, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have proved feeble. Interstate conflict has grown rapidly, in some instances with the active participation of non-African states. Military expenditures have risen markedly. Afro-Arab and other forms of Third World solidarity have been unproductive. Efforts toward a "new international economic order" (NIEO) have been conspicuously barren. The continent has been badly battered by international economic forces, with a number of deep fiscal and economic crises the result. Attempts at regional economic and political integration, despite a proliferation of regional organizations, have been quite hollow. Even the East African Community (EAC) died a bitter death. Progress toward significant economic and social development has been minimal. Internal stability and control remain elusive. Meaningful forms of mass political participation have only rarely been achieved. Many observers would surely echo Ali Mazrui, who in his characteristically provocative, wide-ranging, and well-written book notes "the gap between the depths of its [Africa's] longings and the fragility of its achievements" (p. 301).

In the course of this drama—which Mazrui describes as the "anguish and the ambitions of an Africa in the process of moving from modern nationalism to modern nationhood" (p. 300)—the individual African state has increasingly become the focus of action, of the calculation and articulation of interests, and of identity. Both internally and externally, African social-political life is now state-centered. *Realpolitik* has taken firm root on the continent, and older notions of statecraft have gained a new ascendancy—in practice if not in rhetoric.

Although the books under review here cover a wide range of material and share no common perspective, they leave no doubt as to the nature, importance, and implications of these trends. In discussing these books, and, indeed, in attempting to make sense of the complexity of African reality today, it is essential to focus on the individual African state. To do so most easily, we shall look in turn at the two battlegrounds on which the state simultaneously contends—first the internal front, then the external front—all the while recognizing that the outcome of the struggle in one affects the outcome of the struggle in the other.

ON THE INTERNAL FRONT, instability has been a major concern of African states. Domestic instability stems from various sources, each given a different emphasis by the various authors under review here.

Ethnic particularism has been a persistent source of such instability in African politics. According to Mazrui, who continues to assert the uniqueness of things African, domestic instability can in part be ascribed to the resilience of tradition, to "the tensions between the blessing of cultural diversity in Africa and the curse of deep ethnic cleavages" (p. 36). Moreover, Mazrui predicts that civil wars rooted in ethnic differences will continue to be a threat for the rest of the century and that, in consequence, military spending will increase and pan-Africanism will suffer greater setbacks.

Clearly, most African countries are not nation-states; rather, they are states in search of unity, power, and, eventually, nationhood.[1] But, as Mazrui wisely indicates, rising class conflict will also be a source of internal instability.

Class formation is an increasingly important aspect of African politics today. Emerging patterns of class stratification are directly affected by *both* the state and the external environment, particularly the world capitalist economy. Of special interest in this regard, though, is the increasingly cohesive, but still faction-ridden ruling group that controls the state. This political class, contrary to classical Marxist analysis, acquires its power from the state, not from any autonomous position in the economy. It thus strives to increase state power (and thereby its own power) and to advance the interests of the state in dealing with emerging classes internally and powerful actors and forces externally. Such efforts highlight the state's centrality, its partial autonomy vis-à-vis emerging classes and external actors.

Class factors are given a clear, balanced, and perceptive treatment in Henry Cooperstock's chapter in *The Politics of Africa,* edited by Timothy Shaw and Kenneth Heard. For Cooperstock, the crucial characteristic of African stratification patterns is their great fluidity. Thus, he terms them "emerging contours." Mazrui agrees, pointing out that Africa's internal stratification patterns are in much greater flux than is the rigid international system of stratification, which "'is for the time being more like a caste than a class structure" (p. 17). But, as Cooperstock wisely stresses, it would be a serious error to assert that the developing patterns of stratification in African countries merely reflect international forces and patterns.

The interplay of ethnic and class inputs to instability in a particular case is skillfully detailed in the fine volume by Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw on Zambia. The authors demonstrate that "beneath the veneer of unity" (p. 3) in Zambia lie *increasing* regional, ethnic, linguistic, political, and class divisions, which not only divert energies from other crucial concerns but also can be exploited by both internal and external actors. As complicating external factors, the authors list attempts at subversion by the South Africans and the Portuguese, the spillover effects of the Shaba events of 1977 and 1978 in Zaire, and, of course, the impact of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

The highly personalized nature of African politics is yet another source of instability, one that is often overlooked or underestimated. African governments are mixed partrimonial-bureaucratic organizations of rule, in which personal factors—the ideals, material interests, and idiosyncrasies of powerful individuals—can be as important as structural factors such as ethnic particularism and class formation. Anglin and Shaw, for example, constantly underscore Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's heavily moral and psychological approach to foreign policy, an approach that has repeatedly frustrated the firm belief of South African leaders that "in the final analysis, economic self-interest would prevail over political ideology" (p. 300). Richard Hodder-Williams, in his uneven but useful piece in *The Politics of Africa,* makes a useful plea "to value more highly some African variation of Kremlinology and to reinstate private motives as significant forces in political developments. . ." (p. 175).

It should be pointed out that the patterns of internal conflict so far mentioned help to account for the generally authoritarian character of African politics. That is, African elites have sought to cope with the variety of internal cleavages by turning to authoritarianism. To be sure, there are signs of a fragile countertrend toward multiparty civilian regimes. In 1979, for example, both Nigeria and Ghana returned to civilian rule. All the same, the durability of this countertrend is open to question.

The continuing problems of internal instability and the internationalization of domestic conflict are underlined in the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 volumes of Colin Legum's *Africa Contemporary Record (ACR),* since 1969 one of the most valuable research tools available to students and analysts alike and a work consistently distinguished by high quality, comprehensiveness, accuracy, and sophisticated analysis. The two volumes under review well illustrate the increasingly conflictual nature of African reality. In addition, the evidence they present tends to lessen the importance of the concept of legitimacy so central to the theories of modernization and nation-building developed in the 1960's. This concept pictured legitimacy in diffuse terms, as granted by the mass of "citizens." But, after the events of the 1970's, it is clear that specific internal and external support groups—militaries, students, administrative elites, foreign states, multinational corporations, international organizations—are of more significance and that all these groups find their focus in the state. Hodder-Williams appears to be groping toward a reconceptualization of legitimacy in these terms.

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[1] Several new studies stress this sequence for Europe as well. See, for example, Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1975; and Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1976.

ON THE EXTERNAL FRONT, the emergence of an increasingly competitive continental state system was one of the clearest and most important developments in Africa in the 1970's. Shaw and Heard, for example, note that the "trend in post-colonial Africa is towards a comprehensive continental system" (p. 267), characterized by a growing *Realpolitik* and an emerging stratification, or hierarchy, among states.

Moreover, the rise of the African state system has had far-reaching consequences. As Mazrui points out:

> *The problems of a decentralized state system without an overarching government, of which modern Europe has had so painful an experience since the sixteenth century—namely, interstate suspicion, conflict, war and hence the necessity for military establishments—have as a result begun to appear unavoidable in the similar state system of Africa.* (p. 237)

In fact, Africa experienced all these problems in the 1970's.

First, interstate conflicts have increased greatly in number, intensity, and type. Decolonization and liberation struggles, after the most recent success in Zimbabwe, persist in a few areas, notably Namibia and South Africa. Border disputes and civil wars with external repercussions, by contrast, have sprung up with increasing frequency. In Chad, Angola, and Ethiopia, the sporadic guerrilla fighting of the 1960's grew in the 1970's to become full-scale civil wars with outside involvement. For example, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somali rebels in the disputed Ogaden region drew Somalia into the fighting in 1977, and the two countries are still engaged in an undeclared war. Recently, too, a growing number of African states have resorted to subversion or outright invasion. Angola-based Katangan rebels have twice mounted incursions into Zaire's Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province, once in 1977 only to be repelled by Moroccan troops airlifted in by France, and again in 1978 only to be repulsed by French and Belgian paratroopers. Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda in late 1978 and succeeded in overthrowing Idi Amin within several weeks. In Western Sahara, Algeria-backed rebels of the Polisario Front still contend with Moroccan troops for control of the area, although the rebels have now managed to push Mauritania to the sidelines. Legum and his collaborators have rendered excellent service in analyzing these conflicts.

Moreover, as interstate conflicts have spread, African leaders have increasingly shown an open concern about the nature of other African regimes, and, more recently, an express willingness to intervene in the internal affairs of those regimes. Even before President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania began his campaign in Uganda, he publicly "had begun to voice concern about the failure of African leaders to denounce tyrannies perpetrated by Blacks on Blacks" (Legum. in *ACR 1978–1979*, p. xxiii). Now he is using the presence of his troops in Uganda as a political tool to affect the outcome of internal Ugandan political struggles. Similarly, the two invasions of Shaba were justified as efforts to overthrow a tyrannical regime.

Increased militarization of the African states, as Mazrui points out in his chapter "Arms and Nationhood," has been one of the main consequences of interstate and intrastate conflict. Again, the case of Nyerere, as related by Mazrui, makes this point in telling fashion: "On the eve of independence Julius Nyerere had, in fact, wondered whether a country like Tanganyika, as it then was, needed an army of its own at all. Nyerere had been concerned that African countries would just be turned against other Africans" (p. 125). It is ironic that Nyerere, a leading pan-Africanist, has now become the first African leader to invade a neighboring country with a regular army for the express purpose of overthrowing a regime.

In connection with the growing militarization of African states, much has been written about emerging regional powers in Africa. The key word here is "emerging," for at present there is only one real black African "middle power"—Nigeria. In *The Politics of Africa*, Timothy Shaw correctly focuses on the "growth of local hegemonies" and notes that "Africa's rediscovery of *Realpolitik* is a function of its developing continental inequalities" (pp. 383-84). He foresees a possible "second scramble" for Africa, "not so much by the multinational corporations as between a small group of important African states with their international advocates" (p. 387), perhaps among states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zambia, Zaire, and Senegal, all of which have been mentioned as aspiring or emerging black African regional powers. This eventuality is by no means unthinkable; indeed, the chances of its happening are doubtless greater than many observers believe.

Given Africa's record in the 1970's, it seems safe to predict—Mazrui does so—that interstate conflicts will continue to proliferate in the future. If they do, however, it will be not simply because of the African state system itself. As we shall see, it will also be because that system is deeply embedded in the world state system, which, especially with the decline of détente, has aggravated African tensions and intensified the emergence of Africa's competitive state system.

GREATLY INCREASED outside involvement in African conflicts and the decline of African nonalignment were other major developments of the 1970's. In actual practice, as opposed to rhetoric, the major shift came in 1974 with the conflicts in Angola and on the Horn. Speaking of Angola, Mazrui notes: "Of all the major liberation forces in Africa's experience since the Second World War, only MPLA [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] went to the extent of importing up to twelve thousand fighters to wage its war against fellow Angolans . . . . by African standards this constituted the importation of a whole army" (pp. 190-91). Herewith expired the principle of "continental jurisdiction."

In terms of rhetoric, however, the shift came only after the Shaba upheavals of 1977 and 1978—specifically, during the debate at the 1978 OAU summit meeting in Khartoum. Despite the massive increase in Soviet, Cuban, and East German activity on the continent since 1975, it was Western intervention in the Shaba invasions that touched off the debate. Like the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire had requested and received outside assistance. In other respects, too, the situation was no different. But African leaders found it difficult to face this reality squarely. The more conservative states railed against Communist penetration and subversion while calling for more Western aid. The more radical states termed Soviet and Cuban activities "internationalist aid" and everything else "imperialism." A larger middle group claimed that "both East and West were guilty of intervening in domestic conflicts in Africa" (Legum, *ACR 1978-1979*, p. xxi). But "guilty" of what? President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, at least, underscored that African states were themselves responsible for most of the foreign intervention. As the debate at Khartoum indicates, the need for external help has made ideological differences between African states much more salient than in the past.

Much of the debate at Khartoum revolved around the proposal by France and certain Francophone African states for the creation of an Inter-African Security Force. Nyerere maintained that such a force should be created only by the OAU but was pessimistic about the chances of doing so—and with reason. When the committee formed to consider such a move submitted its report a year later, the proposal was shelved as impractical, in large part because of "inter-African suspicions about the kinds of situations in which it might or might not be used" (Legum, *ACR 1978-1979*, p. xxi). Originally proposed as a pan-Africanist concept at the founding of the OAU in 1963, the notion of an African peacekeeping force thus fell victim in 1979 to an increasingly conflictual African state system.

Whom have the African states to blame for the involvement of outside powers in African affairs? Most of the authors in the six books under review leave little doubt. Legum notes that the "Africans themselves had to accept full responsibility" for the externalization of conflict (*ACR 1977-1978*, p. xx). Shaw asserts that "continued inter-state disagreements in Africa make strategic alliances with external actors still attractive" (p. 372). Hence, African states of all ideological persuasions have invited outside assistance. All actors, African and non-African alike, thus pursue their interests as they see fit—Ethiopians and Somalis, Angolans and Zairians, Cubans and Moroccans, East Germans and French, Soviets and Americans.

African nonalignment has died in fact, if not in the pronouncements of the African regimes themselves. Originally, Mazrui maintains, a major objective of African nonalignment was to keep foreign military bases out of Africa. Now several African countries have sizable contingents of French military personnel, and others have Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans.[2]

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[2] Mazrui and the contributors to *Africa Contemporary Record* agree that Soviet and Cuban interests in Africa are not identical but basically complementary and that the Soviets and the Cubans are mutually interdependent. On the Cubans, see Mazrui, pp. 188–93; Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "Cuba: The New Communist Power in Africa," *ACR 1977–1978*, pp. A103–18; and idem, "Cuba in Africa in 1978: How Non-Aligned?" *ACR 1978–1979*, pp. A58–71. On the Soviets in

(continued on page 58)

Somalia and Kenya are now offering "facilities" to the United States. As will be seen, African states no longer see their interests in the broader communites envisaged in such notions as pan-Africanism, regional cooperation, and Third World solidarity.

PAN-AFRICAN IDEALS and hopes have been among the principal casualties of the rise of the African state system. Mazrui notes that "pan-Africanism has had greater success as a liberating force than as an integrative quest" (p. 78), and he usefully traces the roots of pan-Africanism to a shared blackness, humiliation, and colonial domination. During the struggles for independence, that is, the common enemy represented by the colonial powers helped foster pan-Africanist doctrines of unity, solidarity, and nonalignment. But none of the factors Mazrui lists now acts as a strong impediment to conflict; he fairly points out that even in the early independence period, pan-African ideas led President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to encourage subversion against other African states (p. 53). The unifying threat of the colonial enemy is rapidly receding into the background, especially with the collapse of white domination in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and now in Zimbabwe. After Zimbabwe, the only remaining common enemy is South Africa—which may encourage *partial* African unity on liberation issues but will not mitigate trends toward conflict elsewhere on the continent.

After independence, pan-Africanist hopes declined, and doctrines of "neocolonialism" demonstrated little unifying potential. For example, Nyerere, like Nkrumah a leading pan-Africanist, observed in 1967 that "as each of us develops his own state, we raise more and more barriers between ourselves" and that "it is not impossible to achieve African unity through nationalism . . . [but] it is difficult" (cited in Anglin and Shaw, p. 174). Nyerere's key role in the collapse of the EAC underlined the truth of his earlier statement.

The OAU, the principal incarnation of pan-Africanist ideals and hopes, has failed miserably. Zdenek Cervenka, in his book *The Unfinished Quest* and in his chapters in both the *Africa Contemporary Records* under review, performs a useful if not particularly exciting autopsy. He concludes that "so far the priority of national interests over those of Africa as a whole has been the main African weakness both in the relations between African States and in their relations with the industrialized countries" (p. 190).

In his introduction to Cervenka's book, a leading African journalist, Raph Uwechue, observes that African leaders have settled for a superficial unity and that, as a result, "the list of the OAU's achievements is much shorter than its failures" (p. x). After noting the OAU's dismal failures with regard to interstate and intrastate disputes, collective security, economic cooperation, and organizational reform (Cervenka dissects all these failures in the succeeding chapters), Uwechue proclaims that "it is thus increasingly obvious that if the OAU is to survive as a truly continental organization, it has to accommodate the concept of a politico-economic union somewhat along the lines advocated by Kwame Nkrumah" (p. xii). Illusions do indeed die slowly! Nkrumah's dream is much less likely to succeed now than it was even in 1963.

Attempts at regional cooperation, despite much showy effort, have likewise come to little—a point on which the authors here reviewed are in substantial agreement. As Reginald Green observes, "the late 1970's have not been a happy period for regionalism in Africa" (*ACR 1978–1979,* p. A40). In a rather pedestrian chapter in *The Politics of Africa,* John Clark similarly argues that "despite the growing number of organizational efforts . . . African IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] seem to have made little progress in solving the economic, social and political problems confronting African states" (p. 319). He points to a vicious cycle of weak support from member states, weak results, collapse, possible reformulation, and so on.

Green attributes the weakness of regional cooperation primarily to a fragility of trust. In a lucid, subtle, and well-organized piece in the 1977–1978 volume of *Africa Contemporary Record,* he notes that in the EAC, despite previous tensions, "the final breakup came suddenly, brutally, and in a manner minimizing what could be salvaged, maximizing dislocations, creating lasting bitterness and exacerbating problems of sorting out former Community assets, liabilities and institutions" (p. A125). He stresses both economic and political factors in the breakup and notes the miscalculation of interests and rewards on the part of the leaders of Kenya and Tanzania. The EAC, he predicts, "will not rise from its ashes

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Africa, see *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1978. For general discussions of the internationalization of African conflicts, see James Mayall, "Africa in the International System: The Great Powers in Search of a Perspective," *Government and Opposition* (London), Summer 1979, pp. 349–72; and Raymond W. Copson, "African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1978, pp. 227–45. On the role of the East Germans in Africa, see Z. Cervenka and Mario R. Dedrichs, "The Two Germanies in Africa," *ACR 1978–1979,* pp. A92–107.

like the phoenix in the foreseeable future" (p. A134).

Anglin and Shaw devote a good deal of attention to Zambia's efforts to disengage itself from the white-controlled economic structure of Southern Africa (see Chap. 6). One of their major conclusions is that "nationalism reinforces the drive for disengagement, but inhibits enthusiasm for integration" (p. 174). For example, Zambia had but weak ties with the EAC and was ambivalent about strengthening even those. Clearly, the primary consideration was the state's own interests, not those of some broader African community, even a regional community. Recent efforts at regional cooperation announced by several Southern African states in the wake of Zimbabwe's independence may prove more fruitful.

AFRICAN SOLIDARITY with other Third World states has yielded results generally as meager as those achieved by pan-Africanism. A crucial aspect of this question is Afro-Arab solidarity, once much heralded. Mazrui points out that "the developing countries generally have a good case against the oil-producers" (p. 148). Africa, in particular, has given political support to the Arabs but has received very little economic help in return; most Arab aid has gone to other Muslim states. For Mazrui, "the critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become true *partners in development*" (p. 131). At minimum, he asserts, there should be a two-tier pricing system for oil—not just for African states, but for all Third World states. Mazrui also warns about "the serious risk of Arab paternalism towards black Africa" and "the possibility of Arab neo-colonialism" (p. 153). To date, the Arab states show little inclination to join with black Africa in a true partnership.[3]

Africa's struggle for a new international economic order has been even less rewarding. Mazrui maintains that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been a "failure in practical terms, but important in a pioneering sense" (p. 212). Anglin and Shaw describe Zambia's active participation in a wide range of NIEO efforts, especially in the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries. Such efforts have been "for Zambia, particularly unrewarding . . . . Zambia has so far reaped few immediate benefits from Third World collaboration; the diversity of interests within the developing world has been too great, the agenda too long, and the changes too distant" (p. 29).

The Lomé Convention, a five-year treaty first signed in February 1975 and intended to strengthen economic cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 46 developing nations of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, has proved to be one fruitful joint effort. In a perceptive and subtle piece in *The Politics of Africa,* James Mayall carefully describes how the African states developed a common negotiating stand and agreed on a common front on Lomé. Such agreement was possible, he argues, only because of an intriguing conjuncture of circumstances and interests: an earlier ideological debate over cooperation and dependence had helped to shape a coherent African position, the Francophone states perceived that their position vis-à-vis the EEC was weakening and that they should search for broader African support, and Nigeria, a powerful regional actor, was committed to gaining concessions from the EEC. Although Lomé has demonstrated that African states can work together for common objectives, circumstances since it was first signed have not been conducive to continued overwhelming enthusiasm for it.

On the world scene, Africa is confronted with increasingly unfavorable economic trends. In his survey of 1978, Legum lists two such trends—rampant world inflation (especially higher oil prices), and rapidly accumulating problems with debt repayment and balance of payments. Since Africa is generally dependent on the world economy and has been unable to increase food production significantly, world inflation and debt repayment mean that most African states have experienced little or even negative economic growth. New OPEC oil price increases in 1979–80 are making matters worse.

If, as Mazrui avers, "the international economic system will remain rigid but not unchallenged" (p. 293), then what can African states do? What strategies have they adopted? What strategies can they adopt?

African attempts at socialism have left a bleak record.[4] Tanzania and Guinea, the two countries that have not abandoned early attempts at socialism, are in serious difficulty economically. Mozambique has just announced a major opening to the international capitalist economy.[5]

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[3] See Victor T. LeVine and Timothy W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

[4] See Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, Eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1979; and Ali A. Mazrui's essay in the present issue of *Problems of Communism*.

[5] On the recent moves by Mozambique, see Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, "Socialist Mozambique Woos Western Capital for Revival," *The Christian Science Monitor*, (Boston, MA), Apr. 9, 1980. On Angolan interest in Western investment, see "U.S./Africa—Where the Twain Meet," *Africa News* (Durham, NC), July 28, 1980, pp. 2, 11.

Does the bleak record of African socialism leave the African states completely at the mercy of international economic forces? Not at all. As Mayall states in *The Politics of Africa*, "it is simply not true that African states have no power to reorient their economies . . ." (p. 311). *Within limits*, African states generally have some room for maneuver.

Most African states have chosen a state-centered approach—commonly called "state capitalism." Zambia is a classic case in point, of particular interest because it combines the rhetoric of socialism with the substance of state capitalism. Anglin and Shaw, although ambivalent about the nature of Zambia's external linkages, do an admirable job of describing its "reorganizationalist" strategy. In its approach to its economy, Zambia "has been neither permissive nor resistant in an unequivocal way, but rather has adopted a pragmatic bargaining position" (p. 411). The state interacts with the internal and external environments primarily through economic regulation and the economic sector that has grown up around the state (the parastatal sector). The power of the state is thus reinforced, and the interests of those who control the state are furthered. State capitalism is not a full-fledged economic doctrine. Rather, it is a tendency, a thrust, full of contradictions and limitations. Its impact will most likely be modest but identifiable.

THE OUTLOOK for Africa in the decade of the 1980's is by no means promising. For the foreseeable future, most of the African states will achieve little economic and social development. Intrastate and interstate conflicts will most likely continue to proliferate, and non-African states will persist in playing crucial roles in some disputes. Ideological differences between African states will become more salient as the continental state system comes to maturity. Although past hopes and illusions will not soon fade from the rhetoric of African regimes, a fundamental *Realpolitik* will become more manifest in practice as older notions of statecraft gain a new importance. In the longer term, however, a greater realism may have salutary effects.

Marxism on the Horn of Africa

By Richard F. Sherman

COLIN LEGUM and BILL LEE. *Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1977.

COLIN LEGUM and BILL LEE. *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1979.

TOM J. FARER. *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm*. Second, revised ed. New York, NY, and Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979.

JOHN MARKAKIS and NEGA AYELE. *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978.

RAÚL VALDÉS VIVÓ. *Ethiopia's Revolution*. New York, NY, International Publishers, 1978.

THE HORN of Africa has been in a state of constant upheaval since Haile Selassie was deposed as Emperor of Ethiopia in 1974. In addition to tremendous internal change, each of the countries of the Horn — Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti — has undergone realignment in its international position as well. During the quarter century before 1974, Haile Selassie's Ethiopian empire had received more aid from the United States than any other African country. Somalia, which signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in 1974, was one of the Soviet Union's best friends in Africa. The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (TFAI) was a sleepy French colonial outpost. And the Eritrean insurgent groups fighting for independence from Ethiopia were racked by such internal dissension that they posed little threat to the stability of the empire.

By 1977, all this had changed. Somalia had abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR. The Ethiopian government, now in the hands of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, or Dergue, had expelled numerous US agencies from the country and had become a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. The TFAI became the independent Republic of Djibouti in June, and the new ministate's long-term course remained a matter of debate. Finally, amid the internal disarray in Ethiopia following the ouster of the Emperor, the Eritrean liberation movement had taken control of 95 percent of the territory of Eritrea.

This process of international realignment on the Horn culminated in early 1978 with the defeat of the Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. Though both Ethiopia and Somalia claimed an allegiance to Marxist rhetoric, if not principles, the ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia's Ogaden region and represented by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were attempting to make good their longstanding claim that the Ogaden constituted an integral part of the Somali nation. The July–September 1977 military successes of the WSLF acting in conjunction with the Somali army had led to de facto Somali control of nearly one third of Ethiopia's territory. It took the combined efforts of the freshly equipped Ethiopian army and militia backed by Soviet and Cuban forces to drive the Somali forces from the Ogaden in March 1978. This put an end to the Soviet-Somali flirtation that had been an essentially uninterrupted part of politics on the Horn of Africa since the 1960's.

THE RELEVANCE of this realignment and the strategic significance of the entire Horn area are discussed in the volumes by Colin Legum and Bill Lee and by Tom Farer. In *Conflict in the Horn of Africa* and its sequel published two years later, Legum and Lee have done a very thorough job of demonstrating that both the United States and the USSR perceive that they have substantial national interests in the region. Farer, for his part, argues that the Horn area does not rank very highly on

> *any rational list of geopolitical priorities. . . . It deserves a modest measure of Western attention and*

resources, but nothing on the scale of Soviet involvement. (p. 161)

Whatever one's precise assessment of the strategic significance of the Horn, it is clear that the superpowers' roles there continue to impose on the area styles, ideologies, and weaponries very different from those that would be present in the absence of superpower involvement. The superimposition of Soviet Marxist ideology, in particular, deserves more detailed investigation.

For our purposes, two major themes emerge from the five books under consideration here. The two converge at more than one point. The first is that some of the Marxist ideology, modes, and means injected into the Horn by the Soviet Union and Cuba are at odds with more indigenous modes of thought and behavior. The second theme concerns the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the so-called Marxist regimes and movements that have emerged on the Horn over the last decade, especially as they have tried to cope with the problems of nationalism and subnationalism in the region.

Of course, the perspectives of the authors differ. Colin Legum, who edits the widely respected *Africa Contemporary Record,* and Bill Lee, who serves as editor of the *Jordan Times* (Amman), for the most part provide factual and well-documented recapitulations of the events on the Horn which have drawn attention to these themes. Tom Farer, who teaches international law at Rutgers University and is Vice President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, takes a less chronological, more issue-oriented approach. The last two books reviewed are more ideological in nature. John Markakis and Nega Ayele have written an indictment of Ethiopia's rulers, past and present. (Ayele was summarily executed in Ethiopia in 1977, before the book appeared in print.) Raúl Valdés Vivó, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, on the other hand, provides an unabashed defense of everything that has taken place in Ethiopia since 1974. Valdés is in charge of foreign affairs for his party, but his lack of knowledge of Ethiopian history, his attempts at crude psychohistory, and the simple clichés and generalizations that permeate his book leave many of his judgments open to serious question.

THE RAMIFICATIONS of nationalism and subnationalism on the Horn dominate any discussion of the mix of imported and indigenous elements in the Marxism of the region. Legum, Lee, and Farer cite numerous examples of the Soviet and Cuban tendency to underestimate the complex and seemingly incompatible nationalistic leanings of the Marxist movements in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. The Soviets especially have followed a general course of action based on the notion that a measure of "socialist brotherhood" existed that could help overcome essential national differences. In 1977, for example, when Moscow wanted and believed it could have both Somalia and Ethiopia as allies, the Soviets encouraged Fidel Castro to attempt to negotiate a "socialist federation" between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Moscow even envisioned the expansion of this federation to include the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and Djibouti. In light of the Soviet Union's own internal subnational tensions and concrete historical factors militating against Somali-Ethiopian cooperation, the "solution" proposed by the Soviets was viewed as naive by outside observers and well-nigh insulting by the Soviet Union's erstwhile allies in Somalia. President Mohamed Siad Barre, feeling betrayed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, broke diplomatic relations with both countries later in the year.

Similar Soviet-Cuban attempts were made to bring together the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean rebel/revolutionaries. However, as Legum and Lee state in *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis:*

> *Prospects for . . . a Federation of Marxist-Leninist Ethiopian and Eritrean States faded away against the intractability of centuries-old irreconcilable nationalisms. Expectations that the "Marxist" Dergue and the "Marxist" Eritrean fronts might "resolve their contradictions" in the name of Marxism alone were shattered as the Dergue set out to liquidate all those whom the Eritrean leaders regarded as the true Ethiopian Marxists.* (p. xi)

Here, as in Ethiopia's conflict with Somalia, the USSR has ultimately thrown its weight behind Addis Ababa; in the process it has nearly abandoned an old ally which can credibly claim to be more authentically Marxist than the Soviets' new friends in the Dergue.

The fact is that the Soviets have gotten bogged down in a quagmire in Eritrea just as they seem to have done more recently on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, in Afghanistan. Unless they can produce some form of peaceful solution to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict — which seems unlikely in mid-1980—they will find themselves in a no-win situation. They have made a tremendous commitment to the Ethiopian regime and have lost their excellent naval facilities at Berbera, Somalia, as a result. Yet the military forces of Dergue Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam cannot defeat the sophisticated and dedicated guerrillas of the Eritrean liberation movement. Mengistu may have to destroy Eritrea to save it, and Fidel Castro, whose forces played a critical role in driving the Somalis from the Ogaden in 1978, has already indicated he will not allow Cuban forces to attack the Eritreans. An Ethiopia with only tenuous control of Eritrean towns and seaports is not the prize the Soviets had envisioned when they began to favor Ethiopia over Somalia. The underlying truth, which the Soviets may only now be learning, is that on the Horn of Africa at least, questions of nationalism, subnationalism, and colonialism cannot be resolved on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

THE SECOND major issue with which we are concerned—i.e., the actual nature of the various "Marxist" movements on the Horn—goes a long way toward explaining why this is so. The central question is: When we dig beneath the rhetoric of the various competing "Marxists" on the Horn, what elements of Marxist-Leninist reality do we find? The volumes by Markakis and Ayele and by Legum and Lee are the most helpful in addressing this question, although they devote far less space to analyzing the nature of the Somali regime than they do to that of Ethiopia.

Somali President Siad Barre has been described as "a nationalist first, a Muslim second, and a Marxist third."[1] Legum and Lee characterized him in their 1977 volume as "a man of old-fashioned virtues and a staunch Muslim," who "had become 'converted' to Marxism because of his disillusionment with the West, mainly over its 'hostility' to Somalia's national aspirations" (p. 32). Today, with the Soviets gone, the Siad Barre regime can be portrayed more accurately as African socialist than as Marxist-Leninist.

The Ethiopian situation is far more complex. With the exception of Raúl Valdés Vivó, all of the authors whose work is represented here raise serious questions as to the Marxist content of the Mengistu regime, and even Valdés lends inadvertent support to the others by the title he chooses for his second chapter, "A Revolution Seeking Its Ideology."

Briefly, the arguments which can be used to demonstrate that the Dergue regime is not Marxist-Leninist are four in number. First, the Ethiopian revolution, unlike the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, has been conducted without the presence of any sort of political vanguard party. Second, while the Dergue has invoked the use of Marxist rhetoric to justify developments in Ethiopia and while Mengistu has found it convenient to use Marxist slogans in his attempts to consolidate state power, the Dergue in fact has little understanding of Marxism-Leninism either in theory or in practice. Third, the Dergue is a military council (the literal translation of the Amharic word is "committee") and has injected into the Ethiopian revolution an overt military flavor that was absent in Russia in 1917 and that has made nationalism rather than internationalism a main focal point of the revolution ("Ethiopia First" was the Dergue's rallying cry.) Finally, although the Dergue has created selected mass organizations of the sort which normally accompany a Communist revolution, it does not have the firm ideological grip required to control them. Democratic centralism is not even close to being operative in Ethiopia today.

Markakis and Ayele maintain, in the harshest terms used by any of our authors, that Ethiopia has undergone radical changes, but not a Marxist restructuring of society. Mass organizations such as peasant committees and urban associations function with virtually no cadres and lack any real substance. And the descriptions provided by these authors of the Dergue's hostility and ultimate repression of Ethiopia's labor movement (pp. 142-45), recruitment of the cities' "lumpen population" to control the urban associations (p. 151), and terror campaign waged against rival political groups, particularly the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (pp. 162-64), make the reader wonder whether the process of change taking place in Ethiopia is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism or of national socialism.

TO FIND THE political movement on the Horn that most closely approximates the Marxist-Leninist model, one would have to look toward the Eritrean liberation movement, particularly the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF is an efficient, well-disciplined political movement struggling not only for independence from Ethiopia, but for a basic social redefinition of Eritrean society. It is run on the basis of democratic centralism, stresses the concept of a national democratic revolution, and has been characterized by Gérard Chaliand, a leading student of Third World Marxism, as "by far the most impressive revolutionary movement

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[1] David Lamb, "Russ Isolated in a Somalia They Helped to Develop," *Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles, CA), Oct. 3, 1977, p. 6.

produced in Africa in the last two decades."[2]

Although the EPLF does seem to approximate other Marxist movements in their earlier stages, as of this writing it continues to consider itself a liberation movement rather than a Marxist party, and has no particular ideological or tactical allegiance either to the Soviets or to the Chinese. Still, it is quite aware of the need for and committed to the idea of a Leninist-style vanguard party. Unlike the Dergue, it promotes the proletariat as the "vanguard of the revolution," even though only 20 percent of the Eritrean population is urban.

In addition, the EPLF emphasizes the importance of the participation of large numbers of Eritreans in the expanding political process and has created a network of mass organizations to this end. EPLF mass organizations—of workers, peasants, women, students, and young people—are permitted to play a far more significant role in the mobilization and socialization processes taking place throughout Eritrea than the Dergue's equivalent organizations play in the rest of Ethiopia. The growing emphasis on health care, education, and the role of women in Eritrean society all attest to expanded political participation.

In effect, the theory and reality of the Eritrean blend of Marxism and nationalism appear to be far more consistent than the theory and practice propagated by the Dergue. While Ethiopia's Mengistu has attempted since the late 1970's to crudely fit Marxist ideology to Ethiopian realities, the EPLF has had a decade in which to develop practical programs based upon a much more systematic commitment to socialist doctrine.

IN LIGHT OF the tremendous number of conflicting forces, both domestic and foreign, at work on the Horn of Africa, what can be expected there in the future? In Ethiopia, Mengistu has consolidated a considerable amount of power in his own hands. He is moving toward the establishment of an Ethiopian political party, but it remains to be seen how independent of the military such a party will be.

The Soviet Union seems prepared to remain in Ethiopia for some time, and is now building naval facilities on the Dahlak Islands, just off Massawa. To counter the expanding Soviet presence in the region, the United States and Somalia have discussed the possibility of America's obtaining access to Somali air and naval facilities at Berbera in return for arms shipments to be used for defensive purposes by the Somali military. It is too early to tell what effect all of these developments will have on the continuing struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden. But however the situation develops in the south, it is already clear that the Eritreans are not willing to accept the political-geographical status quo in the north and will continue to be a major thorn in Mengistu's side.

With many questions unanswerable at the present time, one can only be certain that the future of Marxism on the Horn will remain inexorably tied to the unfolding drama of national development and international realignment taking place in the region. Whether the drama brings stability or instability remains to be seen.

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[2] Gérard Challand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1978, p. 126.

Political Forces in Latin America

By Lynn-Darrell Bender

BRIAN LOVEMAN and THOMAS M. DAVIES, JR., Eds. *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America.* Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1978.

LUIS E. AGUILAR, Ed. *Marxism in Latin America.* Rev. ed. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1978.

ROBERT D. BOND, Ed. *Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs.* New York, NY, New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977.

JOHN A. BOOTH and MITCHELL A. SELIGSON, Eds. *Political Participation in Latin America.* Vols. 1 and 2. New York, NY, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978 and 1979.

LATIN AMERICA is frequently described as an immobile society controlled by a few oligarchs who manage to contain the forces of socioeconomic change. How the oligarchs are presumed to have accomplished this feat has been the subject of considerable speculation, but there is little question that the theory is supported by two observable Latin American social traits: the deep-seated, almost fatalistic sense of social accommodation prevalent in Latin America, and the easy proclivity of potential counterelites to give up their ideals in exchange for assimilation into the establishment. Indeed, the attraction of power and prestige, particularly through appointment in government, has historically thwarted even the noblest revolutionary élan. Whatever the explanation, the end result remains marginal social change as the prevailing norm.

Yet the forces of the status quo have not gone unchallenged. On the contrary, Latin American political life, with its history of multiplicity, has never been short of rebels. To be sure, revolutionary change, while extolled everywhere, has taken place only in Cuba. Even so, the presence of social protesters has prodded traditional elites to make adjustments to hasten economic and social development. Today, industrialization, modern labor legislation, new social welfare programs, and greater educational opportunities are striking realities, particularly in the more developed nations of the region—Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. These advances have brought some innovation and modernity to Latin American society. Still, much of the region's political life is as troubled as before, as events in Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador clearly demonstrate. Indeed, it is largely in response to the challenge of such destabilizing forces that military-dominated authoritarian government remains prevalent throughout Latin America.

MOST POLITICAL systems in Latin America today are subject to direct military domination. In a few others, there is indirect military rule, in which the military restricts the freedom of action of what is ostensibly a civilian government. Only four or five political systems can be broadly classified as "democratic." Almost gone, however, is the old-style caudillo. Now, the armed forces characteristically seize power as an institution, committed to what Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies call the "politics of antipolitics." The result has often been highly nationalistic, authoritarian military regimes, whose policies stress protection of national interests and emancipation of national economies over traditional military concerns and lip service to democratic values. Such regimes, in fact, represent the basic configuration of militarism in contemporary Latin America.

Accordingly, the term "antipolitics" is used to describe the belief, widely held among the Latin American military, that modernization can be achieved only through a depolitization of politics. As before, the new variants of military government—ranging from progressive to regressive in orientation — take power to ensure the future of national policies and programs. Now, however, they are openly disdainful of what they see as corrupt and inept civilian politics, which they hold responsible for Latin America's instability, poverty, and economic backwardness. They instead advocate an indefinite transitional period of military rule to reorient values and power relationships on the basis of a technocratic ideology abhorred by liberals and Marxists alike. The liberals are quite naturally disturbed by this ideology's implications for property rights and traditional civil liberties, and the Marxists reject it outright because it attempts to make people believe that social and political problems can be reduced to purely technical and administrative ones, and thus ignores the fundamental issue of class conflict.

Since most Latin American polities are so highly fragmented, the military's disciplined, hierarchical structure and near-monopoly over the means of coercion provide a solidarity and power generally sufficient to impose its will. The problem is, of course, that the exercise of political power is more difficult than its seizure. And when basic problems are not resolved, the military must once again turn to traditional political "actors" for support. As they do so, military rule comes to resemble the civilian regime that was originally deposed. In some instances, a degree of social justice and socioeconomic progress is achieved—but inevitably the result is a debilitated belief in democracy. Thus, the search for alternatives continues.

UNTIL RECENT times, the diverse political movements spawned by Marxist thought were the most prominent proponents of change in Latin America. However, radical nationalism is now judged — implicitly in the varied primary and interpretive documents found in the Aguilar reader—as ideologically the most promising instrument for achieving a new Latin American social order. True, the radical nationalists espouse a revolutionary rhetoric that differs only slightly from that of Marxist groups, but it is precisely their advocacy and active promotion of revolution "here and now" that truly set them apart from the more staid forces within the revolutionary movement. This difference has major practical ramifications. Even though the official Soviet-line Marxist parties have at times supported guerrilla movements, most radical leftists want nothing to do with parties whose overall strategy—to fit comfortably into the existing national political systems—they view as a betrayal of revolutionary principles. As a result, today more than ever the traditional Marxist movement in Latin America lacks the capability of capturing political power, either extralegally or through established political procedures—the experience of Salvador Allende's Chile notwithstanding.

Often driven by frustration, many nationalist groups in Latin America have resorted to radical alternatives — particularly rural and urban guerrilla warfare. However, this kind of revolutionary activism has not flourished. Cuba is the one true "success story" of revolutionary dynamics. Nicaragua offers an uncertain example. It will not be able to count upon the unconditional support of the Soviet Union, because neither the Soviets nor Latin American Communist party leaders have ever shown much enthusiasm for the risks attendant on another Castro-like revolution. Nicaragua's revolutionary future is therefore still in doubt. El Salvador likewise faces an uncertain future; only time will tell whether current developments in that country favor the success of revolution. Isolated groups in Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina can on occasion stun with a spectacular assassination or kidnapping. But these are largely acts of desperation and symbols of social protest whose practical effects are nugatory.

PARADOXICALLY, the one Latin American country historically most closely identified with both militarism and leftist insurrection — Venezuela—is today the southern continent's showcase of electoral democracy. The reasons for this seeming anomaly are only partly explored by the authors in the book edited by Robert D. Bond, who focus fundamentally on Venezuelan foreign policy goals and actions. Nevertheless, the point is made that democracy took root in Venezuela only after civilian leaders realized that the nation's long tradition of harsh military rule stemmed directly from uncontrolled political conflict. They learned, in short, that ideological and programmatic intransigence must give way to the key democratic values of "compromise, conciliation, and negotiation" if they were to prove themselves capable of managing national affairs. Only then could democracy permanently displace military interventionism.

During the 1960's, Venezuela's fledgling democracy became the target of guerrilla warfare and other insurrectionary strategies from the radical Left. But the radical Left's actions had the unintended effect of consolidating rather than destroying the new political order, for the dominant political forces—including the military—came to view democracy as the only alternative to social disintegration. Since 1958, Venezuelan democracy not only has survived but has also succeeded in establishing strong political institutions that endure even when the political leadership of the country passes from one party and one generation to another. In a word, Venezuela has apparently *institutionalized* its democratic political ideology and procedures.

Underlying these achievements, and really at the core of Venezuela's national life, is the fact of material abundance. Without oil wealth, little progress may have been possible. This is not to say that prosperity is always accompanied by democracy. It just helps. Even so, no other single factor better accounts for the verdure of Venezuelan democracy amid the parched political landscape of Latin American military authoritarianism. Now well beyond mere survival, Venezuelan democracy faces a new challenge: that of using the country's vast oil income to build for the future amid unrelenting clamors from the people for greater social and economic opportunities and more direct benefits now.

In truth, the flood of petrodollars has not been entirely a blessing. Venezuela has chosen a development strategy that relies heavily on using a preponderate share of its petroleum revenues to build a diversified agricultural and industrial base for the future. But whether the policy can be sustained is still uncertain. Easy abundance almost inevitably engenders squandering, inequities, and social injustices. Moreover, furnished with the democratic franchise, the Venezuelan people have quite expectedly made new demands on their rich government. As elsewhere, planning for development by democratic rules is intrinsically more cumbersome than authoritarianism, mainly because force must yield to persuasion, incentives, and other regulatory instruments essentially democratic in character.

Finally, such difficulties are compounded by the fact that Venezuela's major political parties profess democratic socialism, which ideologically commits them to pursue policies designed to redistribute national income as a moral imperative. The state is therefore seen as the agent of both modernization and equality. However, the difficulty with the notion of reliance on the state for national development and the attainment of a more just society through democracy is that it presupposes that the masses will not only share these goals but also put them ahead of their own individual needs and desires. And there is little in the nature of democracy to encourage a voluntary suppression of individual gain, for democracy is essentially the politics of competitive choice. After all, for political survival, even the best-intentioned democratic government must cater to specific constituencies whose preferences are more likely to place means above ends or the immediately useful over the ultimate good.

OBVIOUSLY, the mass publics in Venezuela can bring great influence to bear on ultimate decisions of public policy. But what about the masses in other Latin American countries? Are they, as commonly depicted, merely powerless and passive victims, manipulated by the elites in support of the elites' own initiatives and interests? Do they exercise any meaningful political participation, enough to justify consideration as a credible political force?

These questions are extensively examined by an interdisciplinary group of analysts in the two volumes on political participation in Latin America, edited by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. To provide a common focus, the editors begin by defining political participation as "behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods" (Vol. 1, p. 6). The empirically sophisticated studies that follow generally conclude that Latin America's mass publics do genuinely influence political outcomes when—and this is the crucial point—the issue involves the protection or advancement of purely immediate interests. Otherwise, the masses' influence is practically nil. In other words, beyond the local level, the masses exert little effective political power. As Richard Newbold Adams aptly puts it:

> *Certainly in looking at these Latin American cases, what strikes one is not so much the degree to which individuals have other ways of participating, but rather the degree to which they are subject to decisions premolded by others.* (Vol. 2, p. 17)

FOR THE PRESENT, then, it should be expected that Latin America's traditional elites will in general continue to calm social unrest through adroit combinations of palliatives and force. Military dictatorships will most likely alternate with democratic governments in which a military element is prominent. Fragmentation of the body politic, ideological polarization, and even open political violence will probably endure. Moreover, the ambiguities and contradictions that grow naturally out of societal tensions will inevitably bring forth new political forces dedicated to what they see as their countries' development and liberation. Nicaragua is a case in point. But it is not altogether certain that these new forces will be any more successful in dealing with the countless problems that have long bedeviled this truly perplexing region.

Perspectives on Communist Totalitarianism

By Werner Cohn

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY. *To Build a Castle—My Life as a Dissenter.* Translated by Michael Scammell. New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1979.

JOHN B. DUNLOP. *The New Russian Revolutionaries.* Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Company, 1976.

IVAN VOLGYES, Ed. *Social Deviance in Eastern Europe.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

Dissent in Poland: Reports and Documents in Translation, December 1975–July 1977. London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977.

GERSON S. SHER. *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1977.

PETER R. MOODY. *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

AMY AUERBACHER WILSON et al., Eds. *Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

THE TITLES of these books speak of deviance, of dissent, of opposition. The books do indeed deal with such themes, but their common subject is, more broadly, communism in power. It is from this larger perspective that I would like to assess them.

There is of course a considerable background to studies of Communist and other totalitarian regimes. No reader of this journal can be unaware of the extraordinary group of thinkers and scholars —Hannah Arendt, Merle Fainsod, Leonard Schapiro, Robert Conquest, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Leszek Kolakowski, and others as well as their various coworkers and students—to whom we owe so much insight into the nature of the Soviet Union and its Nazi congener. There are signs, alas, that the golden age of scholarship created and inspired by this group is coming to an end. But their achievement—a small part of which I shall attempt to sketch presently—is durably with us.

The situation is different in Asian studies. It is surely not unduly invidious to observe that the voluminous Western scholarship on Chinese communism has not as yet produced a comparably illuminating body of literature. This difference is not a reflection on any one sinologist. It is perhaps related to certain advantages enjoyed by Arendt and the others but not available to Asianists: both German and Russian are Indo-European languages, accessible without too much difficulty to speakers of English or French; the ethnic, religious, and cultural ties that bind the West to Germany and Russia are particularly strong in the case of these mostly European-born scholars of totalitarianism; and the generation to which these scholars belong suffered through war and through persecution by the European totalitarian regimes (indeed, many of these men and women were themselves victims of war and persecution). It can readily be seen that none of these conditions holds for Western scholars working with Chinese materials.

I begin this essay by evoking the contribution of Arendt and the others because it seems to me that their work contains not only specific information about totalitarian regimes—information, after all, can get quickly dated—but also important advice on how to ask meaningful research questions when confronted with phenomena that appear to be totalitarian. Some of this body of methodological advice can be summarized as follows:

1. Since the totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia seem to present us with a *new and different type of domination,* analytic categories developed for other societies tend to be misleading. Traditional tyrannies and dictatorships, for instance, though showing certain similarities to totalitarian regimes, must not be confused with these because the scope of the totalitarian repression—in the arts, reli-

gion, and academia as well as in politics—is so much more extensive.

2. The nature of totalitarianism is best grasped by paying particular attention to the specialized organs of repression, especially the secret police and the concentration and labor camps.

3. Totalitarian regimes express commitment to certain universal values (even Hitler professed attachment to freedom and equality; the Communists, in addition, profess a belief in democracy) while practicing an unprecedented repression of these very same values. Hence, special care must be taken to test professed aims against deeds and never to take the propagandistic vocabulary of totalitarian movements at face value.

The scholarly tradition that has created such precepts is sometimes criticized for allegedly prejudging, through its analytic categories, the results of scholarly work on a particular regime. But the three propositions I have enumerated (as well as others that could no doubt be derived from the work of these scholars) are meant to be hypotheses and aids to research, not prescriptions of what to find. As is true of any hypothesis in scientific procedure, they exist to be confirmed or refuted, and the research they suggest is that of testing for goodness of fit with the data.

AS ALMOST everyone knows by now, Vladimir Bukovsky is a Russian dissident who in December 1976 was allowed to go to the West in exchange for the Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalán. These memoirs establish Bukovsky as one of the most perceptive and balanced reporters on Soviet society.[1] They confirm that while the repressive apparatus has lost some of the violence and unpredictability of the Stalin era, the secret police are still dominant over more visible institutions such as the courts. The prisons and criminal camps are still filled with people from all walks of life; Bukovsky estimates that a substantial proportion of the Soviet population has spent at least some time in the camps (p. 318). The details of how one becomes a "dissident" in the Soviet Union, the description of life in the prisons and camps, the testimony about the role of Western publicity in helping to soften conditions in the Soviet Union—all these give this volume extraordinary interest.[2]

There is one issue, however, on which I find Bukovsky confusing and contradictory. On one hand, Bukovsky throughout the book places high value on Soviet law and Soviet legal procedures. Expressing regret that he did not earlier obtain a working knowledge of the Soviet criminal code and that other dissidents and oppositionists neglect this study, he recounts with obvious pleasure how he and some of his friends were able to fence with Soviet authorities through legal appeals and legal maneuvers. On the other hand, Bukovsky reports that the result of all this fine legal work is generally nil. The courts ignore the best legal efforts when they pass sentence; the secret police proceed in blithe disregard of all the niceties of the code of procedure. Bukovsky never fails to complain bitterly about the lawlessness of Soviet authorities.

In defense of Bukovsky, it must be said, of course, that the manipulation of Soviet legal forms has brought some advantages to some dissidents. Moreover, it has occasionally created a certain disarray for the Soviet authorities, and it has almost invariably made foreign news media even more sympathetic to the dissidents' cause. But such tactical benefits should not be confused, in my opinion, with the fundamental capacity for justice which Bukovsky seems to attribute to Soviet law.

The reasons for my demurrer here are of two kinds. The first is technical, and has been well explained in an article by Stephen Weiner in the pages of this journal.[3] Soviet law requires that a case be decided "on the basis of law in conformity with socialist legal consciousness." Since "socialist legal consciousness," in Soviet doctrine, can be interpreted only by the Communist Party (that is to say, by its leadership), we have here an overriding principle which we might call *extra partem nulla salus*, or *no salvation outside the party*. This principle is not only professed but rigorously practiced. It means that dissenters to party doctrine cannot successfully appeal to the courts, and Bukovsky is less than fair to his Soviet judges when he accuses them of lawlessness.

But even if we leave *extra partem nulla salus* aside—and perhaps some experts on Soviet law will find the principle debatable—

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[1] Other memoirs by Soviet émigrés are reviewed by Jane P. Shapiro, "Profiles of Political Persecution," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1975, pp. 74–78.

[2] Bukovsky has not been served as well as he could have been by his English translator. It would appear that Bukovsky uses very colloquial Russian when describing conditions in the prisons and the camps, and this must have been exceedingly difficult to translate. But the translator's decision to render much of this into current American slang and current American obscenity detracts from the impression of authenticity of the memoirs. It sounds incongruous to hear Russian prisoners sound like Americans. Slang, unfortunately, seems to be very nation-bound. A very straightforward but standard English would have placed fewer barriers between the very Russian subject matter of this book and the English-language reader.

[3] Stephen Weiner, "Socialist Legality on Trial," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1968, pp. 6–13.

there is a broader issue. Bukovsky is not alone in suggesting that consistent obedience to any code of law, even Soviet law, promotes human rights. The issue is complex and deserves more consideration than it can be given here. My own inclination is to recall that a totalitarian context gives a radically different meaning to any otherwise familiar aspect of society. It is true that in continental and British-American traditions, legal procedures afford considerable protection to dissenting individuals. But these procedures operate in a context of institutions that support human rights, in particular a free press, free public opinion, and an independent judiciary. It does not seem realistic to expect legal institutions alone to perform a protective function in the absence of a protective surrounding culture.[4]

WHERE BUKOVSKY is moderate, humane, and democratic, the "new Russian revolutionaries" described by John B. Dunlop are extremist, chauvinistic, and authoritarian. These anti-Soviet, right-wing nationalists operated clandestinely in the USSR, mostly in Leningrad, from 1964 until their arrest in 1967. Bukovsky portrays them as follows:

> *I have met political parties consisting of two, of five, and of twelve members. The biggest of them all, the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, added up to about a hundred. All they had time for was to write a silly program and read Berdyaev (as if half the country wasn't reading Berdyaev anyway, without any parties!).* (pp. 119-20)

Bukovsky also remarks that many of the illegal grouplets in the Soviet Union imitate the conspiratorial rites of the early Bolsheviks. The All-Russian Social-Christian Union, for example, had elaborate rituals and grades of membership, and specialized in bombastic pronouncements. It and others of its kind will seem familiar to aficionados of, for example, the different Maoist sects or the varieties of Plymouth Brethren.

But Dunlop's treatment is absolutely matter-of-fact. Those interested in the "new Russian revolutionaries" will wish to supplement it with other sources. For example, the All-Russian Social-Christian Union's former defense lawyer, Yuri Luryi, also now in the West, has expressed himself on the subject, with somewhat more sympathy than Bukovsky evinces but along roughly the same lines.[5] Still another Russian émigré, Alexander Yanov, has written a sharp attack on the anti-Semitism of at least some personalities associated with the Union.[6] Those interested in the broader range of organized opposition in the Soviet Union will wish to consult any of several well-balanced volumes now available in English.[7]

THE UNPRETENTIOUS volume edited by Ivan Volgyes, containing several papers delivered at a meeting of the Western Social Science Association in 1977, discusses crime in the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Most of the book's chapters manage to speak sensitively about the relationship between (nonpolitical) "crime" and (political) "dissidence." The chapter by Ivan Volgyes on Hungary and the one by Andrzej Korbonski on Poland highlight the fact that private initiative, encouraged in the West, is with few exceptions a crime in Communist countries (although the Bukovsky memoirs make clear that the repression of private initiative in the Soviet Union is much more crushing than it is in Poland or Hungary). In sum, the Volgyes volume has interesting material to which students of communism may refer, though little in it will startle the reasonably informed reader.

The books by the Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile and by Gerson S. Sher deal with political opposition in Poland and Yugoslavia, respectively, but give evidence of great differences between these countries and the Soviet Union.

The volume on Poland is of particular interest in light of the events in the summer of 1980. It is a collection of documents concerning movements and personalities in Poland that have tried—with considerable success—to obtain a measure of elbowroom otherwise unknown in Communist countries.

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[4] Having spent so much time in detention, Bukovsky has become something of an expert on criminal groups in the Soviet Union. What he has to say about the organized underworld is informative and interesting, but should be compared to recent, more specialized publications. See, for example, Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1972; Yuri Glazov, "Thieves as a Social Phenomenon," *Survey* (London), No. 1, 1976, pp. 141–56; and Valery Chalidze, *Criminal Russia: Essays on Crime in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Random House, 1977.

[5] Yuri Luryi, "Reminiscences of a Soviet Lawyer," *Survey*, No. 4, 1977–78, pp. 56–63. See also Luryi's "Letter to the Editor," in which he comments on Dunlop's book, in ibid., Winter 1979, pp. 213–15.

[6] Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1978.

[7] See, for example, Peter Reddaway, Ed., *Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1972; Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin, Eds., *The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian "Samizdat"—An Anthology*, Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Company, 1977.

These documents speak about government harassment and about the difficulties of being in opposition, and they invite us to lend this human rights movement our support. Whether because of the exemplary steadfastness of the Catholic hierarchy or other favorable circumstances, it is quite clear that a semilegal opposition has been active in Poland for a number of years now and that it would be misleading to think of the country as totalitarian in the classic sense. For a more complete picture, the reader should supplement this volume with other materials.[8]

Gerson S. Sher's book is an interesting description of the Praxists, a group of Yugoslav Marxist philosophers who, until their dismissal from university positions in 1975, were something of a loyal opposition to the regime. It is a case study of the possibilities and limitations of dissent in contemporary Yugoslavia. The possibilities are immeasurably greater than in the Soviet Union; the limitations seem more pronounced than in Poland.

WHEN WE TURN from books concerned with communism in Europe to studies of the People's Republic of China (PRC), we enter a different realm. While the former are generally hostile to the European Communist regimes, those on China tend to be favorable. The particular volumes under review here are no exception.

Peter R. Moody's work seeks, in part, to examine the utility of the concept of totalitarianism as a tool for understanding the Chinese political system. "I hope . . . that it could serve in some way as a critique of totalitarianism," he writes (p. 4). But this intention is not realized.

First, Moody shares with most current analysts of China the disconcerting habit of referring to the 1949 Communist seizure of power as the "Liberation." The word "liberation" means one thing in the context of Communist propaganda, another in ordinary English. Which does Moody mean? Similarly, what does he mean by his use of such terms as "people's democracy," "socialist legality," and "capitalist road"? This use of Communist terminology, without a clear indication of how the reader is to interpret it, amounts to equivocation (such equivocation, of course, is usually by no means intended).

Second, Moody gives no coherent or sustained account of the secret police or other instruments of repression.[9] The sinologist's tendency to bracket off—not exactly deny, but simply ignore—the organs of repression goes back at least as far as Franz Schurman:

> *The public security forces, the political-legal branches of the state administration, the people's militia, and the army itself together constitute a powerful body for maintaining law and order. While not underestimating their power and importance in Communist China, we regard these methods of control as conventional, and hence do not deal with them in this chapter* [*or anywhere else—W.C.*].[10]

If there is no consideration of the organs of repression, however, no test of totalitarianism can be made. Yet Moody's book is described by one of its sinologist reviewers as "an important book because it disproves the oversimplified view of the People's Republic as a totalitarian state . . . ."[11]

Finally, Moody consistently abstracts the printed word from its social context. For example, his sixth chapter, which ostensibly describes "opposition movements" and which takes up a third of the book, turns out to be based almost exclusively on texts published by the Chinese Communist government, either texts that purport to describe deviation or texts that Chinese authorities have subsequently labeled "deviationist." The reader of Bukovsky's book will turn in vain to Moody for any even remotely analogous consideration of real dissident activity in the People's Republic.

WHERE MOODY purports to offer a critique of Chinese totalitarianism but actually produces an apologetic account of conditions in China, the collective work edited by Amy Auerbacher Wilson et al. arrives at similar results from a very different starting point. Its avowed stance is rigorously neutral, objective, scientific: Chinese society is to be examined with the techniques of modern social science, and a contribution is to be made to the comparative sociology of deviance. But the editors inexplicably fail to include chapters on the police, on the detention camps, or on censorship of the media. Moreover, with the sole exception of the chapter by Joe C. Huang on Chinese literature, all the chapters in the book suffer from what amounts to a bias toward Communist China as well as from serious methodological defects.

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[8] Adam Bromke, "Catholic Social Thought in Communist Poland," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1975, pp. 67–72. This is a review of the legal Catholic political group Znak and some of its publications. The same author has written a more general article, "A New Juncture in Poland," ibid., September–October 1976, pp. 1–17. A recent book by Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland 1954–1977*, London, Poets' and Painters' Press, 1978, gives a broader background to oppositional groups and figures than does the collection of documents here reviewed. Unfortunately, Raina manages to blame the Jews themselves for some of the anti-Semitism in Communist Poland. For an account of Polish-Jewish relations, therefore, the Raina book should be supplemented by the Jerusalem edition (not the bowdlerized Polish or German editions) of Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War*, edited and with additional comments by Joseph Kermish and Shmuel Krakowski, Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, 1974. The postwar situation is treated by Czeslaw Milosz, "Anti-Semitism in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1957, pp. 35–40.

[9] For such an account, see Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China*, London, Amnesty International Publications, 1978. Several "*samizdat*" publications from China have now been published, in English translation, in *Index on Censorship* (London), September–October 1979, pp. 3–11. This literature is also discussed by Susan L. Shirk, " 'Going Against the Tide': Political Dissent in China," *Survey*, Winter 1979, pp. 82–114.

[10] Franz Schurman, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966, p. 310.

[11] Merle Goldman, review of "Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China," *American Historical Review* (Washington, DC), February 1979, p. 230.

The introductory chapter, by Amy Auerbacher Wilson, is often difficult to follow, for Wilson writes in an idiom associated with the late Talcott Parsons. Nevertheless, if the reader takes the trouble to translate this rather special language into ordinary English, as C. Wright Mills has done in the case of Parsons himself,[12] the predisposition of the author is clearly discernible. Take Wilson's assertion, made without evidence or qualification, that "today in the People's Republic of China (PRC) the high degree of congruence between values and norms from the standpoint of political content is readily apparent" (p. 3). My translation would read: "It is evident that Chinese Communists generally practice what they preach."

The chapter by Donald J. Munro traces the roots of the government's efforts at thought control back to both traditional Chinese philosophy and Marxism. But it does not attempt to test the government's professed commitment to society's interests against the government's actual deeds. It mentions the word "coercion" only in passing.

The chapter by Richard Whittingham Wilson reports a test he administered to children in Hong Kong, Taiwan, New York City (Chinatown), and New Jersey. He interprets his findings to indicate that Chinese have less of a sense of individuality than Americans. But some of his data (as he admits himself) in fact show no difference between these test groups, and those data that do are overinterpreted by him.

The chapter by Alfred H. Bloom interprets the results of a social-psychological study of Chinese, French, and Americans as showing a psychological fit between Chinese Communist rule and the alleged national character of the Chinese people. Even if one accepts the validity of Bloom's interpretation of his findings, the study itself is open to challenge because of the inadequate sample involved. This sample consisted of "336 Hong Kong residents, approximately one-third businessmen and professionals, one-third workers, and one-third students .... seventy-six students at the Université de Dijon, Dijon, France .... fifty-two college students in the New England area" (p. 70).

The chapter by Sidney Leonard Greenblatt adopts the promising approach of comparing the "recruitment of deviants"—i.e., the labeling of certain individuals as enemies—during the Great Purge in the Soviet Union and the various "campaigns" in China. In his analysis, however, Greenblatt leaves the impression that the Chinese victims were less "innocent" than the Soviet ones (p. 97). He also mentions the work of the Soviet secret police but plays down the role of the Chinese police (pp. 93–94).

The contribution by Victor H. Li on Communist Chinese law and penology speaks of "... the shambles of the American penal system and the relatively healthy state of the Chinese system (at least in its ideal form) ..." (p. 149). Leaving aside one's reservations about the first half of the phrase, one cannot but note that things of different kinds are juxtaposed here. One is as the Communist Chinese would have it ideally; the other is Li's view of what things are in actuality. Here, too, a profession of aims should be treated with considerably more scholarly discrimination.

Lynn T. White III's chapter contains much information of interest on controls connected with rationing and identification documents. But it too is marred by a failure to consider professed government goals against actual coercive practices. It speaks, for instance, of alleged government aims to "direct individual energies toward community purposes" (p. 169), although a study of similar Nazi and Soviet practices might have led the author to consider the possible sinister implications of such social controls in China.[13]

The final essay, by Charles Hoffmann, provides a good illustration of a problem frequently encountered in the writings of sinologists, though in this volume his work affords the only example of it. In seeking to describe Communist practices designed to increase production, Hoffmann proceeds to tell us how work and production committees function in making decisions (p. 191 and passim). But it turns out that the reports he cites as evidence come from official Communist sources. Surely, here as elsewhere, propaganda materials should not be presented as social science reporting.

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[12] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1959, Ch. 2.

[13] See, for example, Aryeh L. Unger, *The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 80 and passim. I found this book particularly instructive because it shows the Nazi and Soviet origins of a great many institutions in the People's Republic of China.

IN SUMMARY of my criticisms of the two China books just reviewed—which in certain relevant respects I take to be typical of current English-language sinology—I offer an incomplete and tentative catalog of problems.[14] Many of these criticisms, of course, also apply to fields other than sinology. In my opinion, however, they do not apply as generally to scholarship relating to the Soviet Union.

1. *Ambiguity*. Much of current English-language sinology employs a mixture of Communist and social science terminology. Not only can a reader be misled about the meaning of terms like "liberation"; one often wonders whether the writer himself distinguishes between observation and acceptance of Communist propaganda.

2. *Inappropriate abstraction*. Two related types are common in many recent works on the PRC. One is the failure to evaluate professed aims in light of actual practice—or, even worse, the use of professed aims to infer actual practice. Had we done the same in the case of Nazism, we might have concluded that Hitler's concentration camps existed to provide human freedom through self-fulfilling labor (after all, "Arbeit macht frei"). The other type is the bracketing off of repression from other aspects of Communist society. Just as context in language supplies the meaning of single words, so does social context supply the meaning of individual features in a society. As noted above, for example, it is inappropriate to study Communist legal theory without considering the administrative practices in which this theory functions. Western sinology has been particularly prone to ignore the organs of repression (police, prisons, camps) in descriptions of China.

3. *Inappropriate interpretation of inadequate samples*. No comparable field of scholarship, alas, is free of this problem. But it seems more common in sinology. Instead of pointing out that the totalitarian conditions of China do not allow for anything like scientific random sampling, many sinologists have inappropriately and unjustifiably employed statistical language. They thereby obscure the totalitarian nature of the society they purport to describe.

4. *Uncritical use of official sources*. Like any other official sources, the documents and declarations issued by a Communist authority may well yield information and understanding if subjected to scholarly scrutiny, analysis, and independent verification. But no official sources can be taken simply at face value, and this is especially true of those of Communist countries. Nonetheless, sinologists frequently fall into this trap. The result is often an unduly favorable picture of conditions in China.

THE BOOKS reviewed here differ greatly not only in subject matter but also in genre and quality. This diversity makes it hazardous to use this little batch of seven volumes to draw conclusions about Communist governments or the state of Communist studies. But perusal of these books, along with other readings, leaves some impressions and leads to some reflections.

The English-language reader, if he chooses widely from among the books available to him, will probably gain an image of the Soviet Union today as but a moderately relaxed version of Stalinist totalitarianism. He will see the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe as ruled by regimes that, with all the worst will in the world, cannot equal the repressiveness of the Soviets.

However, he will get a confusing picture of China. On the one hand, he has information from Amnesty International and other sources about a vast system of forced labor, about political executions, about brainwashings, and about control of the media. On the other hand, a veritable flood of books and articles, by experts and others, suggests that China may indeed have certain problems but that it is, on the whole, a land of exciting and benevolent social experiment.

What should the reader make of this confusion?

Insofar as one can get "truth" about China at all, the sinologist who knows the language and culture of the country should be in a good position to instruct us. But China specialists, like the rest of us, are not immune from intellectual and political fashions. Sometimes such fashions are salutary. Sometimes they are crippling. At present, the literature produced by many sinologists in the West seems so flawed that the public would be well advised to withhold any very firm reliance on it.

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[14] See the author's more detailed discussion of such problems, forthcoming in *Survey*.

West-East Technology Transfer

By Gary K. Bertsch

JOHN R. THOMAS and URSULA M. KRUSE-VAUCIENNE, Eds. *Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives.* Washington, DC, George Washington University, 1977.

CHRISTOPHER E. STOWELL. *Soviet Industrial Import Priorities.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

GEORGE D. HOLLIDAY. *Technology Transfer to the U.S.S.R., 1928–1937 and 1966–1975: The Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1979.

ERIC W. HAYDEN. *Technology Transfer to Eastern Europe.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

FRIEDRICH LEVCIK and JAN STANKOVSKY. *Industrial Cooperation Between East and West.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979. (German ed.: *Industrielle Kooperation zwischen Ost und West.* Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1977.)

C.T. SAUNDERS, Ed. *Industrial Policies and Technology Transfers Between East and West.* Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1977.

NATO DIRECTORATE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. *East-West Technological Cooperation.* Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1976.

R.J. CARRICK. *East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective.* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute for International Studies, 1978.

THIS WOULD appear to be an appropriate time, in light of recent reductions in the transfer of technology from West to East, to examine some of the central issues related to that transfer. Drawing upon a number of recent books on the subject. the present essay will explore the following questions: What is the present level of scientific-technological development and sophistication in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern countries? Given the technological levels of these states, what import priorities have they set? What has been the nature of East-West technological cooperation and transfer over the last decade or so? Finally, what have been the processes, channels, levels, and impacts characterizing the flow of Western technology to the East?

AN APPROPRIATE starting point for any discussion of West-East technology transfer is an appraisal of the present level of scientific-technological development in the Eastern countries. In this light, the workshop that gave rise to the volume edited by John Thomas and Ursula Kruse-Vaucienne sought to expand and deepen Western knowledge of the policies and organization of Soviet science and technology as key components of the Soviet system, to identify and assess domestic and foreign factors which have shaped current, and can influence future, interactions of the USSR with the West in scientific and technical areas, and to identify gaps in Western understanding of Soviet science and technology for possible further research and analysis (p. i). The 19 papers and supporting materials published in the volume make a substantial contribution in these spheres.

This book demonstrates what John Kiser has emphasized — namely, that what you find depends on where you look.[1] Editors Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne draw attention to several popular Western misperceptions about Soviet science and technology, which derive from factors ranging from ideological stereotypes to incomplete and distorted data. They indicate, for example, that we often tend to judge the quality of Soviet science in terms of inappropriate or incomplete measures, such as the number of Nobel prizes received (p. xii). At the same time, this volume correctly identifies the obvious deficiencies in Soviet technology and the USSR's considerable and continuing lag behind the West in most fields. As the contributions of Herbert Fusfeld, Ronald Amann, Philip Hanson, and David Holloway indicate, however, these shortcomings may not reflect the level of Soviet science per se. These authors argue that the principal deficiency of Soviet science and technology lies in inadequate transfer of the results of applied research to commercial production on a broad scale. In other words, while the Soviets have done reasonably well in developing scientific capabilities, technological applications of the results leave much to be desired.

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[1] See, for example, John Kiser, "Soviet Technology: The Perception Gap," *Mechanical Engineering* (New York, NY), April 1979, pp. 22–29; and his *Report on the Potential for Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the United States*, prepared for the US Department of State and the National Science Foundation, October 1977.

Although the Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volume contributes a lot to our knowledge of science and technology in the Soviet Union, we need more research and writing of this kind, on a continuing basis, in order to fulfill the three goals that the editors identified. Perhaps even more important, we require similar in-depth research on science and technology in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the People's Republic of China (PRC). While some significant contributions exist,[2] there are major gaps in what we know about these other countries.

THE USSR'S technological shortcomings and needs help explain its import priorities. Soviet decision-makers have apparently placed high priority on importing advanced technologies from and on scientific and technological cooperation with the West. Research has shown that the Soviet leadership's commitment to economic-technical cooperation with Western countries increased substantially during the 1970's.[3] Aleksey Kosygin, Andrey Gromyko, and particularly Leonid Brezhnev were found to be the main advocates within the Politburo of East-West trade and technological exchange, but even those who showed relatively less interest in cooperation with the West recognized the importance of scientific-technological development. The Soviet leaders' commitment to East-West cooperation in science and technology has also been proved in practice. The 1970's witnessed growing interaction between the USSR and all Western countries, on all fronts. The same was true for the East European states and has also become true for China in the post-Mao era.

But are the Soviets, Chinese, and East Europeans going to get the substantial assistance they need and want from the West to promote their scientific-technological revolutions? A definitive answer cannot be given because uncertainties and imponderables abound in both the East and West. On the Western side, there is considerable uncertainty about export controls, credit, and import restrictions. In the USSR and the PRC, uncertainties exist concerning the development, production, and sale of energy resources and how these and other exports will affect the two countries' financial situation and ability to buy. In Eastern Europe, there are pressing economic and financial problems as well as the political unknowns related to domestic conditions and the murky future of détente. Under all scenarios, however, it is clear that the Eastern countries cannot possibly get all of the assistance they need and would like from the West. This simple fact suggests the importance of a careful examination of their precise import priorities.

In the foreword to Christopher Stowell's study of Soviet priorities regarding imports of industrial goods and technologies, Robert McLellan maintains: "The Soviets have great natural resources; they have great human resources; they do some fine scientific research; but they need the West's applied technology" (p. viii). To evaluate specific Soviet needs in this regard, Stowell addresses the process of Soviet economic development, looks at the 1971–75 Five-Year Plan, and examines what it suggests about import priorities for the recent past. In delineating Soviet needs and Western responses during this period, the book includes case studies of five high-priority import industries—oil and gas, machine tools, chemical-petrochemicals, pollution control, and computers. Such a case-study approach continues to be the most effective research method for probing the real meaning of Eastern needs and priorities. The last part of the book deals with the problems and issues facing US exporters, not only technical matters but also the overall political and economic context of US-Soviet trade. Written during the euphoria of détente, the book did not anticipate the severity of the problems of the early 1980's.

George Holliday's recent case study of the Soviet automotive industry identifies some specific technologies imported from the West and describes the institutions involved in the process of technology transfer. Concentrating on the Gor'kiy Automobile Plant project (built with the assistance of Ford Motor Company in the late 1920's and early 1930's), the Volga Automobile Plant project (built with the primary assistance of the Italian firm Fiat in the late 1960's), and the Kama River Truck Plant (built during the 1970's with considerable assistance from a variety of Western firms), Holliday asserts:

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[2] For recent examples, see John W. Kiser, *Commercial Technology Transfer from Eastern Europe to the United States and Western Europe*, prepared for the US Department of State, Washington, DC, 1980; and Jon Sigurdson, *Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China: An Introduction*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

[3] Rensselaer W. Lee, *Soviet Perceptions of Western Technology*, Bethesda, MD, MATHTECH, Inc., September 1978.

> *. . . changing Soviet institutional arrangements and attitudes are evidence of a gradual but fundamental change in Soviet policy toward economic and technological ties with the West[,] . . . and . . . a new Soviet growth strategy requires an enhanced role for technological progress in general and for Western technology in particular. One of the implications of the new growth strategy is that Soviet technological ties to the West are likely to endure.* (p. 171)[4]

However, one has to wonder if Soviet leaders had any inkling of the possible consequences in this connection of their invasion of Afghanistan. Although the full Western responses to the invasion and their impacts are still unclear, it is obvious that the nature and endurance of technological ties will be problematic during a period of heightened East-West tension.

Eric Hayden's eight case studies[5] indicate that, like the USSR, the East European states place high priority on Western technology. In contrast with technology transfer to the USSR, however, technology transfer to Eastern Europe (especially Poland, Hungary, and Romania) has typically involved complex and disembodied forms, including coproduction, subcontracting, joint design of new products, joint marketing, and joint ventures. One crucial payoff of such transfers is managerial know-how, a vital need of all Eastern countries. Hayden's study argues that US corporations are significant instruments for transmitting industrial technology to Eastern Europe (p. 105) and that industrial cooperation—whether of an equity or nonequity nature—is a feasible and attractive long-term arrangement for both sides (p. 113).

FRIEDRICH LEVCIK and Jan Stankovsky have written a book that examines the various forms of East-West industrial cooperation. Although the volume is largely descriptive, it contains a considerable mass of tabular data which help identify the trends, types, and motives for industrial cooperation between the countries of West and East. It also provides a number of case studies as well as discussions of the impact of legal and institutional regulations, economic policy, and business cycles on East-West industrial cooperation. The authors' analysis and supporting data often move their inquiry close to the levels of explanation and prediction. In Chapter 9 (pp. 158–65), for example, they use empirical evidence to describe the sensitivity of cooperative agreements to business trends. However, adequate methods still have not been developed to assess the scope of cooperative undertakings quantitatively, and these forms of industrial cooperation have been in effect for too short a period to permit longitudinal analysis. Thus, the authors could not test their hypotheses conclusively. Nevertheless, the descriptive groundwork that they and others discussed below have provided leaves us in a much better position to undertake research necessary for a fuller understanding of the dynamics and consequences of industrial and technological cooperation.

East-West industrial cooperation and technology transfer, with some useful case studies, are likewise treated in Saunders's volume on *Industrial Policies and Technology Transfers Between East and West* and the NATO volume on *East-West Technological Cooperation*. The conferences out of which these compendiums grew were convened under different auspices (the Vienna Institute for Economic Studies and the NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs) and attended by significantly different mixes of participants (from both East and West in Vienna, but strictly from the West for NATO). Hence, it is not exactly surprising that they reflect different and often conflicting perspectives.

The NATO book focuses essentially on the Soviet technological lag, giving considerable attention to issues of East-West transfer patterns, channels and problems of transfer and diffusion, and economic impact. An underlying theme, made fairly explicit in Peter Wiles's interesting essay "On the Prevention of Technology Transfer," is how better to understand the nature of Soviet technological deficiencies in order to make sure they are maintained. For the most part, the contributors to the NATO volume show little interest in the possibilities or potential for profitable West-to-East transfers and tend to view technology as a good to be protected rather than a resource to be shared.

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[4] While most scholars concur that the Soviet leaders recognize the costs of technological isolationism and thus prefer to expand or at least maintain economic relations with the West, some observers have predicted a Soviet return to autarky once the USSR's short-run needs are met. See, for example, Carl Gershman, "Selling Them the Rope," *Commentary* (New York, NY), April 1979, pp. 35–45. For a more systematic and comprehensive treatment of the issue, see Marshall I. Goldman, "Will the Soviet Union Be an Autarky in 1984," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1979, pp. 18–36.

[5] Covering the experiences of Clark Equipment, International Harvester, Honeywell, Westinghouse Electric, Singer, Control Data, General Tire, and Instrument Systems.

In contrast, the Vienna papers concentrate on "the process of technological innovation . . . [and] adapting economic structures to the rapid advance of science and technology in an increasingly interdependent world" (p. 11). Consequently, they reflect a more cooperative spirit than that in the NATO papers. This is illustrated, for example, by the remark of Dzhermen Gvishiani, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, that "I am convinced that scientific and technical cooperation have tremendous significance not only in promoting economic development but also in creating better understanding among people" (p. 210). (It would be interesting to know, if next to impossible to estimate, how much understanding East-West technical cooperation created in the 1970's. Such cooperation may have facilitated interaction and exchange between management and middle-level officials, but it is indeed problematic how much understanding spilled over to both the masses and the top elite.)

In his evaluation of the Vienna conference, Friedrich Levcik wrote: "In the reports, as well as in discussions, many facts were given proving that East-West technological cooperation benefits both sides" (p. 298). To support his argument, Levcik maintained that the participants (although we might assume not all participants) thought that the different patterns of technological development in the East and in the West create opportunities and possibilities for mutually advantageous specialization and cooperation. This contention is based on the premise that the East possesses scientific expertise, while the West has the capacities to apply scientific know-how in productive technologies.

Because of the deficiencies of the Eastern countries with regard to marketing and because of the general lack of Western interest in Eastern scientific capabilities, the argument has not yet been fairly tested. Indeed, all available evidence indicates that the transfer of technology has been heavily eastward, with no balancing in sight. Whether or not a balance is practical remains an empirical question, but one unlikely to be answered until the principle of mutual benefits is tested with the passage of time.[6] Given the volatile nature of East-West political relations and their impact on trade and technology transfer, however, there are even grounds to doubt whether the test can be made.

The issue of mutual benefit thus continues to be a controversial one that neither conference made much progress toward answering. But both conferences, and the volumes that grew from them, provide descriptive information that will be useful to anyone who might attempt more definitive assessments.

MANY CONTRIBUTIONS to the NATO volume highlight the priority that the Soviet Union attached to technological imports and the opportunities that the West accorded the USSR as a consequence of détente. Wiles, for instance, quotes the following statement by Kosygin to sustain the proposition that the major Soviet motive behind détente and the Helsinki accords was the acquisition of Western technology: "It is known, for instance, that the Soviet Union lays special stress on the calling of the European Security Conference. For us it is perfectly clear that the conducting of this conference would strengthen confidence, and open the way to a broad economic and scientific-technical cooperation" (p. 27). T.M. Podolski, Hanson, and others call attention to the many channels and dimensions of technology transfer. But important questions remain: How much technology is being transferred, and what are the impacts on those involved?

The flow through many of the key channels of technology transfer—scholarly or commercial contacts and exchanges, the screening of Western technical literature, technical assistance and joint production agreements, licensing agreements, joint ventures, and so forth—cannot be easily measured. However, the transfer resulting from trade is somewhat more amenable to empirical evaluation. Using a refined list of high-technology exports based on international trade data, analysts at the Bureau of East-West Trade in the US Department of Commerce concluded that the flow of high-technology products from 15 industrialized Western countries was not large in volume, did not dominate imports of the Communist states during the 1972–76 period, and did not increase markedly in relative importance.[7] Nevertheless, critics of West-East technology transfer may reach different judgments on the basis of the same data. They can cite the fact that while high-technology exports to the East constituted only 12.6 percent of total exports to these areas in 1976, that share was higher than the proportion of the same items in Western exports to the rest of the world (10.9 percent in 1976). Also, they can point out that in 1976 high-technology exports to the East reached US$4.14 billion, a marked rise over the US$1.56 billion total in 1972.

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[6] In this connection, Kiser suggests: "A major effort should be undertaken to determine the potential for technology flow from the Soviet Union. The outcome of such a study is not foreordained, but initial investigation . . . indicates that the Soviets may have much more to offer than is commonly assumed." See his "Technology Is Not a One-Way Street," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1976, p. 147. However, there is reason for skepticism about what the Soviets have to offer, for some of the firms Kiser cites as benefiting or profiting from Soviet technology have recently told me that the technology they obtained from the USSR was neither advanced nor economical.

Moreover, it should be remembered that even normal trade statistics are unsatisfactory reflections of the true value of technology transfer. Where new technology breaks bottlenecks, can be easily diffused, and has significant spillover effects with respect to the economic infrastructure, the value is considerably greater than trade data might suggest. Furthermore, as a result of cooperation and specialization arrangements within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), there are many indirect effects that go beyond the initial partners. For these and other reasons, the measurement problems concerning technology transfer continue to be significant.

Related to disagreements over the measurement of technology transfers are differences of opinion over their impacts. Those who maintain that Western technology has had a positive and significant impact on Soviet development generally cite three leading studies in support of their position. In perhaps the most comprehensive macroeconomic study available, Donald Green and Herbert Levine contend that in the absence of imports of Western plants, Soviet industrial growth for the 1969–73 period would have been 8 percent lower.[8] Anthony Sutton, in his three-volume study of Western technology and Soviet economic development, argues that the absorption of Western technology and skills has been by far the most significant factor in the development of the Soviet economy.[9] More specifically, Hanson has determined that imports of Western technology have considerably expanded Soviet capacity to produce mineral fertilizers and hence increased agricultural output.[10]

Yet the implications of such research are not always as clear as they may seem. In his excellent monograph on *East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective*, Roger Carrick says that "too little is known for any very comprehensive and detailed statements usefully to be made" (p. 71). However, to indicate that there is reason to dispute some of the more extreme claims of Sutton and others, Carrick cites Hanson's chapter in the NATO volume to the effect that the share of imported Western machinery in total investment in machinery in CMEA countries is very low (4 percent in the early 1970's). Therefore, he suggests that such imports could not be of great significance. He also notes that Hanson "argues that the total impact of Western technology on Soviet economic growth almost certainly comes predominately from noncommercial transfer (e.g., Soviet monitoring of the Western technical press) and from diffusion within the Soviet economy of Western technology already transferred and from other direct means" (p. 72). Finally, Carrick uses Green and Levine's econometric estimates in the NATO volume to contend that the total impact of embodied technology transfer in the USSR is, in its magnitude, not exceptional (p. 72).

* * *

A number of conclusions emerge from a close examination of both the books under review and other work on technology transfers from West to East. First, a good deal remains unclear about the scientific and technological capabilities of Eastern countries. Second, there is much we do not know about how different forms of West-to-East technology transfer affect both the sending and receiving countries. Finally, rational policy responses to the many questions related to West-East technology transfer are difficult to formulate in view of the present low level of understanding.

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[7] Hedija Kravalis et al., "Quantification of Western Exports of High Technology Products to Communist Countries," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Issues in East-West Relations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Jan. 12, 1979, pp. 34–35.

[8] Donald W. Green and Herbert S. Levine, "Soviet Machinery Imports," *Survey* (London), Spring 1977–78, pp. 112–26. Also see their contributions in the NATO and the Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volumes.

[9] Anthony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, 3 vols., Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1969–73.

[10] Philip Hanson, "Western Technology in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1978, p. 28. See, too, Hanson's chapters in the NATO, Saunders, and Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volumes.

Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

THE SOVIET REGIME AND JEWISH RIGHTS

TO THE EDITORS: It was a great pleasure for me to read the interesting and informative article by Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways," in your January–February 1980 issue.

Nevertheless, I would like to call your attention to the fact that Mr. Gitelman at one point repeats in his article, without doubt inadvertently, an "official Soviet lie" found in the last two editions of the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia).

On page 24, he writes: ". . . the Soviet regime removed all the restrictions that its Tsarist predecessor had placed on Jews . . . ."

That is the *Soviet* version, but it is a historical fact that these restrictions were all removed before the Soviet regime came to power after the October 1917 revolution, namely, by the February 1917 revolution, which brought into power the coalition of Democratic Socialists and Liberals. (See G. Ya. Aronson, "The Jewish Community in Russia in 1917-1918," in *Kniga o russkom yevreystve 1917-1967* [The Book on Russian Jewry, 1917-1967], New York, NY, Union of Russian Jews, 1968, p. 2.)

Many Soviet Jews today are ignorant of this fact, because the Soviet leaders have deliberately appropriated the merits of the people who were murdered or sent to exile during 63 years of bloody Communist rule.

JULIA WISHNEVSKY
Munich
West Germany

AGING COMMUNIST LEADERS

TO THE EDITORS: I take the liberty to bring to your attention several factual errors and omissions which appeared in the March–April 1980 issue of *Problems of Communism.*

On page 57 in his essay-review, "How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered," T.H. Rigby gives the life-span of A.I. Mikoyan as 1905–1978. According to *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, 1974, Vol. 16, p. 222, Anastas Mikoyan was born on November 25, 1895. Professor Rigby also fails to note chairmanship of the USSR Supreme Soviet among Mikoyan's positions in the government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although a few lines later he states that L.I. Brezhnev is "President of the USSR."

Second, in Table 1, page 25, of his article, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," Ernst Kux offers 1903 as the year of birth for Enver Hoxha. To the best of my knowledge, all the available sources concur on 1908 as Hoxha's year of birth. Adding another five years to Hoxha's present age may exaggerate the imminence of succession crisis in Albania.

FRANK CIBULKA
State College, PA

A WORD OF CAUTION ON SOVIET DECREES

TO THE EDITORS: A study of Soviet decrees on economic and manpower issues reveals major discrepancies between the versions printed in the major newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* and the texts as reproduced in the official collection of decrees and directives, *Sobraniye postanovleniy Pravitel'stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Collected Decrees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—hereafter *SP).*

These discrepancies not only involve differences in the date of signing and the date of *Pravda/Izvestiya* publication, but also include sharp abbreviation or even complete omission of whole paragraphs of the official text in the newspaper version.

For example, compare the text of the economic reform decree "On the Improvement of Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism's Impact on Raising Production Efficiency and Quality of Work," as published on July 29, 1979, in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* with the version published in *SP,* No. 18, Article 118, 1979, p. 402. The newspaper version totally omits paragraph 23 of the decree, which contains details on planning documents and on measures to be undertaken to regulate the labor market by various levels of authority and which foreshadows a December 1979 decree on labor discipline.

The latter decree, signed on December 13, 1979, and published in *SP,* No. 3, Article 17, 1980, pp. 43–52, contained previously unpublished data on worktime and labor turnover, especially for 1978. In particular, it revealed that there had occurred only a 3-percentage-point drop in the turnover rate (from 21.2 to 18.2 percent) over the decade since 1970. These data were omitted from the text of this decree as published in *Pravda* on January 12, 1980 (with no mention of the date of signing). The *Pravda* version also omitted paragraph 19, which dealt with new and/or expanded surveys and reports by the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on losses of worktime and on labor turnover. Judging from the brief description offered in *SP*, data from these surveys and reports may well be important information for the Soviet government, and for Western observers (if such data were to be released).

To add to the confusion, *Pravda*'s version of the labor discipline decree contained one paragraph (paragraph 17) *not printed* in the official *SP* version. There was a footnote in *SP* indicating that this paragraph concerned only a "one-time task" *(razovoye zadaniye)*. *Pravda*'s version revealed that this paragraph concerned "concrete action to deal with persons who shirk socially useful work," an item which could have both political and economic implications for potential émigrés and for the population as a whole.

I cannot claim to have made a systematic study of the extent or history of such variations in published texts of official legislation, but the two cases detected in a single year may signal a general practice. What does seem called for is close comparison of newspaper versions with official registers of Soviet legislative acts.

MURRAY FESHBACH
Fellow
The Wilson Center
Washington, DC

MORE MATTERS OF DECREE

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to add my voice to the discussion of the matter that Murray Feshbach has indicated he planned to draw to the attention of *Problems of Communism*'s readers (see above).

When it comes to joint decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, the version published in *Pravda* is sometimes the exact text, or at least the most complete version ever published. However, in many cases more detailed versions later appear in the periodical *Sobraniye postanovleniy Pravitel'stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, in specialized journals, or in collections in book form.

Regarding the July 12, 1979, decree on improving planning, no less an authority than *Pravda*'s deputy chief editor for economic questions, Dmitriy Valovoy, advised those analyzing the decree not to go by the *Pravda* version, but to seek out a more extensive version. Writing in the November 1979 issue of *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), Valovoy said

> *Before going on to specific questions, I would like to express the hope that journalists and editors, especially those who are directly involved in spreading information about the decree and in preparing material on its practical implementation, would use the full text of the document published in pamphlet form by the Political Literature Publishing House in Issue No. 32 of the CPSU CC weekly* Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. *The thing is that in the other newspapers the decree was published in abridged form, and therefore they left out some specific explanations and characterizations of a number of problems. And these are sometimes very important for press workers.*

Actually, the July 12 decree appeared in *three* versions: the relatively short version in the July 29 *Pravda;* a longer—but not clearer—version published in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 32, August 1979 and in the September 1979 issue of *Planovoye khozyaystvo;* and the version published in *Sobraniye postanovleniy*. . . . This last version is similar to the second version, but it also included an appendix *(prilozheniye)* listing projected followup acts and their target dates.

There are also times when joint Central Committee/Council of Ministers decrees appear in *Izvestiya* (the government newspaper) and not in *Pravda*, again in truncated form. For example, the short version of a December 4, 1978, joint decree ordering industrial ministries to create more subsidiary farms that was published in *Izvestiya* on December 23, 1978, omitted key paragraphs ordering ministries to finance new farms and to cover the gap between procurement prices and retail prices. These paragraphs were included in *Sobraniye postanovleniy*. . . , No. 3, 1979.

Hence, to locate more complete versions of decrees published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*—not to mention decrees not published in these newspapers—scholars should peruse *Sobraniye postanovleniy*. . . ; specialized economic periodicals; party journals such as *Partiynaya zhizn'*; and also various published collections such as *Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam* (Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions—so far 12 volumes have been issued), *Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika* (Party Worker's Handbook—so far 19 volumes have been issued), and of course various editions of *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK* (CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and CC Plenums—the 12th volume of the latest edition was issued in 1978). These latter collections present some decrees in apparently full text, but others are in clearly identified abridged form, labeled "summaries" *(izlozheniya)* or "extracts" *(izvlecheniya)*.

One can sometimes identify omitted sections in these decrees, sections which apparently contain information still considered secret. For example, a decree of September 8, 1972, in *Resheniya*. . . , Vol. 9, pp. 254–55, skips from paragraph 2 to paragraph 6. These books sometimes indicate that there is an "appendix" *(prilozheniye)* to a particular decree but that it is not being published.

On the other hand, these collections sometimes include whole decrees never published, even in short form, in the newspapers. For example, in *Resheniya*. . . , Vol. 9, p. 232, one reads a key (previously unpublished) August 9, 1972, Central Committee/Council of Ministers decree ordering preparation of a 15-year plan and of the 1976–80 five-year plan.

These more specialized sources are also crucial in determining the date of decrees. Except for decrees adopted at party plenums, *Pravda* does not indicate when decrees were actually adopted. Comparison with dates given in other sources indicates that decrees often appear in *Pravda* days or even weeks after they were adopted. In addition to the delayed publication of the July 1979 and December 1978 decrees cited above, one could mention a Central Committee decree on ideological matters published in the May 6, 1979, issue of *Pravda*. When published later in brochure form, the date affixed to the decree was April 26.

W.G. HAHN
Silver Spring, MD

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